The Challenge of Radicalization and Extremism

# **Moral Development and Citizenship Education**

*Series Editors*

Wiel Veugelers (*University of Humanistic Studies, Utrecht, The Netherlands*) Kirsi Tirri (*University of Helsinki, Finland*)

*Founding Editor* 

Fritz Oser†

*Editorial Board*

Nimrod Aloni (*Kibbutzim College of Education, Tel Aviv, Israel*) Marvin Berkowitz (*University of Missouri–St.Louis, USA*) Horst Biedermann (*St. Gallen University of Teacher Education, Switzerland*) Maria Rosa Buxarrais (*University of Barcelona, Spain*) Helen Haste (*University of Bath, UK/Harvard University, USA*) Dana Moree (*Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic*) Clark Power (*University of Notre Dame, USA*) Jasmine Sim (*National Institute of Education, Singapore*) Joel Westheimer (*University of Ottawa, Canada*)

#### Volume 19

The titles published in this series are listed at *brill.com/mora*

# **The Challenge of Radicalization and Extremism**

*Integrating Research on Education and Citizenship in the Context of Migration*

*Edited by*

Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Hermann J. Abs and Kerstin Göbel

leiden | boston

This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the CC BY-SA 4.0 license, which permits any non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided no alterations are made and the original author(s) and source are credited. Further information and the complete license text can be found at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

The terms of the CC license apply only to the original material. The use of material from other sources (indicated by a reference) such as diagrams, illustrations, photos and text samples may require further permission from the respective copyright holder.

Cover illustration: Tobias Zielony, Le Vele di Scampia, 2009, video, still; courtesy of the artist and kow Berlin

All chapters in this book have undergone peer review.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data


Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: "Brill". See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.

issn 2352-5770 isbn 978-90-04-52563-4 (paperback) isbn 978-90-04-52564-1 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-52565-8 (e-book)

Copyright 2022 by Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Hermann J. Abs and Kerstin Göbel except where stated otherwise. Published by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R unipress.

Koninklijke Brill NV reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

### **Contents**

Series Editor's Foreword ix *Wiel Veugelers* Acknowledgements xi List of Figures and Tables xii Notes on Contributors xiv

Introduction: Bringing Together the Discourse on Migration, Integration, and Citizenship Education in Times of Radicalization 1 *Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Paulena Müller, Kerstin Göbel and Hermann J. Abs*

#### **PART 1** *Foundations*


#### **PART 2** *Analysis of Preconditions within the Educational Context*


6 Language as a Precondition for Social Integration of Migrants in the Educational Context: Evidence from Germany 154 *Hanna Beißert, Sofie Leona Bayer, Seçil Gönültaş and Kelly Lynn Mulvey*

### **PART 3** *Approaches for Prevention and Intervention*


Index 347

### **Series Editor's Foreword**

Moral education has a strong link with citizenship education and with multicultural education. All these concepts are about the good life and living together, and about stimulating human development and community-building. The three concepts have all their own founding theories, their research communities, and their communication platforms. It is important to have strong traditions but also dialogues and fusions between such different traditions.

Our book series *Moral Development and Citizenship Education* has since its start in 2008 supported the linking of, in particular, moral education and citizenship education. The 18 volumes in the series show a wide range of theoretical perspectives and research methods in connecting moral education and citizenship education.

Many of the books paid attention to multicultural aspects of education, but this book, *The Challenge of Radicalization and Extremism: Integrating Research on Education and Citizenship in the Context of Migration*, is the first book in our series that put multicultural education as a central focus, in particular migration and integration. From this multicultural perspective the authors address moral and citizenship issues.

The book came out of the bi-annual conference of the SIG Moral and Democratic Education of the European Association of Learning and Instruction (EARLI) in 2018. Many international scholars contributed to this volume and present a wide range of ideas and methods.

This book first was guided by the founder of our book series, Fritz Oser. Fritz and I have been editing the book series together for 15 years. Many of the contributors to this book, in particular the editors Hermann J. Abs and Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, knew Fritz quite well and met him in several academic organizations like EARLI, AME, and AERA. Eveline even was the colleague who worked together with Fritz in his last few years at the University of Fribourg. With this book, we also honour Fritz for his contribution to the book series, research on moral education and citizenship education, and for his active dialogues in many academic meetings all over the world.

This volume, *The Challenge of Radicalization and Extremism: Integrating Research on Education and Citizenship in the Context of Migration*, shows in its diversity, quality, and relevance that research and theory development of multicultural education can benefit from connecting it with different perspectives like moral education and citizenship education. We hope that this book makes our book series richer and more relevant for contemporary and future education.

> *Wiel Veugelers* Series Editor

## **Acknowledgements**

The editing of this volume was co-funded by the German Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth as well as by the Interdisciplinary Centre of Integration and Migration Research (InZentIM) at the University of Duisburg Essen.

The open access publication has been supported by funding through the Duisburg-Essen University Library.

### **Figures and Tables**

#### **Figures**


#### **Tables**


### **Notes on Contributors**

#### *Hermann J. Abs*

holds the chair for Educational Research and Schooling at the University of Duisburg-Essen since 2013. Previously he has been Professor for Research in Schooling and Teaching at the University of Giessen since 2009. He also lectured at the University of Frankfurt and at the University of Freiburg. Outside the university, Abs worked as a project coordinator and project leader for national and international projects in the area of citizenship education at the German Institute for International Educational Research (DIPF) in Frankfurt, Main from 2002 to 2009. Earlier on, he taught as a teacher at secondary schools.

Professor Abs was the founding director of the Interdisciplinary Center for Integration and Migration Research (InZentIM) at the University of Duisburg-Essen from 2016 to 2020. He co-coordinated the European Association for Research on Learning and Instruction (EARLI) Special Interest Group 13 on Moral and Democratic Education from 2015 to 2019. Currently, he serves as the Principal Investigator for the IEA International Civic and Citizenship Study (ICCS 2022) in Germany.

#### *Ewa Bacia*

(PD) studied Social and Political Science at Uniwersytet Warszawski. She achieved her PhD (2008) at Freie Universität Berlin. Her doctoral thesis 'Democracy Perception in Post-Socialist European Regions in the Context of Social Capital and the Post-Democracy Theory' was rewarded with a special distinction by Poland's Ambassador in Germany (Scientific Reward of the Ambassador of the Republic of Poland). Her research interests concentrate on following topics: promotion of competencies in the youth, citizenship and civic education, participatory, inclusive education, international comparative studies on the educational systems, teacher education. In the years 2015–2019, she worked as an IPODI Fellow (Marie Curie Co-funding) on the project 'Learning Democracy at Schools. Tools in International School Contexts', aiming at capturing different dimensions of educational processes in terms of citizenship education. The project was realized in the Department of Educational Psychology at the Technical University in Berlin and had an inter- and transdisciplinary character; it was conducted in cooperation with educational scientists, sociologists, psychologists, historians, as well as teachers, students, and persons from German, Polish, and international NGO s. In April 2018, Ewa Bacia obtained a habilitation degree from the Technical University in Berlin for her cumulative habilitation thesis 'Democratic Approaches in School and Extracurricular Education Processes. Results of Empirical Studies in International Educational Context' ['Demokratische Ansätze in schulischen und außerschulischen Bildungsprozessen. Ergebnisse empirischer Studien im internationalen Bildungskontext']. She publishes in English, German, and Polish.

#### *James A. Banks*

is Kerry and Linda Killinger Endowed Chair in Diversity Studies Emeritus at the University of Washington, Seattle. He was the Russell F. Stark Univeristy Professor at the University of Washington from 2000 to 2006 and founding director of the Center for Multicultural Education from 1992 to 2018, which has been renamed the Banks Center for Educational Justice. He is a past president of the American Educational Research Association (AERA) and the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS). He is a member of the National Academy of Education and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Professor Banks is a specialist in social studies education and multicultural education and has written widely in these fields. His books include *Diversity, Transformative Knowledge, and Civic Education: Selected Essays*; and *An Introduction to Multicultural Education* (6th ed.). His edited books include *The Encyclopedia of Diversity in Education* (4 vols.), and *Citizenship Education and Global Migration: Implications for Theory, Research, and Practice*.

Professor Banks has given lectures on citizenship education and diversity in many different nations, including Australia, Canada, China, Cyprus, England, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Scotland, Singapore, Sweden, Turkey, and New Zealand. His books have been translated into Greek, Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Turkish, and Arabic. Professor Banks has six honorary degrees.

#### *Sofie Leona Bayer*

is a research assistant in a cooperation project of University of Mannheim, Germany and DIPF | Leibniz Institute for Research and Information in Education, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. In this research project, she is supporting research on moral development and social exclusion in the context of intergroup processes. She received her bachelor's degree in Psychology (2019) at the University of Mannheim, Germany. Besides her major in Psychology, she has a minor in Economic and Business Education. Within her bachelor programme, she took specializations in Educational Psychology, Clinical Psychology, and Organizational Psychology. Currently, she is in a master programme for Cognitive Science at the Technical University of Kaiserslautern. In this research-oriented master programme, she focusses on the intersection of social sciences, computer sciences, biology, and neuroscience.

Her research interests center on social exclusion in adolescence and cognitive science. She is involved in a research project that investigates adolescents' social inclusion or exclusion decisions concerning refugee youth in Germany.

#### *Hanna Beißert*

is a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Education and Human Development at DIPF | Leibniz Institute for Research and Information in Education, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. She is also a lecturer at the Department of Educational Psychology at University of Mannheim, Germany, where she teaches classes on group dynamics and on social development.

She completed her PhD (2017) at the Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany. Her dissertation thesis was on inter- and intraindividual differences in moral development. Her undergraduate and master degrees in Educational Sciences, Sociology, and Psychology are from the University of Mannheim, Germany.

Her research interests center on social-cognitive development in childhood and adolescence, in particular moral and social development with a strong focus on intergroup processes. She conducts research examining social cognition (e.g. theory of mind), group dynamics and stereotypes in the context of social exclusion. Further, she is also involved in research on gifted education and the participation of underrepresented groups in the STEM fields, as well as on understanding the role of stereotypes in this context. Moreover, she is interested in how gender specific socialization processes can explain gender differences in social exclusion and moral reasoning as well as in participation in the STEM fields.

#### *Hazel Bryan*

is Dean of Education and Professional Development at the University of Huddersfield. Her research interests are situated at the interface between education policy and values. Of particular research interest is the emerging relationship between education and extremism. Hazel has published in the field of education and extremism on a range of themes, including the ways in which teachers are now altering their practice in classrooms to provide opportunity for young people to engage in discussion relating to extremism and radicalization, and the ways in which this impacts upon teacher professional identity. She has researched the impact the statutory requirement to prevent radicalization has on the way Head Teachers approach teacher appraisal, and on the ways in which trainee teachers are introduced to these concepts in the university and in schools. Hazel is Chair of the Universities Council for the Education of Teachers (UCET) Research and International Committee, Chair of the International Professional Development Association (IPDA), and co-managing Editor of the journal *Practice: Contemporary Issues in Practitioner Education*. She sits on the Executive Board of the Society for Educational Studies and on the Editorial Board of the *British Journal of Educational Studies*.

#### *Inger Marie Dalehefte*

is an associate professor at the University of Agder. Her main issues in research are improving instruction, professional development, assessment, and evaluation within the field of education. Until 2014, she worked at the Leibniz Institute for Science and Mathematics Education (IPN) in Kiel, Germany, focusing primarily on teaching and learning processes in Physics education (IPN Video Study) and teachers' professional development and improvement of instructional quality within Mathematics and Science instruction (SINUS for Primary Schools).

Since 2015, she has been involved in the programmes School-In and DEMO at the University of Agder, Norway. School-In is a professional development programme for teaching staff dealing with expectation structures in and outside school, school's relationship to the local context and school's culture for fostering inclusion. The DEMO strategy 'Democratic Mobilization—Democracy on Education's Agenda' focuses on democratic values in pedagogy and education. It aims at understanding how democracy can develop and maintain on different levels in the educational system and how it interacts with other national and international regulations. As an involved member of the Special Interest Group 13 – Moral and Democratic Education within the EARLI organization, she is concerned about fostering research. Her motivation to mobilize motivation among educators and researchers to deal with democracy as a topic has resulted in establishing international networks and conducting educational conferences, i.e. the Special Interest Group 13 conference in Kristiansand 2022.

#### *Natascha Diekmann*

is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Educational Research at the University Salzburg, Austria. She studied Educational Science and Sociology at the University of Bielefeld in Germany and started to investigate Education for Sustainable Development in her master's thesis. In her dissertation, the focus is on adding values to sustainability education. Implementing that focus, sustainability projects in German schools have been conducted, and Values *and* Knowledge Education (V*a*KE) has been used as a suitable method to supplement sustainability education. Natascha Diekmann has also collaborated in a project using V*a*KE as an intervention method in the context of education for democratic citizenship for female refugees.

#### *Georg Kristoffer Berg Fjalsett*

is working at ARKIVET Peace and Human Rights Centre in Kristiansand, Norway. He held the role as coordinator for DEMBRA in Southern Norway 2017–2019 and has since focused on practical guidance of DEMBRA schools.

Fjalsett received his master's degree in History at the University of Agder in 2010 and has also studied music, religion, social science, and philosophy, as well as teacher training. Before joining ARKIVET full time in 2014, he worked as a lecturer in History and Social Science at different schools in addition to a project at ARKIVET called holocaustdagen.no, a resource bank for teachers and others on how to fight racism and anti-Semitism as well as information about nationwide commemoration ceremonies on The International Holocaust Remembrance Day.

His academic fields of interest have primarily focused on understanding mechanisms behind racism and others forms of discrimination and practical training in critical thinking for both teachers and students. He has also been working school-based with whole educational staffs in schools to facilitate seminars and training them in various subjects, such as drama as a working method, the importance of historical consciousness and phenomenological understanding of radicalization, among other themes. Through ARKIVET, Fjalsett has also held the position of secretary for a nationwide network of human rights educators.

#### *Kerstin Göbel*

is a chair and full professor at the University of Duisburg-Essen since 2013. She received her PhD in Psychology on 'Quality of Intercultural English as a Foreign Language Teaching – A Video Study' at the University of Koblenz-Landau (Germany) and habilitated in Educational Science at the University of Wuppertal in 2012. From 1996 to 2005, Kerstin Göbel realized her research (acculturation and teacher training; studies abroad in adult education and intercultural and interlingual perspectives in the context of the DESI-study) at the Department of Psychology of the German Institute for International Educational Research in Frankfurt/Main. During this time, she was teaching at the faculty of Educational Psychology at the J. W. Goethe-University in Frankfurt. In 2005, she changed her position to become Assistant Professor at the Centre for Teacher Education to the University of Wuppertal. In Wuppertal, she worked on intercultural and interlingual perspectives of language teaching and the analysis of respective videos. In 2010, she took over a Stand-In Professorship for Education in the Context of Immigration and German as a Second Language at the University of Wuppertal. She started her full professorship at the University of Duisburg-Essen in April 2013, where she leads the workgroup for teaching development. Her research topics on intercultural and interlingual learning remain, but she broadened her focus towards schoolengagement and reflection on teaching.

Since 2015, Kerstin Göbel is a member of the user advisory board of the Fachinformationssystem Bildung (German Institute for International Educational Research, Frankfurt, a.M.). At the University of Duisburg-Essen, she was heading the Examination Board for Bachelor and Master Programmes (2014–2016), is member of the faculty board of the Faculty of Education since 2018, member of the senate of the University since 2018 and since Mai 2021 member of the executive board of the Interdisciplinary Centre of Education of the University of Duisburg-Essen.

#### *Seçil Gönültaş*

is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Exeter. Seçil finished her PhD at the Lifespan Developmental Psychology Program at North Carolina State University in the USA. She received a master's degree in Developmental Psychology at Koç University in Turkey and completed her Bachelor's degree at Boğaziçi University in Turkey. Her research interest centres on investigating how social cognition (e.g. theory of mind) and group processes (e.g. prejudice, discrimination, and threat perception) relate to intergroup decision-making. She aims to broaden her focus on both theory of mind and group processes into different areas of social development across childhood and adolescence. Her other research interest is to investigate bullying and bystander interventions. She also conducts research at the intersection of bullying and group processes which examines children's and adolescents' responses to bias-based bullying (i.e. if someone is exposed to bullying due to belonging a particular group such as race or ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or disability). In her future research, she is planning to investigate the other factors (e.g. intergroup membership, intergroup norms, loyalty, peer norms, and parental attitudes) that influence when and why children and adolescents defend victims of bias-based bullying as complementary to her earlier studies. Through her research, she hopes to translate this research agenda into policy-focused promotive intervention programmes aimed at fostering equity and social justice, especially in school settings.

#### *Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger*

is a guest professor at the Interdisciplinary Center for Integration and Migration Research at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany and Senior Researcher at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. She earned her Master's degree in General Psychology, Pedagogy and English Literature at the University of Basel. She earned her PhD at the University of Berne and was awarded the Lazarus Award of the Faculty of Humanities for her dissertation. After holding a post-doc position at the University of Berne, Professor Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger worked as a Project Leader and Senior Researcher at the Research and Development Department of the University of Teacher Education of Lucerne, Switzerland, where she became a professor of Educational and Social Sciences.

Professor Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger was Interimistic Full Professor for Empirical Educational Research at the University of Leipzig, Germany and Visiting Professor at the Università degli Studi di Firenze, Italy and the University of British Columbia, Canada. She has co-organized several international scientific conferences including—in her role as guest professor—the 2018 Conference on "Migration, Social Transformation, and Education for Democratic Citizenship" held by the Interdisciplinary Center for Integration and Migration Research at the University of Duisburg-Essen.

Professor Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger's main research interests include sociomoral development across the lifespan, teacher professional development, school bullying and its moral dimensions, and the prevention of school bullying in the context of teacher education.

#### *Farhad Khosrokhavar*

is an Iranian-French Philosopher and Sociologist. He received his PhD in 1974 with a study on the Heidegger reception in France. He was appointed as Professor of Sociology at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris in 1991. He also is the director of the "Observatoire des radicalisations" at the "Maison des Sciences de l'homme" in Paris. He has been a Rockefeller Fellow (1990), a Yale Visiting Scholar in 2008, and a Harvard Visiting Scholar in 2009.

Farhad Khosrokhavar's main fields of study include Jihadism in Europe, Arab societies, and radical Islamist movements within them, the Arab revolutions and social movements in Iran. During his academic work, he first focused on modernization theory and specialized in comparative governmental analysis. Later he integrated the sociology of religion and became a main author for the analysis of Jihadism.

He has published some 30 books, six of which either translated or directly written in English, some translated in different languages and more than 70 articles, in French, English, and occasionally, Persian. Among his books are *Radicalization, Why Some People Choose the Path of Violence* (The New Press, 2017), *Le Nouveau Jihad en Occident* (Robert Laffont, 2018), and *Jihadism in Europe* (Oxford University Press, 2021).

#### *Aslaug Kristiansen*

is a professor of education at the University of Agder, Norway. Her PhD was a theoretical study of trust and trusting relationships within an educational context. Kristiansen's main areas of research now are educational theory, ethics, teacher role and qualification, and the art of dialogue in various settings. Her publications include ethical and educational questions related to professional cooperation, terror, immigration, and democratic teaching and living.

Since 2015, she has been heavily involved in the strategy 'Democratic Mobilization (DEMO)' at the University of Agder and has initiated further projects and conferences under the umbrella of DEMO. For instance, she has, carried out an evaluation project on the effect of various initiatives implemented to prevent harmful behaviour from escalating in a group of vulnerable youth in a region in Southern Norway. She also participates in the national DEMBRA project in the section that focuses on teacher education and teacher qualifications. In teacher education, the aim is to equip future teachers with attitudes, intellectual capacities, and sensitivity to be able to discuss controversial issues like racism, anti-Semitism, polarization, and to promote a supportive classroom environment based on trust.

#### *Dan Laitsch*

is an associate professor with the Faculty of Education at Simon Fraser University and on the Board of the SFU Faculty Association. He is a researcher with the SFU Centre for the Study of Educational Leadership and Policy and his primary teaching area is in Educational Leadership. He is co-editor of the open access peer reviewed *International Journal of Education Policy and Leadership* (www.ijepl.org), and is active in the American Educational Research Association Special Interest Group on Research Use, having served past terms as Chair, Program Chair, and Treasurer. Dr. Laitsch has worked with the Joint Consortium for School Health on health issues in BC, across Canada, and globally through his leadership of the World Education Research Association International Research Network, "Teaching, Learning & Literacy for Health. Safety, Life Skills, Inclusion, Social & Sustainable Development".

Dr. Laitsch joined SFU after serving as Senior Policy Analyst for the U.S.-based Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, where he focused on federal and state legislative issues. Prior to joining ASCD, he spent five years working on state policy issues related to teacher quality at the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education. He taught high school English in alternative and mainstream schools in Fairfax County, Virginia, and through the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program, he taught English to middle school students in rural Japan.

Dr. Laitsch's research interests include the use and misuse of research in teaching, policymaking, and issue advocacy; the impact of neoliberal policies on educational systems; and school health approaches to systemic education reform. He earned his doctorate from American University, in Washington, DC.

#### *Joanna Leek*

(PhD in education) is an adjunct of educational theory and practice at the University of Lodz, Faculty of Educational Sciences, Poland. After she graduated from Studies on Modern Languages in 2000 (MA in teaching German as Foreign Language), she became a teacher in secondary schools in Poland. In the years 2004–2006, she worked for international organizations where she was involved in projects on migration matters in Europe. Since the year 2006, she has been working as a researcher at the University of Lodz, an author and co-author of papers published in international, national journals, and books on the theory and practice of international education, peace education, functions of schooling, 'proposed, implemented and attained functions of school curricula and programmes' and policy of education. She took part in European and national funding research projects where she paid attention to how students and teachers can develop their leadership, to the empowerment of youth in and out of school activities, to teaching practices, principles, methods in relation to teaching programmes and curricula, and to experiences of teachers and students with their national programmes. In addition, her research work focuses on citizenship education in the European context, in relation to policy and practice. She is also a teacher trainer and leads courses on methods, reflective teaching, learning in international environment, and students' educational support.

#### *Lydia Linortner*

is currently working in a women vocational center in Bad Ischl. For the last six years, she has worked in two projects in collaboration with European and Israeli universities. At that time, she started working on her PhD with the topic V*a*KE in combination with the SDT (Self-Determination Theory) focused on facilitating identity building in a multicultural classroom. In her master's thesis, through her experiences with this teaching method, and working with curriculum teachers for the hearing-impaired, she has evaluated and adapted this method for pupils with hearing impairments. Following on from this, with an aim to improve the transaction of 'putting theories into practice', she adapted V*a*KE for the Tact to be implemented in the curriculum of several universities. Lydia planned, operated and evaluated a pilot study in Aalen, Germany for optometrists. These experiences helped her improve the *Teacher*  *Manual* (2015) for Israeli universities by combining V*a*KE and Tact. The last assignment of V*a*KE-Tact was working together with the Hadassah College in Jerusalem. One paper she took part in is the Lifelong Learning Journal with a short description of V*a*KE-Tact. To summarize, she carried out three types of adaptions, implementations, and evaluations with regard to the new teaching method V*a*KE in several fields, in kindergarten, with hearing-impaired pupils and with university students studying optometry. Each had a focus to support teachers and offer them an easily applicable technique to improve in a contemporary way, but also as the Lifelong Learning aspect of combining V*a*KE and Tact and as an implementation into the curriculum. Her last contributions in the V*a*KE Approach Handbook (in press) are Training of in-service teachers for V*a*KE, V*a*KE in teaching the hearing-impaired and V*a*KE in different health care settings.

#### *Sabine Manzel*

is Professor in Didactics of Social Sciences of the University of Duisburg-Essen and Head of the CIVES! School of Civic Education since 2011. Her research interests are Civic Education and Social Cohesion, Civic Literacy and Political Knowledge, Argumentation and Reasoning in Social Science Issues as well as Professional Teacher Training. She is well experienced in standardized videography. She also offers Teacher Trainings for Civic Education together with the Ruhr-Campus-Academy, Essen.

Together with other researchers, she attracted several third-party funds, e.g. the project "Writing in the subject lessons of secondary level I with the inclusion of Turkish. An intervention study on the effectiveness of interdisciplinary and subject-specific writing support in cooperative settings (SchriFT II)" and the interdisciplinary project for teacher training "Professionalization for diversity dynamic – reflexive – evidence-based (ProViel)" from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. In 2017 together with her team she hosted the Annual Conference of the German Association for Didactics of Political Science and Civic Education on the topic "Populism and Civic Education". Her publications and projects can be found on the internet at www.cives-school.de.

From 2016 until 2021, Sabine Manzel was a Vice Chair of the Centre for Teacher Education, from 2017 until 2021 Board Member of the Interdisciplinary Centre for Empirical Educational Research at the University of Duisburg-Essen. From 2012 until 2016, she was a Vice Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences for teaching and learning. She is a member of several Associations, e.g. the European Association for Research on Learning and Instruction (EARLI) with the Special Interest Groups 13 and 26.

#### *Douglas S. McCall*

is a former teacher, union leader, community organizer, and lobbyist. He was a key part of the school health movement in Canada between 1987 and 2010. During those years, he worked as a consultant for education organizations in Canada such as the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada, as well as an employee or contractor of the national associations representing education ministry officials, teachers, school boards, school principals, and senior school administrators. He has been instrumental in establishing much of the infrastructure in Canadian school health promotion, including the federal-provincial Joint Consortium for School Health, a uniquely Canadian mechanism (there is no federal department of education) established by the education and health ministers in 2005, partly in response to the SARS outbreak in Toronto.

More recently in his semi-retirement, Mr. McCall has worked with others from around the world to establish the International School Health Network. As part of this work, he chairs the FRESH Partnership, a coalition of UN agencies, donors, and global NGO s. His interest and commitment to forming and supporting networks has led him to be part of the formation of the Global Network of Deans of Education.

He has written and published over 100 monographs, journal articles, book chapters, guides, booklets, and other publications on a wide variety of health & social development issues in education and health promotion. Key publications include work with the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies a status report on HIV/AIDS and school health programmes with the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada and three book chapters describing the evolution of settings-based and school health promotion around the world and in Canada. Mr. McCall co-authored an award winning journal article on the application of systems-focused, ecological approaches to school health promotion and social development.

#### *Paulena Müller*

is a student research assistant at the chair for Educational Research and Schooling at the University of Duisburg-Essen. She gained her Bachelor's degree in German, Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies in 2012 and is currently finishing her Master's studies in Gender and Theatre Studies at the Ruhr-University Bochum. From 2017 to 2020, she worked as student research assistant at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Integration and Migration Studies (InZentIM) at the University of Duisburg-Essen. She was the organization assistant for the 2018 InZentIM & EARLI Special Interest Group 13 Conference *Migration, Social Transformation, and Education for Democratic Citizenship* and co-edited the thematic papers based on this conference which were published in 2019. Paulena Müller has been the editing assistant for this volume.

#### *Kelly Lynn Mulvey*

is an associate professor in the Department of Psychology at North Carolina State University. She completed her PhD (2013) in the Department of Human Development and Quantitative Methodology at the University of Maryland and was previously an Assistant Professor in the College of Education at the University of South Carolina. Her undergraduate and Master's degrees are from Duke University. Prior to completing her doctorate, she was a public school teacher in Durham, NC and received certification by the National Board of Professional Teaching Standards. She currently has federal funding from the National Institute of Justice and the National Science Foundation. She is an associate editor for the *British Journal of Developmental Psychology.*  Her research interests center on social-cognitive development, in particular moral and social development in intergroup contexts. She conducts research examining theory of mind, social exclusion, and group dynamics, including when children challenge peer group norms. Her work focuses on intergroup contexts, and examines the influence of children's bias, prejudice, and stereotypes on their intergroup relations. Her work also examines broadening the participation of underrepresented groups in the STEM fields and understanding stereotypes regarding who can and should be a scientist. Her work has been published in leading journals in the field, including *Child Development, Developmental Psychology, Psychological Science*, and *Cognition.*

#### *Laura M. Neumann*

(M.A.) is leading the department for education, quality, and science at the German children and youth Charity "Die Arche" as well as teaching bachelor students of social work studies. She holds the function of representing an expert group (LAK) of organizations in Berlin which are working in the field of child poverty and consulting political decision-makers. She studied Educational Science at the Freie Universität Berlin, Technische Universität Berlin, in Germany and at the Universiteit van Amsterdam, Netherlands. Her research experiences are in the fields of educational psychology and integration. She contributes to several evaluation projects, such as Educational Quality Improvement, in Berlin and Hamburg as well as environmental education, in South Africa and Tanzania.

#### *Jean-Luc Patry*

is Professor Emeritus for Education. He works at the Department of Educational Research at the Paris-Lodron University Salzburg (Austria). Professor Patry studied Natural Sciences and Teaching (Biology) at the ETH Zurich where he earned his PhD. In 1991, he habilitated in Educational Science at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland).

His research interests focus on the situational specificity of human behaviour, moral and values education, pedagogical interaction, methodology (esp. critical multiplicism and groundwork in scientific theory), educational research from a constructivist perspective, theory and practice (e.g. pedagogical tact as an application of the theory of situational specificity), etc.

From 1972 to 1975, he worked at the institute for behavioral science at the ETH Zurich. From 1975 to 1993, he was employed at the Institute of Educational Science at the University of Fribourg. He has been working at the University of Salzburg since 1993. Professor Patry was a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University and Lehigh University as well as a Guest Researcher at the University of Salzburg from 1982 to 1984. He was Head of Institute in Salzburg several times as well as a member of the University Senate for one legislation period. He was Coordinator of the EARLI Special Interest Group 13 "Moral and Democratic Education" from 2007 until 2011.

#### *Jan S. Pfetsch*

(PhD) is a senior researcher at the Department of Educational Psychology at Technische Universität Berlin, Germany. He studied psychology and philosophy at the universities of Trier, Germany, and Valencia, Spain. For his PhD at the University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, he developed and evaluated a bystander intervention training in the context of offline bullying at school. Formerly, he worked as research fellow and visiting professor at the Technische Universität Berlin and as visiting professor at the University of Konstanz, Germany. His research expertise covers educational psychology, developmental psychology, and social psychology. For example, his research interests focus on learning with digital media, development of competencies in teacher training (esp. media and diagnostic competence), vocational interests in STEM fields, empathy in offline and online contexts, media use and media literacy, cyberbullying (especially cyberbystanders), and aggressive and prosocial behaviour in children and adolescents. Currently, he leads research projects in the area of technology enhanced learning in pre-service teacher training and artistic design teaching, and digital safety of children and adolescents. He co-organized several conferences and special issues, and published over 40 articles and book chapters in national and international publications.

#### *Zuzanna M. Preusche*

is a doctoral student and research assistant in the workgroup for teaching development at the Faculty of Education at the University of Duisburg-Essen. She studied secondary teacher education with a focus on teaching German and English as a foreign language. She finalized her studies with a state examination in 2014.

While studying, she worked as student assistant at the Faculty of Humanities, Institute for German as Second and Foreign Language. In 2010 and 2011, Zuzanna Preusche worked as foreign language assistant in different secondary schools in London, UK. During this time, she was a Foreign Language Assistant Ambassador at the Goethe Institute and the UK-German Connection. Before her state-examination at the University of Duisburg-Essen, she spent a semester abroad at the Fort Hays State University (USA), where she took classes in educational and social psychology, and sociology research, she also worked there as a student assistant in the department of modern languages. Before joining the workgroup of Professor Göbel, Zuzanna Preusche worked as research associate at the Faculty of Philology and Applied Linguistics, at the Ruhr-University in Bochum, Germany.

Her research interests are teacher education, cultural, and linguistic diversity in education, school engagement, and school-based interventions.

#### *Marcin Rojek*

is a researcher, lecturer, and teachers' trainer at the University of Lodz, Faculty of Educational Sciences. He is the University of Lodz graduate and at this University obtained a PhD (2017) in social science (education). His PhD thesis focused on teachers intergenerational learning in schools. His research interests are learning process, especially socio-cultural learning, intergenerational learning, learning in the work place, work-related learning, teachers' learning, teachers' professional development and ethical dimension in research doing by the teachers. He is the author of several articles on this issue and two books. In 2012, he conducted academic training at the Danish School of Education of Aarhus University (Denmark). He was a member of the organizing committees of several international scientific conferences. Four times he participated in the Erasmus International Pedagogical Summer Schools. He is a member of editorial board of *Journal of Mixed Methods Studies* (Turkey) and a member of the Commission for the Development of Didactics of the University of Lodz. He coordinates the university cooperation with employers, business, social environment, and graduates.

#### *Anja Schultze-Krumbholz*

(Dr. phil.) is a deputy professor (visiting professor) and currently head of the Department of Educational Psychology at Technische Universität Berlin, Germany. She studied psychology at Freie Universität Berlin where she also received her doctoral degree with "summa cum laude" (highest honor) and worked as a research fellow for many years. Her dissertational work focused on risk and protective factors, consequences, and prevention of cyberbullying during adolescence and she is the first author of the German cyberbullying prevention programme "Medienhelden". Her research comprises the areas of developmental psychology, educational psychology, social psychology, and diversity and inclusion psychology. Her current research interests are bullying and cyberbullying in childhood and adolescence, social-emotional development in school, classroom influences on behavior, discrimination and biasbased bullying among students, hate speech and counter speech, and diversity and inclusion in schools. Among others, she is currently a deputy member of the management committee for the EU COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology) Action CA18115 "Transnational Collaboration on Bullying, Migration and Integration at School Level".

#### *Saloshna Vandeyar*

is a full professor in the Department of Humanities Education and Director of the Centre for Diversity and Social Cohesion at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. She is a National Research Foundation rated-scientist and the awardwinning researcher of four international and three national research awards; runner-up for the Women in Science award, 2017; finalist for the NSTF Lifetime Award, 2014, and the Shoprite Checkers Woman of the Year, 2006; She was the recipient of the Gauteng Woman in Excellence award in 2018. She also won five institutional research awards; two community awards for research and two merit awards for teacher professionalism and excellence. The focus of her research is on social, cultural, and cognitive justice education, with a particular focus on race in(equalities) and the ways in which all other kinds of inequalities are produced and reproduced in educational spaces by educational processes, practices, and discourses. She serves on a number of editorial boards; has published widely (6 scholarly books; 49 journal articles, 16 book chapters, numerous conference proceedings); has numerous international networks and has presented many invited keynote addresses. Of note, she has recently developed a theoretical framework called *Pedagogy of Compassion* for diverse educational spaces.

#### *Sieglinde Weyringer*

has been working as a scientific collaborator and lecturer at the Department of Educational Research as well as the School of Education at the Paris-Lodron University Salzburg (Austria) since 2004. Dr. Weyringer started her professional career as a teacher in different elementary schools and special education centers in 1973.

From 1999 to 2004, she held a crucial position in establishing the Talent Center in Austria. She earned her diploma as a creativity trainer in 1993 and the ECHA (European Council for High Ability) Diploma "Specialist in Gifted Education" from the University of Nijmegen (Netherlands) in 1996.

In 2001, she completed her Magister degree in Educational Science, Sociology and Psychology. In 2008, she earned her PhD in an area of giftedness research, moral and values education, and European conscience.

#### *Johanna F. Ziemes*

is a research fellow at the Faculty of Educational Sciences at the University of Duisburg-Essen. She earned her Bachelor's and Master's degrees in Psychology at the University of Trier. Since late 2014, she is part of the research group "Educational Research and Schooling" at the University of Duisburg-Essen. She was part of the German national research team that conducted and reported the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 2016 (ICCS 2016). ICCS explores how students around the world are prepared to become citizens. In the year 2021, she earned her PhD in Pedagogy at the University of Duisburg-Essen. Her dissertation uses theory and the ICCS 2016 data to explore the relevance of social relationships for the political socialization of emerging citizens. Specifically, she found that social relationships are connected to aspects of political support. Johanna F. Ziemes is now part of the national research team for ICCS 2022 in Germany where she holds the role of national research manager.

Johanna F. Ziemes' main research interests include the relevance of social relationships for the persistence and development of political systems and the responsibility of educational systems in fostering positive social relationships. Furthermore, she is interested in the preparedness of schools to provide a nurturing environment for transgender and intersex children.

## **Bringing Together the Discourse on Migration, Integration, and Citizenship Education in Times of Radicalization**

*Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Paulena Müller, Kerstin Göbel and Hermann J. Abs*

This volume on *The Challenge of Radicalization and Extremism: Integrating Research on Education and Citizenship in the Context of Migration* addresses the need for educational researchers to place their work in a broader social and political context by connecting it to the current and highly relevant issue of extremism and radicalization. At the same time, it is important for researchers of extremism and radicalization to strengthen their conceptual links with educational fields, especially with education for democratic citizenship. The volume was planned in the aftermath of the international conference 'Migration, Social Transformation, and Education for Democratic Citizenship', jointly held in 2018 by the European Association for Research on Learning and Instruction's Special Interest Group *Moral and Democratic Education* (EARLI SIG 13) and the Interdisciplinary Centre for Integration and Migration Research of the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany. In our capacity as both organizers and attendees of the conference, we realized that the core insights gained from the event should be developed further and should be made available to a wider scientific and non-scientific audience. During our deliberations and based on attendees' specific interest in the keynote presentation on jihadism and its urban, national, and anthropological dimensions, we decided to expand the intended discourse by inviting contributions that address the pressing societal challenge of extremism and radicalization.1

Our idea was further supported by two main insights. First, in the field of education, we currently observe a confluence of societal, political, economic, and environmental phenomena which link individuals and groups from various generations and with a large variety of different backgrounds. These linkages go beyond the individual level and affect the local, national, and international space—and education. However, education, particularly education for democratic citizenship, is not just passively affected by these current developments. Education also has the power to effect positive social and societal change by implementing prevention and intervention efforts in an educational setting.

© Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Paulena Müller, Kerstin Göbel and

Hermann J. Abs, 2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004525658\_001

This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-SA 4.0 License.

This mutual but insufficiently researched interplay between current political, economic, and environmental developments and education informs the central objective of this volume: to analyse migration-related acculturation processes in the context of education for democratic citizenship with a particular focus on extremism and radicalization. The volume thus investigates the role of individual, institutional, and societal conditions both for the emergence and the prevention of extremism and radicalization in the field of education.

Second, the impact of migration and its associated societal changes on the conditions and processes of civic and citizenship education is still an emerging field of research (Banks, 2017a). So far, acculturation processes have not been sufficiently considered in the context of research on civic and citizenship education. Moreover, the potential effects of specific measures of civic and citizenship education which purposely target the societal change caused by migration have also been rarely investigated. Due to the lack of research, we do not know in what ways institutionalized educational processes might contribute to meeting the challenges of education for democratic citizenship in immigrant societies. Several issues remain unclear when it comes to fostering education for democratic citizenship and preventing radicalization, namely: which specific measures have to be taken and under what conditions; and which individual prerequisites must be considered in order to enhance the effectiveness of such measures?

In sum, there is a lack of research-based publications that address these issues across subjects and disciplines to inform both scientific and professional stakeholders in the educational and social sectors. Moreover, to the extent that it does exist, the literature on the potential role of education in counteracting radicalization and extremism appears to be largely dominated by a North American perspective. Accordingly, in order to broaden the scope and to provide additional perspectives, the present volume is more closely linked to European discourse(s) while also including transatlantic and South African contributions.

#### **1 Insights from Extremism and Radicalization Research**

During the past two decades, political and religious extremism and radicalization have posed ever-increasing levels of challenge for countries and democratic societies in Europe and around the world (see also Ghosh et al., 2017). Various definitions exist for both extremism and radicalization, and researchers deplore the lack of a generally accepted precise terminology (Lösel et al., 2018). Extremism in all its forms can be described as the active opposition to, or a significant attitudinal and behavioural deviation from, a given social system's basic norms and values such as 'democracy, equality, liberty, rule of law, and tolerance for the faiths and beliefs of others' (Lösel et al., 2020, p. 55), with the aim to at least partly abolish and replace these norms and values (Beelmann, 2020). Radicalization describes the process(es) through which individuals and groups develop such beliefs and behaviours, whereby the beliefs themselves serve to justify violence as a means of enforcing political and social change (Doosje et al., 2016). Radicalization is associated with a 'change in the individual's psycho-cognitive construction of new identities' (Ghosh et al., 2017, pp. 6–7).

Theoretical explanations of radicalization include, for example, the 'lone wolf' trajectory; difficult childhood experiences like rejection, exclusion, or bullying; association with violent or extremist groups; or identity problems during adolescence (e.g. Beelmann, 2020; Nivette et al., 2017). Various models describe radicalization as a process that develops and intensifies over time; these models increasingly consider the role of social and societal influences in this process and ascribe education an important role in preventing this process from occurring in the first place (Beelmann, 2020; Ghosh et al., 2017; Moghaddam, 2005).

Against this background, the present volume combines research from two different fields which do not usually overlap, namely education (particularly education for democratic citizenship) on the one hand and extremism and radicalization on the other hand. Some of the chapters do not concentrate on education per se whereas others target extremism and radicalization only in an indirect way. To provide a common focus on extremism and radicalization and to establish a basic link between the chapters, those authors who were not familiar with the literature on radicalization and extremism were asked to consult two specific scientific papers so they could familiarize themselves with common concepts and issues. The first of these papers is by Borum (2014). It offers an integrative model of the interplay between individual vulnerabilities and propensities and the contextual and situational factors in the development of violent extremism. It introduces core concepts and offers initial insights into the complex dynamics between individual and contextual factors in contributing towards the development of radical beliefs, intentions, and behaviours. The second paper is by Ghosh et al. (2017). It addresses the role of education in preventing radicalization and religious extremism. This paper also clarifies the complex interrelationships between fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism, and terrorism, and offers pedagogical recommendations for the (Canadian) educational system.

We suggested that authors who did not directly address radicalization and extremism should develop links to this common theoretical and empirical basis and outline these links in the theory and/or discussion sections of their respective chapters. By linking the authors' own research with issues of extremism and radicalization (development, contributing factors, prevention, and intervention), the contributions in this volume may help to draw a more detailed picture of the potential differential effects, mechanisms, and processes which may favour or counteract extremism and radicalization in varying contexts.

As a result, the topic of acculturation-related extremism is addressed in the context of education—specifically citizenship education—against the backdrop of migration processes. Furthermore, the causes, mechanisms, and development of radicalization and extremism are addressed in the context of multiple disciplines, thereby offering a multifaceted picture of these phenomena. By analyzing and reporting approaches for the prevention of radicalization and extremism that are rooted in citizenship education, the volume establishes links to informed educational practice with a view to educating professionals and to adapting and implementing prevention initiatives in diverse educational settings.

#### **2 The Relevance of Citizenship Education**

Citizenship education within democracies has a twofold function. First, it is tasked with assimilating young people into existing structures and with supporting the pattern maintenance of political institutions. Second, it is also intended to empower young people to scrutinize existing structures critically and to promote change in corrupted or otherwise untrusted political institutions or governments.

Based on discourse occurring at national levels, European intergovernmental organizations have formulated integrative definitions of both democratic citizenship and citizenship education (Abs, 2021). The frequently used definition by the European Union (EU) follows closely the idea of socialization within a democratic society. Its leading concept for promoting citizenship education is *active citizenship*. Active citizenship is defined as 'participation in civil society, community and/or political life, characterised by mutual respect and non-violence and in accordance with human rights and democracy' (Hoskins & Mascherini, 2009; Hoskins et al., 2012). By defining the objective of citizenship education in this way, the EU's emphasis lies on integrating the individual into a given society and political system rather than on the role of the individual as an agent of change.

The Council of Europe's (CoE) definition, on the other hand, is closer to the idea of citizenship education as a vehicle for empowerment, defining *education for democratic citizenship* as the 'education, training, dissemination, information, practices and activities which aim, by equipping learners with knowledge, skills and understanding and moulding their attitudes and behaviour, to empower them to exercise and defend their democratic rights and responsibilities in society, to value diversity and to play an active part in democratic life, with a view to the promotion and protection of democracy and the rule of law' (Council of Europe, 2010, pp. 5–6). By defining citizenship education in this fashion, the CoE focuses more on the role that the individual can play in changing society.

Yet both definitions are set in the context of supporting the persistence of liberal democracies, including the respect for human rights and the rule of law. Moreover, they are both connected to a broader concept of competences for democratic culture (Council of Europe, 2018; European Council, 2018). Indeed, this is where citizenship education meets with the prevention of radicalization and extremism. Extremism puts the basic values of democracy aside or restricts them to some people only, while radicalization prepares individuals for the violent enforcement of extremist ideas. However, prevention efforts concern themselves mainly with scrutinizing and prohibiting the articulation of extremist interests. In that sense, prevention efforts do not provide an alternative to extremist beliefs or processes of radicalization. Therefore, prevention may require a lot of effort without yielding satisfactory results. Citizenship education, by contrast, does provide an alternative to extremism and radicalization that allows for the articulation of individual interests and shows individuals how to work towards the recognition and implementation of their ideas. In this sense, citizenship education is the positive approach towards preventing radicalization and extremism.

As part of the *Moral Development and Citizenship Education* series, the present volume follows a tradition of putting young people's social and cultural development at the centre of theoretical, empirical, and practice-related scientific endeavours. As indicated in the series description, the aim of the series is both to research and to promote such development by including 'the social, political, and religious domains, as well as cognitive, emotional, and actionoriented content' (Oser & Veugelers, n.d.). In the context of sixteen volumes in the series that all address core issues regarding the conditions for (promoting) young people's cultural development, the present volume is the first to address the threats that radicalization and extremism pose and the potential role(s) that education may play in meeting and counteracting these threats.

#### **3 Chapter Summaries**

The chapters of this edited volume establish a basis for exploring the relationship between the prevention of radicalization and citizenship education. By integrating citizenship education's twofold function to assimilate and to empower, new avenues for prevention can be opened up. Strategies for preventing radicalization and extremism will be more effective when they not only aim to de-radicalize and assimilate individuals into the existing society, but when they also empower young people to bring about change in a democratic way.

The volume is divided into three parts which each address different facets of extremism and radicalization as a challenge for citizenship education to tackle. The first part—*Foundations*—provides fundamental research on radicalization and the rejection of democratic values. Although they do in parts refer to the role of education, the two chapters in this part discuss the issue in a broader sense, conceptualizing radicalization as being grounded in a lack of systemic support and a missing sense of societal belonging. Against this backdrop, the second part—*Analysis of Preconditions within the Educational Context*—explores the key risk and protective factors against radicalization for young people. Focusing on social, cultural, or political aspects, the chapters in this part follow up on experiences and skills that educational systems can impart. A special emphasis lies on the need to counteract the risk of extremist development amongst young people. Finally, in the third and most extensive part—*Approaches for Prevention and Intervention*—researchers present concrete suggestions for prevention and intervention methods within formal and informal educational contexts. Authors draw on the risk and protective factors established in the first two parts and expand them in their own research. They discuss the specific challenges of implementing preventive measures in actual educational programmes while highlighting the potential that citizenship education offers in this context, whereby this education must be both empowering and inclusive to protect against extremist attitudes and behaviours.

#### **4 Part 1: Foundations**

The two chapters in the first part examine the fragility of citizenship in Western democracies, which can, particularly for young people, lead to the rejection of democratic values and to extremist attitudes and behaviours.

In his previously published paper *Failed Citizenship and Transformative Civic Education*, James A. Banks establishes a typology of ways in which citizenship is being realized. Acknowledging the complexity of the concept of citizenship in general, Banks distinguishes between *failed, recognized, participatory, and transformative* citizenship. Giving special consideration to core sources of diversity (i.e. racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious), Banks uses the four different types of citizenship to portray a differentiated spectrum of political recognition, identification, and participation within the nation state and links it to neglected transgressions of existing societal norms on the part of individuals. In particular, Banks emphasizes the linkage between failed citizenship and transformative action. In order to prevent failed citizenship, which is characterized by a lack of identification with and participation in the nation state's polity, assimilationist and exclusive norms within the state need to be transformed through civic action. Finally, Banks elaborates on the way in which schools can cause the emergence of failed citizenship and how transformative civic education can contribute significantly to its decrease. The chapter is a reprint of the author's paper as published in *Educational Researcher* (Banks, 2017b).

In the subsequent chapter, Farhad Khosrokhavar dissects the complex sets of conditions and motivations that characterize young people's path to jihadism. The chapter examines different individual examples of extremist Muslim young people in France, comparing three main groups: socially disadvantaged young male migrants, middle-class jihadist men, and jihadist women. Khosrokhavar identifies as common factors for each of the different social actors a feeling of insignificance and a lack of orientation, belonging, and recognition. The author demonstrates that these factors may manifest themselves in significantly different ways depending on an individual's respective social position and background. Thus Islamist radicalization can be a response to the disaffection from mainstream society that socially disadvantaged young people experience, or it can be a response to the loss of stability and ideological orientation which young people from the middle class often face. While the extremist role can provide men with a feeling of superiority and heroism, female Islamist radicalization tends to occur to counter women's perceived lack of belonging through the re-idealization of gender roles and a fixed notion of femininity and womanhood.

Drawing on a shared consideration for democratic citizenship and its shortcomings, both chapters pinpoint the foundations of extremism and radicalization with distinctively different methods and settings. Banks' approach is based on multicultural citizenship education research and focuses mainly on the national context of the United States. His concept of citizenship offers a comprehensive approach that emphasizes the productive potential of different types or realizations of citizenship as well as the risk of social estrangement and radicalization. In contrast, Khosrokhavar's sociological perspective is European, with a specific focus on social situations in France. He draws attention to individual experiences to explore a specific religious form of extremism while tracing radicalization processes that already took place. When considering the transnational, interdisciplinary range of preconditions for radicalization that are presented in the two introductory chapters, it stands out that both authors recognize as core reasons for radicalization the lack of social belonging and agency as well as Western nation states' abandonment of vulnerable young citizens. Both authors argue that it is necessary to develop and implement inclusive citizenship education that explicitly counteracts these social and sociopolitical disruptions.

#### **5 Part 2: Analysis of Preconditions within the Educational Context**

The second part of the book consists of four chapters. The analyses in these chapters stem from a European context and provide insights into crucial preconditions for integration and successful citizenship education. Social relationships, ethnic and democratic identity, and language skills are elaborated on as key factors in fostering a strong democratic sense of belonging through the educational context. These factors are thus shown to be major (potential) protective factors against the development of extremist attitudes.

In the first chapter of this part, Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger et al. explore the role that the quality of social relationships at school may play in students' endorsement or rejection of pre-extremist attitudes. The authors draw in particular on Beelmann's (2020) social-developmental model of radicalization and argue that the emergence of pre-extremist attitudes during adolescence needs to be researched more extensively. Using a normative sample from the German data set of the 2016 *International Civic and Citizenship Education* study, the authors analyse pre-extremist religious attitudes among 14-year-old students in relation to religious identity and practice, civic knowledge, and social relationships at school. The authors' findings are indicative of a certain preventive potential of civic education and reveal a complex interplay between religious identity and practice in predicting pre-extremist attitudes. That said, their research also shows that the characteristics of pre-extremist attitudes as well as the impact of social relationships require a more targeted evaluation.

Kerstin Göbel and Zuzanna M. Preusche explore the complex dynamics between the ethnic identity, perceived discrimination, and self-esteem of minority students in Germany. Their chapter compiles and compares recent international findings that inform their own study on adolescent students with minority ethnic identifications in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. In particular, their findings emphasize the importance of self-esteem for school adjustment and success, suggesting a strong preventive effect of self-esteem against social disaffection and radicalization. Furthermore, their analyses indicate that a strong ethnic identity is a crucial factor for developing positive self-esteem, highlighting the necessity to create an inclusive and affirmative school climate that supports the diverse identifications of students.

Sabine Manzel investigates the potential effectiveness of citizenship education classes for preventing the emergence of right-wing extremism in Germany. In light of recent terrorist incidents committed by the extremist right, Manzel examines the development of right-wing tendencies in Germany. Her analysis also sheds light on the current state of citizenship education and adolescent participation in Germany, both of which are particularly challenged by the rise of right-wing attitudes. In so doing, Manzel provides fruitful insights into a specific extremist challenge for citizenship education. Additionally, by combining theoretical approaches to the emergence of extremist attitudes with instructional concepts such as Helmke's learning opportunities model, she carves out a theoretical foundation regarding the preventive potential of civic and citizenship education in schools, which can inform further research.

In the final chapter of this part, Hanna Beißert and her colleagues focus on the crucial role of immigrant and non-immigrant children's host-country language skills in integration processes. The authors characterize language as being all at once a communication medium, a resource, and a symbol of relatedness; language is vital for educational and professional success as well as for the social relationships of immigrants in their new country of residence. Emphasizing the reciprocity of integration processes and the need for openness in the host society, the chapter specifically focuses on the symbolic function of language skills as a significant social resource. Based on two empirical studies conducted in a secondary school and in universities in Germany, the authors show how language skills are a key influence on social integration in different educational contexts. The contribution by Beißert et al. therefore highlights the preventive importance of a specific skill while shedding light on the dynamics of prejudice that education needs to counteract.

#### **6 Part 3: Approaches for Prevention and Intervention**

The third part of the volume comprises eight chapters from seven national contexts (Austria, Canada, Germany, Norway, Poland, South Africa, and United Kingdom) which analyse a diverse range of prevention and intervention approaches that may be deployed in the context of citizenship education. The measures presented are implemented at the political, activist, or school level. Many chapters present best-practice examples; others critically discuss educational policies that hinder the sustainable prevention of extremist developments. While adding concrete new preventive and intervention contexts such as digital skills, public health, or activist social visions, the approaches in this third and last part of the volume also mirror and apply the basic risk and protective factors established in the first two parts. Social estrangement and a missing sense of belonging and agency continue to be recognized as risk factors which need to be counteracted, while an inclusive affirmation of personal identity and skills, tolerance, empathy, and the purposeful promotion of democratic values are highlighted as the main preventive measures that need to be implemented in educational settings in multifarious ways.

The part starts with a critical analysis of (educational) policies regarding immigration as well as extremism prevention in the United Kingdom. Hazel Bryan demonstrates how 'preventive' political measures that restrict and depreciate cultural diversity in fact counteract the potential preventive effects of social cohesion, understanding, and belonging as they unfold in educational contexts. She describes the political abandonment of the concept of multiculturalism that the British government has undertaken in the last two decades. Bryan focuses on educational policy and teaching requirements that mirror the political concepts of a *muscular liberalism* and a *hostile environment* towards immigration. Dismantling the roots of these policies in othering and racism, the chapter makes a strong point for education as a safe space for marginalized voices in order to prevent extremist attitudes, an effort which is severely weakened by culturally exclusive politics.

The two subsequent chapters take up and support Bryan's concluding point by discussing the preventive potential of educational policies that foster democratic values while encouraging communal linkage and diverse individual identities instead of regulating them. With a specific focus on southern Norway, Inger Marie Dalehefte and her colleagues present the initiative 'Democratic Preparedness Against Racism and Anti-Semitism (DEMBRA)' and its potential as an intervention to foster democratic values and prevent extremism. Against the backdrop of violent extremist acts in Norway as well as global political developments exposing the vulnerability of democratic values, the authors emphasize the importance of democratic education in school as well as in teacher training. The chapter examines recent implementations of DEM-BRA in both of these contexts. The authors suggest that the combination of the guided courses and self-initiative, knowledge transfer, and the identity work that the DEMBRA programme provides makes it a promising model for fostering democratic skills and values. At the same time, they highlight open issues and thematize the need for further developments that characterize the DEM-BRA programme just as they characterize democratic citizenship itself.

Dan Laitsch and Douglas S. McCall present a public health approach to the prevention of violent extremism, mapping existing research and preventive programmes with a particular focus on the Canadian education system. Violent extremism is depicted as a public health issue. The authors identify risk as well as protective factors for radicalization and extremist violence and examine how schools can counteract the risk of a lack of social connection and communal linkage. Acknowledging the challenges that arise from definitional problems in the field and the complexity of individual and communal factors, the authors argue against conceptualizing strategies for preventing violent extremism as deficit-based programmes. Instead, they favour efforts to support protective factors by strengthening the role of schools as a critical facilitator for democracy, social connection, and institutional trust.

Following this discussion of the preventive role of educational policies and systematic approaches, the part sheds light on a variety of different intervention programmes. Three European contributions examine the potential of specific tools for democratic education and for preventing extremism, mainly implemented in non-formal contexts. First, Sieglinde Weyringer and her colleagues discuss the Values *and* Knowledge Education (V*a*KE) model as an intervention tool. Working with first-generation migrants in Austria, they establish 'pillar values' for integration and cultural interaction. Next, the authors identify the competencies that must be promoted to enable first-generation migrants to act according to these values. V*a*KE is presented as a method for identifying diverse value systems and fostering cultural integration values, hence combining values education with knowledge transfer. The authors present two intervention studies from Austria in which different groups of first-generation migrants were confronted with political or moral dilemmas. Acknowledging the need for further research to confirm their exploratory findings, the authors discuss the potential of V*a*KE for the development of stable democratic values and their preventive impact.

Joanna Leek and Marcin Rojek focus on the potential of digitalization for promoting civic attitudes. Using a sociocultural approach to learning as a lifelong process and exploiting the democratic potential of information and communication technologies (ICT) in general, the authors present two interventions conducted across multiple countries including the United Kingdom, Poland, Cyprus, Sweden, and Spain. One of these interventions used virtual reality in the classroom, and the other implemented intergenerational ICT learning. Both projects proved to be successful in fostering participants' mutual understanding and social purpose. The authors conclude that ICT tools, if used in a collaborative learning environment, can be particularly helpful with the social challenges that young immigrants face and can therefore be considered a valuable means for preventing both isolation and radicalization processes.

Ewa Bacia focuses on social innovation processes within grassroots activist structures as a prevention model. Her chapter examines five grassroots initiatives in Germany that foster social innovation with respect to migration and refugee issues. Bacia rethinks integration in a postmigrant society, positing that it must be necessarily linked to social diversity and inclusion. Offering an alternative to assimilationist approaches to acculturation, this model calls for innovative visions of societal structures. Bacia's analysis shows how private and small institutional initiatives can be catalysts for this visionary process and can thereby create educational, psychological, and social effects that assist in preventing radicalization.

The last two chapters of the third part present educational approaches and programmes designed to promote social cohesion and democratic consciousness in the classroom. Jan Pfetsch et al. present a universal prevention programme developed for 5th graders at a school in Germany. The authors draw on comparative definitions of prejudice and tolerance and the development of these respective attitudes throughout childhood and adolescence. With a particular focus on the interactions between refugee and non-immigrant children, they evaluate existing empirical findings on preventing prejudice in schools, emphasizing the generally positive effect of such efforts (especially on majority groups), and particularly the potential positive impact of intergroup contact and multimodal/multifaceted programmes. The results further confirm the effectiveness of intergroup contact in a structured, multimodal school setting for reducing prejudice held by non-immigrant children against refugee children.

Finally, Saloshna Vandeyar proposes a *pedagogy of compassion* against the backdrop of the specific global migration and radicalization tendencies in South Africa. The author presents current theoretical approaches to these challenges and discusses the crucial role of education as opposed to 'hard power' strategies for preventing extremism. Linking these findings with the concept of cosmopolitan citizenship education, Vandeyar sets forth the pedagogy of compassion as a 'soft power' concept that aims to forge dialogue, ambiguousness, and the questioning of belief systems as a means for dealing with diversity. Classroom observations demonstrate the application of these principles and their potential to prevent radicalization in South Africa.

The contributions compiled in this volume highlight the importance of continuing to integrate research on citizenship education and research on integration for the purposes of counteracting or preventing processes of radicalization. They do so by considering and evaluating various theoretical and empirical perspectives. We hope that this volume offers the reader relevant insights, but we recognize and indeed suggest that there is an urgent need for further development of this particular research avenue.

#### **Note**

1 All contributions in this volume were invited based on the authors' previous research, their expertise in the fields of radicalization, citizenship education, and/or migration, and the respective potential to create linkages between these fields through their work. To ensure the scientific and textual quality and coherence of the book, all chapters went through a thorough process of double peer review. Additionally, all chapters were professionally copy-edited.

#### **References**


### **PART 1**

### *Foundations*

∵

### **Failed Citizenship and Transformative Civic Education**

#### *James A. Banks*

#### **Abstract**

Global migration, the quest by diverse groups for equality, and the rise of populist nationalism have complicated the development of citizenship and citizenship education in nations around the world. Many racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups are denied structural inclusion into their nation-state. Consequently, they do not fully internalize the values and symbols of the nation-state, develop a strong identity with it, or acquire political efficacy. They focus primarily on particularistic group needs and goals rather than the overarching goals of the nation-state. I conceptualize this process as *failed citizenship* and present a typology that details *failed, recognized, participatory*, and *transformative* citizenship. I describe the role of the schools in reducing failed citizenship and helping marginalized groups become efficacious and participatory citizens in multicultural nation-states.

#### **Keywords**

diversity – equity – globalization – immigration/immigrants – multicultural education – social studies education

#### **1 Introduction**

Global migration, the rise of populist nationalism, and the quest by diverse racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups for recognition, civic equality, and structural inclusion within their nation-states have complicated the attainment of citizenship in countries around the world. In a number of nations, including Canada (Joshee & Thomas, 2017), England (Tomlinson, 2009), and France (Bozec, 2017), populist nationalism and a push for social cohesion have arisen in response to globalization, migration, and "super-diversity" (Vertovec, 2007). Nations in Europe such as England, the Netherlands, and especially France are having a difficult time structurally integrating citizens from diverse racial, ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups into their cultural, social, and civic lives (Fredette, 2014; Lemaire, 2009). Muslims are facing especially difficult barriers becoming fully participating citizens in these nations (Cesari, 2013).

The challenges of inclusion and citizenship within Western nations have been manifested in recent years by the conflicts between police officers and communities of color and the Black Lives Matter Movement (BLM) in the United States (Taylor, 2016), the large number of people from nations such as Syria and Iraq who have fled their homelands seeking refuge in European nations, and the terrorist attacks that occurred in cities such as Paris and San Bernardino, California, in 2015, and in Manchester and London, England, in 2017. The xenophobia that has targeted immigrants and mobilized angry populist groups in a number of Western nations was among the factors that led to the passage of the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, the popularity of conservative political leaders such as Marine Le Pen of the National Front Party in France, and the election of Donald J. Trump as U.S. president. These developments and events have stimulated renewed, contentious, and polarized political discussions and debates about the extent to which Western nations can and should structurally integrate diverse ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups into their nation-states and provide opportunities for them to become fully integrated and participatory citizens in the polity (Bawer, 2006; Murray, 2017).

#### **2 Citizens within Democratic Nation-States**

Citizens have certain rights and privileges within a democratic nation-state and are entitled to its protection. They are also expected to be loyal to the nation-state. This minimal definition of citizen lacks the thickly textured and complex discussions and meanings of citizenship in multicultural democratic nations that have been developed by scholars such as Kymlicka (1995, 2017), Gutmann (2004), and Gonçalves e Sliva (2004). These scholars state that citizens within democratic pluralistic nation-states should endorse the overarching ideals of the nation-state such as justice and equality, be committed to the maintenance and perpetuation of these ideals, and be willing to take action to help close the gap between their nation's ideals and practices that violate those ideals, such as racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination and economic inequality. Bosniak (2006) also describes multiple dimensions and conceptions of citizenship, such as cultural citizenship and multicultural citizenship. Status, rights, and identity are among the variables of citizenship analyzed by Joppke (2010).

In this article, I describe a typology of citizenship that consists of (a) *failed citizenship*, (b) *recognized citizenship*, (c) *participatory citizenship*, and (d) *transformative citizenship* (see Table 1.1). Marginalized and structurally excluded ethnic, racial, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups experience failed citizenship because they are denied many of the rights of full citizenship and consequently develop complex identities and ambivalent attachments to the nation-state. Individuals and groups who are not structurally included within the political and cultural systems of their nation-state lack political efficacy and consequently participate at low levels in the political system. They often do not vote because they believe that their votes will not make a difference and that politicians don't care about them. Most have negative views of politicians (Cohen, 2010).

Individuals and groups that are recognized citizens are structurally integrated into the nation-state, have strong identifications with it, are publicity recognized and validated as citizens, and have the opportunity to fully participate in the polity. I maintain that institutions and structures within nation-states need to enable marginalized and structurally excluded ethnic, racial, linguistic, and religious groups to attain recognized and participatory citizenship to create democratic and inclusive nation-states, actualize social justice and equality, and help the diverse groups within the polity to develop thoughtful and reflective national identities and attachments. Policymakers and educational leaders within nations that are grappling with diversity and citizenship need to realize that individuals and groups that are structurally excluded may not be peacefully apathetic and that structural exclusion produces alienation, resistance, and insurgency. Failed citizenship is antithetical to a fully functioning democratic, inclusive, and just nation-state.

In the second part of this article, I describe ways in which schools have contributed to failed citizenship by using assimilationist approaches to civic education that required minoritized students from diverse groups to deny their home cultures and languages. I then describe how schools can reduce failed citizenship by implementing transformative approaches to civic education that will enable marginalized and structurally excluded groups to become recognized and participatory citizens who are fully integrated into the polity while retaining significant aspects of their community cultures and languages. I also describe ways in which schools are limited in the extent to which they can reduce failed citizenship. I conclude this article by depicting the limited but significant effects of schools.

#### table 1.1 Citizenship typology

#### **Failed citizenship**

Failed citizenship exists when individuals or groups who are born within a nation or migrate to it and live within it for an extended period of time do not internalize the values and ethos of the nation-state, feel structurally excluded within it, and have highly ambivalent feeling toward it. Individuals who experience failed citizenship focus primarily on their own needs for political efficacy, group identity, and structural inclusion rather than the overarching and shared goals of the nation-state. Their allegiance and commitment to the nation-state is eclectic and complex.

#### **Recognized citizenship**

Recognized citizenship exists when a state or nation publicly recognizes an individual or group as a legitimate, legal, and valued member of the polity and provides the individual or group full rights and opportunities to participate. Although recognized citizenship status gives individuals and groups the right and opportunity to fully participate in the civic community of the nation-state, it does not require their participation. Individuals who have state-recognized citizenship status participate in the polity at very different levels, including nonparticipation.

#### **Participatory citizenship**

Participatory citizenship is exercised by individuals and groups who have been granted recognized citizenship by the nation-state. It takes place when individuals with citizenship rights take actions as minimal as voting to influence political decisions in their communities, nations, and the world to actualize existing laws and conventions. An example of participatory citizenship is the action taken by civil rights groups to enable African Americans to vote after the Voting Rights Act was signed into law by President Lyndon Baines Johnson on August 6, 1965.

#### **Transformative citizenship**

Transformative citizens take action to implement and promote policies, actions, and changes that are consistent with values such as human rights, social justice, and equality. The actions that transformative citizens take might – and sometimes do – violate existing local, state, and national laws. Examples are actions taken by transformative citizens such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Rosa Parks that violated national laws but helped actualize values such as human rights and social justice and eliminate institutionalized discrimination and racism.

#### **3 The Nature of the Citizenship Education Typology**

The typology described in this article is a Weberian conception because the four categories approximate but do not describe reality in its total complexity. The categories are useful conceptual tools for thinking about citizenship socialization and citizenship education. Although the four categories are conceptually distinct, in reality they overlap and are interrelated in a dynamic way. For example, individuals must be recognized by the state as legal and legitimate citizens before they can become participatory citizens who can take actions such as voting on political candidates or referenda. However, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, failed, recognized, and participatory citizens can all take transformative actions to make fundamental changes within the nation that promote social justice and equality. Individuals and groups do not have to be recognized citizens to take transformative citizenship action. The African American college students who sat down at a lunch counter reserved for Whites at a Woolworth's store in Greensboro, North Carolina, on February 1, 1960, had few citizenship rights but were able to effectively protest racial segregation laws.

The four types of citizenship conceptualized and detailed in this article can be used to describe and analyze the civic behavior of any racial, ethnic,

figure 1.1 The interrelationship of the types of citizenship. This figure illustrates how the typology of citizenship described in this article is a fluid and complex concept. The four categories of citizenship are interrelated rather than discrete and distinct

cultural, social class, or religious group. However, because of the limited focus of my analysis, the typology is used in this article to describe marginalized and minoritized ethnic groups of color. Whites—especially those who are low income or have a marginal status within mainstream civic society (C. Murray, 2012)—can also experience aspects of failed citizenship. Individuals and groups who are differentiated by social class, gender, sexual orientation, and religion can also experience failed citizenship barriers (Banks & Banks, 2016).

Individuals and groups who experience failed citizenship may become recognized citizens if the polity provides them with increased recognition and structural inclusion. Recognized citizens may become participatory citizens in various phases of their lives. Failed, recognized, and participatory citizens engage in transformative citizen action when they work to promote policies, actions, and changes that promote values such as human rights, social justice, and equality. This action may disrupt existing customs and laws.

#### **3.1** *Noncitizens and Citizens*

I am making an important distinction in this article between action taken by individuals who are citizens to influence and shape policies in the polity and action taken by noncitizens. Kymlicka (2017) argues compellingly that citizenship theorists should distinguish civic education for citizens and noncitizens because they should have overlapping but distinct aims. The focus of civic education for noncitizens should be on expanding their human rights. Civic education for citizens should include human rights but emphasize helping individuals from diverse groups learn how to become fully participating citizens in the polity while retaining important aspects of their home and community cultures. Kymlicka is concerned because some citizenship education theorists view national citizenship as increasingly obsolete because of global migration, the weakening of national borders caused by globalization, and the increasing recognition of the influence of supranational bodies such as the European Union and UNESCO. In the conceptualization of the types of citizenship in this article, individuals who are noncitizens can take actions that foster human rights and that may violate existing laws and customs. However, I do not classify these individuals as engaged in *transformative citizenship* because they are not citizens. Rather, I classify their actions as *transformative civic action*.

#### **4 Balancing the Needs of the Polity and the Aspirations of Minoritized Groups**

One of the challenges of diverse democratic nation-states is to provide opportunities for different groups to maintain aspects of their community cultures while constructing a nation into which these groups are structurally integrated and to which they develop allegiance. A delicate balance of unity and diversity must be an essential goal of democratic nations and of teaching and learning in democratic societies. Unity without diversity results in cultural repression and hegemony, as occurred in the Soviet Union before its dissolution in 1991 and in China during the Cultural Revolution that lasted from 1966 to 1976. Diversity without unity leads to Balkanization and the fracturing of the nationstate, which occurred when India was divided into India and Pakistan in 1947.

To create a unified and cohesive polity, both marginalized groups and the nation-state must negotiate and make concessions. The state must be willing to provide recognition for marginalized groups such as incorporating aspects of their cultures and symbols into the nation's master narrative and legitimizing their home and community languages. Minoritized cultural and language groups must be willing to learn and speak the lingua franca of the nation-state, understand its constitution and laws, and develop patriotism to the nation that is "manifest in collective rituals that express pride in one's country" (Banks et al., 2005, p. 23). However, patriotism is a double-edge sword because "it comprises both positive and dangerously negative attitudes. In the name of patriotism, intolerance toward dissent groups has been propagated, freedom of speech restricted, and an arbitrary consensus imposed" (Banks et al., 2005, p. 23). Consequently, the teaching of *critical patriotism* should be a priority in schools in democratic multicultural nation-states, which consists of reasoned and reflective loyalty (Malin, Ballard, Attai, Colby, & Damon, 2014).

#### **5 Recognized, Participatory, Failed, and Transformative Citizenship**

I conceptualize recognized citizenship as a status that is publicly sanctioned and acknowledged by the state. The state views these individuals and groups as legitimate, legal, and valued members of the polity and provides them with the opportunity to participate fully in the nation-state. This status does not mean that the individual or group actually participates but has the opportunity and potential to participate as fully functioning members of the polity. When recognized citizenship expands and becomes inclusive, the social, cultural, economic, and political systems of the nation facilitate the structural inclusion of marginalized individuals and groups into its major institutions. Consequently, individuals and groups who become recognized citizens have the potential to develop strong attachments, allegiances, and identities with the nation-state or polity.

The attainment of recognized citizenship status gives individuals and groups the right and opportunity to fully participate in the civic community of the nation-state. However, it does not guarantee their participation. Consequently, individuals or groups who have state-recognized citizenship status participate in the polity at very different levels. Some individuals with recognized citizenship status do not exercise their rights and privileges at all, including voting they are recognized and legal citizens but do not exercise their civic privileges. Estimates indicate that only 58% of eligible voters participated in the presidential election in the United States in 2016 (Regan, 2016). Some individuals who are recognized citizens are "minimal citizens"—their civic action is limited to voting in local and national elections for conventional candidates and issues (Banks, 2008). Other individuals with recognized citizenship status take action beyond voting to actualize existing laws and conventions. I call each of these levels of civic action *participatory citizenship*. This category is similar to the participatory citizen detailed by Westheimer and Kahne (2004) in their study of civic education programs in the United States. They describe three conceptions of the good citizen: (a) *personally responsible*, (b) *participatory*, and (c) *justice-oriented*. They define a participatory citizen "as an individual who actively participates in the civic affairs and social life of the community at the local, state, or national level" (p. 241).

Transformative citizens take actions to actualize values and moral principles that transcend the nation-states and national boundaries, such as the values that are articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that were articulated and promoted by civil and human rights leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Eleanor Roosevelt, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Nelson Mandela. The action taken by transformative citizens often means that they must violate existing local, state, or national laws to promote cosmopolitan and universal values. Rosa Parks and the African American students who participated in sit-ins and marches during the civil rights movement of the 1960s violated existing segregation laws when they protested against them. Given the widespread social and economic inequalities within nations around the world, transformative citizen action is required to actualize justice and equality within most nation-states. Transformative citizens share characteristics with the "social-justice citizen" described by Westheimer and Kahne (2004) who "critically assesses social, political, and economic structures to see beyond surface causes" and "seeks out and addresses areas of injustice" (p. 240).

Individuals and groups that experience failed citizenship are denied many of the rights and privileges of citizenship because of their racial, cultural, linguistic, or religious characteristics. They are likely to participate in protest, civil disobedience, and resistance (C. E. Sleeter, personal communication, November 10, 2015). People who experience failed citizenship may also be more likely than structurally integrated individuals to accept and be victimized by the propaganda of extremist groups such as White nationalist groups and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). By December 8, 2015, 250 Americans had traveled to nations in the Middle East to join ISIS; 40 had returned to the United States (cited on NPR News, December 8, 2015). Some published sources indicate that as many as 4,000 or more Europeans had joined ISIS by June 18, 2015 (Bora, 2015). Although individuals are attracted to and join extremist groups for many different and complex reasons—including those related to personality factors (Brooks, 2015)—it is reasonable to hypothesize, based on emerging case studies of deradicalization (Jordan & Audi, 2015), that political alienation and structural exclusion are contributing factors. These programs reveal that radical groups such as ISIS are especially attractive to immigrant youth who feel alienated within their new nation and are caught between the culture of their original homeland and the main-land culture of their new nation. Deradicalization programs try to help these youth attain an anchor in both cultures.

#### **6 Citizenship Socialization**

Participatory citizenship socialization occurs when individuals who live within a nation-state internalize it basic values and symbols, acquire an allegiance to these values, and are willing to take action to actualize these values and protect and defend the nation-state if it is endangered. Citizenship socialization fails and is unsuccessful when individuals who are born within the nation or migrate to it and live within it for an extended period of time do not internalize the values and ethos of the nation-state, feel structurally excluded within it, and who have highly ambivalent toward it. In this article, I call this phenomenon *failed citizenship* and will—through the discussion of the experiences of marginalized ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups in different nations—identify factors that cause failed citizenship, political alienation, and ambivalent identities among individuals and groups who feel structurally excluded and politically apart from their nation-states.

These groups often lack political efficacy and experience failed citizenship because they are required to become alienated from their cultures, languages, and communities in order to be viewed and treated as recognized and participatory citizens of their nation-states. Historically in immigrant nations such as the United States, Australia, and Canada, indigenous and immigrant groups have been required to abandon their cultural, linguistic, and religious characteristics in order to be viewed and treated as fully recognized and participatory citizens. They have experienced cultural self-alienation and dehumanizing assimilation that Spring (2004) calls "deculturalization". Valenzuela (1999) refers to this process as "subtractive schooling" when it takes place in schools.

By failed citizenship, I am not suggesting that citizens who are structurally excluded, alienated, and marginalized within their nation-states have failed. Rather, I am using this concept to describe the political, social, and economic institutions within nation-states that have created barriers that prevent the structural inclusion of individuals and groups who have racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious characteristics that differ in significant ways from those of mainstream and powerful groups that control the institutions within the nation. I am using *failed citizenship* to describe the structures and systems within nation-states rather than the characteristics of excluded and marginalized individuals and groups who experience barriers that prevent them from becoming full citizens.

Individuals and groups that experience failed citizenship frequently develop complex and ambivalent identities with the nation-state and low levels of allegiance to it. They usually participate at minimum levels in the political system of the state. Although excluded racial, cultural, linguistics, and religious groups usually have identities with the nation-state, their identities are complex and multidimensional because they have strong identities with their cultural communities and sometimes with their original homelands. Because of both their marginalized status and multiple identities, they often focus on their particularistic goals and issues rather than the overarching interests and goals of the nation-state. Their first and primary identity is their ethnic, racial, cultural, linguistic, or religious group rather than the nation-state. They focus primarily on their cultural needs and empowerment rather than the universal priorities of the nation-state in order to attain the cultural capital, recognition, and power required to attain structural inclusion and participate in equal-status interactions with dominant and mainstream groups.

Sizemore (1972) hypothesizes that excluded groups within capitalist nations must acquire power and economic capital before they can attain structural inclusion and engage in equal-status interactions with mainstream hegemonic groups. Sizemore's conceptualization indicates that excluded and marginalized groups will not attain recognized and participatory citizenship status until they have acquired what Collins (2000) calls the "power of self-definition" (p. 97). Intellectual and political leaders of indigenous groups such as the Maori in New Zealand, Native Americans in the United States, and the Kurds in Turkey view the attainment of cultural integrity, autonomy, and self-determination as essential for their citizenship participation in the polity. These groups view their citizenship as dual and multidimensional—they are citizens of their indigenous lands and "nations" or territories as well as citizens of the polity.

Kymlicka (2011) maintains that "multination states" that have national groups such as Native Americans in the United States, the Maori in New Zealand, and the Kurds in Turkey need to adapt a "multinational conception of citizenship" (p. 282). He states that these groups "conceive of themselves as forming a 'nation' within a larger state, and mobilize behind nationalist political movements to attain recognition of their nationhood, either in the form of an independent state or through territorial autonomy within the larger state" (pp. 284–285). Kymlicka contends that "ambivalent feelings and contested commitments are not evidence of failure of citizenship, but rather define the challenge to which citizenship must respond" (p. 289).

Historically, the Western immigrant nations such as the United States and Australia did not make provisions for multidimensional conceptions of citizenship that included strong identities and attachments to community cultures or to "nations" or territories within the nation-state. Indigenous and immigrant groups were required to become alienated from their home, community, or territorial cultures in order to become valid, recognized, and participatory citizens of the nation-state. However, citizenship should be expanded to include cultural rights and self-determination in addition to civic, political, and social rights (Banks, 2008, 2016, 2017). Ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups should not have to experience self-alienation or deculturalization to be recognized, participatory, and full citizens of the polity.

#### **7 Factors That Lead to Participatory Citizenship**

When participatory citizenship occurs, the social, cultural, economic, and political systems facilitate the structural inclusion of marginalized individuals and groups into the nation-state and its dominant institutions. Consequently, individuals and groups who attain recognized and participatory citizenship can develop strong attachments, allegiances, and identities with the nationstate or polity. Individuals and groups within a nation-state who are recognized and participatory citizens speak the official language or languages of the nation; have cultural values and behaviors that are idealized, valued, and publicity recognized within the nation; and can fully participate in the public and civic cultures of the nation-state. They can also exercise considerable power in the political system.

The successful and dominant groups in most nations usually view themselves as the founders of the nation even though there may have been indigenous groups living in the territory in which the nation is now located. Recognized and participatory citizens have strong identities with the nationstate and view their culture and the culture of the nation-state as synonymous. In the Western immigrant nations such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, the recognized and participatory citizenship groups that are hegemonic usually attained their power and influence by conquering and or enslaving indigenous groups and constructing a national culture that privileged the culture of Western Europeans and marginalized the cultures and experiences of indigenous groups, Africans, Asians, and other non-White groups.

Recognized and participatory citizenship groups that exercise the most power within a nation-state tend to view their interests as identical to those of the polity and the "public interest" and the interests of minoritized and marginalized groups as "special interests" (Huntington, 2004; Schlesinger, 1991). Political dominant groups also tend to marginalize the interests of groups such as Mexican Americans and American Indians by labeling them *identity groups*. The ways in which they describe identity groups suggest that only marginalized groups such as Mexican Americans, African Americans, and other minoritized groups are identity groups. Yet as Gutmann (2003) insightfully points out, mainstream groups such as Anglo-Americans and the Boy Scouts of America are also identity groups.

#### **8 Diversity and Failed Citizenship in Different Nations**

Ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups that experience failed citizenship exist in nations around the world—including the Kurds in Turkey, Muslims in France, the Uyghur people in China, and the Chechens in Russia. I recognize that the Kurds in Turkey as well as the Chechens in Russia seek political self-determination, independence, and nationalism. However, I view them as experiencing failed citizenship within Turkey and Russia because they are prevented from attaining recognized and participatory citizenship and consequently are not able to function as full citizens in the polity.

Failed citizenship is a fluid and complex and not an absolute concept. In other words, some groups experience failed citizenship barriers at greater levels than others. The position of the Chechens in Russia is an example of a very high level of failed citizenship because the Chechens are seeking separation from Russia to form their own nation. In Australia, the Aborigines have a high level of failed citizenship whereas the Greeks have attained significant levels of structural and civic inclusion into Australian life.

The citizenship status of African Americans in the United States has both failed and participatory citizenship characteristics. Their situation is multifaceted and intricate. In many ways, African Americans are structurally integrated into the political, economic, and cultural institutions of the United States and are recognized citizens. However, they have not attained full citizenship inclusion and rights because of enduring institutionalized discrimination and racial barriers (Ladson-Billings, 2004; Omi & Winant, 1994).

Social class significantly influences the citizenship status of African Americans, as Wilson (1978) perceptively points out in his important and controversial book, *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions*. Although African Americans do not enjoy full citizenship rights in the United States primarily because of institutionalized racism and discrimination (Feagin, 2000; Ladson-Billings, 2004), social class mediates the effects of race. The higher their social class, the more political, social, and cultural opportunities African Americans have. However, regardless of their social class, race still remains an intractable barrier. The racial microaggressions that many middle-class and upper-middle-class African Americans experience indicate that social class mobility reduces but does not eliminate racial categorization and stigmatization (Feagin, 2000). In her moving and eloquent commencement address presented at Tuskegee University in 2015, former First Lady Michelle Obama describes some of the painful racial microaggressions she experienced after Barack Obama became president of the United States (Obama, 2015).

The experience of Muslims in France is a significant and complex example of failed citizenship. Since the 1960s and 1970s, the French have dealt with immigrant groups in ways distinct from the United States, Canada, and Australia. *La laïcité* is a highly influential concept in France, the aim of which is to keep church and state separate (Bozec, 2017; Lemaire, 2009). *La laïcité*  emerged in response to the hegemony the Catholic Church exercised in France over the schools and other institutions for several centuries. A major goal of state schools in France is to assure that youth obtain a secular education. Consequently, just as Catholic students may not wear a crucifix, Muslim students in French state schools may not wear the hijab (veil) or any other religious symbols (Bowen, 2007). In France, the explicit goal is assimilation (called integration) and inclusion (Castles, 2004). Requiring immigrants to surrender their languages and cultures to become full citizens of France contributes to the development of barriers that result in failed citizenship.

#### **9 Schools as a Factor in Failed Citizenship**

Assimilationist conceptions of citizenship require individuals and groups to give up their first languages and cultures to become recognized and participatory citizens in the civic community of the nation-state. These conceptions are major factors that result in individuals and groups experiencing failed citizenship. Assimilationists fear that a focus on ethnic identity will undermine attempts to develop national identity and a cohesive nation-state. They also view identities as "zero sum" constructions (Kymlicka, 2004). Assimilationist scholars argue that educators should develop students' national identities and not their cultural or ethnic identities. They call efforts to help students clarify their ethnic identities "identity politics" (Chavez, 2010; Glazer, 1997; Huntington, 2004). It is a false dichotomy to argue that educators should focus on developing *national identity* rather than *ethnic identity. Ethnic and cultural identity, national identity*, and *global identity* are interconnected, complex, changing, and contextual concepts (Banks, 2008). After an extensive literature review of the citizenship identities of Muslim youths in the United States and the United Kingdom, Abu El-Haj and Bonet (2011) concluded that "many Muslim youth see no conflict between their identity as Muslims and as Americans or Britons" (p. 40). A study by Gibson (cited in Deaux, 2006) is consistent with the conclusion by Abu El-Haj and Bonet. Gibson found that strong group identity and national identity are compatible concepts. Writes Deaux (2006):

Research recently done in South Africa suggests that not only can ethnic and national identity be compatible, but they can be mutually supportive … James Gibson (2004) found that the correlations between ethnic and group identification and the importance and pride associated with being a South African were universally positive, arguing against the hypothesis that strong group identification is incompatible with strong national identification. (p. 94)

The scholarship of citizenship theorists such as Kymlicka (1995), Young (2000), Gutmann (2004), and Ladson-Billings (2004) indicate that students from cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religiously diverse communities will find it difficult to develop strong commitments and identities with the nationstate if it does not reflect and incorporate important aspects of their ethnic and community cultures. Gutmann calls this phenomenon "recognition" and argues that students need to experience civic equality and recognition to develop civic commitments and allegiance to their nation-state. The young men who were arrested for the bombings of London's transport vehicles on July 7, 2005, were British citizens who grew up in Leeds but apparently had a weak identity with the nation-state and non-Muslim British citizens. Citizenship education theory and research indicate that recognition and structural inclusion are required for marginalized groups to develop and internalize a deep commitment to the nation-state and its cultural values and become full and participating citizens in the polity (Banks, 2007, 2008; Gutmann, 2004; Kymlicka, 1995; Young, 2000).

Historically, however, schools in the United States—as well as schools in other nations such as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and China (Banks, 2004; Postiglione, 2009b)—have alienated marginalized students from their histories and cultures when trying to make them citizens. Nation-states tried to create unity by forcing racial, cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious minoritized groups to give up their community languages and cultures to participate in the national civic culture. These actions have resulted in significant failed citizenship in various nations. In the United States, Mexican American students were punished for speaking Spanish in school, and Native American youth were forced to attend boarding schools in which their cultures and languages were eradicated (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006). "Kill the Indian and save the man", a statement made in 1882 that is attributed to Captain Richard Henry Pratt, epitomizes the assimilationist goals of the boarding schools to which American Indians were sent in the United States (Peterson, 2013). Pratt founded the Carlisle Indian Industrial School in 1879, which was the first off-reservation boarding school established in the United States for Native Americans. Some teachers used soap to wash the mouths of Mexican American students who spoke Spanish in schools in Southwestern states such as Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. First Nations students in Canada were sent to boarding schools in which they experienced forced assimilation and their languages and cultures were eradicated (Barman, Hébert, & McCaskill, 1986).

Aboriginal children were taken from their families and forced to live on state missions and reserves in Australia (Broome, 1982), a practice that lasted from 1869 to 1969. These children are called "the stolen generation". Kevin Rudd, the Australian Prime Minister, issued a formal apology to the stolen generation on February 13, 2008. In China, Tibetan students were sent to boarding schools where their culture and language received little recognition and were marginalized (Postiglione, 2009a). To embrace the national civic culture, students from diverse groups must feel that it reflects their experiences, hopes, and dreams. Institutions such as schools cannot marginalize the cultures of individuals and groups and expect them to feel structurally included within the nation and develop a strong allegiance to it. When institutions such as schools, museums, and courts marginalize the cultures of minoritized and stigmatized groups, they create alienation and failed citizenship. Civic educators within multicultural nation-states should realize that many students from diverse groups are negotiating multiple and complex identities and require cultural recognition and rights as essential parts of their citizenship identities (Abu El-Haj & Bonet, 2011).

#### **10 Transformative Citizenship Education**

The school can help reduce failed citizenship and enable students to acquire structural inclusion, political efficacy, and civic action skills by implementing transformative citizenship education. In the next sections of this article, I describe four interventions that can be used to actualize transformative citizenship education in schools: (a) social studies teaching, (b) culturally responsive and sustaining pedagogy, (c) civic action programs, and (d) ethnic studies teaching.

#### **10.1** *Social Studies Teaching*

An important goal of civic education should be to help students from marginalized groups become recognized and participatory citizens by attaining a sense of structural integration and inclusion within their nation-states and clarified national identities (Banks, 2017). Research indicates that the content and methods of school-based civic and multicultural education can promote structural inclusion. Research by Callahan and Muller (2013) indicates that the civic knowledge that students attain and the high levels of social connection within schools increase the civic efficacy and political participation of immigrant students. Consequently, courses that teach civic knowledge within classrooms and schools that promote high levels of social connection among students can help them develop a sense of structural inclusion. Research also indicates that social studies coursework can increase the political participation of students who have immigrant parents. Research reviewed by Obenchain and Callahan (2015) indicates "a direction association between the number of social studies credits completed and the probability of voting among children of immigrant parents" (p. 127).

Theoretical and empirical work by civic education scholars such as Parker (2003) and Dabach (2015) provide compelling evidence that visionary schools and teachers can help marginalized students increase their sense of civic inclusion and belonging within their communities and nation-state. Parker (1996, 2003) advances a theory and a teaching strategy—deliberation—for deepening democracy in schools and society, enhancing citizen participation, and extending democracy to cultural, ethnic, racial, and linguistic communities. In a two-year qualitative study, Dabach identified a teacher who humanized the experiences of undocumented families and students by using deportation narratives that actively engaged marginalized students in her civic classroom.

#### **10.2** *Culturally Responsive and Culturally Sustaining Pedagogy*

The research on culturally responsive teaching by scholars such as Ladson-Billings (1994), Au (2011), Lee (2007), and Gay (2010) indicate that students of color become more actively engaged in learning, attain higher academic achievement, and experience structural inclusion when the content and pedagogy of instruction reflects their histories and cultures. Culturally responsive teaching promotes structural inclusion because it gives students recognition and civic equality (Gutmann, 2004). Research indicates that the recognition and civic equality that students experience in culturally responsive classrooms help them feel structurally included and become more academically engaged (Lee, 2007).

Au (1980) found that if teachers used participation structures in lessons that were similar to the Hawaiian speech event "talk story", the reading achievement of Native Hawaiian students increased significantly. Lee's (2007) research indicates that the achievement of African American students increase when they are taught literary interpretation with lessons that use the African American practice of signifying. Moll, Amanti, Neff, and González (1992) found that when teachers gain an understanding of the "funds of knowledge" of Mexican American households and community networks—and incorporate this knowledge into their teaching—Mexican American students become more active and engaged learners.

A study by Ladson-Billings (1995) indicates that the ability to scaffold student learning by bridging home and community cultures is one of the important characteristics of effective teachers of African American students. Paris (2012) contends that culturally responsive pedagogy is necessary but not sufficient. He maintains that effective teaching strategies for minoritized students should not only be responsive to their cultures and languages but should also help them maintain or sustain important aspects of their languages and cultures while they are learning the knowledge and skills required to function effectively in the mainstream culture. Paris calls this strategy "culturally sustaining pedagogy" (p. 93). He writes:

The term *culturally sustaining* requires that our pedagogies be more than responsive of or relevant to the cultural experiences and practices of young people—it requires that they support young people in sustaining the cultural and linguistic competence of their communities while simultaneously offering access to dominant cultural competence. (p. 95)

#### **10.3** *Civic Action Programs*

A number of researchers have created and implemented youth participatory action research (YPAR), service learning, and community-action projects that have enabled students from diverse groups to increase their academic knowledge, political efficacy, and political participatory skills (Cammarota & Fine, 2008; Mirra, Garcia, & Morrell, 2016). When students participate in YPAR, they investigate important community problems and take actions to influence decisions and policies (Nieto, 2016; Powers & Allaman, 2012). The Council of Youth Research program, which is a YPAR intervention, focuses on helping students increase their knowledge and skills in civic learning, agency, and participation (Mirra, Morrell, Cain, Scorza, & Ford, 2013). The Council has taken action on helping students attain greater access to healthy foods, acquiring space for student self-expression, expanding access to technology, and increasing the quality of the school curriculum (Mirra et al., 2016). Lund (2006) has actively engaged youth in movements to increase social justice in their Canadian schools and communities. Ginwright and Cammarota (2007) have used community-based organizations in Oakland, California, to engage African American and Latina/o youth in civic action and "critical praxis" to reduce problems in their urban communities such as crime.

#### **10.4** *Ethnic Studies Teaching*

Students from cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religiously diverse communities will find it difficult to develop strong commitments and identities with the nation-state if the institutions within the nation such as museums, libraries, schools, and other public sites do not reflect and incorporate important aspects of their ethnic and community cultures. The incorporation of ethnic studies into the school curriculum is an effective way to help students from diverse groups experience a sense of structural inclusion as well as improve their academic engagement and achievement. In her review of studies on the academic and social effects of ethnic studies, Sleeter (2011) concluded that "there is considerable research evidence that well designed and well-taught ethnic studies curricula have positive academic and social outcomes for students" (p. viii).

More recent studies have revealed the positive effects of ethnic studies teaching on student academic engagement and achievement. The Mexican American Studies program that was implemented in the Tucson, Arizona, school district was designed to help Mexican American students attain a sense of inclusion within the curriculum by providing a history of the United States that gave their culture and history visibility and recognition (Cammarota, 2007). Another aim of the course was to increase the academic engagement and achievement of Mexican American students, which the developers of the program assumed would be attained by the visibility given to Mexican American history and culture in the curriculum. Cabrera, Milem, Jaquette, and Marx (2014), in a rigorously designed study of the effects of the program, found that it had positive effects on the academic engagement and achievement of the students who took the course. The program evoked a chorus of criticism from influential conservative politicians in Arizona in part because it viewed the history of institutionalized discrimination and racism in the United States from a critical perspective. Despite the program's positive effects on the academic achievement of Mexican American students, the Arizona legislature enacted a bill that terminated it.

Dee and Penner (2016) examined the effects of an ethnic studies course on several variables related to high school persistence and academic achievement such as attendance, grade point average, and credits earned. Their sample consisted of 1,405 ninth-grade high-risk students in the San Francisco Unified School District. They concluded that the ethnic studies course had "large positive effects on each of [the] student outcomes" (p. 3). The researchers think that the teachers' use of critical pedagogies and culturally responsive teaching in which they incorporated the cultures of their students were important factors that contributed to the success of the ethnic studies course.

#### **11 The Limited but Significant Effects of Schools**

In maintaining that schools can facilitate the structural inclusion of marginalized students and therefore reduce failed citizenship and the barriers it creates, I am keenly aware of the limitations of schools and the claims made by their revisionist critics. In 1972, Greer published a scathing critique and revisionist interpretation of schools that argued that the belief that schools taught and exemplified democracy was the "great school legend". The schools not only did not teach or promote democracy, argued Greer, they perpetuated social class stratification and reinforced the class divisions within the larger society. Bowles and Gintis (1976), in their erudite and complex Marxist analysis of U.S. schools, reinforced and extended Greer's thesis. Anyon (1996) also described the significant ways in which schools reflect the social, economic, and political contexts in which they are embedded.

Although he describes the limitations of schools, Noguera (2003) views schools as vehicles for change and transformation. Noguera's background as a sociologist compels him to conclude that schools are limited by their social and political contexts. However, his experiences as a teacher, parent, and school board member are the source of his strong belief that schools can transform the lives of students and promote equality and social justice. In his book, *City Schools and the American Dream: Reclaiming the Promise of Public Education*, as well as in his other articles and books, Noguera's hopeful and inspiring work helps restore our faith in the ability of schools to create possibilities for students who are victimized by failed citizenship. Noguera argues that schools in low-income communities are desperately needed by the students and communities they serve. Consequently, they are essential for the realization of social justice, equality, and successful citizenship socialization.

The theory and research that I describe in this article about the positive effects of social studies, culturally responsive, and ethnic studies teaching as well as youth participatory action research support Noguera's (2003) argument that schools can increase the academic engagement, achievement, and structural inclusion of minoritized students and consequently reduce failed citizenship. Noguera's perspective and the theoretical and empirical work that I discuss are valuable and useful for making counterarguments to the revisionist critics of schools and constructing transformative civic education interventions that will help reduce failed citizenship and enable students to develop political efficacy and participatory citizenship.

The narrow and assimilationist conceptions of citizenship education that are normative in most nations in the world are causing many individuals and groups from marginalized and structurally excluded racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups to experience failed citizenship (Banks, 2017; Banks, Suárez-Orozco, & Ben-Peretz, 2016). Minoritized and immigrant individuals and groups have nuanced and complex identities with their cultural communities and nation-states that require that multidimensional conceptions of citizenship be implemented within nations and schools. The nuanced, complex, and evolving identities of the youth described in studies by researchers such as Abu El-Haj (2007) and Nguyen (2011) indicate that assimilationist notions of citizenship are ineffective today because of the deepening diversity throughout the world and the quests by marginalized immigrant, ethnic, cultural, racial, linguistic, and religious groups for cultural recognition and rights.

Schools need to work to reduce failed citizenship by implementing transformative civic education programs that promote multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995, 2017) and recognize the right and need for students to maintain commitments to their cultural communities as well as the nation-states in which they live. Global migration, the quest by marginalized groups for self-determination and efficacy, and the rising populist nationalism and xenophobia in nations around the world require a reexamination of the ends and means of citizenship education if it is to promote structural inclusion and civic equality and reduce failed citizenship and its barriers that prevent minoritized students from becoming recognized, participatory, and transformative citizens.

#### **Acknowledgements**

I presented versions of this article at the annual conference of the Korean Association for Multicultural Education (KAME), April 30 through May 2, 2015, Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea; in the Education, Equity, and Society (EES) Colloquium, College of Education, University of Washington, May 19, 2015; at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, July 7, 2015; and at the UCL Institute of Education, University of London, May 18, 2016. I wish to thank my University of Washington colleagues who gave me discerning and helpful comments in the EES Colloquium. I am grateful to these colleagues who read various drafts of this article and gave me insightful comments that enabled me to strengthen it: Cherry A. McGee Banks, Yiting Chu, Carlos E. Cortés, Dafney Blanca Dabach, Carlos F. Diaz, Muhammad Faour, David Gillborn, Gillian Klein, Lee Jerome, Audrey Osler, Walter C. Parker, Christine E. Sleeter, and Hugh Starkey.

#### **Author's Note**

This chapter originally appeared as Banks, James A. (2017). Failed citizenship and transformative civic education. *Educational Researcher, 46*(7), 366–377. doi: 10.3102/0013189X17726741 Reprinted here with permission from Sage Publications. The exclusive rights of this chapter are owned by Sage and permission for any further reuse must be obtained from Sage.

#### **References**


Gutmann, A. (2003). *Identity in democracy*. Princeton University Press.


#### chapter 2

### **The Making of Jihadist Social Actors in Europe**

*Farhad Khosrokhavar*

### **Abstract**

With the term jihadism, I refer to a religious and political phenomenon based on a radical version of Islam that claims to be the genuine and unique embodiment of Allah's religion, all the others being fake. It is based on the primacy of jihad, i.e. violence in the name of God, in order to impose on the world its religious norms, which are reinterpreted in the light of radical Islam. Between the emergence of the Islamic State (IS or ISIS) in June 2014 and its end as a state in October 2017, jihadism brought new agents to the world stage, especially in Europe. Its advent multiplied the calls for jihad among Western young people, particularly in Europe. Among them were adolescents and post-adolescents, including young people of migrant origin, middle class converts, people with psychological problems, and women. This article focuses on young people of migrant origin, the middle class, and jihadist women.

#### **Keywords**

migration – jihadism – disaffected young people – inverted multiculturalism – total Muslims – negative hero

#### **1 Introduction**

Jihadism is a complex social and political phenomenon that has multiple dimensions. In Europe, it is related to migration and generations of sons and grandsons, but there are differences among European countries. In some countries, such as Spain or Norway, the majority of jihadists are from the first generation of migrants, whereas in others, such as France, Great Britain, or Belgium, they hail from the second generation. Jihadist attacks can in some cases even be committed by newly arrived migrants; in Germany, most of the attacks between 2013 and 2017 were perpetrated by newly arrived people, some of whom were seeking political asylum (Khosrokhavar, 2018).

44 Khosrokhavar

We will show that jihadism in most cases is related to humiliation and a sense of denied dignity. These feelings have objective and imaginary dimensions. They are reinforced by the educational system that segregates and puts the young sons of migrants together, separating them from other children from poor districts, within schools that are populated by an overwhelming majority of migrants' young sons and grandsons. They are also accentuated by the segregation in poor districts that I call 'jihadogenous urban dwellings'. Further, these feelings of humiliation and denied dignity are also rooted in a generation that is excluded, in most cases economically, but also socially and culturally. A sense of deprived citizenship is embedded in this type of subjectivity, and the combination of lower levels of education in segregated areas, humiliation, and lack of socialization within the mainstream culture push young migrants towards aggressivity and radicalization. Middle class jihadists are mostly converts and their story is different, although being Muslim exposes them to social prejudices, Islamophobia, and humiliation.

#### **2 Three Types of Jihadist Agents**

We can distinguish three types of jihadist actors according to their social class:


These three types of young people are distinct in their social and ethnic origins, but they are equally beset by the fear of an uncertain future. For the middle classes, this is fear of proletarianization and the loss of their middle-class status; among young people of migrant origin, the fear is a feeling of hopelessness and 'no future'.

#### **3 Rejection of Politics**

Almost all over Europe, a major proportion of second- and third-generation migrant families (in Great Britain, from Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, i.e. Asians or black Africans; in France, North Africans and those from Black Africa) suffer from non-participation in the economic and political spheres. In 2009, an official report focused on the lack of political commitment by these disaffected young people in the UK (Change Institute, 2009). They sometimes found substitutes for political citizenship in radical movements. This disengagement is in itself the result of a mistrust in the political system, a sense of the inaccessibility of politics, as well as a lack of motivation to participate in politics in all its dimensions (electing as well as being elected). These young people strongly believe that no real change can occur by engaging in the political arena or by voting. This trait is found everywhere in Europe among young people of migrant origin; it is, in fact, one of the causes that pushes them towards radicalization (Change Institute, 2009). A small minority, often from within the middle classes among immigrants' progenies, become members of the political elite, but they are considered traitors by the young people of the poor districts, who reject them as 'lackeys of the white man'.

#### **4 Disaffected Young People**

Disaffected young people are typically between the ages of fifteen and thirty. Of a sample of 1,200 individuals who left Western countries between 2012 and 2015 to join Syria and Iraq, 14% were under 18 years of age; 27% were between 18 and 21 years old; 26% were between 22 and 25 years old; 17% were between 26 and 29 years old; 9% were between 30 and 35 years old; and 7% were 36 years old and over. If the age group of 14- to 25-year-olds is described as 'young', it comprises 67% of the total sample (Perliger & Milton, 2016). Most of these young people suffer from a feeling of non-participation in society and a profound sense of stigmatization, and they form the major part of the 'reserve army' of jihadists in Europe. Their adherence to radical Islam bears witness to the crisis of European societies. We can compare Amedy Coulibaly (who killed five people in Paris between 7 and 9 January 2015), Adel Kermiche (who 46 Khosrokhavar

murdered the Catholic priest Jacques Hamel on 26 July 2016) and Anders Breivik from Norway (who, on 22 July 2011, killed 77 people and injured 151 in the name of fighting the Islamization of Europe). In all three cases, we find:


#### **4.1** *Inverted Multiculturalism*

Jihadism cannot be solely attributed to disaffected young people of immigrant origin, whether in France, England, Germany, or other Western countries; but young Muslims of immigrant origin, from the first to the third generation and living chiefly in ghettoized neighbourhoods, constitute the majority among European jihadists.

Let us analyse one specific case. In 2013, Karim, Adil and Rabi were the first to leave Lunel, a town with 27,000 inhabitants in southern France. Since then, more than twenty young people followed them to Syria. Seven are already dead, including Karim. Hamza lived close to the shop kept by Karim and his brother Saad in Lunel. The two friends spent long hours discussing the upheavals in the Middle East, the warning signs of the end of time in Islam, and the ills of French society. 'I got a BTS [technician's diploma] in accountancy, and the result was that all native French students found a job, and we, the only two Arabs [French citizens of North African origin] of the class, we did not find any. … In France, the choice is whether the employer likes the look of the customer or not. For the Arab, manual work is normal, not a higher job, even if he is qualified', Hamza said to the researchers (see Kepel & Jardin, 2015).

To get Karim out of his predicament, Hamza activated the network of Johan Juncaj, an Albanian close to Mourad Farès, one of the main recruiters for the jihad in France. Before being formally identified by the intelligence services, Mourad Farès and Johan Juncaj created Facebook pages praising the holy war. For Karim, jihadism was a means to get revenge for the humiliation of having been mistreated by society; the humiliation of seeking and finding a job below his competence, which is shared by other young people with immigrant background in France (due to their North African origins) and England (due to their Bangladeshi or Pakistani origins) as well as elsewhere in Europe.

More generally, the feeling of being a second-class citizen, of being exposed to social prejudice and not having the same opportunities as other citizens, is widely shared by immigrants in Great Britain, Holland, Germany, Denmark, or Belgium, and empirical research by sociologists largely confirms it almost everywhere in Europe (Adida et al., 2013; Valfort, 2015; Dugan, 2014; Sedghi, 2014; Dobson, 2014).

Jihadism in this sense means reversing humiliation into a radical counterhumiliation which is inflicted on society as a whole as a retribution. Humiliating those who humiliated them is the dream entertained by many young migrants' sons who consider their lives destroyed by the arrogance of a society that considers them as subhumans.

In Europe, the vast majority of young people who enlisted under the IS flag (referring to the Islamic State, also called Daesh, and, more rarely, networks like Jabhat al-Nusra, which represent al-Qaeda) belong to the group of disaffected young people (Castel, 2007). Their view of society is marked by 'hatred' related to their social and racial condition. They feel marginalized, excluded, rejected, mistreated, stigmatized as second-class citizens, and reduced to being infrahuman, to being 'insects', as a young man told me in prison during the empirical fieldwork funded by the French Ministry of Finance that I conducted between 2011 and 2013 in four major prisons in France (Fresnes; Fleury-Mérogis, in the suburbs of Paris; Lille-Séquedin, in the vicinity of the city of Lille; and Saint-Maur, a high-security prison in central France). For an exhaustive analysis of this research, see Khosrokhavar (2016a).

This negative self-image, which is shared by many young men (but not women) living in the poor suburbs in France or in ghettoized neighbourhoods throughout Europe, makes understanding others impossible. Stigmatization becomes second nature among these young people. At a certain point, not only do they not do anything to fight against this negative self-image in constructive terms, but they corroborate the social prejudices by behaving accordingly: they act aggressively and reject white people—i.e. those of non-migrant origin thereby opposing the dominant society's racism with a counter-racism of their own.

The overwhelming majority of these young people do not take part in elections because, in their view, no noticeable change in their circumstances will occur regardless of the outcome of the vote. The only viable solution is to cheat the system and to get involved in the underground economy (traffic, drugs, theft, robbery). Violence also plays a role in bypassing the long road to economic integration: they refuse to start with underpaid menial jobs and to finish like their parents with an insignificant retirement pension, which 48 Khosrokhavar

is synonymous with indignity in their eyes. They want immediate access to middle-class status. They are in a situation of 'neither/nor' that generates rancour and a feeling of 'double un-belonging': they are neither Arab nor French; in the country of their parents, they are called 'dirty Frenchmen', but in France, they are 'dirty Arabs'. The same holds true for the young people of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin in Britain: they are 'Pakis' in the eyes of British citizens and 'nasty Englishmen' in Pakistan. Delinquency gives them an opportunity to obtain middle-class status symbols, thereby giving them a sense of joining the middle classes to which their parents were denied access.

It is also an act of provocation towards a society that treats them as less than nothing (*moins que rien*), as one of them told me in prison. The intense feeling of internalized indignity and the yearning to live in a provocative manner make them seek illegitimate recognition rather than legitimate recognition which, in their eyes, is inaccessible (see Honneth, 1995, for a discourse on the importance of recognition in modern life). They therefore long to become, not 'positive heroes' who are admired by others, but 'negative heroes' who are hated by society and yet glorified all the same by the media which assure the negative heroes notoriety based on their monstrosity and their superlative violence through jihadism and other avenues.

They *hate* society: hatred (*la haine*) is an anthropological category used by the very same young people to characterize their attitude towards society. Therefore, they literally accept (and some of them enjoy as a form of revenge) being hated by society in a reciprocal relationship, this time successful in their eyes, due to the 'fame' achieved through terrorist acts that push them to the forefront of the media. The recognition they seek is an inverted one: since they cannot be recognized for good, they must be acknowledged as evil in the eyes of others, inspiring fear instead of admiration, marking through deadly deeds the break with the dominant norm of non-violence.

In France, poor suburbs (*les banlieues*) are the venue of illegality for these young boys, who learn from a young age to share values of ostentatious consumerism through deviance. As young boys, they idolize the local *caïds* (chiefs) who 'succeed' by showing off their cars, fashion sunglasses, and branded shoes.

Deviance and dropping out of school are part of the culture of these poor districts for young boys because the normal way, the route through schooling and studies, leads them nowhere given their social and cultural handicaps. Their parents are unable to help them because of their lack of fluency in French or English or German, and, sometimes, their illiteracy. School fails them; the school environment in these poor districts is not conducive to 'healthy competition' in learning, and the fact that a high concentration of pupils come from anywhere in the world but the host country itself makes their acculturation to the host country's national norms difficult or almost impossible. In these districts reigns an inverted multiculturalism; to wit, a variety of cultures with the exception of the most important one, namely the host country's culture.

This type of multiculturalism creates individuals who lack an understanding of the body language and the daily habits of the larger society in which they live, and who have not learned through contact with other French, German or English individuals the basics of national behaviour, in particular as regards polite manners or fluency in the normal daily language. These individuals usually create a subculture of their own, using a mixed language where inverted words (*verlan*) some Arabic, English, and slang—give birth to a vernacular that is almost incomprehensible to the outsider. Black African, North African, Asian, even Chinese cultures are muddled up, with some dominant features of the North African culture in France, Bangladeshi or Pakistani in Great Britain, Moroccan in Belgium.

Espousing a subculture from which the mainstream national culture is all too often absent creates a generation that has major obstacles to overcome in order to become part of the larger society in terms of its cultural understanding of others. This subculture and the sentiment of being excluded generate a body language and verbal expressions that express this explicit fact of separation. Since the chasm between 'them' and 'us' is regarded as unbridgeable, the young people's attitude becomes provocative, even aggressive, and they accentuate it to express their rancour. Words made up of expressions that are unintelligible to outsiders and gestures often considered as threatening and even offensive by the dominant culture put other citizens ill at ease in front of these young men. While this aggressiveness is real, it is partly exaggerated by attributing an aggressive nature to these young men who, for their part, also live in the apprehension of the others, namely the 'Frenchmen' (the 'Englishmen', the 'Germans') who do not recognize them as citizens. When they leave their poor districts, these young men usually move in groups, thereby in turn increasing the level of apprehension experienced by the other citizens, who face a horde rather than individuals.

Between these young men and the other citizens stands a wall of misunderstanding, both sides rejecting each other and both characterizing the other in derogatory terms: the non-immigrant Frenchman calls them 'Arabs', 'Beurs', 'Bougnoules'; while they call the non-immigrant Frenchman 'Garoui' or 'Blanc' (White). This divide of mutually derogatory language exists all over Europe.

Transferring this identity from delinquency to jihadism requires some mutations, but it also preserves constant features like the revenge-seeking character of the individual: as a deviant youth, he 'shines' by squandering money and roaring his car, often stolen, which is then set on fire to make disappear the traces of the theft but also to underline the pleasure derived from destruction 50 Khosrokhavar

in a kind of modern potlatch (see Mauss, 1904–1905). By becoming jihadist, these deviant young people literally stage their own narcissistic tendency to magnify themselves at the expense of the disbelievers; they put their pictures on the internet in order to assert their glory and their superiority towards a society that has denied them a fair lot. Larossi Abballa, the killer of a French policeman and his companion in Magnanville on 13 June 2016, filmed himself, streaming the video live to Facebook; in March 2012, Mohamed Merah filmed himself murdering the Muslim soldiers and the Jewish father and his children in Toulouse and Montauban, sending the footage to the channel Aljazeera.

For many stigmatized young people, death is a means for having their superiority recognized by society (whereas in real life they suffer from inferiority); their exposure to deadly dangers flatters their wounded egos as they consider as inferior normal citizens who are afraid of death and avoid exposure to it. In Fresnes in 2013, in a large nineteenth-century prison close to Paris, a 25-yearold Frenchman of Moroccan descent, jailed for having been involved in drug trafficking and deeply marked by the stigmas of his origins, did not attribute his ideas to himself (for fear that I might denounce him to the prison authorities), but credited his friend for those opinions:

Mohammad: My buddy told me, they mistreat us, they put us in a hole in these poor suburbs, separated from the rest of the population, they put us in jail, they look down on us, they think we have no pride, we are like apes. But Islam gives us pride. That frightens them. They are afraid of death—we are not. When we lean on Islam, they are afraid of us; they don't despise us anymore, they believe we are reckless and violent. We know what we want, and after death we will go directly to paradise while they will go to hell! (Khosrokhavar, 2016a, p. 54)

Islamization in this context results in recovering the lost pride, becoming somebody that cannot be treated as inferior, pushing towards the holy war in order to overcome the humiliation of being an outsider, of being a Frenchman 'only on paper', a non-genuine French citizen. Radical Islam rejects citizenship and instead promotes violence in order to establish a new order in which those who were superior become inferior, and Muslims will gain the upper hand through the holy war.

Jihadists of the poor districts of Europe make up a tiny minority among European Muslims. Usually, male members opt for deviance if they do not succeed in getting integrated into the normal economy; however, if they succeed, they usually leave the poor districts to live in middle-class neighbourhoods instead. Once they choose Islam as a receptacle for their identity, they might become pietistic non-violent Salafists or jihadists. As jihadists, they transpose their aspirations onto a religious plane which restores to them their lost dignity they become the knights of the faith—and which satisfies their need for forced recognition by the others; because the others refused to acknowledge their dignity and mistreated them as second-class citizens, young jihadists assert themselves in a lofty manner through sacred violence. In their eyes, they do not seek violence for selfish and deviant motives as might have been the case in the past, but they seek violence to dispense a religious sentence to miscreants. Jihadism instils pride in the disaffected young people who think that they can only regain their dignity by transgressing the existing norms and by espousing a counterculture of sacred violence that doubly denies legitimacy to society: through religion (whereas in a democratic society the law, not religion, should be paramount), and through violence (whereas legitimate violence should be exerted not by the individual, but by the legal system).

By espousing radical Islam, these young people adopt a provocative attitude vis-à-vis the secularized societies that host them, and of which they are often citizens (although some are residents rather than citizens). As already mentioned, jihadist Islam plays a fundamental role in turning inferiority into superiority: they *were* insignificant, but now they are the self-proclaimed elites of a conquering faith; they were condemned for offenses or crimes; but now they condemn the society that judged them; they were unemployed subcitizens without public recognition, but they have become superbelievers who seek to coerce humanity into an intolerant version of Islam; they were anonymous, but they have become the stars of the internet and the world media.

The results of psychiatric analyses of a dozen jihadists reveal the following insights: most had not finished school; none of them had a professional career; their financial situation was precarious; they felt as if attacked by the void; they left for Syria to break free from an unattractive daily life (Bazex & Mensat, 2016). These traits united the excluded young people with no economic and social prospects, destined for a life with no future.

Among the marginalized young people in the poor districts of Europe where the families of immigrant origin are the majority, a tiny minority joined Daesh, but a significant proportion identified with non-violent Salafism, called pietistic or scientific Salafism. The latter has become a new type of socialization. It fosters a sense of community that is not set *against* the others but in stark distinction to them. Many pietistic Salafists attempt to separate themselves and their children from the wider society by avoiding a state school education (at the secular *École publique)* for their children. One pietistic Salafist based in La Reynerie, a poor migrant district of Toulouse, told me in August 2017:

Karim: My dream is to migrate to a Muslim country with my wife and child so that I can be in a Muslim surrounding where I can perform my 52 Khosrokhavar

daily prayers, avoid women who are without veil and sometimes halfnaked, and where I am able to raise my children far from the eyes of the *kuffar* (disbelievers). Here in France, state schools spread *kufr* (disbelief). Boys and girls are mixed in a sinful way; they look at each other in an illicit way; they learn that God should not interfere with human politics, that men and women are equal, that polygamy is forbidden—although men have mistresses and women have lovers, even married ones; that daily prayer is not tolerated in public. My wish is to go to a Muslim country where these *haram* (illicit) acts are forbidden in order to make my *hegira* (migration in conformity with the ideal of the Prophet of Islam who went from Mecca to Medina). This society perverts my daughter, who is mixed with male children and does not learn what is *halal* (licit) and what is *haram*; my wife has to protect herself against sin every minute when she is out in the street; she wears the total veil that is forbidden by French and Belgian law. Their TV, their radio, their media—they all spread sin. (Khosrokhavar, 2016a, p. 122)

As a rule, pietistic Salafists are not jihadist, and they often reject physical violence, preferring to build up sectarian types of closed communities.

Radical Islam as well as pietistic Salafism both provide a bond built against society, the former through violence, the latter through creating a closed group fostering a countercultural subculture that constructs a world of its own and raises a wall between the in-group and the others.

Radical Islam imposes a coercive sense of belonging through sacred duties, and it rejects freedom: 'good repression' is far superior to 'bad freedom', whereby bad freedom encompasses all kinds of modern freedoms, from the sexual to the secular (for example, sexual freedom, homosexuality, gender equality). Individual freedom has become trivial and sometimes devoid of meaning; many young jihadists prefer repressive norms that give sense to their lives to a set of freedoms that robs them of sacred norms. The major problem that distinguishes the new generation from that of 1960s is that it *suffers* from the lack of norms, and the unlimited freedoms to which its members are exposed make them unhappy. They do not know where to set limits: patriarchal family is dead, nothing seems sacred; the need for limits and transcendent principles gets the upper hand over the transgression of norms that characterized the generation of the 1960s and that created the 'revolution' of 1968 in France as well as social protests in the United States against the Vietnam War.

In many cases, freedom has become synonymous with loneliness and a lack of a sense of solidarity, in particular among those people who are exposed to the new rules of flexibility in labour relations, among those who find the freedom to remain jobless indefinitely meaningless, and among those who suffer from being left without protection against the blind forces of the market in the name of freedom.

Family fragility and women's liberation have contributed to the loss of the sense of identity; there is no longer a bond to provide resistance to the internalized sense of loss among those who suffer from economic fragility as well as anthropological instability within the family. In this social context, freedom is more a negative than a positive; it overburdens the individual with the risks of life without providing societal assistance and solidarity. Jihadism substitutes this cold society with a 'warm' (even 'hot') imaginary neo-umma to be built by the new heroic agents who put their lives at stake in order to construct the city of God in this world pending the advent of the end of time.

On the other hand, individuation reaches its upper limits insofar as the globalized individual has to assume many areas of his social, emotional, economic and cultural life that literally crush him under their weight. The negative dimensions of freedom push him to despair and depression whereas the positive dimensions (to choose one's work, to live in economic stability, to take advantage of one's rights within the welfare state in order to achieve a sense of freedom in culture and leisure) are becoming scarce. Self-depreciation, a feeling of deep mental instability, and a sense of being inferior (lack of intelligence causing one's failures in life) are common. Involvement in jihadism contributes to building a renewed self-esteem and overcoming the sense of instability by leaning on God, and by embedding oneself in a new community, namely the Islamic neo-ummah reshaped by the Caliphate, the IS. Exposure to the test of sacred death in the exaltation of staging the jihad creates a new situation that overcomes the lack of self-esteem and allows access to a positive acceptance of oneself in the heroic fight against the infidels.

#### **4.2** *Humiliation in School*

Humiliation begins at a young age at school for the sons and grandsons of migrants. I concentrate on the French case but *mutatis mutandis* my observations can be extended to many of the sons and grandsons of migrants living in the segregated poor districts of Europe, where they feel inferior to the middle-class lads who choose the main (academic) track, whereas they themselves are confined to vocational options. The school system also humiliates young migrants in another manner: migrant children from a wide variety of different cultures and backgrounds are put together without French pupils (or with only very few) who would introduce them to the mainstream French culture so that they could imitate it. What I call inverted multiculturalism begins at school, and it makes it impossible to become a 'normal' French person by 54 Khosrokhavar

learning how to behave according to the unwritten patterns in day-to-day contacts with other French people. In the poor ethnic neighbourhoods, young children live in a cultural mix that has no Ariadne thread to let them come out of the ghetto by showing them how to conduct themselves in ways that might be considered as normal in the mainstream culture. The specific body language developed by these young people begins at school, and it is a reaction to the lack of knowledge of the middle-class pattern as much as a transgression in order to denounce this lack of access to the codes of the mainstream culture.

Young boys develop an anti-school subculture, as Lacey (1970) and Willis (1977) observed a few decades ago. The main difference is that the young working-class boys of the 1970s acted in an aggressive manner against the rules of their schools because they knew that they had no chance to accede the noble sections of society and that once out of school, they had nothing but manual jobs waiting for them. Nowadays, it is not so much the prospect of unskilled jobs (there being largely no need for them in the highly automated industrial economy) but the desire to avoid visible exposure to unemployment by joining deviant groups that motivates migrant young men. The school curriculum does not allow them to embrace a middle-class career; it simply lets them choose pathways for ending up with lower-paid jobs under the supervision of 'native' French persons. They hate it because it reminds them of colonial times, and the type of discipline these jobs require (keeping precise officer hours, or social attitudes that are alien to their own world) exhausts them. They reject this kind of work and instead aspire to jobs in which they are the boss; for instance, working as a taxi driver for Uber offers them hierarchical autonomy. Likewise, being self-employed avoids suffering the postcolonial superiority of the 'white' boss or the disciplined attitudes that they find so humiliating. School is where many young people in the poor districts develop an unruly attitude as troublemakers: not believing in its ideals, having little respect for the teachers who are there for lack of another alternative (after the perfunctory period forced on them at the beginning of their careers, many teachers will leave these districts gladly). Young boys are well aware of the dead-end jobs for which they are destined even if they do succeed at school. Some of them enter university (Truong, 2015), obtaining the required diplomas for middle-class jobs, but in many cases this does not open up opportunities for better jobs because of their origins, their names, their accents, sometimes their lack of discipline, and their body language: with the same qualification, Mohamed, a migrant's son, has between a third and a fifth of the chance of French-born Robert to accede the same job (Dobson, 2014; Dugan, 2014). Education may open up some doors, but social stereotypes and stigmatization close many of them. Humiliation becomes a major problem at different levels for these young men, and one of the solutions (for the minority of cases by far) is jihadism.

#### **4.3** *Stages of Radicalization among Disaffected Young People*

Jihadism among the disaffected young people of migrant origin follows a series of stages that is different from those of the middle classes.

First, a sense of exclusion promotes social deviance. Life in the ghettoized neighbourhoods that I call jihadogenous districts causes the feeling of being banned from society. Ghettoization creates a desire to be recognized as *someone* in a subculture of deviance where honour is paramount and its defence is part of the domination strategy. Among jihadists, the rupture is deepened by the total rejection of 'the other' as 'miscreant'. Deviance frequently results in prison terms and recidivism.

Second, the erosion of traditional family structures promotes violence in the home and fosters early social deviance. Deviant socialization begins early. It is encouraged by the resignation of the father, the supreme authority in the patriarchal family, which has become, after less than half a century, not a 'blended' or an egalitarian family in the traditional style of the European middle class, but rather a 'beheaded patriarchal family' in which the figurehead of the father is simultaneously *de jure* paramount and de facto absent (either the father has gone back to his country, or there has been a divorce, or he is simply 'dethroned' by his sons) and in which children are raised by the overworked and overburdened mother. Despite the central role of the mother, the symbolic patriarchal figure of the father remains essential and, in the absence of the father, the big brother often tries to usurp his role by exerting violence against his brothers, sisters, and sometimes the mother. This beheaded patriarchal family is the privileged venue for the crisis of authority. Many suburban jihadists have suffered from this deeply deficient family structure in which the father figure is simultaneously paramount and absent. Many of these young jihadists were either placed in a children's home, or they lived in a singleparent family with much higher levels of violence than found in middle class neighbourhoods. To give just one example, Mohamed Merah suffered through this type of fatherless family, his older brother claiming to be the highest authority, the latter's attitude often leading to physical violence against him. Mohamed developed a hyper-aggressive character in the public institution where he was placed by the authorities, combining delinquency and violence. Similarly, Mehdi Nemouche spent time in a children's home and with foster families before being raised by his grandmother. The Kouachi brothers were orphaned very young, the mother prostituting herself occasionally to provide 56 Khosrokhavar

for the family before committing suicide, after which they were raised in a children's home. Amedy Coulibaly seems to be an exception, but many other cases highlight this crisis in the family.

Third, the deviant trajectory results in crimes that lead to imprisonment. From January 2012 to July 2015, 80% of those who committed terrorist acts had a criminal past, and 60% had spent time in prison (Basra et al., 2016). Prison then serves as a place of socialization for these young people, who include it in their life project as a 'rational risk' in their deviant attitude (Khosrokhavar, 2016a). Sometimes in prison, at other times outside, young people have a 'revelation' that leads them to radical Islam.

Fourth, a deepening of radical faith ensues whilst young migrants spend time in prison. Armed with their militant faith, these young people often deepen their religion whilst they are in prison by adopting a pre-oriented inclination towards jihadism: they read the radical Surahs of the Koran, which preach an uncompromising attitude towards the unbelievers or the other faiths, like *Tawbah* (repentance) or *al-Anfāl* (treasures of war), rather than those who preach tolerance (such as the Surah Kuffar). The deepening of their faith in prison (or sometimes outside) consists in overcoming their religious ignorance through their reading inspired by the radical version of Islam.

The fifth and final stage involves the journey of initiation that these disaffected young people make to the lands where jihad is raging. The Kouachi brothers made a trip to Yemen (one of them was invited and financed by Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-Yemeni jihadist killed by United States drones in 2011); Mehdi Nemouche went to Syria; Mohamed Merah made a trip to Pakistan and Turkey (and probably from there to Syria); Abdelhamid Abaoud, a major figure of the attacks of 13 November 2015, stayed in Syria in the service of the IS, as did Brahim Abdeslam, another member of the group. In addition, these people can be indoctrinated by charismatic figures at home, as was the case with Amedy Coulibaly, who did not go to a holy war country but was indoctrinated by Djamel Beghal, a major French/North African jihadist figure. The journey of initiation involves military training and encompasses the manufacture and handling of explosives. It generates a denationalization with regard to the society of origin, now considered foreign. Jihadist socialization outside the country of origin creates a new identity which is detached from citizenship and polarized by religious militancy. After their stay in the Islamic country in the service of the jihadist order, the adept becomes insensitive to extreme forms of cruelty, accepting beheadings of disbelievers or heretics (e.g. Shiites). War in the service of Daesh (or other jihadist organizations, like Jabhat al-Nusra) puts an end to empathy for the victims. In his utter insensitivity towards the victims, the mujahid (the combatant of the holy war, the jihad) performs the role of the executioner as much as that of the warrior.

While not necessarily all of the above five characteristics are present among the disaffected young people of migrant origin, at least three or four of them are present when they embrace jihadism.

#### **5 Middle-Class Jihadism**

In recent decades, the distinction between the middle classes and the working classes has tended to fade, particularly among the lower middle classes. The fear of social downgrading and proletarianization is no longer a marginal phenomenon but is found in the deterioration of the living conditions among many people who thought themselves to be among the entrenched middle classes. Chauvel (2016) highlights the effects of rising taxation, more expensive housing, devalued university degrees, and the increasing instability of employment and remuneration as the major causes of the decline of the middle classes. These factors provoke a feeling of deep insecurity among young middle-class people who are not certain that their future will hold access to the same living standards their parents enjoyed. Their desire to leave for Syria is partly linked to their lack of hope for the future. Between 2014 and 2015, Daesh seemed invincible; it conquered a territory of approximately 300,000 square kilometres, which is larger than the size of the United Kingdom. It paid a monthly salary of \$400 to \$1,000, and provided free accommodation—often the houses which had been abandoned by the Syrian middle classes were put at the disposal of the jihadist warriors—as well as a weekly shopping basket, delivered to them for free. For many of these young lower middle-class people, this meant social promotion on top of religious felicity.

In my interviews with young middle-class people who were prevented from joining Daesh, one of the reasons cited for seeking to join Daesh was humanitarian. Indeed, the desperate situation in Syria, where the protest movement against the Assad regime ended in 2012 in a bloodbath by the despotic government, and the intervention of the geopolitical actors in the region (Iran and Russia on the one hand, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, the United States on the other) pushed young Muslims or converts to help victims in Syria by means of legitimate violence. In the first wave of young people travelling to Syria from 2012 to 2013, the jihadist dimension itself was rather marginal. One can quote this young middle-class convert who received a suspended sentence in France for his attempt to go to Syria in 2013 and who claimed:

I was tired of injustice: Muslims were being killed in Syria and nobody cared, never mind the lofty expressions by the government. I wanted to do something, to help these people who got killed and were left alone. … 58 Khosrokhavar

Humanitarian assistance in the traditional sense was powerless. These people needed more than doctors or medicines, they needed to be defended against the bloody regime of Assad. (November 2013)

With the advent of Daesh, the process of ideologization began in the second half of 2013. Daesh was officially created in June 2014, but many months prior to its official proclamation as the Caliphate it was already attracting young men from all over the world. From that moment on, the idea that Muslims were being attacked by miscreants became dominant, and the holy war became a pressing religious duty (*fard al-ayn*) to be fulfilled; hell would await those who refused to engage in jihad. The aspirations of these young people were manifold. As already mentioned, many no longer had confidence in their futures in European societies where everything had been destabilized: the status of stable work, the family, the welfare state, but also the distinction between man and woman. This was the case for this young man, who was jailed for attempting twice to go to Syria in 2014:

We live in a country where the future they promise is bullshit (*de la merde*), our future is at best a badly paid job as a petty earner, dreaming of a better life, knowing full well that it is unattainable. My parents had a rather good life with a pension that allows them to enjoy life and holidays; mine will be worse. They had job security, in my case there will be none. I have a shabby university diploma that has not opened up the doors to any kind of bright future. I feel cheated, although I have a small job that gives me enough to live on, without high expectations. (November 2014)

Not only are the middle classes in an increasingly precarious situation, but nothing cements society together any longer; there are no common ideals, there is no utopia. This is what this middle-class professional computer specialist of North African origin in his early thirties, whose father fought alongside the French Communist party as a worker within the leftist trade union CGT (*Confédération Générale du travail*), maintained in an interview in Paris in October 2014:

Islam makes me feel tied with those who submit to Allah. What kind of common bond do I have with the others? My father was a communist, he was a Muslim from Algeria, but Islam was his faith, not his tie with the other citizens. Communism was his real bond with France, but also with Algeria and the rest of the world. He believed that he could create a new society where there would be no class, no exploiter, no exploited, and that was the link that united him with the labour movement in France. Others were socialists, others still found meaning in republicanism. Today, nothing of the sort is noteworthy, there is no link, people live in their own exile. Islam, at least, makes sense to me. I feel that I am not alone, that something relates me to those who share this religion. Islam provides meaning to me, a sacred meaning, something that is lacking in our society. But they hate it, people in France, but also in the West, [they] are fighting against Muslims; Islam has become the whipping boy (*tête de turc*), and racism against it is on the rise. I feel that Palestinians are oppressed, the Arab world is oppressed by the West, and Islam is the new enemy. They push us towards radicalization with their hatred. A girl with a simple scarf is a fundamentalist, whereas the naked FEMEN who desecrates a mosque is regarded with indulgence. Muslims are rejected, and to me that is the reason why they radicalize (October 2014). (Note that the FEMEN movement is a movement of young women who show their more or less naked bodies as a sign of protest against religion or other causes that anger them.)

For this young man's father, Islam was more or less a private matter in accordance with the French principle of *laïcité* (secularity); it did not mobilize him, contrary to the class struggle ideology. But to the young man, all those ideals are dead; the only meaning that remains is within Islam.

A second category of middle-class youth was tired of the peace reigning in Western Europe since the end of the Second World War—the war exalting a 'will to live' of Nietzschean nature; they were no longer satisfied with the dull status quo of the everyday life, especially in Europe. A European young person deprived of utopia looked for thrills that would shake up everyday life and introduce animation in the form of warrior exaltation and virile heroism. This young man, who dreamed of leaving France for Syria but was dissuaded by his friends, still entertained the dream of going somewhere to wage holy war in 2015:

I am bored to death. We have a life with a flat pulse; there is no excitement, no calling, nothing noble, nor exciting. The only ideal [that remains] is to get rich, to consume, and to find attractive girls to screw (*baiser*). I need more, something more thrilling and more heroic. I also need to be in a situation out of the ordinary. The war in Syria excited me; I saw the video footage of some young men proudly wearing their Ray Ban glasses, posing in front of their four-by-fours, (proudly) showing their submachine guns, defying death and killing the nasty soldiers of the Assad regime …. (Khosrokhavar, 2016a, p. 116)

This category included a large proportion of young middle-class people looking for adventure in order to escape boredom, emptiness, and paradoxically, 60 Khosrokhavar

the uncertainty of the future: war is an antidote to the fear of long-term economic uncertainty. The impression prevailed among them that the festive effervescence of the war and the intensification of life through it would make them forget the vagaries of the future and engender a situation of generalized joviality, blurring the frontiers of life and death, the possible and the impossible, the predictable and the unpredictable. In this way, these young people exorcized the anxiety of a risky future without a guaranteed prospect of individual and collective progress.

Some of the young middle-class people engaged in the deathly game in order to join an 'effervescent' community and to leave behind the 'cold' community of a nation in which individuals were left to themselves, insulated, and without any strong feeling of belonging. The imaginary neo-ummah of the jihadists provided a reinvigorated sense of togetherness to these young people otherwise bereft of hope, fearful for their future, inclined to regard it as devoid of economic and social progress, squeezed between the haves and have-nots. Identity crises among the middle classes are the more acute as Europe has jeopardized the political dimension of nationality by depriving the nation state of many of its former economic prerogatives. In an interview conducted in July 2014 in a project of middle-class Muslims and French society in an eastern Parisian district, this middle-class convert expressed his feelings in a rather brutal fashion:

Robert [Abdullah, his adopted Muslim name]: Islam has brought me a sense of genuine life. Before that I was a living dead, and my only goal was to become rich. The more I worked, the less I could be rich. What I earned was taken away in taxes and duties and squandered on stupid consumption of alcohol and sexual parties, and I was becoming a cash cow for the government and my occasional buddies and girlfriends. There was no sense of belonging, I was left to myself, the others were indifferent. Islam has given me a sense belonging to the same ummah; we are ready to sacrifice everything to achieve it. Before, I was a monster of selfishness; now I am ready to give away everything, including my life, to achieve the Islamic ideals. My former friends think I'm crazy, but in secret they envy me and my faith. Islam makes me feel more than a sheer consumer or somebody whose sole aim is to amass more wealth or to have more sex with beautiful girls. I belong to a group of people who have strong ties to God. (July 2014)

Robert, aka Abdullah, does not talk about jihad, but his readiness for the ultimate sacrifice might be understood in that sense. He was among those young people who were not radicalized but, due to his former life and disappointments, might still go to the extremes of the holy war.

In many cases, war allows for the positioning of oneself as a hero. Heroism contrasts with the insignificance of the self who, in the peaceful West, must wait indefinitely to find less and less stable jobs while living within families destabilized by half a century of feminism and egalitarianism. The possibility of cutting short this long and hopeless wait is provided by the war in which the young man can become an exceptional warrior. Confronting death opens up the prospect of a glorious future—if one survives. In case of death as a martyr, according to the Islamic tenet, the young man will find his place in paradise.

The feeling of insignificance is shared by the young middle- and lower-class people of Muslim origin. Both groups are beset by a feeling of having no calling, no purpose; the middle classes, because of the lack of utopia and a deep anomie in the Durkheimian sense, and the disaffected young people, because of their utter sense of being the despised underclass.

In 2013, in Fleury-Mérogis, the largest European prison, this Frenchman of Algerian origin expressed his dream of martyrdom in an unambiguous manner:

Ahmed: You know, those who die as martyrs in the battlefield, they are heroes in this world, but also friends of Allah (*awliya Allah*): they accept to die for God's sake (in the way of God, *fi sabil illah*); they are heroes in this world and eternally redeemed in the other world. Look at my life here: I am in prison for theft and once out, I'll do the same again. I have no choice, there is no future, I am utterly useless, I am less than nothing, I have no respect for myself. This is what I am up to. Martyrdom, for those who dare, opens the doors of paradise, and it also gives them self-respect. (February 2013)

The ideas of this disaffected young man and the middle-class converts converge at least partially: both find in the holy death a way for leaving behind the non-identity, indignity, insignificance, and loss of purpose in life within cold and impersonal societies where no common ties cement people together. In the case of the middle-classes, anomie and lack of calling is paramount, whereas among the disaffected young people, lack of self-respect, stigmas, and indignity push towards jihad and martyrdom.

#### **6 Jihadist Women and the Reaction to Feminism**

In the Islamic tradition, women who fought the enemies were first the *Sahabiyat* (companions of the Prophet), including Um ˈUmara Safiya: she cut off the head of one of the Jewish Arab attackers who climbed the wall of the fortress 62 Khosrokhavar

where women and children had taken refuge during the battle of Khandaq in 627. From the ninth to the eleventh century, the *mutarajjulat*—women dressed as men—fought and were cursed by the quotations attributed to the Prophet (the *hadith*). On the whole, the classic sources of Islam are very reluctant on the matter of the role of women in jihad (Cook, 2005).

However, a reinterpretation of tradition has been made by some scholars in order to legitimize the intervention of women in jihad (Lahoud, 2014). In particular, reference is made to the classical doctrine of defensive jihad (*jihad al-daf'*), stipulating that all Muslims—men, women, children, and slaves have the obligation to fight (*fard al-ayn*) to defend their territory and their faith in case of attack by the enemy.

Before the civil war in Syria in 2013 and the advent of Daesh in 2014, very few women were involved in jihad in Europe. From 2013 to 2015, there was a large increase in the number of women involved in jihadism: women totalled 1,023 (around 17%) out of 5,904 people who left Western countries for Syria (Cook & Vale, 2018). They were often from the (lower) middle classes. A few of them came from the suburbs or from the poor and isolated neighbourhoods from which the majority of young men hailed. Many had a proven criminal past (Basra et al., 2016; Atlantico, 2016); the cases of Hayat Boumedienne, Amedy Coulibaly's wife (one of the terrorists of the Paris attacks of January 2015) or Hasna Aït Boulahcen, Abaoud's cousin (Abaoud was one of the major terrorists in the Paris attack of November 2015) were the majority. They mostly came from families in which the jihadist stance was not dominant, or they were women of neo-traditional families in England who intended to obey the religious injunction of the new Caliphate; they were not from the poor strata, and most had no judicial record.

When women participate in jihad in Muslim countries, it is specifically to avenge a family member such as a husband, a cousin, a brother or father, murdered by the police, as was the case for the Black Widows in Chechnya. Or they accompany their husband, as with Sajida al-Rishwai, who tried unsuccessfully to detonate her belt in Jordan on 9 November 2005. In Europe, feminine jihadism occurred in a new fashion, and vengeance was not the major motive for their actions. Rather, it was a new identity based on more than half a century of feminism that paradoxically pushed them towards female jihadism.

Some post-adolescent young people found a way of becoming 'adults' through the war that, to them, assumed the role of a rite of passage. In an interview in a voluntary association in Île-de-France in June 2015, the sister of 15-year-old Nicole who left for Syria told me about her sister's strong urge to be married and to have children. While their mother, who had had children much later, told her to wait and build her own independent life, becoming a mother apparently felt essential for Nicole's gender identity:

Nicole insisted that she wanted to be a real woman, and to be recognized as such. […] She went to Syria, not because she was radicalized, but to achieve her goal of becoming a mother. (Khosrokhavar, 2021, p. 243)

To begin with, some young women intended to restore their image as genuine women as opposed to their mothers, who had become 'quasi-men' by adopting attitudes that seemed to deny their female identity. These young women opposed the dominant feminist tendency to become pregnant in their thirties by giving birth to 'lion cubs' at a much younger age in the service of their new faith. Some had military training in Syria (within the *Al-Khansaa* brigade). Those who were not able to join the ranks of jihad nourished a hatred of society and tried to constitute autonomous women cells. This was particularly the case for three young jihadist women in Paris who intended to blow up a car filled with gas cylinders in a tourist district in Paris in September 2016, one of them stabbing a police officer.

The self-assertion of jihadist women poses the question of a new style of feminism that is partially at odds with the leitmotif of traditional feminism based on the rejection of violence. The new logic of action exalts violence in an attitude that derives simultaneously from feminism, post-feminism, and anti-feminism. The feminist dimension lies in women's self-assertion and their ability to act without men leading them and or providing them with legitimacy. In France (not in Syria, where this would be impossible), women asserted themselves as autonomous agents of violent jihadism, whereas until then this had been the exclusive prerogative and the inalienable privilege of men. The feminist dimension here, at odds with non-violent Western feminism, is to contest the exclusivity of violent action by men in the name of holy war.

**6.1** *Convergence and Divergence with Men: Feminism and Its Avatars* The causes that attracted girls and women to Syria from 2013 to 2016 bore similarities to those that drew men there.

First, women constituted a significant proportion of workers and employees in Europe for at least two generations due to the benefits of feminism, the shaking up of the patriarchal family, and the advantages arising from the legal equality between men and women. As a result, they feel the same job insecurity and fear of the future as men—if not more, due to their disadvantaged position in the job market. In a society deprived of utopia where the sense of 64 Khosrokhavar

belonging has been weakened in many ways (the fragile family structure, the weakening of the nation state, the loss of job security due to globalization, and the new 'flexibility' in recruitment policies), women lean towards the utopia of radical Islam, attracted by its promise of an effervescent community and a restored family structure (a reassuring neo-patriarchal family rather than the destabilizing modern family).

Another common point is the monotony of everyday life and the boredom experienced in the peaceful European societies since the end of the Second World War. The instability and fragility of the family, even if it is experienced differently by men and women, have the same roots: the family is no longer perceived as solid in the face of the uncertainties of life and the multiplication of family models (man and woman, woman and woman, man and man, informal partnership, the 'blended' family). The 'à la carte family' puts the burden on the couple, who must negotiate their coexistence with each other, who must negotiate with the stepfamily which is diluting their authority, who must assimilate children bequeathed by stepfathers or stepmothers. The shared authority between the biological father and the new husband of the biological mother, or the mother and the new wife of the father, contributes to this growing sense of fragility of authority, which is now subject to endless negotiations between husband and wife or the two members of the couple. The dream of marriage to a knight in shining armour who might die after a few months was easily internalized by many of these young women who ventured into Syria because in their minds, marriage had already been affected in its immutability within their own family and put to the test of a destabilizing modernity.

The pride of being part of the new effervescent Muslim community, even though this proved to be an illusion upon arrival in Syria, was a strong motivation for young women to depart for Syria. The knight of faith was a role model opposing the de-idealized man to whose trivialization have contributed both feminism and the loss of his role as the exclusive financial provider for the family. A large proportion of these young women were drawn to Syria by the romanticism of love, which re-idealized men, rather than by adherence to the political ideal of a jihadist Islam or the desire to protect Muslims against secularization, both of which prevailed in the motivation of young men to travel to Syria.

Finally, there was a quest for norms and even discipline among women and men, a need for guidance that would give meaning and direction to their lives. For men, this was particularly the case among those who sought to join the police or the army and who, as unsuccessful candidates, turned to jihadism; this was the case for Mohamed Merah, who tried to join the *Légion étrangère* in France in 2010 before committing the deadly attacks against Muslim military men and Jews in 2012. There were many male examples, but there were also proven instances of similar female examples, like Hasna Aït Boulahcen, who dreamed of joining the French army (Rey-Lefebvre et al., 2015).

However, while women and men shared some aspirations for their relationship with the new Islamic State, other characteristics separated their motivations. To begin with, their relationship with death was different in the overwhelming majority of the cases, even though some jihadist women aspired to die as martyrs in the same way as men. While many girls died in bombings in Syria, the female death rate was much lower overall than that of men. They were not affected in the same way, and what often awaited women was the death of a husband, a period of mourning (lasting around four months), and then a possible marriage with a second husband.

#### **6.2** *The Need for Norms and a Strong and Inclusive Community*

Jihadist women, like their male counterparts, strongly aspired to belong to a community that would give meaning to their lives. The dystopia of Daesh, repressive and regressive but promising strong integration into a close-knit Islamic community (the neo-ummah), was highly attractive to young men and women living in European societies, where togetherness had become almost meaningless due to the lack of a shared utopia (up to the 1980s, utopias of socialism, communism, and republicanism (in France) had provided the promise of a better future and the cement of social togetherness in the present). The more restrictive the norms, the more reassuring they became, at least before jihadist women experienced real life under the aegis of Daesh in Syria. Rigid norms played a reassuring role for the anomic individuals in search of belonging to a hot community, as compared to the cold societies they lived in.

This is particularly the case for Saïda, born in the early 1980s in a nonpracticing North African family to a French mother of Algerian origin and an Algerian father who had seven children (de Féo, 2019). Saïda's parents divorced when she was thirteen years old. She blamed her father for not raising her as well as he had raised her brothers and sisters, loving her less than the other siblings. She was more tender towards her mother, and she worried about her because she did not perform the daily prayers and therefore risked hell in Saïda's eyes. In secondary school, Saïda had problems attending classes and turned to Islam, influenced by her friends. She tried to pass the police officer examination in order to fight against paedophiles, drug dealers, and other law breakers. Despite receiving good grades, she did not succeed because she did not provide a medical certificate of good health. She attributed the fact that she did not succeed in the examination to Allah. Afterwards, she also noted that working in a male environment such as the police would have been illicit 66 Khosrokhavar

(*haram*) from an Islamic viewpoint. She married a Tunisian Salafist in spite of the opposition from her parents, learning about Salafism (the *Salafiyya*) on the internet. She found answers to her questions on Islamic forums. She had fits of depression that she attributed to the sins she had committed prior to joining the Salafist faith. Not only did she yearn for rigid norms, but she also felt guilty for not having applied them previously. This type of aspiration is as prevalent among the peaceful Salafists (the so-called pietists who aspire to hegira, leaving Europe for a Muslim country rather than engaging in jihad) as it is among a significant proportion of Salafist jihadists (who consider violent jihad the only way to assure their redemption). Both are in search of restrictive norms, absolute certainties, a faith that will frame and give meaning to their existence. Wearing the full veil, Saïda was stopped by the police and, after an altercation, spent a night in prison. For her, the will to build another life with a set of self-imposed restrictive norms was a paramount existential question. The Salafist neo-ummah filled this void but stripped her of much of her free will.

#### **6.3** *Women Facing Violence: Total Muslims versus Negative Heroines*

For a new generation in the West, women's relationship with violence has been progressively evolving at an anthropological level. Violence still remains largely the preserve of men: the female prison population is 3.3% in France (République Française, Ministère de la Justice, 2020) and 5% in Great Britain (Silvestri, 2013). However, women's imagination, especially of very young women, regarding violence, has been evolving. As already mentioned, 17% of jihadists today are women. If we compare this figure with most extremist movements, this proportion is one of the highest, except in far-left movements like the Baader-Meinhoff gang (the proportion of women in this group exceeded 50% and at times reached 60%; see Neuman, 2016) or the Red Brigades in Italy. In the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, 5% of members were women (Gill et al., 2014); 6.4% of the members of the Basques organization ETA were women (Reinares, 2004). The number of Western women who went to Syria between 2013 and the first half of 2015 is as follows: 70 German (including 9 minors); 63 to 70 French; 60 English (20 minors); 30 Dutch; 14 Australian (Bakker & de Leede, 2015). Given how women are treated by Daesh, this proportion reflects *their* fascination with jihadism as well as that of adolescent girls and post-adolescents.

To begin with, violence is no longer being perceived as the exclusive preserve of men. It must be emphasized that this was already the case in the past, specifically in the second half of the twentieth century; examples include the Algerian women who played a major role in the Algerian war of independence in the early 1960s, the Chechen Black Widows up to the present time, but also the socialist and communist leftist women in Lebanon who took part in the movement against Israeli occupation through kamikaze attacks in the 1980s.

Some of the women who joined Daesh presented particular traits, especially their quest for 'de-Westernization' in order to embrace Islam more thoroughly and to become new women. These young women felt that 'Occidentality' (Westernness) had stuck to their skin like a straitjacket, preventing them from identifying fully, absolutely, totally with the neo-ummah which, in their eyes, embodied happiness in this world and bliss in the afterlife. For them, the West was first and foremost a reign of total secularization, the profanation of the sacred in the name of the supremacy of the secular, the annexation of the public sphere being by a non-religious (or anti-religious, in the jihadists' view) system of reference. Becoming a real Muslim was impossible in this situation. Leaving Europe was also finding a way to escape the all-secular public sphere where 'naked bodies' (women without veil, sometimes exposing their legs and/ or their forearms) were permitted. Shedding all occidental traits and habits became a prerequisite for recovering a full Muslim identity.

A 23-year-old woman from a secular middle-class background in France who converted to Islam became radicalized under the influence of a local preacher, according to her brother. She sought to become a total Muslim and left France for Syria in 2015. Her 28-year-old brother described her mindset in these terms:

She felt that the entire society was corrupt and perverse […]: 'I feel ashamed to be a French woman. Not only am I not free to be a proud Muslim, but other people dress and behave in such a way that I am ill at ease all the time. My dream is to migrate to a Muslim country, forget about France […], and embrace my Muslim identity […]'. (Khosrokhavar, 2021, p. 301)

I qualify Women and men of this category as 'total Muslims'. Benslama, in French, speaks of the *surmusulman* (the super-Muslim) to characterize those Muslims who look for more and more restrictions in the name of religion in order to prove to themselves worthy of their genuine Islamic identity. Super-Muslims are different in the sense that it is their quest for de-Westernization that characterizes them (see Benslama, 2016; Benslama & Khosrokhavar, 2017).

These total Muslim women want a world in the image of the uniqueness of Allah that would result in the unification of all spheres of existence under the protective wing of God. The secular world seems monstrous to them because it has broken off its ties with God, and is bound only by the soft consensus of the citizens who have banished God from their existence and have taken his place. The loss of the old utopias and the lack of meaning resulting from the absence 68 Khosrokhavar

of a cement for living together creates a climate of anxiety for some, who feel a strong need for an encompassing principle in the sense of Karl Jaspers (*das Umgreifende*, the encompassing, which gives sense to the existence and ties the community together, see Jaspers, 1948); or who long for mystery in the sense of Gabriel Marcel, who opposed the *mystery of the sacred* to the *problem,* understandable and susceptible of finding a solution in the secular world; (see Marcel, 1951). For a few years, Daesh brought this kind of meaning to the young men and women who entered the fold of Islam and broke with the West, the world of domination, desecration, and opposition to Islam and all that is sacred and transcendent. The Islamic State excommunicated a desacralizing and profane Western world by opposing it with an agonistic version of Islam that violently reintroduced the sacred into daily life and restored in a coercive manner a unified meaning to the world by guaranteeing individuals a blessed life after death if they fought the forces of evil incarnated by the agents of secularization in a diabolic West.

The West, the venue of feminism that managed to desecrate the patriarchal family, to bring the social roles of man and woman dangerously close to each other, and to make inaudible the desire to be a woman and to feel the body during precious childbirth for these young women, was experienced as alienating, making impossible the self-assertion as a genuine mother-woman. Admittedly, the desire for early motherhood among young women or adolescent girls could not reproduce the model of the past, that being the product of the imagination of young post-feminist girls and women. It was the reaction to many generations of feminists and the yearning for recovering a sense of womanhood rather than the desire to become a woman in the traditional sense. This romanticized worldview was totally destroyed for the majority of these young women after few months in Syria, when the patriarchal system and the subordinate status of women under the Islamic State became unbearable to many of them. But in Europe, prior to their journeys to Syria, many of these young women yearned for an exotic life, romanticized and estranged from their uninspiring daily life in the West.

Another step was taken in jihadism with the figurehead of the negative heroine who went beyond the total Muslim woman in terms of her radicalization. She was the feminine counterpart of the male negative hero. Her mindset was an explosive mix of feminism, anti-feminism, and post-feminism; her will to act hid her tormented character. The jihadist heroine sought to embody the countervalues of society, beginning with violence, acting for ISIS, mostly in the West. The more violent she became, the more she legitimized herself in her own eyes, inversely proportional to her de-legitimization in Western societies. She sought to punish the West through violent action. She also intended to attract new female adepts to strengthen IS. The number of these negative heroines was rather marginal. In contrast to the majority of the young women who intended to marry a knight of faith, they aspired to take up arms and to fight against the miscreants (the entire West) in order to defend radical Islam.

In Syria, except in rare exceptional cases, the *mujahidat* (female *mujahids*) could not intervene in the battlefield during the reign of the IS. In Europe, some of the women who were prevented from going to Syria turned their anger against their host society and became negative heroines. This was the case for the young women who tried to blow up a car in the tourist district of Notre-Dame de Paris in September 2016. One of them, Ines Madani, attacked a police officer with a knife and wounded him. She planned to play the role of a jihadist combatant *sensu stricto*. She had pledged allegiance to IS on the internet.

Women thus oscillated between the dream of love, the desire to break with a morose daily life, the yearning for building up a family beyond the fragility of the modern one, and the aspiration to recover their female identity by reinforcing its difference with men. A tiny minority intended to act as combatants in the battlefield or to attack their own country through terrorist action.

#### **6.4** *Women Converts and the Mythical Restoration of a Lost Unity*

Among the women who went to Syria (jihadist brides), a significant minority was made up of converts. For example, in January 2016, roughly a third of French women present in Syria within Daesh were converts (Guéguen, 2016). European female converts have a number of characteristics that distinguish them from the Muslim women or girls who left or were about to leave for Syria.

As already mentioned, a principle of active individuation underpinned their motivations: they felt called to an individual duty (*fard al-ayn*) that encompassed men and women (Hoyle et al., 2015, pp. 10–14). The distress of Muslim societies morally compelled some women to go to Syria to defend the dignity and the territory of Islam. Some English women took the initiative to go to Syria. To the overwhelming majority of them, being a woman no longer meant escaping this obligation which, in the past, applied only to men, if not *de jure*, then *de facto*. During the period from 2013 to 2017, when IS claimed the status of the Caliphate, individual awareness created a sense of obligation and responsibility towards the Muslim community that pushed individuals towards action. Sitting by idly promoted feelings of guilt for men and women alike. Engaging on the side of Daesh meant fulfilling their religious duty as Muslims.

The notions of the afterlife, divine justice, the last judgement, hell and its pangs, and paradise and its delights, preoccupied women as much as men. 70 Khosrokhavar

Secularization had apparently rendered obsolete those religious notions, which were thought to be strictly reserved for the private life of the citizens.

The behaviour of these young people fascinated by Daesh called into question the separation between the public and the private life: they questioned the relegation of religion to the private sphere; moreover, they wanted to annex the public life and put an end to the separation of politics and religion. In the perspective of these young people, the belief in the hereafter was rooted in an eternal reality that extended to the entirety of the individual's life (and in particular his or her life in the public sphere). This belief brought with it an ethical-religious sense that encompassed both the private and the public spheres while, in European societies, it belonged solely to the private sphere. This demand for religion by converted women and girls who questioned the dichotomy of private versus public spheres could be explained by the exhaustion of secular utopias throughout Europe and the emergence of new dystopias that attempted to coalesce the fragmented lives of individuals by insisting on the totality of their existence, private and public spheres at the same time.

Late modernity diversifies the sectors of life and tends to compartmentalize social relations without a link between them. The new regressive utopias, such as jihadism, attempted to unify all spheres of existence by denying the principle of differentiation and diversification in the name of a transparency based on the mythical unity of Islam. Daesh opposed an opaque and fragmented complexity devoid of unity with a transparent simplicity in which violence against the disbelievers gave a monolithic unity to the life of the believer. Women were particularly exposed to its seductive powers because the boundary between womanhood and manhood has become fuzzy, feminism having transformed women into quasi-men, the dialectic of gender equality having created an anguishing indistinctness with regard to their femininity. Radical Islamism reassured these women by re-inscribing the difference of the sexes into a sacred register where to be a man or to be a woman had an absolute meaning, reintroducing a mythical transparency which appeased the modern anguish of gender indistinctiveness. One can mention an afterlife in paradise that would soothe the anguish caused by the uncertainties of the present time through the assurance of eternal bliss.

Before their departure to Syria, the fascination among young European teenage girls with the Daesh-type family was rooted in the quest for a countermodel to the stepfamily (blended family) in which they lived, which was often marked by instability, a lack of unified authority, the disappearance of patriarchy without a new substitutive frame of reference, and the agonizing dilution of the distinction between men and women. The converted girls wanted to find a spouse who was the antithesis of the clichés of men in their daily lives, clichés marked by the loss of the former's superiority (the Islamic hero would re-idealize the man's role), the equalization that de-idealized men, and an egalitarian culture that rendered men effeminate or robbed them of their manhood (the Islamic warrior would restore the man's virility). What they were looking for was an exceptional man who could be *trusted*—someone who accepted the possibility of dying for his ideals would be trustworthy—and who also would back them in the vicissitudes of married life, who would not be intimidated by danger, and who would kill or get killed without flinching. His heroic nature would reassure young women anxious to idealize their future husbands.

Identifying herself with an effervescent neo-ummah in which she would assume the eminent role of the mother (ummah and *umm* (mother) stem from the same linguistic root in Arabic), she would no longer feel insecure. The extraordinary man would guarantee the couple an intensified marital life which would also be protected from the monotony and boredom which assail many modern couples after the first few months of marriage. Of course, the couple could be shaken by the death of the husband as a martyr, but *boredom* would not besiege them.

In Europe, girls spent hours on the internet looking for a suitable young man who would become their husband, while men used social networks to go in search of women once they had arrived in Syria and subsequently tried to seduce them by courting them according to Islamic norms. Women journalists contacted young European jihadists in Syria, pretending to be a young woman ready to migrate, in order to see how young jihadists tried to seduce young girls (see Erelle, 2015).

In addition, young women also wanted to become celebrities to raise themselves above their insignificance and give meaning to their lives: they built a new ego by making a new skin. The jihadist star system needed feminine figures who stood out for the quality of their propaganda on the internet and for their striking, even cruel, character. This was the case for Samantha Louise Lewthwaite, Maria Giula Sergio, and Emilie König, who all made a name for themselves in the global jihadist network and attracted young girls in whose eyes they were envied stars.

Finally, the spectacle of a Syrian society plagued by death and destruction has induced an attitude of compassion that can create a humanitarian goal of a new kind: to help the Muslims of Syria against the heretical regime of Assad, legitimizing the use of violence which is perceived as legitimate, and bypassing non-violent options in the name of the higher values of Islam. This argument was confirmed by the stories of a dozen American women, who might easily have been Europeans, arrested before they left for Syria, exemplified by Shannon Conley, a 19-year-old woman from Colorado who was sentenced to four years in prison for trying to help Daesh (Hughes, 2015).

#### **7 Conclusion**

Under the reign of Daesh, many men and women, mostly from Europe, went to Syria, driven by a fascination with the new Caliphate. Their imaginary view of Islam and their grievances towards society as well as their sense of exoticism and romanticism played a major part in their readiness to identify with the new Islamic State. The latter acted swiftly through social media to heighten young men's perceptions of the exceptional knights of Islam that would await them in Syria, and to inflame young women's desire to become adult women, willing and able to build up new family ties through marriage and motherhood in an exotic setting, all in the name of an imaginary Islam. The twists and turns of their subjectivity have to be understood in order to grasp their fascination with Daesh.

#### **Acknowledgement**

This chapter is a revised version of Khosrokhavar, F. (2019). The jihadist social actors in Europe. In E. Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, H. J. Abs, & P. Müller (Eds.), *Thematic papers based on the conference "Migration, social transformation, and education for democratic citizenship": 2nd InZentIM conference & 6th EARLI-SIG 13 conference*, *August 27–29, 2018* (pp. 243–273). DuEPublico. doi: https://doi.org/ 10.17185/duepublico/47769

#### **References**


Mauss, M. (1904–1905). Essai sur les variations saisonnières des sociétés eskimos: Étude de morphologie sociale [Essay on seasonal variations in Eskimo societies: A study of social morphology]. *L'Année Sociologique*, *IX*, 6-119. http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/mauss\_marcel/socio\_et\_anthropo/7\_essai\_

societes\_eskimos/essai\_societes\_eskimos.html

	- http://www.prisonobservatory.org/upload/PrisonconditionintheUK.pdf

### **PART 2**

### *Analysis of Preconditions within the Educational Context*

∵

## **The Role of the Quality of Social Relationships at School in Predicting Students' Endorsement of a Pre-Extremist Attitude towards Religion**

*Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Johanna F. Ziemes and Hermann J. Abs*

#### **Abstract**

Recent research suggests that radicalization must be seen as a process that evolves over time and that starts in childhood. According to Beelmann's (2020) socialdevelopmental model, the interplay between risk and protective factors in childhood and early adolescence impacts whether and how proximal radicalization processes, among them the acquisition of political or religious extremist ideologies, will be triggered. Some studies suggest that negative social relationships at school contribute to students' risk for radicalization in addition to sociodemographic, education-related, and personality-related factors. Against this background, we investigated the relative contribution of the quality of relationships at school (student–teacher, student– student, victimization) to predicting pre-extremist attitudes in a normative sample of adolescents. We used the German data from the 2016 *International Civic and Citizenship Education Study* involving 1,451 eighth-grade students (mean age = 14.29; 52% girls). Bivariate associations for relationship quality and pre-extremist attitudes (religion being more important than national politics and laws) were very small. Hierarchical regressions indicated that being a Muslim, being a Christian, and frequently attending religious services each positively predicted pre-extremist attitudes. However, being a Muslim and attending religious services frequently strongly negatively predicted pre-extremist attitudes. This finding confirms earlier research indicating that Muslims' intense religious practice may act as a protective factor against religious extremism and radicalization. Civic knowledge and socioeconomic status were found to be negative predictors of pre-extremist attitudes. Results are discussed from a combined developmental and educational perspective.

#### **Keywords**

quality of social relationships at school – pre-extremist attitude – religion – risk factors – protective factors – ICCS 2016

© Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Johanna F. Ziemes and Hermann J. Abs, 2022 doi:10.1163/9789004525658\_004

This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-SA 4.0 License.

#### **1 Radicalization and Extremism**

[…] the developmental tasks of adolescents—among them developing a personal, social, and political identity, redefining bonds and relations, and forming new relationships—make them vulnerable to radical beliefs. (Pels & de Ruyter, 2012, p. 313)

Political and religious radicalization and extremism pose a threat to the stability of democratic societies (e.g. Ghosh et al., 2017). Both the term extremism and the term radicalization have been defined in various ways (Beelmann, 2020), but a generalized specific terminology has not yet been developed (Lösel et al., 2018). Very simply, political, religious, or other forms of extremism can be described as a 'significant deviation in attitudes and behaviour from basic legal and political norms and values within a social system (society or state) that seek their (at least partial) abolition and replacement' (Beelmann, 2020, p. 2). Radicalization denotes the process by which these attitudes (sometimes also referred to as beliefs) and behaviours emerge and develop in individuals and groups, representing a 'change in the individual's psycho-cognitive construction of new identities' (Ghosh et al., 2017, pp. 6–7). The beliefs adopted in this process serve to justify the use of violence for bringing about political and social change (Doosje et al., 2016; Lösel et al., 2018). Thus, the stability of democracies can be threatened by large groups of people undermining the support of its fundamental values. In the context of the present chapter, we address extremist attitudes and behaviours that are not in line with democratic values.

A growing body of research from various disciplines (e.g. sociology, criminology, political science, psychology) has searched for explanations for how, when, why, and under what circumstances extremism and radicalization emerge and develop, and has explored potential reasons for why they may assume violent forms like terrorism (e.g. Borum, 2011; 2014; Knight et al., 2017). One focus lies on exploring how and why (very) young individuals radicalize themselves. Findings from recent research indicate that social-developmental processes contribute to radicalization and extremism. Therefore, identity problems, prejudice, political or religious ideologies, and antisocial attitudes and behaviours have been described as 'core conditions for radicalization and extremism' (Beelmann, 2020, p. 1). Further theoretical explanations of radicalization include, for example, the 'lone wolf' trajectory; difficult childhood experiences like rejection, exclusion, or bullying due to a migrant history; association with violent or extremist groups; or identity problems during adolescence (e.g. Beelmann, 2020; Nivette et al., 2017).

The search for both *push* (driving people towards extremism) and *pull* factors (attracting people towards extremist groups and lifestyles; see Vergani et al., 2020) and the identification of specific risks and vulnerabilities have resulted in rich empirical and theoretical descriptions and the development of various process models. Examples are Borum's (2014) contextualized model of 'worldview, psychological vulnerabilities and propensities for involvement in violent extremism' or Beelmann's (2020) social-developmental model of radicalization, the latter focusing not only on the actual genesis of radicalization but also taking into account developmental preconditions.

Although not all extremism is violent (Knight et al., 2019), there seems to be a danger that, given certain circumstances, violent means might be employed by individuals and groups to achieve their goals, resulting, in extreme cases, in terrorist attacks (e.g. Ghosh et al., 2017). Drawing on Moghaddam's (2005) metaphor of the 'staircase to terrorism', Ghosh et al. (2017) describe a stage model of transformative behaviour with fundamentalism at the bottom, followed by extremism, radicalism and, finally, terrorism in a sequence of continuously narrowing steps. The continuous narrowing of the steps represents the decreasing number of people who can be persuaded to continue 'climbing'. Preventing (young) individuals from climbing the staircase towards violent and terrorist acts is seen as a core task for both society and education (Ghosh et al., 2017; Moghaddam, 2005).

Whilst the staircase model describes the behavioural side of radicalization with terrorist acts as the culmination of the process, the two-pyramid model by McCauley and Moskalenko (2017) distinguishes between behavioural and cognitive radicalization pathways. The *cognitive* pathway (i.e. the *opinion radicalization pyramid*) leads to extremist ideologies and beliefs and must be distinguished from the more dangerous *behavioural* pathway (i.e. the *action radicalization pyramid*), which leads to action (see McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017, p. 211). McCauley and Moskalenko underline the necessity for conceptualizing two distinct pathways by referring to the rather weak empirical relationship between extreme (or radical) attitudes and the corresponding behaviours, observing that '99% of those with radical ideas never act' (p. 212). However, individuals holding radical attitudes may provide moral support, exert moral pressure, and offer (post-hoc) justifications to action-prone individuals, thereby playing an indirect role in supporting radical (and violent) behaviour. Moreover, the endorsement of radical attitudes, including the justification and support for radical behaviours, was found to be a significant risk factor for both radical intentions and behaviours in a recent meta-analysis of 57 studies involving mostly samples comprising (young) adults (Wolfowicz et al., 2020). Accordingly, considering factors which promote or prevent the development of radical attitudes is relevant for the prevention of radical behaviours. All told, preventing the development of radical attitudes even in those individuals who will never enact radical behaviours is key because such attitudes provide an 'empowering climate' for those individuals who are disposed towards radical behaviours.

#### **1.1** *Developing Extremist Attitudes: Risk and Protective Factors*

Various individual, social, and societal/contextual risk and protective factors regarding radical/extremist attitudes and behaviours (perpetration) have been identified, mainly from studies involving (young) adults (see Beelmann, 2020). Meta-analytically confirmed risk and protective factors for developing radical or extreme attitudes were described recently by Wolfowicz et al. (2020). Risk factors include, for example:


Protective factors include, for example:


The larger number of risk factors reported here reflects the relative dearth of research on protective factors (Beelmann, 2020; Lösel et al., 2018).

More recently, researchers have also begun to investigate risk and protective factors in adolescent populations (Lösel et al., 2018) and have particularly addressed the issue of vulnerability (Harpviken, 2020), the latter being understood as 'a state of openness to attack, harm or damage' (Borum, 2014, p. 291). In his social-developmental model of radicalization, Beelmann (2020) proposes that radicalization occurs in three consecutive stages spanning early childhood to middle adulthood, namely: Stage 1—ontogenetical developmental processes; Stage 2—proximal radicalization processes; and Stage 3—political or religious extremism.

In Stage 1 (encompassing the age range from early childhood to early adulthood), ontogenetic developmental processes include the interplay between risk and protective factors. Risk factors (individual, social, and societal) are causally linked to radical/extremist attitudes and behaviours, whereas protective factors (general and extremism-specific) can counteract the effect of a risk factor (Beelmann, 2020, p. 7). How this interaction plays out over time impacts the increase or decrease in an individual's risk of radicalization, with a chronic imbalance in favour of risk factors leading to an increased probability that the subsequent proximal radicalization processes (i.e. Stage 2) will be triggered.

Stage 2 of Beelmann's model encompasses the years from early adolescence to middle adulthood (age fourteen to about age thirty) and is more closely and directly linked to radicalization. It 'represents the central preconditions for political or religious extremism to emerge' (2020, p. 8) and covers the life phase during which the radicalization of most extremist offenders occurs. The four proximal processes of radicalization include identity problems, prejudice, political or religious ideologies, and antisocial attitudes and behaviours. These processes both influence and reinforce each other while at the same time exerting distinct influences on extremist attitudes and behaviour. The ontogenetic risk-protection background resulting from Stage 1 forms the backdrop against which current individual, social, or societal problems or events can trigger or reinforce the four proximal radicalization processes, as follows:


illegal and violent means to reach extremist goals. Often, these ideologies are created in the context of in-groups which are also engaged in constructing prejudices. Among core risk factors for adopting such ideologies are certain personality characteristics (e.g. authoritarianism), a societal context which condones these political or religious ideologies, and contact with groups that uphold them.

– *Proximal radicalization process 4: Antisocial attitudes and behaviours—*these represent the fourth proximal radicalization process and are characterized by a marked tendency to break age-related social rules and norms and engage in antisocial and delinquent behaviours. The strongest risk factors relate to an early onset of aggressive and antisocial behaviours (already at preschool age) as well as to an affiliation with delinquent peer groups in adolescence.

The interaction between the ontogenetic risk-protection history with the 'current triggering social context, against the background of social intergroup processes' (Beelmann, 2020, p. 9) determines the type and strength of the above proximal radicalization processes. In turn, the strength of these proximal radicalization processes is directly related to the risk of developing extremist attitudes and behaviours, i.e. Stage 3: the stronger these processes, the greater the risk. However, protective factors like having a non-deviant partner or stable employment may still buffer the effects from Stage 2. The interplay between the different factors at the various stages also implies that different individual trajectories towards radicalization are possible (Beelmann, 2020). This is also described in Borum's (2014) worldview model or McCauley and Moskalenko's two-pyramid model (e.g. 2017). The multicausality characterizing Beelmann's (2020) model as well as its developmental perspective render it particularly valuable for attempts to explain how students may develop pre-extremist/fundamentalist political and/or religious attitudes, and how these might contribute—given unfavourable social and societal circumstances—to enhancing their risk of further radicalization. In sum, both 'general' radicalization research targeting mainly (young) adults and developmentally oriented research indicate that radicalization unfolds and intensifies over time and results from an interplay of both individual and social risk and protective factors. This underlines the need for early prevention.

#### **1.2** *Fundamentalist Religious Attitudes and Beliefs*

Using Moghaddam's (2005) staircase model as a starting point, we may locate fundamentalism, i.e. the endorsement of fundamentalist attitudes and beliefs, at the lowest step of a potential radicalization trajectory. Alternative definitions of fundamentalism sometimes equate fundamentalism with radicalism or terrorism (e.g. Koopmans, 2015). The definition used in this chapter refers specifically to attitudes; it describes fundamentalism as consisting of three interrelated attitudes, namely that 'believers should return to the eternal and unchangeable rules laid down in the past; … [that] these rules allow only one interpretation that is binding for all believers; … [and that] religious rules should have priority over secular laws' (Koopmans, 2015, p. 35). This kind of attitude may also be conceptualized as representing macro-religious beliefs according to the classification by Driskell et al. (2008) by including 'broad, worldly concerns' (p. 302).

As discussed in the previous sections, however, even the endorsement of extreme attitudes (one step above fundamentalism according to the staircase model) or radical attitudes (one step above extremism) does not automatically lead to radical or terrorist action but rather represents attitudinal propensities and potential psychological vulnerabilities that may become activated in given contexts and based on specific circumstances (e.g. Borum, 2014). According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2017), fundamentalist attitudes must also become linked with a given religious and/or political cause (e.g. the jihadist terrorist cause) to reach higher levels of the opinion pyramid, whereby the highest level represents a perceived moral obligation to take up violence in defence of 'the cause'.

At this point, we can establish a link to Beelmann's (2020) social-developmental model of radicalization as described above. Political or religious ideologies represent one out of the four social-developmental (proximal) processes that are triggered by actual conflicts (social, societal, or individual) and that are 'marked by continuous intergroup processes' (p. 1). The likelihood of developing extremist attitudes and behaviours is positively related to the intensity of these proximal processes. For religious or political ideologies, this means that the more pronounced they are, the greater the likelihood is that they contribute to developing extremist attitudes and behaviours in the context of particular triggering factors. Accordingly, the endorsement of fundamentalist religious or political attitudes may be understood as a potential openness towards adopting more extreme forms of related religious or political ideologies.

From an empirical perspective, behavioural radicalization represents a rather simple, specific, and relatively easy to measure construct, whereas cognitive radicalization according to the attitude pyramid (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017) constitutes a less specific and more complex construct. Thus, cognitive radicalization is often assessed using a variety of more or less specific proxy variables, whereby measures of the support or the justification for radical violence and terrorism are among the most specific (Wolfowicz et al., 2020). Consequently, attitudes and beliefs as cognitive outcomes of radicalization can be assessed along a broad spectrum, involving more proximal (directly supporting and justifying radical violence and terrorism) or more distal indicators. Distal indicators do not represent radical or extremist attitudes per se but attitudes that have been consistently found to be related to radical and extremist attitudes and behaviours like, for example, fundamentalist religious attitudes (see the meta-analysis by Wolfowicz et al., 2020), which is the outcome that we are targeting in this study. Taken together, involving distal indicators like pre-extremist attitudes helps to assess individuals' openness towards adopting more extreme ideologies.

#### **2 The Role of Socialization and Education at School in Promoting or Counteracting Radicalization**

The contribution of socialization and education at school to promoting or preventing radicalization and extremism is not yet clear (e.g. Pels & de Ruyter, 2012; Vergani et al., 2020). Some research identifies lower levels of education as a push factor, indicating that, for example, lower levels of education are associated with strongly dichotomous worldviews and identities that are themselves predictive of radicalization (Vergani et al., 2020). The meta-analysis by Wolfowicz et al. (2020) indicates that higher levels of education represent a protective factor against developing both radical attitudes and radical intentions, although the effect sizes found were small. In the systematic review by Lösel et al. (2018), attending higher education and good levels of achievement in school were also identified as protective factors against extremism and radicalization, with the former playing an important role regarding religious/ ethnic ideology. Therefore, education in schools may help to foster protective factors against radicalization. In addition, higher levels of civic knowledge may foster students' ability to understand other groups' points of view, and fostering social relationships may promote affective bonds between students of different groups, thereby increasing tolerance (Ziemes & Abs, 2020).

Generally it seems that until recently, radicalization research has only marginally considered the role of children's and adolescents' socialization and educational environments (Pels & de Ruyter, 2012). However, as discussed earlier, radicalization processes start at school age (Beelmann, 2020). Youngsters are particularly vulnerable to endorsing radical beliefs during their adolescent years, mainly because of the developmental tasks they are facing, such as 'developing a personal, social, and political identity, redefining bonds and relations and forming new relationships' (Pels & de Ruyter, 2012, p. 313). Therefore, in order to better understand radicalization processes, it is important to consider not only the role of student's educational level or success, but also the quality of relationships which students form with core socialization agents at school, i.e. with teachers and peers.

**2.1** *The Quality of Social Relationships in School and Student Outcomes* The quality of social relationships at school is meaningfully related to core academic, social, and health outcomes in students. The quality of the student– teacher relationship has been linked to students' social, emotional, behavioural, and academic outcomes (e.g. Farmer et al., 2011; see also the review by McGrath & Van Bergen, 2015). Positive student–teacher relationships are associated with outcomes like an enhanced sense of school belonging (Wong et al., 2019), academic achievement (Hattie, 2009), peer liking (Hendrickx et al., 2016), and prosocial behaviour (Luckner & Pianta, 2011). Moreover, they have been found to prevent peer aggression, specifically bullying and victimization (e.g. Konishi et al., 2010). In addition to their predictive function, positive student–teacher relationships have been identified as a protective factor for students in general and particularly for those students at risk of both socioemotional and academic difficulties (McGrath & Van Bergen, 2015; Sabol & Pianta, 2012). A positive relationship between teachers and student may also buffer adverse effects of ethnic discrimination by peers. A recent study by Civitillo et al. (2021) found that a high quality of the student-teacher relationship attenuated the negative association between perceived personal and group discrimination and both global self-esteem and emotional school engagement.

Regarding the quality of student–student or peer relationships, research has consistently indicated that positive relationships are important for students' cognitive, academic, motivational, emotional, and social development (e.g. Bukowski, 2001; Deci & Ryan, 2008; Hay et al., 2004), and that they are positively related both to trust in political institutions (Ziemes et al., 2020) and to tolerance (Ziemes & Abs, 2020). Additionally, positive student–student relationships have been found to prevent peer aggression, specifically bullying and victimization (e.g. Konishi et al., 2010).

Bullying (perpetration) and victimization (being the target of bullying) are indicators of dysfunctional, negative peer relations (Lenci & Matuga, 2010). Bullying is characterized by a certain repetitiveness and an imbalance of power between bully and victim (e.g. Olweus, 2003) and manifests a genuine lack of respect (see Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger & Ziemes, 2017). As constructs of 'otherness' lie at the heart of bullies' and bystanders' justifications for their behaviour, they use all possible facets of diversity to justify and 'legitimize' their systematic aggression against others as well as the discrimination and marginalization of others. Student characteristics related to migration, ethnicity, nationality, language, and culture are one potential source of diversity (see Oliveira et al., 2015). A growing body of research has investigated whether systematic relationships exist between these sources of diversity and bullying. Result patterns are mixed and complex. Some studies indicate that there are no differences in the prevalence of bullying and victimization between ethnic minority and white majority children (e.g. Durkin et al., 2012), while other studies indicate that 'first generation immigrant adolescents' are more often victimized by peers than 'third generation and native counterparts' (see the meta-analysis by Pottie et al., 2015). The grave psychosocial, health, and academic consequences of experiencing victimization at school have also been extensively longitudinally documented during the last three decades (e.g. the meta-analysis by Moore et al., 2017).

Finally, the generalized quality of social relationships at school (often conceptualized as school climate) has been identified as one essential factor determining core student outcome variables like, for example, academic achievement, school absenteeism, aggressive behaviour, or psychosocial health and wellbeing (e.g. Durlak et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2016). Positive social relationships at school fulfil students' basic need for social belonging, i.e. to feel connected to others, to be accepted, respected, and appreciated, as described by self-determination theory (e.g. Ryan & Deci, 2001).

#### **2.2** *Relationship Experiences at School and Radicalization*

We may assume that negative relationship experiences at school can contribute to radicalization processes, whereas positive social relationships at school and a feeling of school connectedness or school bonding may represent factors preventing or reducing extremism (Roffey & Boyle, 2018; Lösel et al., 2018; Wolfowicz et al., 2020). Regarding the former, negative experiences with peers and relevant adults (e.g. bullying, social exclusion, discrimination) have been identified as one level of strain that renders adolescents vulnerable to extremism (see the review by Harpviken, 2020). These experiences of violence and abuse seem to operate both at the level of attitudes and behaviours: on the one hand, they heighten the risk that individuals endorse extremist attitudes; on the other hand, they increase the risk that individuals become involved in violent extremism (Knapton, 2014; Knight et al., 2017). However, there seems to be a lack of studies which specifically target the role that the quality of teacher–student and student–student relationships plays in an individual's radicalization.

Beelmann's (2020) conceptualization of political or religious extremism 'as an expression of deviant social development' (p. 5) offers a more integrated view of the role which social relationships in general play in radicalization. Based on his model as described above, we may hypothesize that negative social relationships at school operate at different stages of the radicalization process. Regarding ontogenetic developmental processes, negative social relationships at school (e.g. bullying, victimization, social exclusion, discrimination) may act as individual social risk factors. For example, they may exacerbate individuals' experiences of social exclusion and low acceptance outside of the school context, contributing to a generalized experience of being isolated and not being accepted. With respect to proximal radicalization processes, negative social relationships at school may act as trigger conditions or accelerators. For example, they may contribute to the development of identity problems by thwarting individuals' need for appreciation, making them feel marginalized and treated unjustly.

School-based experiences of victimization, discrimination, marginalization, and rejection all have one factor in common: they indicate to individuals that they *do not belong* to the school and classroom community. Accordingly, individuals' basic need to belong is thwarted (see Roffey & Boyle, 2018), rendering them more vulnerable to extremist attitudes and behaviours (Beelmann, 2020). Conversely, positive relationship experiences at school may act as a protective factor by making individuals feel welcome and accepted. However, systematic research is scarce, particularly regarding the relationship between teachers and students, for which no studies seem to exist. In sum, school represents a potentially relevant context for radicalization, regarding both the academic and the social context. Whether students' need to belong is fulfilled or thwarted may thus impact their potential openness to extremism.

#### **3 The Present Study**

Radicalization represents a developmental process over time, with proximal radicalization processes spanning from age fourteen (early adolescence) to about age thirty (Beelmann, 2020, p. 8). Therefore, radicalization processes that are potentially proximal and more intensified start to play out during a critical phase. In early adolescence, students attend secondary school and often must adapt to a new school environment. They face challenges in their individual, social, and academic development. The developmental task of forming a personal, social, and political identity renders them especially vulnerable to radical beliefs (Pels & de Ruyter, 2012). In other words, potential proximal radicalization processes coincide with a developmental phase during which students are particularly vulnerable to such processes.

Against this background, we explored the link between the quality of social relationships at school and pre-extremist attitudes in multi-ethnic classrooms. We pursued the following research question: Does the quality of social relationships at school predict the endorsement of pre-extremist attitudes in multi-ethnic classrooms? More specifically, we investigated whether the quality of the student–teacher and student–student relationship negatively and victimization experiences positively predict pre-extremist attitudes. To investigate the potential relationships at the population level, we decided to use a representative, normative (i.e. non-clinical) sample of secondary school students. To this end, we accessed the German data of the 2016 *International Civic and Citizenship Education Study* (ICCS, 2016). Using ICCS data had the additional advantage that the study focuses on students with an average age of fourteen, thereby capturing the age at which proximal radicalization processes become relevant according to Beelmann's (2020) social-developmental model of radicalization.

As core sociodemographic variables have been shown to be related to radical attitudes (some as risk and some as protective factors; see Wolfowicz et al., 2020), we included gender, age, socioeconomic status, and immigration background as additional potential predictors. Another potentially relevant area in students' lives refers to religion. Research suggests that whereas religious *practice and adherence* seem to play only a marginal role as a risk factor for developing radical attitudes, religious *identity* seems to have a much stronger influence (e.g. Koopmans, 2015; see Wolfowicz et al., 2020). Accordingly, we included both the religion with which students identified and their religious practice as additional potential predictors.

Furthermore, positive attitudes towards society and political values such as democracy have been identified as an extremism-specific protective factor (Beelmann, 2020, p. 6). However, there seems to be little comprehensive research on whether and to what extent political education (e.g. citizenship education) is effective in preventing the development of political or religious extremist ideologies (Beelmann, 2020). To explore a potential relationship between citizenship education and the endorsement of pre-extremist attitudes, we therefore included students' civic knowledge as a predictor in our analyses.

#### **4 Method**

Our analyses use the German data from ICCS 2016. The study was conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) and aimed to assess how students across the world are being prepared to become citizens (Schulz et al., 2017). Prior studies were conducted in 1999 and 2009. Reports and data sets for all study cycles are accessible via the IEA homepage. International results as well as information on the instruments and scales of the 2016 study have been published (Schulz et al., 2018). In Germany, the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) participated in the ICCS 2016 study (Abs & Hahn-Laudenberg, 2017).

#### **4.1** *Sample*

To account for the multilayered educational system and an uneven distribution of students with an immigration background in NRW, a stratified, multistage randomized cluster sample was drawn. Sampling strata were school type and proportion of students with immigration backgrounds (more versus less than 30%). The sample consisted of 1,451 eighth-grade students from 59 secondary schools. Students' mean age was 14.29 (range: 12.08 to 16.75). 52% of students were girls, and about 40% had an immigration background. Students were categorized as having an immigration background if they themselves or one of their parents were born outside of Germany. Distribution of students across school types was as follows: 10.27% attended *Hauptschule* (lowest academic track), 18.33% *Realschule* (middle academic track), 15.92% *Gesamtschule*  (comprehensive school), and 55.48% attended *Gymnasium (*highest academic track). Written consent from a parent or guardian was obtained for all students of the sample. Detailed information on the German sample can be found in Ziemes et al. (2017).

#### **4.2** *Measures and Procedure*

Data was collected from students, teachers, and headteachers. Our present study focuses on student data only, which was collected using paper-and-pencil questionnaires. Data collection took place in students' regular classrooms and lasted about 135 minutes, with breaks between individual parts of the survey. In the first part, students completed a civic knowledge test covering the areas of civic society and systems, civic principles, civic participation, and civic identities (Schulz et al., 2016). The second part consisted of an international student questionnaire assessing affective-behavioural and contextual factors (including students' experiences of social relationships at school) as well as sociodemographic variables. In the third part, students' attitudes toward civic society and systems in the European context were assessed through the European student questionnaire. Data from the third part is not addressed in our study.

For all scales, the IEA provided authors with values based on weighted likelihood estimations (WLE) of partial credit models (Schulz et al., 2018). In accordance with data preparation in the 2009 cycle, these scales were calibrated to have an international mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10 (social relationship scales) and an international mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100 (civic knowledge scale; see Schulz et al., 2018). Internal consistencies reported for all scales are based on Cronbach's alpha. All variables and scales used stem from the ICCS 2016 study.

#### 4.2.1 Sociodemographic Variables

*Gender* was assessed with one question with a dichotomous answer choice (0 = boy; 1 = girl). The indicator for socioeconomic status (SES) as provided by IEA is a nationally z-standardized indicator which includes the number of books at home, parental occupation, and education.

*Religion* was assessed with a single choice question which asked students 'What is your religion?'. The answer choices were 'no religion' (N = 182); 'Christianity' (N = 973); 'Islam' (N = 195); 'Judaism' (N = 5); and 'other religion' (N = 51). Three dichotomous indicators were created for 'no religion', 'Christianity' and 'Islam', whereby students self-identifying with these choices were assigned 1 and all others were assigned 0.

*Attendance at religious services* was assessed with one question where students could indicate if they attended religious services. Answer options were 'never' (N = 291), 'less than once a year' (N = 137), 'at least once a year' (N = 437), 'at least once a month' (N = 321), or 'at least once a week' (N = 221). 35 students who indicated 'no religion' still reported that they attended religious services once a year or more often.

#### 4.2.2 Civic Knowledge

*Civic knowledge* was designed as a competence measure using both multiple choice and open-ended tasks. Based on Rasch analyses, five plausible values were calculated for each student and introduced in the calculations (Schulz et al., 2017).

#### 4.2.3 Quality of Students' Social Relationships at School

The *quality of student–teacher relationships at school* was assessed using the students' perspective. Three items measured students' assessment of their own relationships with teachers (e.g. 'Most of my teachers treat me fairly'). Two items assessed students' evaluation of the quality of the relationship between teachers and the other students (e.g. 'Students get along well with most teachers'). All items had a 4-point Likert-type response scale ranging from 1 ('strongly agree') to 4 ('strongly disagree'). Internal consistency was .80.

The *quality of student–student relationships at school* was also assessed using the students' perspective. Two items described the way students treat each other (e.g. 'Most students at my school treat each other with respect'). One item tapped into students' fear of being bullied by other students (this item was reversed for analyses). All items had a 4-point Likert-type response scale ranging from 1 ('strongly agree') to 4 ('strongly disagree'). Internal consistency was .74.

*Students' self-reported victimization at school* measured the frequency of self-reported victimization by students within the past three months. The six items included direct, indirect, verbal, physical and cyber-victimization (e.g. 'A student said things about you to make others laugh'). The 4-point Likert-type response scale ranged from 1 ('not at all') to 4 ('five times or more'). Internal consistency was .74. For further details, please see Schulz et al. (2018, p. 163).

#### 4.2.4 Pre-Extremist Attitudes

*Students' pre-extremist attitudes* were assessed as part of a broader scale on students' attitudes on religion in society. Items were answered on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = 'strongly agree' to 4 = 'strongly disagree'). Three items of the broader scale ascribe religion a dominant role in social and political life (e.g. 'Rules of life based on religion are more important than civil laws'). For the purposes of our study, these items were identified as representing a *pre-extremist attitude*. The items were combined to form a latent scale which we call *hegemony of religion*. Internal consistency was .87. Item wording and dichotomous agreement rates for students with and without religion are listed in Table 3.1, as are factor


table 3.1 Items and aggreement rates for hegemony of religion

Note: Percentages indicate the percentage of students choosing the 'agree' or 'strongly agree' answer options.

loadings for the overall sample. Agreement rates indicate that students who self-identified with a religion were more likely to welcome a strong influence of religion on society. This effect was particularly pronounced for Muslim students as compared to Christian students.

#### **4.3** *Results*

Weak to moderate bivariate associations were found between the main study variables (Table 3.2). Hegemony of religion was negatively associated with SES and civic knowledge. No significant correlations were found for indicators of the quality of social relationships, i.e. student–teacher relationship, student– student relationship, and victimization. Therefore, these variables were not included in multivariate analyses.

Mplus 8.2 was used to predict the latent variable hegemony of religion. The analyses controlled for the clustered nature of the data (type = complex) and employed weights. Model 0 introduced gender, SES, and immigration background. Students with a lower SES and an immigration background were more likely to support a strong role of religion. Model 1 introduced civic knowledge, which shows a negative association with hegemony of religion.

Model 2 introduced students' religion and their attendance at religious services. Only self-identification as Christians or Muslims was used because the other groups were too small. Both religious affiliations predicted support for hegemony of religion. Furthermore, the frequency of attendance at religious services was a much stronger predictor of hegemony of religion than selfidentified religion.


table 3.2 Bivariate relationships between main study variables

\**p* < .05; \*\**p* < .01; \*\*\**p* < .001


table 3.3 Regression models: standardized coefficients for hegemony of religion

† .10 < p < .05; \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001; SES = socioeconomic status; IBG = immigration background; estimator = MLR; type = complex

Model 3 introduced the interaction of self-identified religion (Muslim or Christian) and attendance at religious services. Interactions of manifest variables in Mplus were included by defining a variable representing the product of the interacting variables and introducing this interaction term into the regression. Results yielded the following pattern (see Table 3.3). There was a main effect for Muslim religion; Muslims were more likely to support hegemony of religion than non-Muslims (i.e. Christians). Another main effect was found for frequency of attending religious services. The more often students attended religious services, the more likely they were to support hegemony of religion. Moreover, there was a significant negative interaction for being a Muslim and attending religious services. This indicates that Muslims attending religious services were less likely to support the hegemony of religion.

#### **5 Discussion**

Our results indicate that a particular constellation of and interplay (as interactions) between factors best predicts hegemony of religion, i.e. our measure of pre-extremist attitudes. Looking at a normative, representative sample of 14-yearold German secondary school students, our findings confirm results from earlier research, including risk and protective factors for radical/extremist attitudes.

First and foremost, students who identified with a religion indicated that their religious rules were more important than the rules of the state. This was true for both of the major religions (Islam and Christianity) with which students in the sample identified. Further, results differed according to the specific religion chosen; specifically, Muslim students showed a higher degree of agreement with all three items of the hegemony of religion scale. Finally, students who identified with a religion tended to propose a stronger role for religious leaders in political affairs. We cannot assume that all those students hold extremist views which are dangerous for democratic societies; however, according to the models of radicalization we reviewed (Beelmann, 2020; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017; Moghaddam, 2005), these students may be at greater risk of developing those views given further unfavourable circumstances. That said, we need to consider the relative contribution of *identification with a religion* in the context of our multivariate analyses.

Interestingly, indicators of students' relationship quality at school were not related to their endorsement of pre-extremist attitudes. Due to their nonsignificance, they were excluded from multivariate analyses. The strongest association with hegemony of religion was found for students' self-reported victimization. Those students who reported more victimization also showed a higher endorsement of beliefs supporting hegemony of religion, confirming earlier research (Knapton, 2014; Knight et al., 2017; see also Beelmann, 2020).

There are several possible explanations for the weak results regarding the impact of relationships as found in our study. First, we included a normative sample of 14-year-old students attending regular German secondary schools. We may assume that relationships might have a stronger impact in a sample including at-risk or already radicalized students. As even serious cases of political/religious extremism have very low base rates (Lösel et al., 2020), the variance regarding hegemony of religion in our sample might be too small. Second, our analyses focus on the individual level and do not include shared perceptions of the social climate. This is partly because all relationship variables were assessed at a general level without identifying the respective relationship partners, yet social relationships play out in a given context involving specific relationship partners. Indeed, the quality of relationships has been shown to vary across classrooms and schools, for example in the context of bullying research (Gini et al., 2015). Thus, future research will need to use measurement approaches that allow for the representation of this nestedness and include relationship (and climate) data from multiple informants at different levels (individual, classroom, and school).

Our multivariate analyses indicated that with respect to sociodemographic variables, neither students' gender nor their socioeconomic status were related to the endorsement of beliefs supporting hegemony of religion, whereas an immigration background was related to a stronger support for hegemony of religion. The latter finding is in line with meta-analytic findings reported by Wolfowicz et al. (2020), who found that being an immigrant was a risk factor for radical attitudes (see also Bhui et al., 2012), albeit with a small effect size. Wolfowicz et al. (2020) also found that being male was a (weak) risk factor, and a higher socioeconomic status was a (weak) protective factor for radical attitudes. However, we must interpret our findings (confirmatory and other) with caution as our study assessed *pre-extremist* attitudes in a normative sample, while the studies on radical attitudes that were included in the meta-analysis by Wolfowicz et al. (2020) used measures assessing the justification or support for radical behaviours. That notwithstanding, it is important to relate our findings to this meta-analysis because the latter also included adolescent samples and because it was undertaken with a high degree of scientific rigour, including only studies involving either a normative control group or a control group of non-violent radicals.

Civic knowledge proved to be a significant negative predictor of hegemony of religion (Model 1), indicating that students with a higher level of civic knowledge were less likely to endorse beliefs supporting the hegemony of religion. As it remained a significant negative predictor in the subsequent models, we conclude that civic knowledge can be seen as a potentially important protective factor against embracing hegemony of religion. Fostering civic knowledge may be one avenue schools can take to support students in linking their religious identity with democratic attitudes. This interpretation finds some support in the meta-analytic finding by Wolfowicz et al. (2020) that states that antidemocratic values are a risk factor for developing radical attitudes.

We also found that Christians, Muslims, and students who frequently attended religious services were more likely to embrace hegemony of religion. As religious identity and attendance at religious services were also included as interaction terms in Model 3, we will not interpret these main effects here. Furthermore, accounting for these religion-related factors (Model 2) also decreased the predictive power of immigration background. This is in line with previous research showing that the experience of societal rejection is a risk factor for radicalization (e.g. Roffey & Boyle, 2018). Having an immigration background or endorsing a socially less appreciated religion may create feelings of isolation in students. The question whether migration is endangering the political culture of democratic societies is part of an ongoing debate (e.g. Pickel & Pickel, 2018). However, it would be too simplistic to portray immigration as a driving force for the development of pre-extremist attitudes. Our regression models show that the effect of immigrant background decreases continuously with every analytic step. Immigrant background is therefore better perceived as a proximal indicator covering various influences that often occur in the aftermath of immigration, like, for example, experiences of discrimination and a strong emphasis on group identities within the political discourse (Abs, 2021).

Finally, with regard to the interaction effects of religious identity and attendance at religious services, we found that Muslim students attending religious services were less likely to embrace hegemony of religion. This confirms findings reported in the reviews by Lösel et al. (2018; 2020) which showed that Muslims' intense religious practice acted as a protective factor against religious extremism and radicalization. Indeed, Wolfowicz et al. (2020) also found that religious practice and adherence had very small effects on radicalization, whereas religious group identity and religious fundamentalism had larger effects. However, as religious group identity was inextricably linked with national identity in the studies which the authors included in their metaanalysis, and as no interaction effects with religious practice were considered, the relative contribution of religious identity per se cannot be surmised.

Our own findings using pre-extremist attitudes as an outcome in a normative sample of German 14-year-olds suggest that identifying as a Muslim or Christian and practising that religion cannot explain potential openness to radicalization. Still, the main effects for both self-identifying as Muslim and attendance at religious services in Model 2 retained their substantial respective size in Model 3 despite the inclusion of the interaction terms, marking them as potential risk factors. Regarding self-identification as Muslim, a recent study by Goede et al. (2019) including 6,863 German secondary school students (mean age = 14.7) found that 1.5% of Muslim students endorsed extremist/Islamist attitudes and had displayed at least one instance of religiously motivated deviant behaviour. The authors classified these students as at risk for further radicalization. However, unlike in our study, religious practice (including attending religious services) was not identified as a risk factor for extremist attitudes (right-wing, left-wing, Islamist) in the sample as a whole (Goede et al., 2019). Other research (involving mainly adults) also suggests that the effect of religious identity on radicalization by far exceeds that of religious practice (Aly & Striegher, 2012; Wolfowicz et al., 2020; see also the discussion by Koopmans, 2015). As our study used a restricted measurement of religious practice, namely the frequency of attending religious services, further research will need to utilize a broader assessment that includes additional aspects like praying at home, attending religious celebrations, or discussing religious issues (see Goede et al., 2019).

#### **5.1** *Limitations*

Our study has several limitations. First, we did not study the radicalization process per se but investigated potential predictors of pre-extremist religious attitudes at an age which marks the beginning of the age window during which radicalization occurs (Beelmann, 2020; Borum, 2014). Due to the crosssectional nature of our study, it is not possible to link our findings to more pronounced extremist attitudes and behaviours. Future longitudinal research will be necessary to explore whether pre-extremist attitudes can contribute to predicting whether extremist attitudes and behaviours will occur.

Second, as already mentioned, our assessment of the quality of social relationships at school focused on the individual level and did not include aggregate measures. This may have blurred potential effects on one of those levels. Future research using measurement approaches that allow for the representation of this nestedness and that include relationship (and climate) data from multiple informants at different levels (individual, classroom, and school) will offer a promising way for exploring the relative contribution of the quality of relationships to young people's endorsement of pre-extremist attitudes. Furthermore, such research might also explore potential mediation or moderation effects of relationship quality and thus account for possible indirect effects.

Third, our rather restricted assessment of pre-extremist attitudes involving only three items does not allow for a fuller representation of such attitudes. Future research might include factors like openness to extremist attitudes or admiration for people endorsing fundamentalist views in order to characterize pre-extremist attitudes more clearly. Capturing the early stages of the radicalization process (Beelmann, 2020) calls for measurements that are adapted to these stages and do not refer to already fully-fledged extremist attitudes and behaviours.

#### **5.2** *Practical Relevance and Outlook*

Our findings suggest that strategies for the early prevention of (violent) extremism might include addressing pre-extremist attitudes, particularly regarding the role of religion in society. This is relevant for at least two reasons: first, the radicalization process unfolds and intensifies over time (Beelmann, 2020; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017; Moghaddam, 2005); and second, even if most individuals holding extreme/radical beliefs will never translate them into (terrorist) action, they still indirectly support radical and potentially violent behaviour, for example by offering (post-hoc) justifications to action-prone individuals (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017).

Educational efforts at school are often designed to help identify young people at risk of radicalization, with a clear security policy focus as, for example, in the context of the Prevent strategy in the United Kingdom (e.g. Mattson et al., 2016; Bryan, this volume). Systematic, evidence-based approaches to prevention seem to be scarce, partly because of a dearth of sound empirical research (Lösel et al., 2018). In their interdisciplinary review of the literature on the prevention of violent extremism, Stephens et al. (2021) identified four core themes that might inform a common framework for prevention: first, building resilience, for example by fostering values related to citizenship and human rights; second, promoting adolescents' identity search and their need to belong, for example by creating space to explore identities and by strengthening and validating identities; third, promoting dialogue and action, for example by creating safe spaces for the exploration of students' views without condemnation; and fourth, creating engaged and resilient (school) communities, for example by offering opportunities for social bonding.

If we map these themes onto Beelmann's (2020) model of the radicalization process, we see that they can be directly related to proximal radicalization processes, particularly to issues of identity problems, prejudice, and political and religious ideologies. In addition, as the model also considers social and societal influences, it aligns well with Stephens et al.'s (2021) systemic perspective on the promotion of resilience against radicalization. Addressing pre-extremist attitudes in this context might particularly relate to promoting young people's identity search and dialogue. Given early adolescents' vulnerability to radical beliefs, our findings that pre-extremist attitudes can be found as early as age fourteen help to make a case for early prevention.

Such early prevention needs to include civic and citizenship education. State school systems were developed within the emerging nation states of the 19th century. They were installed to serve a homogeneous citizenry and to support the idea of a homogenous nation state. But nowadays, it appears that schools must serve ever more heterogeneous societies, with teachers and students being characterized by multilayered or hybrid identities (Abs, 2021). To be a driver for integration, schools need to develop further their potential for integration. Our findings underline the importance of civic knowledge for preventing pre-extremist attitudes that focus on religion. Civic knowledge seems to be an important educational force when it comes to preparing students for developing cohesive perspectives for societies as a whole.

Furthermore, both religious education and citizenship education frequently proceed in our schools without referring to each other (Bacia & Abs, 2017). Our analysis highlights how important it is for both religious and citizenship education to deal with the place of religion in the democratic state (Hahn-Laudenberg & Abs, 2019).

#### **References**

Abs, H. J. (2021). Options for developing European strategies on citizenship education. *European Educational Research Journal*, *20*(3), 329–347. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1474904121994418


group proportion in school context. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 42*(2), 243–251. doi:10.1002/ejsp.870


## **The Relationship between Minority Students' Ethnic Identity, Perceived Discrimination, and Their Self-Esteem**

*Evidence from Germany*

*Kerstin Göbel and Zuzanna M. Preusche*

#### **Abstract**

Acculturation processes generally follow complex patterns and differ between cultural groups and contexts. Being a member of an ethnic minority can have a lifelong impact on an individual's identity and often causes psychological distress due to prejudices towards and discrimination against minority groups. Minority young people, who frequently struggle with their identity development, particularly suffer from perceived discrimination. They might lack a sense of belonging to the majority culture which, in turn, can have an impact on their self-esteem. Experiences of discrimination might lead to internalizing outcomes, like a decrease in well-being, as well as to externalizing outcomes, like anger or radicalization. Self-esteem can be affected by experiences of discrimination, but it might also be a buffer against the negative outcomes of discrimination experiences. The construction of one's identity is a dominant issue in young people's development in general; it can be especially challenging for minority young people during their acculturation process. Therefore, this chapter analyzes the relevance of individual and group-related perceived discrimination and national and ethnic identity on the self-esteem of minority young people using exploratory multiple linear regression. Results suggest that individually perceived ethnic discrimination, ethnic identity and hence the sensitivity to group-based discrimination can be relevant predictors of minority students' levels of self-esteem. Implications for teaching are discussed.

#### **Keywords**

discrimination – ethnicity – identity – minority students – self-esteem

#### **1 Acculturation of Minority Young People**

The ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity resulting from historical, recent, and current immigration flows into Germany is reflected particularly in schools, which therefore play a major role in the acculturation process of immigrant children and young adults (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017; Göbel & Preusche, 2019).

Acculturation is the process of cultural and psychological change which takes place as the consequence of direct contact between two or more cultural groups and their individual members. Its consequences are changes in social structures, institutions, and social practices as well as changes in the individual members of the respective cultures (Berry, 2006). Acculturation processes differ between cultural groups and societies of residence. Individual prerequisites and the context of acculturation are likewise supposed to be influential in the process (Sam et al., 2013; Berry & Hou, 2016). Mutual adaptation processes for minorities and for the respective majority culture seem necessary in order to cope with experiences in culture contact situations (Horenczyk et al., 2013).

The adjustment of minorities is conceptualized as relying on two main outcomes, namely psychological and sociocultural adaptation, whereby psychological adaptation focuses on emotional outcomes such as psychological well-being and life satisfaction, while sociocultural adaption is understood as the more behavioural aspect of adaptation, including skills as well as adaptive behaviour (Ward et al., 2001). For children and young adults, acculturation is a complex process; the outcome of this process is influenced by various factors such as individual qualities, the specific minority group they belong to, and the support they receive (or do not receive) within their family and from their society of residence (Berry et al., 2006). In the context of migration and acculturation, minority group members are simultaneously confronted with expectations and pressure from their own ethnic group and from the majority society (Horenczyk et al., 2013).

Within any given society, schools constitute relevant integration agents for culturally diverse young people because schools provide access to education, opportunities for social mobility, and genuine contact between majority and minority cultures (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2015; Vedder & Horenczyk, 2006). Because its outcome is relevant to the sociocultural acculturation process, academic achievement plays a prominent role in research on the acculturation of children and young people (Brown & Chu, 2012; Vedder & Horenczyk, 2006).

Research studies focus especially on risk factors for academic engagement, such as ethnic discrimination by peers and teachers or psychological distress, as well as on resilience factors which might promote academic engagement, such as positive ethnic identities (Chu, 2011). Academic achievement seems to be an important step towards the often desired upward social mobility in the new society (Horenczyk & Ben-Shalom, 2001). Although schools ought to be a place for integrating students from different cultural and linguistic origins, they usually only represent the culture and values of the country of residence (Fortuin et al., 2014; Gutentag et al., 2018). Furthermore, international studies indicate that there is a considerable gap between majority and minority students in terms of their academic achievement and dropout rates (Stamm, 2012; Vedder & Virta, 2005; OECD, 2015; Weis et al., 2020). In a meta-analysis, Dimitrova et al. (2016) were able to show that this gap is manifest not only in poorer levels of school adjustment, but also in psychological adjustment in terms of depression symptoms and externalizing behaviours (migrationmorbidity hypothesis). In fact, the adaptation process for immigrant young people seems rather complex. Therefore, factors that are relevant for their positive adaptation should be examined because maladaptation might result in psychological problems or externalizing behaviours which, in their more drastic forms, could lead to radicalization (Borum, 2014; Ghosh et al., 2016).

#### **2 Ethnic and National Identity**

Being a member of an ethnic minority group can have a lifelong impact on an individual's identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Huq et al., 2016) and can often cause psychological distress (Stein et al., 2016; Cross, 1991; Crocker et al., 1998). The social group to which people belong is an important point of reference for their identity construction as well as a strong source for the development of their self-esteem. In general, the group one belongs to is perceived as superior to most other groups; belonging to one's group is usually related to positive emotions such as happiness and pride (social identity theory, see Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

During the acculturation process, the construction of cultural identity plays a prominent role. The question of whether acculturating individuals wish to maintain their ethnic identity—i.e. a strong emotional, psychological, and behavioural connection to their ethnic origins—or whether and how they want to adopt the national identity (majority culture) is a central issue in Berry's model. Berry (1997) proposed a two-dimensional model of cultural identification, hypothesizing that the best outcome of acculturation in terms of psychological well-being and behavioural adaption would be reached by identifying with an ethnic culture and through a strong wish for contact with the majority culture. More recent research points to the fact that there might be no such thing as 'the best' acculturation orientation, but that such orientation can instead be affected strongly by the context of acculturation and the fit between acculturation orientation and host community members (Birman & Simon, 2014; Bourhis et al., 1997).

As previously mentioned, the construction of the social identity of students with immigration experience is usually based on their heritage culture as well as on the (new) culture of residence (Seaton et al., 2017; Hannover et al., 2013). In discussions of acculturation and identity, a positive and strong ethnic identity is often interpreted as a resource for immigrants that supports immigrants in coping with the demanding task of acculturation (Allemann-Ghionda et al., 2010; Berry et al., 2006; Liebkind et al., 2004).

Looking at the behavioural outcome of school adaptation, it may be assumed that the influence of majority-culture identity or ethnic identity is complex, with many additional factors playing a role. Unsurprisingly, empirical evidence regarding the effect of children's cultural and ethnic identity on school adaptation is quite heterogeneous (see Makarova & Birman, 2016). Some empirical studies show that a strong ethnic identity has a positive impact on school adaptation (Vedder & Horenczyk, 2006; Fuligni et al., 2005; Horenczyk, 2010). Several studies indicate that an integrative bicultural identity has a positive impact on psychosocial adaptation and the school performance of learners with immigrant backgrounds (Göbel & Buchwald, 2017; Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2013). In a German study, Spiegler et al. (2018) confirm a positive correlation between school adaptation (school motivation, perceived competence, social support) and a strong ethnocultural identification for Turkish minority students. Similar results have been shown in a study by Vietze et al. (2019) for a diverse immigrant sample. A study from Switzerland indicates that biculturally identified adolescents integrate better into their society of residence (Makarova, 2015), and another study on the acculturation of young people with immigrant backgrounds in Switzerland similarly shows the benefit of ethnocultural and bicultural identification; those who either identify with their ethnic culture or identify with both their ethnic culture and Swiss culture show better levels of school adaptation (Haenni Hoti et al., 2017). In Germany, the connection between cultural identity and the school adjustment of immigrant students seems less clear (Edele et al., 2013). The ethnic identity of immigrant students is often associated with low cultural capital, and this low social and cultural capital given to young people from immigrant families seems to play a crucial role in the relatively low educational outcomes of students from immigrant families in Germany (Konsortium Bildungsberichterstattung, 2006; Weis et al., 2020). International large-scale studies on educational achievement show that the correlation between social background and educational success is particularly pronounced in Germany, especially at lower secondary school level, which points to several other underlying issues (Ditton & Maaz, 2015).

An endowment with the so-called 'target country-specific capital' seems crucial for successful participation in the education system (Steinbach & Nauck, 2004; Stanat & Edele, 2011; Maaz et al., 2014). Looking at research focusing on the motivation to learn the language of communication in Germany and Switzerland, ambivalent effects of ethnic identification have been found. Ethnic identity showed both a *direct negative* effect on the motivation to learn the German language and an *indirect positive* effect on the school-related contingency of self-worth (Wolfgramm et al., 2010). Results of a study with another German student sample show a negative correlation between national and ethnic identity (Zander & Hannover, 2013); assimilative pressures of the host society might be one explanation for these contradictory effects.

The picture concerning the correlation between ethnic and national identification might depend on the context of acculturation. An international comparative study on immigrant young people (ICSEY study, Berry et al., 2010) found positive correlations between ethnic and national identity only for typical countries of immigration like the United States, Canada, and Australia. Immigrant students have been found to favour national identity as a strategy for school adaptation when their ethnic identity is confronted with discrimination (Berry et al., 2006). A study conducted in the United States by Chu (2011) confirmed the connection between positive ethnic identities and positive academic attitudes of ethnic minority students.

However, when these students experienced discrimination in school by their peers or teachers, negative attitudes towards academic effort and towards school were the consequence. The influence of contextual conditions on the positive impact of ethnic identity on school adaptation is also illustrated by the findings of Baysu and Phalet (2019), which indicate that learners who identify with both ethnic and host country identities suffer particularly from the activation of performance-related stereotypes (e.g. low academic ability of specific ethnic groups) regarding their culture of origin. Although ethnic identification might be a resource for promoting school adaptation, the construction of ethnic and national identity in the school context as well as the relationship between ethnic identification and school adaptation seems to be strongly influenced by contextual factors.

#### **3 Ethnic Discrimination and Self-Esteem**

People who belong to ethnic minority groups are often different from the majority culture in terms of their physical appearance or their habits. Such differences can lead to individuals from ethnic minorities being perceived as out-group members and can hence confront them with experiences of prejudice and discrimination in their everyday life (Cassidy et al., 2004). When groups or individuals are exposed to discrimination, negative emotions such as anger and frustration are a common consequence (Feddes et al., 2012; consider also the current *Black Lives Matter* movement in the United States, where people protest against systematic patterns of racism in law enforcement). A study by Chu (2011) states that children who are confronted with discrimination are more likely to be psychologically distressed, anxious, report symptoms of depression, and suffer from lower levels of self-regulation manifest in unfocused attention and low inhibitory control. The psychological distress caused by perceived discrimination frequently leads to lower academic aspirations and generally lower levels of well-being.

As belonging to a social group has been shown to be relevant for self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), negative experiences like discrimination might result in severe psychological problems which, in turn, could cause a progressive disengagement from different social domains and particularly from the school environment (Brown & Chu, 2012; Berry et al., 2010).

Several studies provide evidence of the negative connection between perceived discrimination and the adaptation of students inside and outside of school (Berry et al., 2006; Wolfgramm et al., 2014). In general, the perception of various kinds of discrimination at school—for example, when students are being teased by their peers or graded unfairly by their teachers because of their ethnicity—can have far-reaching negative consequences for the psychological development of children and young people. It can be assumed that the experience of discrimination and its perception can vary greatly both between different migrant groups and within migrant groups (Wang et al., 2019). In the context of a country comparison survey, the ICSEY study has shown a significant correlation between perceived discrimination and the well-being and adaptation of migrant learners in thirteen countries (Berry et al., 2006). A more recent meta-analysis of the relationship between discrimination and school adaptation also confirmed the disastrous effects of discrimination (Benner et al., 2018). The meta-analysis of different studies shows a correlative relationship between perceptions of discrimination and psychological tension, low academic achievement, and low levels of school motivation and school engagement.

The experience of discrimination and the respective individual reactions to it can have a long-term negative impact on the overall psychosocial adaptation of young people (Benner et al., 2018). In particular, negative stereotypes relating to specific migrant groups can have an inhibiting effect on the performance of students with migrant backgrounds (Martiny et al., 2013). For example, activating negative stereotypes relating to differences in educational achievement between non-migrant German students and students with a Turkish background led to a negative development in the performance in mathematics of students of Turkish origin and also to a stronger identification of those students with their own ethnic group (Martiny et al., 2015). This retreat into their own ethnic group confirms the rejection identification model, which was postulated in the 1990s by Branscombe et al. (1999). However, such a retreat can be problematic for integrating minority learners. Findings from Switzerland indicate lower levels of integration of affected young people into social groups in the host society (Wolfgramm et al., 2014), and studies on ultra-orthodox Jews in Israel also confirm the problem of withdrawal (Bergman et al., 2017). The situation seems to be complex; while the perception of discrimination appears to be negatively associated with students' engagement in school, Dotterer et al. (2009) found in a sample of African American students that ethnic socialization, among other factors, could have an additive effect regarding the students' level of school engagement, but that it did not show a moderating effect on the connection between experienced discrimination and school engagement. Interestingly, Dotterer et al. also found that ethnic identity served as a protective factor for school bonding, but only for girls not for boys.

The relationship between discrimination and psychological well-being seems to be multi-layered; while most studies confirm the correlation between ethnic discrimination and psychological distress (e.g. Chu, 2011; Williams & Williams-Morris, 2000), some studies did not find any direct correlation. In a study by Fischer and Shaw (1999), for instance, the relationship between perceived racism and mental health could not be verified. In order to better understand these contradictory findings, Cassidy et al. (2004) argue that self-esteem could play a mediating role for the relationship between perceived discrimination and psychological distress. In the late 1970s, the self-esteem theory of depression (Brown & Harris, 1978) already claimed that self-esteem could moderate the distressing impact of negative life events on psychological well-being. Self-esteem represents the internalized feelings of mastery, value, and self-acceptance of the individual and is strongly influenced by implicit and explicit messages provided by relevant others (Hill, 1999; Constantine & Blackmon, 2002). A higher level of self-esteem might consequently be a protective factor for individuals when they are confronted with distressing experiences; higher self-esteem might also be a resilience factor, making individuals less vulnerable to stressful life events (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; Cassidy et al., 2004). However, as racism and discrimination have generally been found to affect psychological well-being, the mere exposure to racism and discrimination might also lead to low levels of self-esteem (Crocker & Quinn, 1998). Still, there seems to be a difference concerning the relation between perceived discrimination and self-esteem across different minority groups. Studies have found a negative relationship between perceived discrimination and selfesteem for Asian Americans but a positive relationship for African Americans (Juang & Cookston, 2009; Crocker & Quinn, 1998).

Although research hints at differences in the estimated impact of perceived discrimination depending on whether individuals themselves have directly experienced discrimination or whether the group to which they belong is exposed to discrimination, empirical studies mostly focus on the perception of individual discrimination. However, several studies indicate that people tend to perceive group discrimination as being stronger than individual discrimination (Taylor et al., 1990; Verkuyten, 2002). Both individual and group discrimination have been found to have a negative impact on general psychological well-being and self-esteem (Mereish et al., 2016; Greene et al., 2006; Cassidy et al., 2004). But even though it appears that the impact of individual discrimination seems to be generally underestimated, some authors emphasize the importance of discovering the specific relevance of each (Stevens & Thijs, 2018, Armenta & Hunt, 2009). As previously stated, against the backdrop of the rejection identification model proposed by Branscombe et al. in 1999, it can be argued that ethnic minorities attempt positive self-evaluation through a higher level of ethnic identification; hence group discrimination might turn out to be related to higher levels of ethnic identification and to higher levels of self-esteem. When differentiating between individual and group discrimination, a study by Stevens & Thijs (2018) involving Moroccan-Dutch adolescents does, in fact, report a positive correlation between group discrimination and ethnic group identification and a positive impact of both on self-esteem. On the other hand, Stevens and Thijs' results confirm the negative impact of individual discrimination on self-esteem. A previous study of a Latino sample in the United States had produced quite similar results; however, it also hinted at an interaction effect of group discrimination and individual discrimination for predicting self-esteem and ethnic identification in the sense that individuals who perceived higher levels of discrimination in comparison to other in-group members showed lower levels of in-group identification and lower levels of personal self-esteem (Armenta & Hunt, 2009).

During the acculturation process, minority young people find themselves in a unique position which requires them to construct their cultural identity based on their ethnic and national identities. This construction can be strongly influenced by their experiences of discrimination which, in addition, can have an impact on their self-esteem.

#### **4 Self-Esteem and Extremist Behaviour**

Self-esteem is an important outcome in acculturation research as it is a relevant aspect of a healthy psychological development and an important predictor of school adaptation and of the societal integration of minorities (Ward et al., 2001). On the downside, low self-esteem and the feeling of not being a valuable or relevant member of a group seem to be a major predictor of aggression and delinquent behaviour (Bushman et al., 2009). Likewise, when one's own group is perceived as being treated less well than other groups (relative deprivation of the in-group), this perception may result in feelings of anger and frustration (Feddes et al., 2012). Consequently, individuals might disassociate themselves from society and might become attracted to deviant or criminal behaviour or even to violent radicalization (Doosje et al., 2012). Young people during critical stages of identity formation in particular are in search of a meaning for their lives; and to bolster their self-confidence, they are most susceptible to adopt extremist religious ideologies (Ghosh et al., 216). A study by Doosje et al. (2013) shows that Muslim adolescents in the Netherlands who feel relatively deprived show more positive attitudes towards ideology-based violence.

In their review of reasons for engagement in extremist behaviour, Ghosh et al. (2016) come to the conclusion that a threat to individual and collective identity and marginalization from mainstream society by way of discrimination, segregation, or bullying can all promote deviant conduct. In many cases, radicalization seems to be a response to a lack of meaning in life or to the experience of enduring and systemic inequalities (Ghosh et al., 2016). When looking at violent extremists, Borum (2014) points to specific psychological vulnerabilities of this group; violent extremist young people are in search of personal meaning and identity and in need of a sense of belonging. This makes them receptive to imposed ideas and alternative worldviews. Furthermore, they often perceive injustice within society, a fact which further enhances their readiness to distance themselves aggressively from this society.

#### **5 Research Question**

Schools are relevant socializing agents for children both from majority and minority groups. To promote a healthy psychological development and to counteract aggressive violent radicalization, it is important to understand the relevant predictors of positive self-esteem. Research on discrimination, ethnic identity, and self-esteem has been mostly conducted in the United States and in some studies in European countries; only a few studies have focused specifically on the situation in Germany. This article wants to shed light on this issue by looking at a sample of young people in North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany. The question addressed by this research is how perceived individual and group discrimination as well as national and ethnic identity predict self-esteem for ethnic minority adolescents.

### **6 The Study**

### **6.1** *Study Design*

The data analyzed in this chapter was gathered in western Germany and is part of the international project 'Hidden School Dropout in the Context of Immigration' conducted at the University of Duisburg-Essen. The study is a cross-sectional survey study based on paper-and-pencil assessment of 7th grade students (mostly between 12 and 13 years old) conducted in North Rhine-Westphalia in the summer of 2017. The study is part of a larger international cooperation focusing on hidden school dropout of immigrant children in different European countries and Israel. Data collection in Germany was carried out by the authors of this chapter and by trained student assistants. Data collection involved the completion of a structured questionnaire with one open question at the end ('Is there anything else you want to tell us?'). The questionnaire was completed by students individually during regular class time (Göbel & Preusche, 2019).

#### 6.1.1 Sample

The analysis presented here focuses on students who reported cultural self-identification with at least one other culture in addition to the German one. This subsample consisted of 454 students (47.8% female) with a different cultural identification in addition to German, aged mostly between 12 and 13 years (21.2% of participants were older than 13), and reporting more than 50 different cultural identifications. In this study, we assessed both migration status—defined as having at least one foreign-born parent—and the students' self-reported cultural identity. Because a person's individual cultural identification is relevant for their emotional acculturation process (see Berry, 2006), we included those students who reported at least one other cultural identification and dropped those who had a migration background but did not feel associated with a culture other than the German one (see Göbel & Preusche, 2019).

#### 6.1.2 Measures

The questionnaire items concerning students' sociodemographics were questions about their gender, the country or countries in which the students and their parents were born, their cultural identification ('Which culture or cultures do you feel part of?'), and their parents' occupation (using the measure of highest international socioeconomic index of occupational status [HISEI]; see Ganzeboom et al., 1992). Self-esteem was measured using an adapted version of Rosenberg's self-esteem scale (1965). Ethnic and national identity were measured with scales developed by Phinney et al. (2001). Perceived discrimination was assessed with scales developed by Oppedal et al. (2005), which are based on an operationalization of Berry (1997). The scales and their characteristics are presented in Table 4.1.

The Cronbach's α test indicates that the scales used in the analysis tend to be highly reliable. The mean scores of the dependent variable 'self-esteem' show a rather even distribution within the sample. Students' national and ethnic identity as well as their perceived discrimination are unevenly distributed; students reported a relatively strong national identity and a strong ethnic identity. On the other hand, their perception of individual and group-based discrimination showed to be quite weak.

#### 6.1.3 Data Analysis

An exploratory multiple hierarchical linear regression was calculated to predict self-esteem by cultural identity, perceived discrimination, and perceived support, with statistical control for demographic variables (gender, HISEI). Three regression equations were administered to determine the respective explanatory power of the resulting models.

#### **6.2** *Results*

First results of the exploratory multiple linear regression (F(4,341) = 6.163, *p* < .001) controlling for families' economic capital and gender show that individually perceived discrimination serves as a significant predictor (β = –.303 *p* < .001) of minority students' self-esteem; group-based discrimination does not appear to be a significant predictor (β = .122, *p* = .058). HISEI does not seem to have a significant effect, but gender shows to be influential, with boys having a somewhat higher probability for a higher self-esteem. When including identity variables in the model (F(6,339) = 6.727, *p* < .001), individually perceived discrimination (β = –.292, *p* < .001) is still the strongest predictor, but now, groupbased discrimination is also significantly predictive for self-esteem (β = .127, *p* = .047) just after ethnic identity (β = .136, *p* = .009). National identity does not become relevant for explaining self-esteem within the presented analysis (Table 4.2).




National identity .034 .048 Ethnic identity .142 .136\*\*

Adjusted *R²* .019\* .077\*\* .091\*

table 4.2 Regression analysis (dependent variable: self-esteem, *n* = 346)

\**p* < .05; \*\**p* < .01, \*\*\**p* < .001

a International socioeconomic index of (highest) occupational status.

b Individually perceived discrimination.

c Group-based perceived discrimination.

#### **7 Discussion**

According to findings from previous studies, our results confirm that male students tend to have a higher self-esteem than female students (Bleidorn, 2016). In our German sample of students we could furthermore show that individually perceived ethnic discrimination seems to be a significant predictor of minority students' self-esteem, a result which is in line with previous research studies in other countries (e.g. Chu, 2011). The results also show that the relevance of individually perceived discrimination is accompanied by the relevance of ethnic identity as a further significant predictor of self-esteem. This is also in accordance with previous research. Because human beings have an innate urge to feel included in social groups, their ethnic heritage culture can serve as a strong social group, and being excluded can have a negative impact on their overall well-being and their performance (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Walton et al., 2012). According to the rejection identification model (Branscombe et al., 1999), a strong feeling of connectedness with one's ethnic heritage culture can have a protective effect when facing prejudice or discrimination towards the respective ethnic group. This phenomenon may weaken the generally negative consequences of discrimination (Branscombe et al., 1999).

Looking at the relevance of group-based discrimination, the findings of the present study also support previous findings by Armenta and Hunt (2009) or Stevens and Thijs (2018) as in the third model of analysis group-based discrimination has found to be predictive for students' self-esteem. As has been argued by Armenta and Hunt (2009), the positive impact of perceived group discrimination on self-esteem might trace back to moderation effects of individual discrimination experiences. Group identification might result in a higher sensitivity to perception of group discrimination and therefore a connection between group discrimination and self-esteem can be revealed, which is actually pointing at the relevance of group identification as a resource factor for minority students. Further analysis of the given sample might shed light on possible interaction and moderation effects. In the presented regression analysis, respondents' national cultural orientation was also included in the model, but it did not show a significant predictive power for self-esteem. Although national cultural orientations seem to play a role for levels of school adaptation of minority students in Germany (cf. Zander & Hannover, 2013), it might not be that relevant for explaining self-esteem. Although the findings presented support the general empirical results from the literature review, it is important to address some limitations. We assessed perceived discrimination with a very general scale; a more specific school-focused discrimination scale might have led to other results. Moreover, as mentioned before, the regression analysis should be interpreted as exploratory due to the sample size and the distribution of the scales (see Lumley et al., 2002).

In sum, the study shows that individually perceived discrimination, perceived group-based discrimination, and ethnic identity seem to play a relevant role for explaining self-esteem in German minority students. Therefore, it seems important to address the issue of discrimination and ethnic identity in schools in order to provide a healthy environment for students. Ethnic identity seems relevant for the development of self-esteem in minority students in Germany. To counteract discrimination, the development of a positive inclusive cultural climate, in which ethnic identity should not be ignored in terms of 'colour blindness', should be promoted in schools (Schachner et al., 2016; Göbel & Frankemölle, 2020).

#### **8 Conclusion**

Low self-esteem has been shown to have a negative impact on different aspects of psychological well-being and might even lead to aggression (Bushman et al., 2009). Children and young adults who have a lower self-esteem because of their experience of racial (or ethnic) prejudice and/or discrimination tend to be psychologically distressed and are more likely to display deviant behaviour (Chu, 2011). In that light, self-esteem might be a mainstay when it comes to counteracting a negative adaptation development or the development of radicalization. Young adults in the most formative years of their life are a target for extremist groups which exploit their need for belonging and for feelings of self-worth (Borum, 2014).

Perceived inequality and harassment may provoke negative emotions in students who can block their academic aspirations and thus might lead to poor school adjustment (Özdemir & Stattin, 2014). Therefore, supporting children's ethnic identities and being sensitive to perceived discrimination experiences are important measures for counteracting depression and anxiety. The school setting and school teachers can play an important role in influencing children's everyday experiences (Chu, 2011). Children and young adults feel a need for school connectedness and belonging (Juang et al., 2018; McNeely & Falci, 2004; Walton et al., 2012). Therefore, in order to prevent radical or extremist behaviour, schools and teachers should create an inclusive environment where all students can experience social belonging (Ghosh et al., 2016). A key aspect of this endeavour are teachers who are able to integrate students with different cultural and linguistic experiences and who can build supportive and caring relationships with their students (Göbel et al., 2017; Gutentag et al., 2018; McNeely & Falci, 2004).

Nevertheless, the integration of a wide range of students who speak different languages and who have different acculturation experiences is a complex task for teachers. Teachers are often not sufficiently prepared for this complex situation; therefore, they often fade out cultural diversities and ignore the diverse living conditions of their students, or they oversimplify them by relying on stereotypes (Göbel et al., 2017; Bender-Szymanski et al., 2000). For this reason, it is important to prepare teachers to better understand cultural differences in order to create an inclusive and embracing climate at school (Göbel & Buchwald, 2017; Civitillo & Juang, 2020).

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### **The Potential of Civic and Citizenship Education to Preventing Right-Wing Extremism**

*Sabine Manzel*

#### **Abstract**

In recent years, populist and right-wing parties and organizations have been on the rise in Germany. All of them share ethnic, anti-human, and racist beliefs. Borum's mindset is the key starting point for the theoretical analysis of the potential of civic and citizenship education for preventing right-wing extremism. Following a brief introduction of the current situation of right-wing terrorism in Germany, the article touches upon the challenges which citizenship education is facing today. In a next step, Borum's model is connected with Helmke's uti lization of learning opportunities model and Detjen et al.'s model of political competence to highlight the potential of citizenship education to preventing young people from embracing right-wing extremism and to strengthening their democratic identity.

#### **Keywords**

civic and citizenship education – argumentation and reasoning – right-wing extremism – young people – hate speech

…

Menschenfeindliche Hetze war in der Vergangenheit und sie ist auch heute der Nährboden für Gewalt bis hin zum Mord. Wer diesen Nährboden düngt, macht sich mitschuldig. [Anti-human incitement has been in the past and is still today the breeding ground for violence, even culminating in murder. Anyone who fertilizes this breeding ground is complicit.]

Schäuble (2019)

# *∵*

#### **1 Introduction**

Kassel, Halle, and Hanau are three German cities which mark the threat to democracy of right-wing terrorism in Germany. In June 2019, the regional district president of Kassel, Walter Lübcke was shot to death by a right-wing extremist. In October 2019, another right-wing extremist tried to enter the Jewish synagogue in Halle to kill the worshippers. He did not gain entry to the synagogue due to a heavy door, so he killed two people on the street instead. In February 2020, a third right-wing extremist killed nine people with migration backgrounds in a Shisha-bar in Hanau.

It is not only these assassinations which urge policymakers and the government to act but also the constant number of citizens in the German society among whom right-wing populist, far right-wing, and extremist attitudes are becoming ever more popular, resulting in an increasing number of right-wing, extremist-motivated incidents of violence and crimes. In the 1970s, German society faced a series of incidents of left-wing extremist violence, but today it is mostly confronted with anti-immigration sentiments, Euroscepticism, religious extremism, Islamic extremism, and Salafism. This chapter focuses on right-wing extremism and right-wing terrorism. Borum's thesis that 'an individual's mindset and worldview establish a psychological climate' for or against radicalization or the risk 'of involvement in violent extremism' (2014, p. 287) is the key starting point in this chapter for the theoretical considerations regarding the preventive potential of civic and citizenship education.

The chapter starts with a definition of right-wing extremism and right-wing terrorism. Following a brief outline the current situation of right-wing terrorism in Germany, this chapter touches upon the challenges citizenship and civic education are facing today. The difference between participation in school and outside of school is highlighted with reference to international research. The idea of good citizenship is discussed. The role of attitudes as a protective factor against right-wing extremism leads to the key point of this chapter: the linkage of three theoretical models. Borum's mindset is combined with the learning opportunities model (*Angebots-Nutzungs-Modell*, Helmke, 2010, p. 73) and the model of political competence (Detjen et al., 2012) in order to identify opportunities for preventing radicalization through citizenship education in schools. It is assumed that civic and citizenship education can support young people in building their identities, developing values, and strengthening their self-concepts, and that it encourages their participation in society. The objective of this chapter is to aggregate existing knowledge and to stimulate new ideas for evaluating the potential of citizenship education to prevent radicalization. Due to the lack of empirical findings, these theoretical ideas have to be taken as recommendations rather than evidence-based advice.

#### **2 Right-Wing Extremism**

A definition of right-wing *extremism* as opposed to right-wing *terrorism* is the basis for the considerations in this chapter.

#### **2.1** *Definitions*

#### 2.1.1 Right-Wing Extremism

Right-wing extremism is often used as a generic term for antidemocratic attitudes and behaviours. Even if the term is discussed in a controversial manner, there is a consensus (Salzborn, 2014) on the ideology of inequality which devaluates people according to their ethnic origin, race, religion, class, gender, or sexual orientation. This leads to anti-Semitism, racism, and xenophobia, which is in accordance with Heitmeyer's prominent sociological conception of group-based hostility (2002). Other elements of right-wing extremism are the desire for an authoritarian state, the denial of pluralistic values in democracy, anti-liberalism, the acceptance and use of violence, as well as the trivialization and justification of the National Socialist era and the Second World War. Alongside the criticism of the theoretical foundation, several researchers developed a scale for measuring right-wing extremism and right-wing attitudes since the year 2000 (e.g. Decker et al., 2014; Best et al., 2013; Zick et al., 2017).

#### 2.1.2 Right-Wing Terrorism

A binding and generally accepted definition of right-wing terrorism is not available yet due to the problem that common definitions of terrorism cannot simply be transferred to the type of political violence and terrorism motivated by right-wing ideologies. 'Right-wing extremist terror often fell through the cracks of security agencies. … This concerned the character and forms of organization of the terrorists, the specifics of their mode of action, and the composition of victim groups' (Botsch, 2019, p. 10). This article uses Virchow's definition, who describes terrorism 'as planned, not only singularly violent, actions by (semi-) secret individual actors or groups that aim to create fear and intimidation among a larger number of people and/or to influence decisions of political actors or social groups without aiming for personal enrichment' (Virchow, 2019, p. 15).

#### **3 Right-Wing Extremism in Germany**

Over the past ten years, there has been a constant trend towards populist and right-wing parties and organizations, like the *Alternative für Deutschland* (Alternative for Germany) party (AfD), the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident (Pegida) movement, the Pro-Chemnitz movement, and the *Identitäre Bewegung* (Identitarian movement). All of these share ethnic, anti-human and racist beliefs. In 2016, a record 23,555 right-wing motivated criminal offenses were recorded (Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat [BMI], 2018), and the number is rising steadily. This section begins by giving an insight into actual statistics regarding right-wing extremism in Germany and the political debate and legislative attempts to deal with it. Next, some empirical findings of the prominent *Mitte*-Studien (Studies of the Political Centre) are presented. These findings underpin the necessity to act in politics and society, and this insight leads to the section concerning the role of civic education.

#### **3.1** *Politically Motivated Right-Wing Violence and Crimes*

At the end of 2018, the strength of the extremist movement amounted to a total of 24,100 members after deducting multiple memberships. As in the previous reporting year, 12,700 people were classified as violent; of these, more than one in two people were considered right-wing extremists. After an increase in right-wing extremist crimes and violence in 2015 and 2016 followed by a significant decrease in 2017, the number of crimes reduced by 0.3% in 2018, while the number of violent acts increased by 3.2% (BMI, 2018, p. 10). Xenophobia and anti-Semitism remain the decisive motive for right-wing extremist violent acts. The new high-profile images of enemies for right-wing extremists include asylum seekers and Muslims as well as political decision-makers.

Supporters and sympathizers of the right-wing extremist scene use the internet intensively to promote campaigns, mobilize for events, or plan actions. Social media networks, short news services such as Twitter, or video platforms such as YouTube are the core tools for right-wing extremists for communicating and spreading their ideology. Social media is not only used by right-wing extremist propaganda but also promotes the emergence of new actors. Following the assaults in Hanau and Halle, it is assumed that there is a new type of extremist, the so-called lone wolf, who is highly active on the internet and who has almost no real social life (Hartleb, 2020, p. 3). Hate speech and virtual extremism incite the lone wolf to eventually carry out attacks in real life and, most recently, also stream them live on the internet. For this reason, the German government coalition of the CDU and the SPD is currently planning to tighten the Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG). The new law aims to fight more effectively hate crime, criminally punishable fake news, and other unlawful content on social networks. This includes insult, malicious gossip, defamation, public incitement to crime, incitement to hatred, the dissemination of portrayals of violence, and threatening the commission of a felony. In February 2020, the German Ministry of Justice presented a bill that must be debated and voted on in the German Parliament. The new iteration of the NetzDG includes a reporting obligation for social media platforms such as Facebook or WhatsApp if there is concrete evidence that social network content fulfils the offence of incitement or death. 'BKA CEO Holger Münch sees this new reporting obligation as an essential building block for tackling hate speech and hatred online. "Hate crime has reached a degree that threatens democracy", Münch said at the European Police Congress at the beginning of February' (Marx, 2020). The German Federal Minister of the Interior Horst Seehofer has announced plans to ramp up the fight against right-wing extremism and right-wing terrorism. 'That is why we are further strengthening the BKA and BfV in terms of personnel and structure', he has said. 'Both authorities will each receive another 300 additional posts for these tasks' (BMI, 2019b). The political show of strength of tightening the law and increasing executive powers can contribute to a clear communication of the framing and demarcation of the democratically secured and legally protected freedom of expression and assembly, but it does not abolish the reasons for, or halt, the spread of right-

wing extremism among citizens. The next section offers a quick insight into some empirical studies about right-wing attitudes in Germany.

#### **4 Exploring Right-Wing Attitudes: The Mitte-Studien (Studies of the Political Centre)**

Since 2002, two different sets of research have explored the right-wing attitudes of German citizens using a representative set of data, namely the *FES-Mitte-Studien* (Friedrich Ebert Foundation studies of the political centre to determine the prevalence of right-wing attitudes in Germany) and the *GMF-Studien* (Studies of the political centre to capture the prevalence of group-focused hostility). The results of research on right-wing extremist attitudes in Germany in 2002 were alarming. 30% of East Germans and 24% of West Germans had xenophobic attitudes. This percentage varied over the following years but is back at the same level in 2016. In 2018, 55% of East and West Germans reported feeling like foreigners in their own country due to the presence of Muslims (Decker & Brähler, 2018, p. 18). The Bertelsmann Foundation's populism barometer shows a populist attitude among 30.5% of Germans, and this trend is rising (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018, p. 25). 'Soft' right-wing populist attitudes are more widespread than far-right ones. One in five surveyed people has right-wing populist attitudes. Right-wing populist attitudes are more widespread among East Germans than among West Germans. Zick et al. report that 51% of East Germans had right-wing populist tendencies in 2015, and 52% in 2016. By contrast, 39% of West Germans had right-wing populist tendencies in 2015, and 37% in 2016 (Zick et al., 2016, p. 119). Right-wing populist attitudes appear to be becoming stable and more normal in society. Botsch criticizes the term populism as a strategy for avoidance and trivialization in order not to address the right-wing threats to democracy which are grounded in populist arguments (Botsch, as cited in Decker & Brähler, 2018, p. 31). Bearing in mind these radicalization trends and the development of right-wing attitudes, politicians, and society must (re)act against these tendencies in order to protect democracy. Demands for political education for democracy in schools and extracurricular political education arise frequently, with a view to combating racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and other dimensions of group-related hostility towards human beings. The next section introduces the global concepts for citizenship education and describes the specific challenges which citizenship and civic education faces in the German education system.

#### **5 Challenges for Citizenship and Civic Education**

Several international organizations have developed concepts for citizenship education in the future, e.g. the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's *Learning Compass 2030* (Rychen, 2016), the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (United Nations, 2015), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation's (2014) *Global Citizenship Education*, and the *Reference Framework for Competences for Democratic Culture* (Council of Europe, 2018). Each concept demands that education should foster the knowledge, skills, values, and attitudes for young learners 'to build a more just, peaceful and sustainable world and to thrive as global citizens in the twenty-first century' (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 2014, p. 9). The concept of global citizenship is positively connoted in numerous political and democratic-theoretical conceptions. Citizenship competence is one of the eight key competences for democratic culture (Council of Europe, 2018), and high expectations are being placed on mature citizens regarding their problem-solving abilities and their active and responsible contributions to a solidarity-based, pluralistic community.

#### **5.1** *A Federal Goal: Citizenship Education in Germany*

Education for democracy is anchored as a goal for each federal state in Germany. The following statement is taken from the website of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior under the heading 'Society and the Constitution':

Civic education is an essential part of democracy. Since the Federal Republic of Germany was first founded, civic education has evolved into an independent task with two main objectives:


The strategy of the German Standing Conference of Education Minister's titled 'Education in the Digital World' focuses on 'individual and self-directed learning, maturity, identity formation … and self-determined participation in the digital society' (Kultusministerkonferenz, 2016, p. 10). The political competence model of Detjen et al. (2012) mentions not only attitudes, motivation, and knowledge, reasoning, and judgement skills, but also the ability to participate. To argue competently involves not only the articulation of interests but also persuasive reasoning. The key competences of knowledge, attitudes, participation, and argumentation skills seem to be identical in global concepts for citizenship education.

The normative objectives thus meet an empirically different reality. International school performance studies such as the *Programme for International Student Assessment* (PISA), the *International Computer and Information Literacy Study* (ICILS), and the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA)'s *International Civic and Citizenship Education Study* (ICCS) indicate that the knowledge, skills, and willingness of students in Germany to participate are partly below the European Union and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development average, and that the German school system continues to produce social inequalities along intersectional lines (school form, migration experience, gender, and socioeconomic characteristics, see Deimel et al., 2019). This could be explained by the small number of hours available for citizenship lessons (Gökbudak & Hedtke, 2019) and the high proportion of inexperienced teachers with no domain-specific diploma (Manzel et al., 2017).

A comparison of European data from the *International Civic and Citizenship Education Study* (ICCS, see Schulz et al., 2017) from 2016 shows that political knowledge affects the dimensions of identity, political attitudes, political trust, and participation as well as self-efficacy. In the study *Youth and Democracy* conducted in Saxony-Anhalt, students reported that citizenship education is not very action-oriented and that they are assigned a rather passive, receptive role (Kötters-König, 2001, p. 7). Participatory competence with the facets of negotiation and decision-making is often only possible in political education via simulations (e.g. role-playing games). The hierarchical relationship between teachers and learners (e.g. giving grades) in combination with clear educational requirements (curricula) in schools does not leave sufficient scope for real participation experiences in regular classes. In projects, youth council elections, or extracurricular excursions, students have the opportunity to gain active, experimental, and participatory experiences in a predefined space; but they also encounter resistance and power relations, which make their participation and the experience of self-efficacy difficult. Mager and Nowak (2012) demonstrate that approaches to student participation, such as student representation or student co-administration, have positive effects on the political efficacy of young people.

#### **5.2** *Civic Participation of Young People in and outside of School*

The previous section has set out the difficulties of civic education in German schools. The next section refers to some studies conducted in other countries which face the same problem. The section contrasts the participatory role of young people within school with their actual participation outside of the school context. The concept of being a good citizen is questioned due to the fact that participation can also lead young people to stray from the democratic path, for example towards participation in right-wing demonstrations or by creating extremist posts in contested social media channels. Civic engagement and political action per se are not a guarantee for democracy. The alienation of young people from politics as highlighted by the Shell Youth Study 2019 is discussed as well as normative ideas regarding democratic competences.

The limited possibilities for engagement and participation in school are addressed by Oser and Biedermann (2006) for Switzerland: '(a) students can participate significantly more in their families than in school and (b) they are not involved in decision-making processes in school about topics which influence their lives prima facie' (p. 25). A recent study in Swedish schools also indicates that students are more likely to be seen as learning objects. They are informed, show respect for others, submit their own proposals, but they go unheard and have to accept teachers' decisions:

It could be argued that in the context of formal student participation, students are almost robbed of democratic experiences and unauthorized as a collective to act politically in school, which will have consequences for their future democratic experiences, attitudes, and knowledge. (Anderson, 2019, p. 161)

Only 37% of young people eligible to vote went to the polls in the UK in 2005, although their political interest remains unbroken (Henn & Ford, 2012). At the same time, they have a low self-esteem in terms of their political knowledge and a low sense of effectiveness in influencing political decision-making processes (Henn & Ford, 2012, pp. 53–55). Despite high voter abstinence and declining commitment to formal politics (Putnam, 2000), young people participate in civic (mass) movements such as Fridays for Future, or they show their opinions through unconventional methods such as flash mobs, product boycotts, and Twitter or YouTube posts. However, the 18th Shell Youth Study of 2019 (Albert et al., 2019) shows a slight downward trend in the willingness of young people to participate; apparently only those interested in politics are becoming significantly more active. Those interested in politics and civic participation can be young people with democratic values but also young people with right-wing attitudes. Decker et al. (2016) explain the rising willingness to participate among right-wing extremists with the transformation of attitudes into action. This leads to right-wing demonstrations such as Pegida, Pro-Chemnitz, or anti–fake-news-on-coronavirus demonstrations such as took place in the spring of 2020. Researchers and politicians warn against infiltration by right-wing extremists. According to Quent, director of the Institute for Democracy and Civil Society in Jena, the protest movement Widerstand 2020 (*Resistance 2020*) is currently a diffuse pool of enemies of science, conspiracy theorists, right-wing populists, and left-wing opponents of vaccination. He has analysed the organization's online presence and comments: 'The content is particularly distributed in right-wing and partly anti-Semitic circles. For example, the idea of an immunity card is equated with the Jewish star in National Socialism' (Quent, as cited in Frenzel, 2020). 'Immunity card' here relates to the suggestion that the detection of antibodies to the COVID-19 virus might support the creation of 'immunity passports' that would enable individuals to resume their normal lives; however, at this time, there is no evidence that people who have COVID-19 antibodies are actually protected from a second infection (World Health Organization, 2020). An immunity card would therefore 'label' different groups of people and could lead to discrimination.

As explained in the previous paragraph, the alienation from institutionalized politics combined with 'committed scepticism' (O'Toole et al., 2003, p. 51) meets an expansion of opportunities for civic participation outside of the classical electoral arena in recent years (Norris, 2002). New forms of collective as well as individual action are on the rise (Theocharis & van Deth, 2017). With smartphones and mobile internet access, a vast quantity of (political) information is available in a wide variety of contexts which requires corresponding digital skills from citizens as well as the ability and knowledge to differentiate between real and fake news in order to make a reason-based judgement concerning contested political issues (Manzel, 2017).

Participation in non-institutionalized and personalized formats is increasing. The video on the destruction of the CDU by the German YouTube influencer Rezo (2019) illustrates how the borders between the private and public spheres are becoming blurred and shows the impact of new media participation on traditional democratic parties. Deliberative discourses in public spaces are facing new challenges due to the transformation of the media landscape through the internet and social media channels. Although 77% of young people in Germany are satisfied with democracy, 24% are inclined towards populism (Albert et al., 2019). Young people are not willing to participate in public discourse because of a deep disappointment with encrusted and ineffective political structures, non-responsiveness, or because of their socioeconomic status (SES). These selection mechanisms generate and reinforce power and inequality relations and thus undermine bridging and bonding in society. The *International Computer and Information Literacy Study* (ICILS, Fraillon et al., 2018) impressively demonstrates the division between digital natives with high digital skills and marginalized digital immigrants who often have migration backgrounds and low SES. Although all citizens can publish their own views on the internet via social media channels without gatekeepers, opportunities for participation in political decision-making are strongly influenced by sociodemographic factors.

Bearing in mind the difficulties that young people are facing in and outside of school and along different participation forms such as elections, demonstrations, boycott, or social media posts, it is important not to overlook the vital role of attitudes towards democracy. The following paragraph further debates the idea of good citizenship and its impact on citizenship education.

Westheimer's concept of good citizenship (2015) includes participation not only as singular actions by citizens outside of the political arena and its institutions but also as common initiatives for the common good and the need for governance legitimated by majority decisions. There are numerous projects of action-oriented community learning settings following the concept of John Dewey (1994), but the empirical evidence is controversial. One criticism is that these approaches have more to do with 'voluntarism, charity, and obedience' (Westheimer, 2015, p. 37) than with democracy. 'Service learning and non-profit engagement without reflection prove to be unsustainable and must therefore be combined with school preparation and follow-up' (Anders et al., 2020, p. 149).

In the case of secondary schools, the Education Action Council, in its current 2020 opinion, notes significant differences in the quality of citizenship lessons in different school forms (Anders et al., 2020). As a result, pupils in primary and secondary schools are systematically disadvantaged in acquiring democratic skills. This is worrying because according to the Shell Youth Study 2019, young people with low levels of education are particularly vulnerable to populist influence (Albert et al., 2019). In addition, the study shows that young people overall are more interested in politics once again while at the same time the disenchantment with politicians among the young generation is high. More than two-thirds of young people do not feel represented by politicians. Around a quarter are open to populist arguments. This point emphasizes the importance of planting the seeds for identification with democratic values in citizenship education. Especially in communities characterized by high levels of segregation and social inequality, citizenship education is necessary in order to strengthen young people with experiences of marginalization and exclusion such as racism, sexism, homophobia, and transphobia.

Citizenship education is expected to foster self-efficacy and problemsolving skills so that young people identify with democracy and do not drift into extreme milieus. But even if researchers in the didactics of citizenship education in Germany are dealing with right-wing extremism (e.g. Behrens, 2019; Hafeneger et al., 2019; Schedler et al., 2019; Besand, 2018; Schmitt, 2018; Möllers & Manzel, 2017), there is a lack of empirical data regarding the potential of citizenship education lessons at school to prevent right-wing attitudes and right-wing extremist actions in young people. It has not yet been proven whether citizenship lessons and an education for democracy can contribute to the development of individual protective factors, which include a sense of social belonging, empathic behaviours, and the ability to understand the perspective of others.

The role of attitudes leads to the next section, which briefly presents multiple explanations for the development of far-right attitudes. A helpful concept for a new theoretical model for a type of citizenship education that prevents young people from radicalization and terrorism seems to be Borum's mindset, which is introduced in this section.

#### **6 Explanations for the Emergence of Right-Wing Attitudes**

#### **6.1** *Radicalization Patterns*

There are multiple explanations for why young people change their attitudes towards far-right or extremist values (Baier et al., 2006; Zick & Küpper, 2009). Zick and Küpper emphasize that extreme right-wing patterns 'arise from the interaction of individual, intergroup and social factors' (p. 299) and thus constitute the result of a complex development process. Prejudices often pave the way for discriminatory behaviours due to the negative assessment of individuals or groups of people with a different group affiliation. This kind of behaviour often manifests itself as social discrimination (Allport, 1954, pp. 51–52). The contact hypothesis generally states that contact with members of a foreign group can lead to a reduction of prejudice and an improvement in attitudes compared to this group.

Personality models for explaining far-right attitudes assume that political and social attitudes are accompanied by certain personality traits. The affinity for political extremism can also be favoured by certain characteristics of a person. One of the personality models is the concept of the authoritarian character according to Adorno et al. (1950). As the primary socialization authority, parents play an important role in the development of political orientations. Children assume certain affective ties to nations and parties and develop basic competences based on their parents' views, which they later transfer to politics (Sann & Preiser, 2008). Gniewosz and Noack (2006) highlight the importance of intra-family communication about attitudes, norms, and values in the formation of xenophobic attitudes of children and adolescents. However, Raabe and Beelmann (2009) state that negative attitudes towards foreign groups are not wave-like—as often reported—with their peaks at the ages of six and seven, and then again at fourteen to fifteen years, but instead tend to increase in their extent intra-individually. This result is 'all the more relevant the higher the stability of prejudices and the more prejudices in adolescence and adulthood are dependent on developmental conditions in childhood' (Raabe & Beelmann, 2009, p. 116). It should also be mentioned that the numbers of victims of violence inflicted by parents are increasing (Bergmann et al., 2019, p. 3).

Deprivation, victimization by parents or other people, an affinity for violence, and right-wing attitudes are seen as potential risk factors for becoming a right-wing extremist. Students with lower levels of formal education commit more right-wing motivated crimes than students with a higher formal education (Krieg et al., 2019, p. 146). Committing a political crime can mark the end of a development process. In this respect, children and particularly young people are endangered by far-right ideas and popular propaganda as their political attitudes can still be shaped and exploited (Maresch & Bliesener, 2015). Far-right attitudes are usually preceded by far-right behaviours. Of course, the opposite is also conceivable: far-right motivated criminal acts and violence may lead to the radicalization of attitudes.

In addition to the family as the origin of radicalization, three other factors are often discussed as being relevant for developing extremist attitudes. First, Baier et al. (2006) emphasize the influence of schools and peers on the political socialization of young people. The fact that assaults with a far-right background are mostly carried out by groups also emphasizes the role of the peers. Second, the impact of gender is discussed together with the construct of hierarchical selfinterest. Boys and men are more inclined to develop far-right attitudes as they are more vulnerable to dominance ideologies than girls and women. And third, school factors such as problems of performance in the classroom, lack of recognition, unsystematic and undemocratic teaching, and low performance standards can also contribute to the development of far-right attitudes (Sturzbecher, 2001).

Socialization models provide further explanations for right-wing extremism. According to Baier et al. (2006), socialization models 'link both structural and individual causes from the point of view of a learning history or career' (p. 292). The theory of social disintegration according to Anhut and Heitmeyer (2008) states that 'the greater the experience of disintegration for subgroups of the majority society, the greater the integration problems of the minorities to be absorbed and the greater the tensions between the members of the different groups are to be expected' (p. 143).

#### **6.2** *Borum's Mindset Concept*

The previous vision of individual protective factors directly leads to Borum's mindset concept. In the process of radicalization into violent extremism (RVE), key turning points can trigger radicalization—or not.

Radicalization often starts with individuals who are frustrated with their lives, society, or foreign policy of their governments. A typical pattern is that these individuals meet other like-minded people, and together they go through a series of events and phases that ultimately can result in terrorism. However, only a few end up becoming terrorists*.* (Precht, 2007, p. 5)

Borum's idea of a mindset that establishes a psychological climate which increases a person's risk of embracing extremism works on the assumption that radicalization is multi-determined (Borum, 2012). His different worldviews of 'authoritarianism, apocalypticism, dogmatism and fundamentalism' can be connected to the research on epistemological beliefs (Krettenauer et al., 2014; Kuhn & Park, 2005; Mason & Scirica, 2006). Human beings develop epistemological understanding to coordinate the subjective and objective aspects of knowing (Kuhn et al., 2000). At the absolutist level two of epistemological understanding, critical thinking is unnecessary because the truth is readily discernible. The more individuals develop multiplist or evaluativist beliefs (levels three and four), the more they develop a tolerance towards other opinions: because everyone has a right to their own opinion, all opinions are equally right. Therefore, choices have to be made concerning one's own values, for example. Rather than facts or opinions, knowledge at an evaluativist level of epistemological understanding consists of judgements which require support in a framework of alternatives, evidence, and arguments (Kuhn et al., 2000). Epistemological beliefs affect the ability to reflect on judgements as well as the reasoning process. This is relevant for the later argument to strengthen young people's knowledge and their argumentation and reasoning skills as well as to support their development of epistemological beliefs towards level four.

In addition to the world views, Borum focuses on psychological vulnerabilities. In particular, the need for personal meaning and identity and the need for belonging create a weakness that may push individuals towards a radical ideology. Young people are looking for their place in society, and they want to participate in democracy and engage in their futures. This is a possible starting point for citizenship education. If students do not feel heard by politicians and have low trust in institutions, their activities can be pushed onto the wrong path. The perception of injustice in society and political decision-making can heat up moral emotions. 'Moral emotions are those "linked to the interest or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent"' (Haidt, 2003, p. 853, as cited in Borum, 2014, p. 293). The dimension of emotion is involved in the learning process. Weißeno and Grobshäuser report the results of different studies on the correlation between students' self-concept, knowledge, political trust, and willingness to participate. The domain-specific self-concept as well as political interest show significant impacts on knowledge (Weißeno & Grobshäuser, 2019, p. 130). Self-efficacy is a significant predictor of political competence. A critical understanding of complex political decisions, different interest groups, and diverging values is necessary to counteract possible disappointment with the political system.

#### **7 A Combined Theoretical Approach for Empirical Research on the Contribution of Citizenship Education to Preventing Right-Wing Extremism**

As I outlined at the end of the previous section, my main purpose is to connect Borum's idea of a mindset with two models of teaching, learning, and the acquisition of competence. The utilization of learning opportunities model (Helmke, 2010) consists of three main axes and is surrounded by a number of context variables such as school form and school community (e.g. housing conditions, unemployment rate in the community, etc.), which also influence success at school. On one side of the model are the teachers with their professional knowledge (content knowledge, pedagogical content knowledge, and pedagogical knowledge), beliefs, and motivation as well as self-regulating skills. Teachers offer lessons based on their own professional competence. On the other side of the model are the students, each with their own personality, family and social backgrounds, motivations, and individual resources. Teachers and students come together at school in domain-specific lessons. Students can show learning activities and teachers can adapt their input to each student individually so that the outcome of the learning process is positive for the learner. If we integrate the requirements for citizenship education for democracy as an outcome into the opportunity-to-learn model, political competence is evident in these four dimensions: knowledge, reasoning skills, participation skills, and attitudes and motivations.

Political alienation and the feeling of political powerlessness, meaninglessness, and normlessness isolation (Solhaug, 2012, p. 5) are the opposites of political trust and a sense of being able to affect the political system. Therefore, citizenship education can foster beliefs and motivation among students. Solhaug's study regarding political alienation and marginalization from mainstream society among migrant students in Norway shows the significance of identity and effective political citizenship in order to strengthen students' self-efficacy and political trust in democracy and its institutions.

School teachers and their lessons cannot change the daily life circumstances with which their students are confronted. They can influence neither the formal education and job situation of their students' parents nor their students' housing conditions, their socioeconomic factors, and favourite peer groups. But according to Hattie (2009), professional teachers do have a significant effect on students' learning outcomes, and teachers do matter in developing students' political knowledge and civic skills via cognitive activation, feedback, problem-solving, and classroom management.

Figure 5.1 clearly shows the key points at which teachers and citizenship education lessons can start to foster individual protective factors. Both the four dimensions of political competence and the learning activities with adaptive feedback and group tasks can help to build a sense of social belonging and empathic behaviours. If empathy is a protective factor (Hosser & Beckurts, 2005) against racism by preventing antisocial or delinquent development, as Bäckström and Björklund (2007) proved with Swedish students between the ages of sixteen and twenty, then empathy could be important for getting students involved in social actions via role plays in which they start learning to argue from different perspectives. Role plays and simulated political debates 'can prevent simplistic binary understandings (good/bad) and absolutist views, which are used by extremists, but they can be challenged by critical

Figure 5.1 The learning opportunities model combined with the model of political

competence (based on concepts drawn from Helmke, 2010, and Detjen et al., 2012)

and relational thinking to make way for accepting alternative worldviews and "the other"' (Ghosh et al., 2016, p. 11). However, Gronostay's (2019) argumentation study indicates that students who were forced to argue a position that diverged from their personal view on a given controversy were less likely to take part in the discussion, but more likely to change their own personal views on the controversy. Three different settings (coherence, divergence, and indifference) were tested in fifty citizenship lessons in ten grade eight and grade nine classes (children aged between 13 and 15 years) in secondary schools in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany, depending on students' personal views on a controversial political issue. 'An important finding with practical implications for teachers was, that the assignment of positions for in-class discussion significantly impacted students' participation in the controversial discussions' (Gronostay, 2019, p. 132). It has to be discussed if the divergent position (whereby the assigned and personal positions are incompatible) or the coherent assigned position would better foster a balanced and reflective judgement. The divergence condition requires perspective taking and attention to information that contradicts personal views, and thereby might reduce confirmation bias (according to Gronostay, 2019, p. 132).

Political education has the potential to be a tool that prevents populism. It can cause cognitive irritation through objectification and controversy, prevent closed world views, and strengthen individual political maturity through political knowledge and democratic transfer of values while keeping in mind the diversity of the society. In the digital era, information and media literacy play a central role in the battle against fake news and hate crime on the internet. The conformation bias—the tendency to attend selectively to information that is consistent with pre-existing beliefs and to disregard contrary or disconfirming information—can be questioned in civic education lessons. 'Resilience to extremist views must be built and students need to be equipped with the skills and knowledge to not just ignore, but argue against, extremist positions' (Ghosh et al., 2016, p. 10). Borum's mindset (2014) offers the dimensions of vulnerabilities and propensities which could be combined with the theoretical models of political competence and learning processes. This could be a helpful theoretical approach for identifying 'where the subject is on a path towards or away from involvement with' (Borum, 2014, p. 300) right-wing extremism or terrorism. Scientists of the didactics of citizenship education are asked to test empirically the effectiveness of civic and citizenship education for developing a protection mechanism against right-wing extremism. In the German compulsory education system, citizenship education can reach every young person. Research regarding the influence of civic education on right-wing attitudes, extremist beliefs, and democratic trust is needed together with research on the preventive dimension of knowledge and reasoning skills vis-à-vis fake news and extremist ideologies. Research on the professional competence of teachers is also needed and must be configured in connection with students' learning processes and belief developments.

#### **Abbreviations**



#### **References**


in Britain. *Journal of Youth Studies, 17*(3), 360–380. https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261. 2013.830704


Vehrkamp, R., & Merkel, W. (2018). *Populismusbarometer 2018. Populistische Einstellungen bei Wählern und Nichtwählern in Deutschland 2018* [*Populism barometer 2018*]. https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/ Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/ZD\_\_Studie\_Populismusbarometer\_2018.pdf


learning outcomes in political education]. In S. Frech & D. Richter (Eds.), *Emotionen im Politikunterricht* (pp. 114–134). Wochenschau.


### **Language as a Precondition for Social Integration of Migrants in the Educational Context**

*Evidence from Germany*

*Hanna Beißert, Sofie Leona Bayer, Seçil Gönültaş and Kelly Lynn Mulvey*

#### **Abstract**

This chapter emphasizes the importance of language for the integration of immigrants. First, we summarize findings on the crucial role of language skills for educational success, occupational opportunities, and social inclusion. As the openness of the host society is also a central factor for integration, we next describe how social categorization can be an important source for the development of prejudice, hostility, and extremism. In this context, we highlight the significant role of language as a social category that has the potential to impact positively the openness of host society members towards immigrants. Finally, we summarize two studies demonstrating the importance of language as an intergroup category. Study 1 found evidence that language skills play an important role in secondary school students' openness towards refugee peers, and Study 2 provided some initial indication that language skills are more relevant than cultural similarity for the openness of host society members towards international students at higher education institutions. In sum, this chapter establishes the crucial role of host society language skills from different perspectives and demonstrates that language has a great potential for promoting the successful integration of immigrants.

#### **Keywords**

language – language skills – social categorization – prejudice – migration – integration

#### **1 Introduction**

Migration has increased all over the world and societies have become increasingly diverse. More and more people from heterogeneous cultural and ethnic

This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-SA 4.0 License.

backgrounds live together. Growing up in diverse cultural contexts with a large variety of ethnicities and languages has become everyday life in many European countries (Hooghe et al., 2009). Thus, it is of great societal significance to identify factors which promote the successful integration of immigrants into their host societies. Research from various disciplines such as psychology, education, sociology, linguistics, and economics has impressively and recurrently highlighted the crucial role of language skills for individual and societal integration (for an overview, see Esser, 2006). In the first part of this chapter, we provide a summary of the most important findings in this regard.

However, despite the great significance of language skills for integration, we must not forget that integration is a reciprocal process of mutual adaption (Berry, 2011). The attitudes and the openness of the host society are very important for the successful integration of immigrants as well (Christ et al., 2013). Therefore, in the second part of this chapter, we describe how the process of social categorization can promote the development and maintenance of stereotypes and prejudices which can hinder openness and integration or even lead to hostility, discrimination, and extremism towards immigrants. In this context, we posit that language is not only a means of communication but also reflects a meaningful intergroup category. In the last part of the chapter, we summarize two studies from different contexts which demonstrate the important role of language for the openness of people of the host society.

#### **2 The Crucial Role of Language Skills for Integration**

In order to understand the crucial role of language in the integration of immigrants, it is important to be aware of the multiple functions of language. First of all, language is a medium for communication which enables understanding between people within a society. If migrants want to interact with the people of their host society, it is very helpful for them to speak the national language in order to communicate effectively (Martinovic et al., 2009). Further, language is a valuable resource that can foster access to other resources, particularly in terms of educational achievement and occupational opportunities. Thus, language skills can be understood as part of a person's human capital (Esser, 2006). And finally, language is a symbol of relatedness (which can enhance integration) or dissimilarity (which can hinder integration) and thus reflects an important intergroup category for social categorization which can lead to stereotypes and discrimination (Esser, 2006; Kinzler, 2013).

In the next section, we present an overview of findings on the important role of language regarding three different aspects: educational achievement, occupational opportunities, and personal integration in terms of social relations within the host society. In this review, we focus on language as a communication medium and as a resource. In the second part of the chapter, we will address the role of language as a symbol, with particular attention to the role of language in social categorization.

#### **2.1** *Language as the Key to Educational Success*

Host country language skills are a key element of integration in terms of the academic achievement and educational success of immigrants (e.g. Stanat & Christensen, 2006). In many countries, immigrant and migrant young people generally lag behind their local peers in their academic achievement and, as a result, they obtain lower educational qualifications (Esser, 2006; Haug, 2008). Although many factors play a role in the disadvantageous educational situation of children and adolescents with immigration backgrounds, language skills may play a central role in ensuring educational success throughout the whole curriculum, starting even early in childhood. For instance, due to their lower levels of language skills, there is a higher likelihood that the primary school enrolment of immigrant children is delayed (Kempert et al., 2016). Further, throughout the whole school career, educational achievement is strongly connected to host country language skills (Kempert et al., 2016; Stanat & Christensen, 2006). Moreover, language skills are relevant not only for language-based domains (e.g. reading, writing, literature, etc.), but also for mathematics, science, and other subjects (e.g. Kempert et al., 2016; Moe et al., 2015). The language of the host country is typically the language of instruction throughout the curriculum, and sufficient knowledge of the language of instruction is central to the acquisition of skills and abilities in various subjects (Stanat & Christensen, 2006). In this context, language can be understood as a resource that helps or hinders learning (Esser, 2006). In mathematics, for instance, conceptual understanding of mathematical terms, operations, and principles is conveyed through the medium of language (Ellerton & Clarkson, 1997). Thus, a lack of language skills will impede learning and restrict the acquisition of skills. In turn, proficient language skills can enhance immigrants' chances of educational success. For instance, academic disadvantages are lower for children of families who speak the host country language at home; and for some countries of origin, children's disadvantages are eliminated when controlled for by the language spoken at home (Stanat et al., 2010). Thus, it is recommended to send children with low levels of German language input at home to preschool early as they will likely benefit from a longer duration of preschool attendance (Klein & Becker, 2017) and as this can lay the foundation for the successful development of host society language skills. Being of such immense significance throughout the whole educational career, language skills can be understood as the key to educational success (Esser, 2006). This is especially true in Europe, where immigrant young people are often enrolled in schools that rely on assimilation ideologies and expect all education to occur solely in the native language.

#### **2.2** *Language as the Key to Occupational Opportunities*

Language is also the key to the successful integration of immigrants in the labour market (Esser, 2006; Geis-Thöne, 2019). It has been shown that people with an immigrant background have a higher risk of unemployment and lower incomes than local people even if they have the same level of education (Geis-Thöne, 2019). One reason for this is that migrants are often not employed in accordance with their professional qualifications due to a lack of language skills (Geis-Thöne, 2019). Weaker host-country language competence is also one important reason for the increased risk of unemployment for people with an immigration background (Geis-Thöne, 2019). In turn, it has been shown that attending language courses can compensate for the language deficit and can reduce the risk of unemployment for immigrants (Auer, 2018). Other disadvantages of immigrants on the labour market also vanish when immigrants have sophisticated language skills (Brücker et al., 2014; Geis-Thöne, 2019; Heath et al., 2008). A clear example of this is the study by Kalter (2006), which demonstrated that proficient host country language skills tremendously improved the employment opportunities of Turkish young people in Germany. Hence, language skills enhance migrants' chances of finding a job, obtaining a good professional position, and earning a higher salary (Auer, 2018; Esser, 2006).

There are two main reasons why host-country language skills are so important for occupations and professional careers. First, in many jobs, elaborate language skills are necessary for most operational processes, and a lack of language skills would lead to inefficiency and high transaction costs (Esser, 2006). Further, without proficient language skills, the transferability of previously acquired human capital (e.g. educational qualifications and work experiences obtained in the country of origin) is limited (Friedberg, 2000; Kalter, 2005). And although English is becoming increasingly important as a global language due to increasing globalization, in many fields host-country language skills are still critically important for occupational opportunities (Attanasio, 2013; Pusch, 2010).

Significantly, it is important to note that the mere *understanding* of the host country's language is but a minimum condition; to enhance success on the labour market, proficiency in written language is essential as well (Esser, 2006). Thus, one key to successfully integrating migrants into the labour market is successful language acquisition.

#### **2.3** *Language as the Key to Social Inclusion*

It is quite evident that host-country language skills are not only crucial for educational and occupational success but also for integration in terms of social inclusion and participation in social life (Haug, 2006; Masgoret & Ward, 2006). Language skills are necessary for communication and aid individuals in interacting with members of the host society (Martinovic et al., 2009). Proficient language skills make it easier to communicate with locals and to establish interpersonal relationships and friendships (Masgoret & Ward, 2006; Schacht et al., 2014). The likelihood of interethnic friendships is much higher for immigrants who have elaborate skills in the language of the host society (Martinovic et al., 2009; Schacht et al., 2014). A lack of language skills can lead to difficulties in social interactions and communication in formal as well as in informal situations (McBrien, 2005), and language barriers can lead to the exclusion or marginalization of migrants in everyday life (Beisenherz, 2006) as well as to misunderstandings that could lead to attributions of hostile intentions in ambiguous situations. Interestingly, the relationship between language skills and social inclusion is reciprocal: while language proficiency enhances migrants' options for participation and social interactions, increased participation in turn supports competent acquisition of the local language (Clement et al., 2001). Further, interactions with peers are especially important for the acquisition of informal language (Haug, 2008). All in all, language skills are a key factor for social inclusion and sociocultural adjustment (Beisenherz, 2006; von Grüningen et al., 2012).

#### **3 The Attitudes of the Host Society: Social Categorization as a Basis for Prejudice, Hostility, and Discrimination**

Although language plays a crucial role in integration, one must keep in mind that integration is a reciprocal process of mutual accommodation (Berry, 2011). In other words, integration cannot be achieved by migrants alone but always depends on the attitudes and the openness of the host society (Christ et al., 2013).

For instance, in many Western European countries, public opinion regarding immigration and multiculturalism is not very positive (Froehlich & Schulte, 2019; Pew Forum, 2011; Zick et al., 2008). This unwelcoming social climate is related to tendencies towards the discrimination and exclusion of immigrants and can impede successful integration (Cuddy et al., 2007; Froehlich & Schulte, 2019). Such negative attitudes and a lack of openness to immigration and multiculturalism are related to prejudices, intergroup processes, and social categorization and can in the worst case lead to radicalization and extremism (Alizadeh et al., 2014; Cuddy et al., 2007).

Social categorization is the process of classifying people into groups. This means that people categorize themselves and others into differentiated groups based on similar characteristics (Brewer, 2001). In the same way that we build taxonomies to categorize plants or animals based on their similarities, we also classify people into social groups based on their typical characteristics, such as ethnicity, gender, or any other characteristic (Aronson et al., 2014). For instance, race and ethnicity are characteristics that people use from an early age as intergroup categories (Nesdale, 2013).

Social categorization is a natural part of social perception and simplifies the perception and cognition related to the complex social world (Aronson et al., 2014). Given our limited capacity for processing information, it would be impossible to process the social world in its full complexity. Thus, it is efficient for us to use cognitive short cuts in terms of heuristics that help us to simplify and organize our social information processing (Jones, 1990). This is helpful for structuring our complex social world and makes social categorization a functional mechanism of our cognition (Aronson et al., 2014). However, the mechanism of social categorization also enables the development of prejudices and their detrimental consequences, such as hostility, aggression, or, in the worst case, extremism (Alizadeh et al., 2014; Aronson et al., 2014).

In order to understand how social categorization leads to prejudices, it is important to know what prejudices are, how they develop, and how they can lead to discrimination, hostility, and aggression.

Prejudice can be defined as a 'hostile or negative attitude toward people in a distinguishable group, based solely on their membership in that group' (Aronson et al., 2010, p. 423). This means that when individuals are prejudiced against immigrants, they have a general negative attitude towards people with migrant backgrounds and perceive all migrants as being the same. Such prejudice regarding immigrants is widespread in many countries and can already be found in children during middle childhood (Nesdale, 2013). Research in the United Kingdom even indicated that ethnic stereotypes are so common that they are becoming normalized in schools (Jones & Rutland, 2018).

Like all attitudes, prejudices include three components: a cognitive component (stereotypes), an affective component (emotions), and a behavioural component (discrimination) (Aronson et al., 2014; Bohner & Wänke, 2002).

#### **3.1** *Stereotypes: The Cognitive Component*

Stereotypes are 'generalizations about a group of people in which identical characteristics are assigned to virtually all members of the group, regardless of actual variation among the members' (Aronson et al., 2010, p. 423). This means that stereotypes are broadly shared assumptions in society about certain characteristics of members of certain groups (Hilton & Hippel, 1996). By definition, stereotypes do not necessarily have to refer to something negative. Positive or neutral assumptions can also be part of stereotypes. For example, some groups of immigrants may be stereotyped as uneducated (negative stereotype) while also being stereotyped as sociable and hospitable (positive stereotype). However, even positive stereotypes are generalizations which ignore individual variations between members of a certain group. And thus stereotypes reflect the way human cognition functions: in categories. Whereas this can be helpful for social information processing, it can also favour the development of hostility, particularly in the context of immigration, because negative stereotypes regarding immigrants are widespread in many countries, typically describing immigrants as cold and incompetent (Lee & Fiske, 2006; Zick et al., 2008).

#### **3.2** *Emotions: The Affective Component*

As described above, prejudices are attitudes regarding specific groups. The affective component is the emotional reaction to such a group and, related to this, the evaluation of the respective group. Anxiety (e.g. fear of the unknown) or anger (e.g. blaming immigrants for economic and social problems) are important emotions in the context of stereotypes regarding immigrants. For instance, intergroup anxiety towards people from other ethnicities has been shown to result in the avoidance of interracial encounters and in feelings of hostility (Plant & Devine, 2003).

The affective aspect of prejudice is of particular importance as such group-related emotions often run deep. As a consequence, it is very difficult to use rational arguments in order to change individuals' attitudes concerning a specific group towards which they have strong emotions (Aronson et al., 2014). Therefore it is possible that individuals can continue to harbour negative emotions towards a specific group even though they actually know that their prejudice is not true (Aronson et al., 2014). In the context of immigration, this is important because emotional prejudices are closely related to discriminatory behaviour (Talaska et al., 2008). This is also relevant for the development of extremism as strong emotions can lead to the derogation of out-groups (Brewer, 2001; Hewstone et al., 2002) and ethnic violence (Petersen, 2002).

#### **3.3** *Discrimination: The Behavioural Component*

The behavioural component of prejudice is at play when an existing stereotype results in the discriminatory or unfair treatment of persons of a certain group. Discrimination is defined as 'an unjustified negative or harmful action towards the members of a group simply because of their membership in that group' (Aronson et al., 2010, p. 426). Discrimination can be expressed through very different forms of behaviour. A few examples are social exclusion, unfair treatment or unequal chances, degradation or humiliation, or direct violence and aggression.

For instance, young people from ethnic minorities are more likely to be excluded or bullied at school (Plenty & Jonsson, 2017); being teased and harassed because of their ethnicity, culture, skin colour, or accent are common experiences for migrant young people (Pachter et al., 2010). Immigrants often experience discrimination in terms of unequal chances or unfair treatment when seeking opportunities, for instance in the housing market (Fuhrmann, 2011).

Prejudices can also manifest themselves in more subtle forms of behaviour as, for example, in the social distance we keep (e.g. when someone does not sit down next to the black man on the bus) or in our language. The way we speak about people from specific groups can reflect discrimination (Ng, 2007). However, especially strong emotions regarding stereotyped groups pave the way towards explicit and violent forms of discrimination and aggression (Petersen, 2002; Talaska et al., 2008).

#### **3.4** *The Development of Prejudice*

The causes for the development of prejudice are manifold and can be found at different social levels: at the individual level, resulting from our category-based social information processing; at group level, due to competition; and at societal level, based on pressures to comply and conform. The latter refers to the fact that we develop many of our prejudices and discriminatory behaviours because we are socialized in a society with many stereotypic mindsets in which discriminatory practices are in line with the prevalent social norms (Aronson et al., 2014). It is difficult to challenge these social norms because doing so might result in being rejected or excluded.

But where do these prejudices in society come from and why is it so hard to get rid of them? Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) offers a theoretical perspective on how social identities (e.g. ethnicity, nationality, gender) and categorizations based on those identities shape individuals' attitudes and behaviours in intergroup contexts.

As described above, prejudices have their base in social categorization, i.e. the way in which we process social information. One important aspect to consider is that social categorization does not only lead to the classification of the social world. In line with SIT, when we make categorizations, we often differentiate between the in-group—a group with which we psychologically identify as being a member—and the out-group—a group with which we do not identify (see Tajfel & Turner, 2004). This categorization has extensive consequences.

SIT states that individuals tend to perceive their in-group members as more positive (in-group bias) than out-group members to protect the group's distinctiveness and to enhance their self-esteem through identification with the in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Further, SIT argues that social categorization might also lead to negative attitudes and behaviours, including prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination towards targeted out-groups (Tajfel & Turner, 2004). Drawing on the ideas of SIT, we will now delineate the ways in which social categorization might play a role in the development of prejudice.

The problem starts with a phenomenon called intergroup bias, which is the tendency to favour members of the in-group over out-group members (Nesdale, 2004; Hewstone et al., 2002). This means that people tend to prefer, and to have affinity for, their in-group over the out-group. Intergroup bias can be expressed in many different ways, e.g. when evaluating others or when allocating resources (Taylor & Doria, 1981). In terms of migration, people prefer their in-group (natives) over the out-group (immigrants) in various contexts (Hewstone et al., 2002).

As argued by SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the main motive behind this bias is to enhance self-esteem, and it can be understood as a mechanism to protect one's own positive social identity as people define their social identity through group memberships (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 2010). On the one hand, intergroup bias consists of in-group favouritism, but on the other hand, people can also enhance and protect their positive social identity through the derogation of the out-group (Hewstone et al., 2002). In-group favouritism can be found very early in children's development. Babies as young as three months of age demonstrate a visual preference for a familiar race (Anzures et al., 2013). Throughout their preschool years, children prefer playing with and helping peers from their own ethnic in-group, indicating that children are motivated to pursue social contacts with in-group members (Kinzler & Spelke, 2011). This in-group preference can develop into out-group negativity when children attribute positive traits to 'us' and negative traits to 'them' to boost their in-group social identities (van Bavel & Cunningham, 2009). According to meta-analytic findings, prejudicial attitudes towards different out-groups increase during early and middle childhood (three to seven years of age) and can manifest in several ways, including stereotypes and discrimination (Raabe & Beelmann, 2011).

Whereas in-group favouritism is very common in various situations and settings, out-group derogation occurs specifically when out-groups are associated with strong emotions (Brewer, 2001). Especially important emotions in this context are fear, hatred, or disgust (Smith, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). The perception of threat is one important factor that triggers these emotions (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

Therefore, when the cognitive component of prejudice, i.e. stereotypes, is combined with the affective component of stereotypes, i.e. strong emotions, this can easily lead to discrimination, i.e. the behavioural component of prejudice. And particularly the perception of threat can be an indicator of someone's attitudinal tendencies towards violent extremism (Borum, 2014).

In this context, perceived or real conflicting goals and competition for limited resources are also important aspects that can intensify prejudices, conflicts, and hostility (Jackson, 1993). If members of the host society perceive immigrants as a threat or as competitors for limited resources such as money, jobs, power, or social status, this perception can intensify hostility and lead to increased aggression and violence towards immigrants (Aronson et al., 2010; Borum, 2014; Jackson, 1993). This is highly relevant in the context of development of extremism because the escalation of intergroup conflict can promote extremism (Alizadeh et al., 2014). The more tensions exist between groups, the more individuals become extremist in a society.

Another phenomenon which is relevant for the development of prejudice is the so-called out-group homogeneity effect, which refers to one's perception of out-group members as being more similar to one another than in-group members (Quattrone & Jones, 1980). Together, intergroup bias and the out-group homogeneity effect pave the way for prejudice and discrimination which can finally lead to racism and extremism: due to intergroup bias, we depreciate members of the out-group; and due to the out-group homogeneity effect, we assign the negative characteristics of individual members to the whole out-group.

This promotes a type of dualistic thinking in which the out-group is perceived as generally bad while the in-group is perceived as generally good with only some exceptions. Dualistic thinking can be described as part of a fundamentalist mindset which may make a person more open to extremism (Borum, 2014).

This section has outlined how problematic and detrimental prejudice can be for integration and which role social categorization plays in this context. In the next section, we propose that language is an important social category. Knowledge of the host-country language can reduce the perception of immigrants as being different; it therefore has the potential to reduce prejudice and can lead to increased openness and more positive attitudes of members of the host society.

#### **4 Language as a Relevant Social Category**

So far, we have argued that language is a means of communication and a resource. But in addition, language itself is an important social category (Kinzler, 2013; Mulvey et al., 2018). Scholars who apply SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) to the language context argue that language serves as one of the key social categories that shape individuals' perceptions about in-group and out-group belonging (Keblusek et al., 2017; Peltokorpi & Pudelko, 2020; Reiche et al., 2015). More specifically, individuals can use language as a category for differentiating in-group members from out-group members based on the language proficiency that they have (Peltokorpi & Pudelko, 2020).

Hence, language is a symbol of relatedness or dissimilarity and thus represents an obvious marker of group membership (Esser, 2006; Kinzler, 2013). Language transmits information about the nationality, ethnicity, and social status of a person (Kinzler et al., 2009). Hence, speaking another language is a salient factor in the perception of others as being different, and this makes language an important intergroup category for social categorization. Moreover, as language is such a salient marker of group membership, it can be a particularly strong trigger for activating stereotypes (Giles & Rakic, 2014; Rakic & Stößel, 2013).

Whereas there is a huge body of research on the relevance of language as a means of communication and as an instrument for educational success or occupational opportunities, there are only a few studies on language as an intergroup category. For instance, it has been shown that in line with general findings on in-group favouritism, children prefer friends who speak the same language as they do (Kinzler et al., 2009), and that this preference can already be found before children themselves can actually speak (Kinzler, 2013). Further, Mulvey and colleagues (2018) revealed that language represents a relevant factor for exclusion in intergroup contexts. Given that language is an important intergroup category, we argue that the language skills of immigrants should play an important role in the reactions of members of the host society towards immigrants and, as a consequence, can support integration. Speaking the same language creates similarity with others, and this perceived similarity can have a positive impact on the openness of members of the host society.

Therefore, research is necessary that investigates the potential of language to reduce dissimilarity and enhance the openness of the host society. In this section, we present two research studies which examine the impact of language skills on the openness of members of the host society (in our case, Germany) to include foreigners in their social interactions. More specifically, by applying SIT to the context of language in Study 1, we investigated the role that language skills play in determining how open German adolescents are towards including refugee peers in their social interactions. In Study 2, we analysed the role of language skills in university students' openness towards the inclusion of international students.

**4.1** *Study 1: Secondary School Students' Openness towards Refugee Peers* One group of immigrants that has been of special interest in recent years is refugees. Due to current crises and conflicts, particularly in the Near and Middle East and in Africa, the number of refugees worldwide has increased tremendously. In 2018, 70.8 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2019). Especially since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, increasing numbers of refugees have sought shelter in the Western world, with Germany attracting the highest number of all European countries (Eurostat, 2020). These huge refugee movements challenge the host societies in terms of promoting successful integration.

As mentioned before, integration is a reciprocal process of mutual adaption (Berry, 2011), and thus the attitudes of the members of the host society are crucial for integration. For children and adolescents, the attitudes and openness of their peers are of particular significance. Being accepted by and belonging to others is a fundamental need and necessary for healthy development (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), but especially so for young refugees who represent a particularly vulnerable group (Ruf et al., 2010). Hence it is important to investigate the attitudes, and specifically the openness, of German young people towards refugees. In Study 1, we used hypothetical scenarios to examine how open German young people are to including refugee peers in their social interactions and if language skills are an important factor for determining that openness. We focused on Syrian refugees as Syrians represent the biggest group of incoming refugees in Germany (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2018).

The study was conducted as part of the project 'Socio-Moral Development of Children and Adolescents' at the Leibniz Institute for Research and Information in Education, Germany. For a full description of the procedural details and a thorough description of all analyses, see Beißert et al. (2019).

The study included 100 adolescents from northern Germany (*Mage* = 13.65 years; *SD* = 1.93; range 10–17 years; 51 females, 49 males). 39% of the participants had an immigration background, i.e. they or at least one of their parents were not born as a German citizen. All participants were presented with three hypothetical scenarios in which groups of adolescents were planning leisure time activities. In each scenario, there was an additional peer from either the participants' own country (Germany) versus another country (Syria) who wanted to join the group. The level of German language skills was varied for the Syrian protagonists (poor versus good). This resulted in three stories with the following protagonists: first, a German peer; second, a Syrian peer with good German language skills; and third, a Syrian peer with poor German language skills. The Syrian protagonists were introduced as refugees who had come to Germany with their families.

In order to measure participants' openness to including refugee peers, we used three measures in each story. Participants were asked: first, if they would let the protagonist join (own inclusion decision); second, what they thought their group would do (expected group decision); and third, what they thought their group should do (prescriptive group decision). All questions were answered using a 6-point Likert-type scale from *not at all* to *very much*. Afterwards, participants were asked to justify their decisions regarding all three measures via open-ended questions.

Data was analysed using repeated measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with participants' intergroup contact, language spoken at home, immigration background, and age as covariates in all analyses. Encouragingly, we found high rates of inclusion on all three measures regarding the Syrian protagonists. This revealed that German adolescents are generally open towards including Syrian refugee peers in their peer activities. However, as expected we found differences in the openness to inclusion based on the language skills of the Syrian protagonists. The Syrian protagonist with poor German language skills was less likely to be included than the other two protagonists, whereas there were no differences between the German protagonist and the Syrian protagonist with good German language skills. This pattern holds across all three measures (see Figure 6.1). These results are line with SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) as

#### Protagonist

Figure 6.1 Likelihood of inclusion for all three protagonists in Study 1. (Note: High numbers indicate a high likelihood of inclusion, scale 1–6)

they demonstrate that language skills are a possible intergroup category for social categorization which might shape adolescents' inclusivity judgements for their in-group and out-group members based on different levels of language proficiency.

We also found differences between the three measures. For all three protagonists, participants expected their group to be less inclusive than they thought it should be and than they themselves would be. As this finding is not related to language skills, we do not cover this aspect in detail.

When analysing the open-ended justifications of participants' decisions, we found further evidence that language skills are an important factor influencing adolescents' openness towards refugees. When speaking about the Syrian peer with poor language skills, participants based their decisions on languagerelated reasons much more often than when speaking about the Syrian peer with good German skills.

However, one important limitation of our study is that our data was assessed in hypothetical scenarios via self-reports. As social desirability is especially relevant regarding explicit measures on intergroup attitudes (Nesdale & Durking, 1998; Rutland et al., 2005), future research should try to connect our findings with behavioural observations in order to examine how self-reports correspond with actual behaviour.

But despite this restriction, based on the inclusion decisions as well as on the adolescents' considerations behind these decisions, we found strong evidence overall that language skills play an important role in young people's openness towards refugee peers.

At this point, it is important to note that we used scenarios with activities that do not require much talking (basketball, beach volleyball, swimming). In other words, elaborate language skills were not even necessary for these activities. This enables us to interpret our findings as a strong indicator that language as a social category is the significant point here, and that language skills play an important role in integration above and beyond their basic role as a means of communication.

#### **4.2** *Study 2: University Students' Openness towards International Students*

In times of globalization, more and more students take the opportunity to study abroad, and international students are a growing group of students at higher education institutions in many countries. International students are foreign students who obtained their university entrance qualification in a country other than where they are studying. In 2018, the proportion of international students among newly matriculated students in Germany was 11% at universities and 7% at universities of applied sciences (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst & Deutsches Zentrum für Hochschul- und Wissenschaftsforschung, 2019). Though many international students are willing to become acquainted with locals and find local peer groups, many of them have problems getting in closer contact with local students—who may be German by birth or who may themselves have first- or second-generation immigration backgrounds (Apolinarski & Brandt, 2016). Again, the openness of the members of the host society is of great importance here. International students can only build social relationships with local students to the extent to that the locals are open to such contacts and to letting international students join their peer groups or including them in their social interactions. In this context, we were also interested in the role that language skills play in the openness of host society members. In Study 2, we used hypothetical scenarios to examine the role of German language skills in the openness of German higher education students towards international students. More specifically, we wanted to compare the role of German language skills with the role of cultural similarity, which is another aspect that has been shown to impact people's attitudes regarding foreigners (Galchenko & van de Vijver, 2007).

The study was conducted in the context of university settings with current university students as participants. For a full description of the procedural details and a thorough description of all analyses, see Kosian (2019).

The study included 189 students of universities and other higher education institutions in Erfurt, Germany (*Mage* = 21.84 years; *SD* = 2.58; range 19–32 years; 142 females, 43 males, two diverse). Most of the participants were enrolled in psychological or educational programmes (68%) or programmes related to architecture and urban planning (22%). The remaining 10% of participants were from a huge variety of different programmes. Eight per cent of the participants had an immigration background, i.e. they or at least one of their parents were not born as a German citizen. All participants were presented with two hypothetical scenarios including situations with group activities in university settings. One scenario was about student project work, and the other was about a fun rally during university orientation days. In both scenarios, the participants were told that they were part of a group of peers which had only room for one more person. The participants had to decide who of two individuals they would most likely choose for their group. They had to choose between two international students: Protagonist A, who was culturally dissimilar (Thailand/Vietnam) but had good German language skills; and Protagonist B, who was culturally similar (France/Poland) but had poor German language skills. The combination of countries and the order of the scenarios was varied randomly between the participants.

We used three measures to assess the participants' openness towards the inclusion of international students. Participants were asked: first, which of the two protagonists they would choose (own decision); second, who they thought their group would choose (expected group decision); and third, who they thought their group should choose (prescriptive group decision). All questions were answered with a 6-point Likert-type scale ranging from Protagonist A to Protagonist B. Answers were coded from −3 = Protagonist A to +3 = Protagonist B. Afterwards, participants were asked to justify their decisions with open-ended questions.

Data was analysed using repeated measures ANCOVA with participants' immigration backgrounds as a covariate. Across both contexts and for almost all measures, participants had a slight tendency to choose the culturally dissimilar protagonist with good German language skills (Protagonist A) over the culturally similar one with poor language German skills (Protagonist B) as shown in Figure 6.2. Only for the prescriptive group decision in the rally scenario was this not the case. The tendency to choose the protagonist with good German language skills was generally stronger in the project work scenario than in the rally scenario. These results suggest that the significance of language as an intergroup category for social categorization might depend on the respective context.

However, when analysing the considerations underlying participants' decisions, we found that language was the most important aspect. The most frequently

#### Context

Figure 6.2 Likelihood of inclusion of Protagonist A versus Protagonist B in Study 2. (Note: Protagonist A is culturally dissimilar but with good German language skills. Protagonist B is culturally similar but with poor German language skills. Negative values indicate a tendency to choose protagonist A. Positive values indicate a tendency to choose protagonist B)

referenced reason for decisions in both scenarios was language. In the project work scenario, language-related reasons were even more frequently mentioned than in the rally scenario.

Thus, in line with SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the decisions as well as the reasoning behind them indicate that language was a relevant factor in determining participants' openness towards the inclusion of international students, especially in the project scenario. This could be due to the dual role of language as a social category and a means of communication. In the project work scenario, elaborate German language skills may also be important for successful work.

However, as a limitation, one must note again that our results are based on hypothetical scenarios and that we applied a forced-choice design. This means that we can only compare the relative inclusivity regarding two protagonists without knowing whether, in real life, they would have included either of the two. But even though this was only an initial pilot study and there might be other relevant variables that influenced participants' decisions (e.g. participants' own language skills in the native language of the respective protagonists), the results can be seen as initial evidence that language skills are relevant for the openness of host society members to including international students in higher education institutions.

#### **5 Conclusion and Practical Implications**

In this chapter, we have given an overview of various findings on the important role of language in the integration of immigrants. We have highlighted the crucial role of language skills as a resource and a tool for educational and professional success, and as a necessary means of communication for social inclusion in terms of social relationships with members of the host society. Further, we have discussed the significance of language as a symbol reflecting an important intergroup category for social categorization: On the one hand, speaking different languages can express dissimilarity and can thus enhance stereotypes and rejection which, in turn, might be facilitators for the development of extreme views towards others and for radicalization. On the other hand, a shared language can increase perceived similarity and thus has the potential to reduce hostility and prejudice. Finally, we have provided two empirical examples that demonstrate this latter aspect and that show the crucial role of language for the openness of host society members towards two different groups of immigrants: refugees and international students.

In sum, the great importance of language becomes apparent: host society language skills are a key element in integration. Given their dual function as means to facilitate communication and learning and achievement on the one hand, and as a symbol of relatedness and similarity on the other hand, host society language skills can increase the openness of the host society and effectively promote integration. This is particularly important because language skills can be modified much more easily than other aspects that might impede integration. This highlights the great importance of expanding the quantity and improving the quality of integration programmes which include language classes (Geis-Thöne, 2019). Policy makers and educational institutions should establish conditions that give every immigrant the chance to attend language courses. For instance, it is important to create programmes that are accessible for parents whose children are not yet in day care facilities. Especially immigrant women who are engaged in the care of young children often find it difficult to attend integration programmes, and thus programs are needed that provide options for childcare during class (Worbs & Baraulina, 2017). It is also necessary that language programmes are readily available and easy to access in order to ensure that as many people as possible can access these vital programmes. Further, it is important that even the youngest children are provided with opportunities for encountering the host society language, e.g. in parent-child playgroups with a focus on language acquisition. Additionally, formal language acquisition programmes should be established in schools and day care facilities as early and as comprehensively as possible.

Further, one important way to enable families to engage informally with the host society language is to ensure that immigrant and refugee families have the opportunity to live in the same areas as native families. Thus, residential segregation should be addressed by policies and programmes in order to foster opportunities for positive intergroup contact.

Language has a great potential for promoting successful integration, and societies should make use of this potential as extensively and comprehensively as possible.

#### **Acknowledgements**

We would like to thank Dominique Drees and Franziska Kosian for the data collection and for their contributions to the development of the scenarios. We would like to thank Lorena Sarter and Lino Szekely for their support with the manuscript. And we are grateful to all students who participated in this study.

#### **References**


Esser, H. (2006). *Migration, language and integration*. WZB.


### **PART 3**

*Approaches for Prevention and Intervention*

∵

### **Radicalization and Extremism in British Education Policy**

*The Challenge of Developing the Informed Young Citizen Since the Riots of 2001*

*Hazel Bryan*

#### **Abstract**

The government of the United Kingdom (UK) has identified state education as the means for teaching and learning what it means to be British. In England, the Teachers' Standards require teachers to promote 'fundamental British values' inside and outside of school. The same standards also place a statutory requirement on teachers to prevent pupils from becoming radicalized, repositioning teachers as counterterrorist actors through the statutory Prevent duty. These requirements form part of a trinity of policy initiatives in relation to radicalization and extremism and can be read as part of a wider cultural context in which the UK Home Office instigated what Home Secretary Theresa May termed a *hostile environment* targeted at those without leave to remain. This hostile environment, legislated in the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016, repositioned citizens as border enforcers. The combination of the hostile environment, the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016, the Prevent duty, and the UK's decision to withdraw from the European Union is the landscape within which teachers seek to practice inclusively and to give voice to marginalized pupils in order to support the development of citizenship and provide opportunities for pupils to explore issues in safe spaces.

#### **Keywords**

prevent – radicalization – extremism – education policy – Britain

#### **1 Introduction**

In 2001, England was in shock at riots that had broken out in three towns in the north of England. Arguably the result of a failure of multiculturalism, the shock reverberated around a country that held its breath: how had it come to this? In 2005, England was once again in shock, when devices were detonated on a double-decker bus and on the London Underground, acts that were perpetrated by 'home-grown' bombers. And once again a country held its breath and asked: how has it come to this?

In the two decades since 2001, the United Kingdom (UK) has evolved a litany of policies drawn from counterterrorism legislation that now informs the practice of education professionals and the quotidian experiences of pupils in schools. Similarly, technologies of immigration have been developed that construct the citizen as border enforcer. Such societal securitization saw expression in the Home Office's hostile environment campaign and the more recent Windrush scandal. And in a time when migration requires a particular global response, the UK has voted to withdraw from the European Union. This chapter explores the policy requirements and cultural influences that impact the construct of the citizen in contemporary Britain and asks what this means for teaching practice.

The rest of the chapter is divided into three sections. Section 2 sets out the education policy context that relates to radicalization and extremism in schools in the UK. The Counter Terrorism and Security Act (2015), the Prevent strategy (Home Office, 2011b) and the Teachers' Standards (Department for Education [DfE], 2011) are analysed one in relation to the other. A consideration of the genesis of these policy initiatives provides a depth of understanding of the political and cultural roots that determined the resulting policies, including a loss of faith in multiculturalism and the introduction by Prime Minister David Cameron of *muscular liberalism*, which has arguably contributed to a securitized discourse, raising issues of orientalism and othering.

Section 3 situates these education-related issues within a wider sociopolitical context in which the then home secretary launched the hostile environment (Kirkup & Winnett, 2012) and subsequent Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016; these shaped the context and intensified the securitized discourse within which education policy has been encoded and decoded in practice.

Section 4 considers the implications of this complex backdrop in terms of key issues for teachers in classrooms; the Trojan Horse affair sets the scene in terms of the relationship between government, schools, and marginalized communities; and the chapter concludes by identifying key themes that have the potential to influence significantly the inclusive, safe classroom spaces within which young people can be supported to develop.

#### **2 Radicalization, Extremism, and Schools**

In July 2011, the policy document *Contest* was published by the UK Home. Contest was designed to address the threats of terrorism, radicalization, and extremism in Britain. Comprising the following four strands, the Prevent strand is of most significance to education:


Following the publication of Contest and the implementation of the 2011 Prevent strand, the UK Counter-Terrorism and Security Act was published in 2015. Stating that schools must show 'due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism', the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act introduced the Prevent duty. The Prevent duty applies to all members of school governing bodies, school leaders, and staff in all education settings, from registered childminders and early years settings to colleges of further education, including all schools; the Prevent duty is articulated under four themes, namely: risk assessment, working in partnership, staff training, and IT policies.

The Prevent duty requires that all professional educators are 'able to identify children who may be vulnerable to radicalisation, and know what to do when they are identified' (Home Office, 2015, p. 5). From a structural perspective, schools are now likely to have information on their websites setting out who their Prevent and safeguarding leads are and the approach they take to prevent radicalization and extremism.

The Prevent duty states that educators should 'build pupils' resilience to radicalization by promoting fundamental British values and enabling them to challenge extremist views (Home Office, 2015, p. 5) by providing 'safe spaces' where extremist views can be challenged. The consequence of this is a proliferation of support materials to aid educators in this endeavour. Subject associations, unions, dioceses, and publishing companies have produced myriad materials to aid teachers in countering radicalization and extremism, and schools now show on their websites, in fine detail, the ways in which they endeavour to fulfil their Prevent duty in curriculum areas.

Since 2012, the Teachers' Standards (DfE, 2011), influenced by the Prevent strategy (Home Office, 2011b), have stated that teachers should promote fundamental British values within and outside of school in order to enable pupils to develop a counter-narrative to the narratives of radicalization and extremism. Thus, teachers and other educators have been identified as key players in the fight against extremism and radicalization; significantly, the development of the Teachers' Standards in 2011 was for the first time informed by the counterterrorist Home Office document, Prevent. Similarly, the revised Prevent duty states that teachers should 'protect children from the risk of radicalisation' (Home Office, 2015, p. 4).

This trinity of policy initiatives—the Teachers' Standards (DfE, 2011), the revised Prevent duty (Home Office, 2015), and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015)—requires teachers and other educators to be able to identify pupils at risk of radicalization and extremism; that is, to have new forms of subject knowledge not previously taught as part of their initial teacher education or subsequent professional learning and development (Revell et al., 2018). The policies require teachers to provide opportunities for engaging in discussion about radicalization and extremism by including a 'safe space' within the curriculum for doing so; and again, teachers require opportunities to learn how to do this appropriately. From a structural perspective, schools now have identified Prevent leads and websites that set out their approaches and curriculum details. These are all inspected by the UK's Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted) under the Common Inspection Framework 2015, and Ofsted reports are published in the public domain.

The contemporary approach to addressing radicalization and extremism in the UK has its roots in three terrorist attacks, one in the USA in 2001, and two in England in 2001 and 2005. These attacks arguably changed forever the interface between education and security and, perforce, education policy, teacher practice, and the curriculum.

#### **3 Three Catalysts**

The initial catalyst for UK government action in response to radicalization and extremism was the attack by al-Qaeda against the United States on 11 September 2001; the concept and discourse of radicalization began to be developed and used more widely following this series of attacks. The Home Office counterterrorism document *Prevent* was first crafted in 2003 by the former Director of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Sir David Ormand as a means by which the concept and practice of security in a post-9/11 world could be articulated; this was an early version, and revised editions were subsequently published in 2006 and 2011.

The second catalyst for current policy and practice in relation to radicalization and extremism was the attack in London on 7 July 2005, which subsequently became known as the 7/7 London bombings. These attacks took place on the London Underground and on a double-decker bus in the heart of the city. The London bombings were perpetrated by four 'home-grown' suicide bombers, that is, young men who had been born in the UK and had been educated in the Western, liberal state school system; and yet they bombed the capital. The burning question asked by a shocked government and people was how and why this happened.

The third catalyst for contemporary policy and practice in relation to radicalization and extremism in the UK also took place in 2001. Unrest and riots in Oldham, Bradford, and Burnley, towns in the north of England, resulted in formal investigations and three major reports: *Community Cohesion: The Report of the Independent Review Team* (known as The Cantle Report, Cantle, 2001); *Building Cohesive Communities: A Report of the Ministerial Group on Public Order* (The Denham Report, Denham, 2001) and the *Oldham Independent Review* (known as The Ritchie Report, Ritchie, 2001). All three reports highlighted the problems caused by the segregation of communities, the lack of economic opportunity, the role of the far right in inciting violence, and the roles of the police and community leaders in supporting cohesion. The notion of community cohesion was questioned in these reports and the premise of multiculturalism was subsequently increasingly seen as problematic as it arguably devalued shared identity and instead 'contribute[d] to ethno-religious isolation' (Pfalzgraff, 2017, p. 107).

#### **4 The Loss of Faith in Multiculturalism**

Some have argued that the riots in Oldham, Bradford, and Leeds were the result of the failure of multiculturalism (Ragazzi, 2015). Indeed, the former Prime Minister David Cameron (2011) stated that:

under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We've failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong.

The concern over the perceived weakness of multiculturalism was expressed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in an interview with the BBC in 2010 in which she suggested that there were inherent problems in 'living side by side' (BBC News, 2010). In fact, as far back as 2004, Trevor Philips, chair of the Commission for Racial Equality, suggested that 'multiculturalism suggests separateness' (Baldwin & Rozenberg, 2004). Such a public questioning of multiculturalism by the chair of the Commission for Racial Equality 'marked a new stage in the attacks on multiculturalism as a tool for negotiating diversity and equality' (Revell, 2012, p. 22). Multiculturalism, it has been argued, has contributed to the aforementioned ethno-religious isolation that has resulted in a lack of shared identity (Pfalzgraff, 2017); a 'desiccated view of ethnic identity' (Kundnani, 2007, p. 46) as it were. And so emerges a changed discourse in which connections are starting to be made between multiculturalism and the problems that were given expression in, for example, the public disorder in the three northern towns. Ragazzi suggests that 'this shift in the discourse is consistently justified in simple terms: security' (2015, p. 157).

#### **5 The Emergence of a Muscular Liberalism**

The Munich Security Conference in February 2011 provided Prime Minister David Cameron with a platform for addressing some of the issues that had been simmering continually and erupting sporadically since 2001. Cameron (2011) opened his speech with a commentary on liberalism, democracy, and freedom:

I believe a genuinely liberal country … believes in certain values and actively promotes them. Freedom of speech. Freedom of worship. Democracy. The rule of law. Equal rights regardless of race, sex, or sexuality. It says to its citizens: this is what defines us as a society. To belong here is to believe in these things.

Cameron's tone changed, however, when he began to articulate the issues relating to extremist ideology, including the problem of people living 'apart', in what he stated were 'segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values'. Cameron's proposal was to move towards a new and rather different form of liberalism, stating that 'frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism' (Cameron, 2011).

Cameron set out what muscular liberalism should look like by listing features such as speaking English and being educated in a common culture and curriculum. This is arguably a significant moment in British political history in which muscular liberalism takes shape, bringing to the fore a discourse on Britishness, religion, the secular state, cultural values, and social mores. And of course, the Teachers' Standards (DfE, 2012) set out previously play into this new muscular liberalism by requiring teachers to promote fundamental British values within and outside of school. So, too, does the Prevent duty, which builds on the notion of muscular liberalism to place a statutory duty upon education (and health) professionals to act as key agents in countering radicalization such that teachers become both policy subjects and policy actors in schools (Ball et al., 2012).

#### **6 A Securitized Discourse**

It has been suggested that 9/11, 7/7, and the Madrid bombings of 2004 were the catalysts for an emergent discourse of securitization. Gearon argues that religion in education is now employed in a securitized manner to link the political to the religious; there is now a new interface in education between security, education, and religion that has given rise to what Gearon terms the 'counter terrorist classroom' (2013, p. 129). The post-9/11 world, Gearon suggests, has witnessed a growing interest in the politics of religion and the place of religion in governance globally (Gearon, 2013). Civic and moral educators in schools are now required to address issues of radicalization and extremism, surveillance and freedom, and, as mentioned above, there has been a proliferation of resources to support those educators and other education professionals in enacting their Prevent duty. Arguably, however, such resources are not simply neutral teaching aids for the classroom; rather, they, too, are crafted within such a securitized discourse—are 'in and of themselves, securitized' (Lundie, 2019, p. 265).

Such resources and artefacts are arguably the 'micro-technologies and representations of policy that serve as meaning makers and controls of meanings in the social-material world of the school' (Ball et al., 2012, p. 121). The securitized discourse also affects the ways in which educators construct pupils, and Heath-Kelly's concept of the 'pre-crime space' is helpful here. Heath-Kelly refers to the pre-crime space as an 'anticipatory form of policing' (Heath-Kelly, 2017, p. 298); applied to education, this is the space in the classroom or the more general school setting where teachers or other education professionals will now, post-9/11, view pupils as having more or less propensity for radicalization, as more or less inhabiting a pre-crime space. This, of course, has a significant effect on the psychological contract between the teacher and the learner in which trust is the cornerstone of such relationships in the quotidian exchanges of the school. In essence, this equates to a post-9/11 discourse of surveillance in the classroom. The problematic nature of such a context of suspicion and surveillance is characterized by the following extract from the revised Prevent duty policy, which states that:

schools and childcare providers can … build pupils' resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British values and enabling them to challenge extremist views. It is important to emphasise that the Prevent duty is not intended to stop pupils debating controversial issues. On the contrary, schools should provide a safe space in which children, young people and staff can understand the risks associated with terrorism and develop the knowledge and skills to be able to challenge extremist arguments. (Home Office, 2015, p. 5)

The contradictory nature of this statement is drawn out by Ramsay (2017), who notes that the concept of a 'safe space' is hardly possible in a context where teachers are required to report young people who may express 'extremist' views to the Home Office referral programme for those who are suspected of having been radicalized (Home Office, 2012). The notion that resilience to radicalization can be built through a discourse on fundamental British values is equally contested. Some suggest that the concept of fundamental British values has 'insidious racializing implications' (Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017, p. 29) and that the teaching of fundamental British values has the potential to alienate learners and is incompatible with pluralistic approaches to curriculum subjects such as religious education (Farrell, 2016, p. 280). The potential for a 'reductive notion of Britishness and a risked sense of alienation' is highlighted by Lockley-Scott (2019, p. 354), and the issue of teachers who do not themselves believe in the contentions of British values and, perforce, worry about how to teach these values is raised by Maylor (2016).

Let us take stock of the UK's education policy landscape in relation to radicalization and extremism. So far, this chapter has set out the policy context in the UK in relation to education and extremism and has drawn out key issues that have evolved in recent years. The chapter has tracked the evolution of a securitized discourse that was given particular shape by Prime Minister David Cameron's promotion of muscular liberalism and has considered this concept in relation to the crisis in multiculturalism. The chapter has shown how the Prevent duty has positioned teachers as key players in countering radicalization such that they are the embodiment of counterterrorist policy as both policy subjects and policy actors. The chapter has also demonstrated how resources produced to support teachers in countering radicalization are in and of themselves micro-technologies of policy, subject to a securitized discourse, and one of the vehicles through which this discourse is promoted. Considered, too, has been the problematic nature of fundamental British values and the potential for the pre-crime space to take root in the mindset of teachers, thus compromising the contract of trust between the learner and the teacher with the ambiguous proposal that there will be a safe space in which pupils can explore and articulate issues and concerns.

This, then, is the current policy landscape in relation to radicalization and extremism in schools in the UK and the provenance of these securitized policy initiatives. But of course, such a securitized discourse has consequences. It has been argued that 9/11 and 7/7 have created populist, anti-asylum, and anti-Muslim opinions that have become sedimented into the culture (Kundnani, 2007). Kundnani argues that over time, this has eroded civil liberties and resulted in both populist and institutional racism.

The education system of any country is of course nested within a wider policy context, and in the UK, the securitized discourse was also evolving in relation to government attitudes towards immigration and constructs of citizenship.

#### **7 A Hostile Environment**

Theresa May had been home secretary for two years when, in 2012, she declared in an interview with *The Telegraph* that

the aim is to create here in Britain a really hostile environment for illegal migration. … What we don't want is a situation where people think that they can come here and overstay because they're able to access everything they need. (Kirkup & Winnett, 2012)

May wished to discourage potential immigrants from coming to the UK, to ensure that those who were in the UK did not overstay their permitted time allocation, and to stop those who had no permission to be in the UK (irregular migrants) from accessing heath care, housing, and other essential public services. First announced in 2012 under Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition, the hostile environment is a set of administrative and legislative measures aimed at migrants with no leave to remain and is designed to make staying in the UK so challenging that migrants will leave voluntarily. The hostile environment is enacted through measures to limit housing, access to work, and health care. The coalition government's Immigration Act of 2014 made these proposals law, and they were further enforced by the subsequent Conservative government's Immigration Act of 2016.

The Immigration Act (2014) required landlords to check the immigration papers of both potential and existing tenants against a Home Office approved list. Landlords could refuse tenancy or even evict tenants who could not produce the required documentation. The subsequent Immigration Act (2016) placed further requirements on landlords such that they could be charged with a criminal offence if they ignored the requirement to check documentation or had not acted on evidence. This had the potential to result in landlords feeling that renting to ethnic minorities was a high-risk strategy that could cause them problems with the Home Office. In this way, landlords have the potential to inhabit the 'pre-crime' space (Heath-Kelly, 2017) referred to earlier in the context of the classroom; the landlord may now view tenants as potential criminals rather than simply tenants. This conceptually alters the construct of both the tenant and the landlord and, perforce, their relationship.

In terms of bank accounts, Sections 40–42 of the Immigration Act (2014) required banks and building societies to check the status of those applying for an account against anti-fraud data. As with the case of landlords above, the subsequent Immigration Act (2016) required banks and building societies to check the status of existing customers where requested and to notify the secretary of state if irregularities were found. The Immigration Act (2014) also introduced the requirement for registrars to report sham marriages and to extend the marriage notice period from fifteen to twenty-eight days. Indeed, the Home Office posted this tweet in February 2013:

Home Office [ukhomeoffice]. (2013, February 14). #Rosesareredvioletsareblue, if your marriage is a sham we'll be on to you: flic.kr/p/88ZNcq #happyvalentinesday [Tweet]1

Similarly, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) was empowered to revoke the licenses of those without leave to remain as a result of the Immigration Act (2014), and the subsequent Immigration Act (2016) gave powers to law enforcement officers to enter and search a premises for a driving license where it was suspected the owner was in the UK without leave to remain; both the person and the vehicle could now be detained.

In this way, immigration control has been embedded into aspects of everyday life, to be undertaken by a range of citizens. This went on to create an atmosphere in which migrants across the UK were regarded with suspicion: 'everyday bordering practices that drive immigration controls into microsettings of everyday practices and quotidian spaces' (Lewis et al., 2017, p. 187). Citizens were effectively given the mantle of immigration enforcement officers: landlords, required to check the passports of tenants; doctors, required to check the status of patients before treatment. In essence, immigration supervision was outsourced to citizens. The expectation that citizens would undertake immigration checks on fellow citizens is a new feature of this environment in which such checks are normally carried out by trained immigration officers. Private citizens are now required to check the immigration status of fellow citizens: the right-to-work papers are checked for those offered jobs, when taking on rented accommodation, when getting married or opening a bank account.

Research into the impact of the hostile environment on health workers explored the impact of data sharing, finding that this policy places health professionals in an 'unworkable position, both practically and in terms of their duties to patients around confidentiality' (Hiam et al., 2018, p. 107). In addition to the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016, Operation Nexus was initiated, posting immigration officials in police stations across the UK in order to check the status of those brought in, including witnesses; the immigration officials have the power to detain those who fall under suspicion.

#### **8 Where Did the Hostile Environment Originate?**

The UK relationship with Europe and with issues of migration had been in the public imagination and media for many years. In 2010, as David Cameron became prime minister (2010–2016) and Theresa May was appointed home secretary (2010–2016), there was continued concern around Poland and Lithuania entering the European Union in 2004 and Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Against this backdrop, Cameron, with the support of the home secretary, announced the intention to reduce net migration in the UK to below 100,000 per annum, to be achieved by 2015. The 2010 Conservative Party election manifesto set out new reduced net migration targets and increased outward emigration targets. The hostile environment policy is thus linked to the net migration target (reduced inward migration and increased outward emigration target).

However, the uneasy relationship with the European Union in relation to immigration was aggravated by the fact that the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP), led by Nigel Farage, had fared unexpectedly well in the 2010 general election. On a tide of growing anxiety about immigration, UKIP, appealing to largely working-class constituencies, called for harder measures. The rise in the appeal of UKIP caused the Conservatives to respond with their own hard line and this, in turn, coincided with Theresa May announcing the hostile environment policy. An expression of this harsh new attitude was *Operation Vaken*, an immigration enforcement campaign that took place in London in 2013 whereby vans, painted with police-style livery, displayed along their sides the message 'Go Home or Face Arrest', and were driven through six ethnically mixed London boroughs. Eight minority ethic newspapers carried the same message, and places of worship began to offer immigration surgeries. After accusations that this incited racial hatred and aggravated tensions within communities, the operation was discontinued. In an example of professionals rejecting the mantle of the immigration official, doctors, nurses, other health care workers, and members of the public converged on Westminster in London to protest at the Home Office requirement for NHS services to be used as technologies of immigration. The 'Go Home or Face Arrest' posters on the side of Home Office vans was parodied with a poster on the side of a van that read 'Doctors acting as border guards? 70,000 doctors and patients say "no" to sharing patient data with the Home Office'. Professional health workers galvanized in Westminster and used their collective social capital to demonstrate. At a polar opposite is the story of those who were without agency or voice, i.e. the tragedy and travesty of the Windrush generation.

#### **9 The Windrush Scandal**

The most apparent expression of the hostile environment was what has become known as the Windrush scandal. The Windrush generation arrived in the UK between 1948 and 1973. The HMT Empire Windrush ship delivered one of the first groups of British subjects from the Caribbean in 1948. The British Nationality Act (1948) had secured free movement to Britain for those living in UK colonies, although the subsequent Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 introduced a series of distinctions in relation to status that became increasingly complex. However, as members of the British Commonwealth, those arriving were British subjects and, perforce, could work and live in the UK.

By 2017, members of this generation were reporting that they had been detained and, in some cases, been deported as illegal immigrants because they did not have documentation to show that they had permission to reside and work as British subjects in the UK. Older Caribbean-born residents were wrongly classified as illegal immigrants. Although this issue was raised with Philip Hammond, then foreign secretary, at the biannual UK-Caribbean forum held in Freeport, Bahamas, in 2016, matters did not improve. The hostile environment legislation placed the burden of proof of their right to reside in the UK on individuals. This generation had variously arrived on their parents' passports or had their landing cards destroyed on arrival. The new Home Office legislation required at least one official document for every year each suspected illegal immigrant had resided in the UK. Unable to provide such evidence, many were placed in immigration detention centres or deported. In the case of those who were deported, they had not seen the country to which they were deported since they were children. The House of Lords research briefing *Impact of 'hostile environment' policy debate on 14th June 2018* reported that '63 individuals may have been wrongfully deported' and that 'there are occasions of people being wrongfully discriminated against by landlords, denied access to bank accounts or driving licenses' (Taylor, 2018).

Wendy Williams, Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of the Constabulary, was commissioned to undertake a review, which was published on 19 March 2020, titled *Windrush Lessons Learned Review* (WLLR) (Williams, 2020). The WLLR calls for, amongst other things:


#### **10 Schools and the Hostile Environment**

Schools, too, became embroiled in the technology of surveillance of the hostile environment. The Education (Pupil Information) (England) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2016 came into effect in September 2016. This required mainstream schools to collect data on nationality, country of birth, and proficiency in speaking, reading, and writing in English through the annual school census and for the data to be stored in the national pupil database. However, by 2018, the Department for Education ceased collecting school data on nationality and country of birth.

By 2017, Home Secretary Sajid Javid disowned the term hostile environment in favour of compliant environment. This is also the period in which fifty-two per cent of the British public voted to withdraw from the European Union following a UK-wide referendum, and in March 2017, the British government began what has become known as the Brexit process, invoking Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. After forty-seven years of membership of the European Union, British citizens voted to leave the union of twenty-seven other countries. This was by no means a straightforward referendum; where Wales joined England in returning a 52.5% vote to leave, Scotland voted to remain by 65%, and Northern Ireland by 56%. The referendum was underpinned by tensions between social classes, age, and demographic divisions. With a rise in nationalism characterized by the emerging popularity of UKIP, contemporary Britain is far from a united kingdom.

Let us once again take stock. The last decade in the UK has seen the intensification of deportation and a rising insecurity in relation to immigrant status. 2012 saw the terminology and technology of the hostile environment launched on the British public, with the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016 introducing border enforcement in the quotidian spaces of British society. These laws constructed citizens differently; the landlord, the health worker, the bank clerk was now constructed as border enforcer, whilst the citizen on the receiving end of such checks fell into the pre-criminal space. This was the context in which Prime Minister Cameron called for a new muscular liberalism to address the failures of multiculturalism and where, in a time of resurgent nationalism, the UK voted to withdraw from the European Union. This, then, was also the context within which the Teachers' Standards (DfE, 2012) were implemented, where the discourse of fundamental British values was introduced in curricula across the UK, and where the Prevent duty, with its requirement to prevent pupils from becoming radicalized or taking part in terrorist activities, became part of the professional role of the teacher. There is an interesting parallel emerging here between the way in which the Immigration Laws of 2014 and 2016 and the Prevent duty have projected new identities onto citizens, whereby citizens are now required by law to consider their pupil, their tenant, their customer, their patient, as 'other'. Over the last decade, the policy context in the UK has identified segregated Muslim communities at the heart of the riots in the north of England, immigrants and refugee and asylum seekers as the focus for the Immigration Acts of 2014 and 2016, and introduced the Prevent duty with a focus on preventing radicalization and extremism. Within this context, the alignment of migration and securitization has evolved; the securitized discourse—an articulation of muscular liberalism—promotes a British identity that requires migrants and minorities to accept integration into British ways of life. The notion of the 'other' is apparent here, whereby otherness is now under surveillance. Said's work on the other is helpful here. In his thesis on orientalism, Said maps the genesis and evolution of a concept of Western hegemony in relation to the Orient which, he argued, had become

suitable for study in the academy, for display in the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial and historical theses about mankind and the universe, for instances of economic and sociological theories of development, revolution, cultural personality, national or religious character. (Said, 2003, p. 8)

The essence of Said's thesis is that over the course of centuries, the West has constructed a totalizing vision or version of the non-Western that has become rooted in ways of seeing. Essentialized representations of the Orient that have their genesis in colonial ideology result in a process Said which termed *othering*. However, whereas Said's thesis describes Orientalism in terms of its evolution, the notion of the other in contemporary Britain is borne out of 9/11, 7/7, and the Northern riots that have resulted in an anti-Muslim, anti-asylum rhetoric from the right; it is commonly argued that Islam is misrepresented in the media (film and print) where representations are both racialized and caricatured (Shaheen, 2008). The question then is how teachers can navigate their way through this complex contemporary policy context to open up spaces for pupils to develop as informed citizens.

#### **11 Education in Securitized Times**

It has been argued that since 9/11, civic and moral educators have been negotiating complexity in terms of surveillance and freedom and how surveillance and freedom are presented in classroom contexts (Lundie, 2019). Others have suggested that moral education is now viewed through a securitized lens (Conroy, 2003). There is one example of how trust between schools and government has had a particular impact in recent years. The Trojan Horse Affair of 2014 encapsulates the ways in which national identity and British values play out in schools and represents a turning point in securitization in education (Farrell, 2016). In 2013, the Department for Education received an anonymous letter allegedly written by governors and teachers in academies in Birmingham that set out how to promote Islamist and Salafist ideas in these schools. The letter was also leaked and published in the press.

Birmingham City Council subsequently received hundreds of letters stating that such activities had been taking place for many years. Tahir Alam, former chair of Park View Educational Trust, was accused of writing the document for the Muslim Council of Britain as a blueprint for the Islamization of schools. Alam and thirteen teachers were initially banned from the profession but had their bans overturned after investigations that took a number of years. The Trojan Horse Affair led to widespread fear about religious freedom and public education (Arthur, 2015). However, the events that followed caused a significant aftershock when, in 2014, Ofsted conducted thirty-five no-notice inspections and reported that eleven schools had failed to prepare pupils for life in Britain as a result of a limited curriculum and had not promoted tolerance of other communities or offered pupils an opportunity to learn about other faiths (Revell & Bryan, 2018). The complexity of the secular liberal state interfacing with minority faith schools highlights the way in which government inspection can quickly turn to interference through the use of swiftly changing policy requirements (Arthur, 2015). The notion of the Muslim problematic is employed by Miah (2017) to express the racial pathologization of Britain's minority communities, which includes anti-immigrant sentiment.

In post–Trojan-Horse times, then, and in the context of Brexit, the hostile environment, the Prevent duty, and anti-immigrant tensions, how should teachers, including teachers of citizenship and religious education, approach classroom discussions? How should teachers open up safe spaces for negotiation and conflict? From a statutory perspective, schools have responded to the Diversity and Citizenship Curriculum Review, a revised national curriculum in 2008 that included the theme of *Identity and Diversity: Living Together in the UK* (Qualifications and Curriculum Agency, 2007), and an updated national curriculum in 2014 that promotes political, legal, and economic knowledge. Research shows that global citizenship education (GCE) has been reoriented to meet the statutory requirement to promote fundamental British values (Bamber et al., 2018). Osler (2017) identifies three specific challenges facing teachers seeking to integrate minority groups and to implement policies based on social justice: first, the high numbers of migrants and refugees seeking to live in Europe; second, issues of multiculturalism and its success or failure, integration, and diversity; and third, the securitization of education policy. Osler suggests that the assimilationist orientation in current education policy brings national values to the fore and has the potential to target Muslim students through the securitization discourse.

In addition to an assimilationist orientation in policy documentation, the concept of vulnerability is dominant in counterterrorist documentation; however, this is arguably conceptualized in ways that are resonant with 'colonial discourses of contagion and immunity, and it risks silencing and even pathologizing the person labelled vulnerable' (O'Donnell, 2016, p. 53). Education, O'Donnell (2016) argues, should not be 'subordinated to security and intelligence agendas on pragmatic, educational and ethical grounds' (p. 53). In navigating the complexity of opening up discussions in classrooms, teachers without a grounding in processes of radicalization or extremism can find themselves engaging in a 'lost boys' discourse whereby the individual can be positioned as vulnerable and therefore a legitimate figure for surveillance in school.

#### **12 Conclusion**

In the classroom context there are likely to be pupils from differing religious and cultural backgrounds—foregrounds, in fact. In such a diverse context, teachers must find ways of opening up discussions that give voice to differing cultural communities in order to facilitate the development of the young citizen in a context of rising migration, issues around the construct of the vulnerable and around pre-crime space, and assimilationist assumptions in policy enactment. The promotion of monocultural fundamental British values sits uncomfortably and inadequately within the context of globalization and cultural richness in British schools.

#### **Note**

1 Retrieved from: url no longer available.

#### **References**


Immigration Act. (2014). c. 22. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/22/contents


### **Raising Children to Become Democratic Citizens**

*Educational Initiatives for Preventing Extremism and Radicalization in Norway*

> *Inger Marie Dalehefte, Georg Kristoffer Berg Fjalsett and Aslaug Kristiansen*

#### **Abstract**

Norway is often highlighted as an outstanding democracy. Nevertheless, there is still a need to work on democratic issues to prevent radicalism and extremism. This chapter presents how a national prevention approach, *Democratic Preparedness against Racism and Anti-Semitism* (DEMBRA), is conducted in southern Norway. DEMBRA is directed at both schools and at teacher education. It highlights the origins of the DEMBRA programmes and how a regional peace centre (ARKIVET) and a local university (University of Agder) both work on the issues of radicalism and extremism. Finally, the authors draw some conclusions from the two different implementations of DEMBRA.

#### **Keywords**

democracy – DEMBRA – prevention – teacher education – school

#### **1 Introduction**

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) measures the worldwide state of democracy annually. The *Democracy Index* report covering 2019 stresses in general that global democracy seems to be in a very vulnerable state (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020). Although Norway was highlighted in this study as the most democratic among the 167 participating countries, there is no room for complacency where democracy is concerned. While democratic values are fundamental in Scandinavia, there can be no doubt that democratic values are under threat in Norwegian society just as in other countries. Globally, a focus on the inability to handle environmental challenges and the unfair

2022 | doi:10.1163/9789004525658\_009

This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-SA 4.0 License.

<sup>©</sup> Inger Marie Dalehefte, Georg Kristoffer Berg Fjalsett and Aslaug Kristiansen,

distribution of trade and production as well as migration and refugee challenges are predicted to initiate and maintain antidemocratic movements in democratic societies (Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise, 2018). Nationally, Norwegian society is becoming more and more culturally diverse due to many different types of immigration, and therefore the need for competence in cultural understanding is growing more crucial. This competence is not simply about being familiar with different languages, clothes, and customs, but also about seeing oneself as a responsible and active contributor to making society as inhabitable as possible for oneself and every other member of society.

In Norway, schools carry the bulk of responsibility for 'producing' democratic citizens because they are the natural meeting point for pupils from different cultures, religions, skin colours, and origins. As a consequence, schools offer a suitable environment for working with this diversity in order to create, support, and maintain democratic societies. In a broad sense, democracy can be seen both as the infrastructure and the anchor for all teaching and learning in the classroom. That is why it is necessary to provide schools with knowledge about democracy, terrorism, and extremism. It is also essential to enhance the self-confidence, routines, and practices for addressing controversial themes, developing an inclusive community, and fostering critical thinking in the classroom for both in-service and pre-service teachers.

Against this backdrop, the educational role becomes more and more critical. In a world with right- and left-wing forces and values, high-speed distribution of correct and incorrect information via the internet and social media, social changes, and great diversity, there is an obvious need for taking care of democracy and for fostering critical thinking abilities. We suggest that educational systems have a moral obligation to meet the need for understanding and to initiate activities that contribute to citizens' enlightenment.

In this chapter, we will explain the characteristics of Norway's national educational system as this is the point of departure for the prevention programmes we will present. After that, we will focus on the southern part of Norway, where two kinds of national prevention initiatives are currently operational, namely *DEMBRA for Schools* and *DEMBRA for Teacher Education*. The chapter closes with a discussion of democracy as an issue in school and the educational system.

#### **2 Democracy and Education in Norway**

The school system in Norway is very similar to the school systems in other Scandinavian countries. The public free school in Norway spans grade 1 to grade 10 and is mandatory for all children between the ages of six and sixteen. After that, most pupils attend secondary school (grade 11 to grade 13). Norwegian schools follow the 'one school for all' ethos, aiming to provide equal learning possibilities for all pupils. The principle of adapted education applies to all pupils, including low achieving pupils who need individual support and high achieving pupils who need additional academic challenges. Special needs education is provided within the pupil's regular class to the extent that this is possible and sufficient (Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training, 2016). In this way, Norwegian schools by their very nature have a diverse composition and an inclusive function. According to large-scale assessment studies, socioeconomic factors seem to play a minor role in pupils' achievement in Norway compared to many other countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2019).

**2.1** *Research Findings Regarding Democracy and Education in Norway* The 2016 large-scale assessment study *International Civic and Citizenship Education Study* (ICCS, 2016, see Schulz et al., 2017) conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) is an essential frame of reference for Norway for comparing how the citizenship competencies of Norwegian young people score from an international point of view. At the same time, the ICCS study indicates how well the educational system prepares pupils for democratic understanding and principles. Thus, Norway's participation in the ICCS study provides the stakeholders with information on how far the educational system succeeds in promoting democracy.

Findings from ICCS 2016 show that democratic characteristics are well represented in Norwegian schools and that Norwegian 9th graders (pupils between 14 and 15 years of age) have a good understanding of how democracy works in theory and in practice. At the same time, Norwegian pupils have a lot of confidence in the government, police, and military institutions. As is the case in many other countries, however, pupils from minority families have a lesser understanding of what democracy is. Norwegian pupils report positively on democratic activities in school, such as pupils' councils, parliament, and debates. Over 90% of the pupils report that they have participated in the election of prefects, and 60% of the pupils have been involved in school decisions (Huang et al., 2017).

All in all, findings from ICCS 2016 corroborate the impression that Norwegian schools are built upon a democratic fundament and that they have a central role in conveying democratic thinking and fostering democratic values in society. In view of these results, both in-service teachers in school as well as pre-service teachers in education need to focus on and consider democratic principles.

#### **2.2** *The Role of Democracy in Norwegian Education*

The Norwegian school system has a long tradition of integrating the topic of democracy in instruction and curricula as well as fostering democratic understanding, critical thinking, and participation (Briseid, 2012). Although different iterations of the curriculum have addressed different opinions of democracy over time, promoting varying ideas of what pupils need to learn in school (Briseid, 2012), democratic values have never lost their importance in Norwegian school curricula.

Democracy is a general basis for the school curriculum and not a separate subject. It is meant to be treated in several study subjects and ought to be practiced in participation and councils, fostering a pupil's respect for diversity and the courage to exchange opinions. Although democracy is crucial in the Norwegian school curriculum, it is, however, not a separate subject in education, with the exception of the elective subject 'democracy in practice'.

In Norway, it is part of the schools' duty to promote support for democratic values and to help pupils understand the rules of democracy. Mutual respect, tolerance, individual beliefs, freedom of speech, and free elections are values that must be promoted by all primary and secondary schools (Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training, 2017). The idea behind this approach is that democratic values and attitudes are counterweights to prejudice and discrimination and that democracy requires independent and educated people. All participants in the school community must develop an awareness of both minority and majority perspectives and create a space for cooperation, dialogue, and opportunities for defending opinions. School is meant to be a place where pupils experience democracy in their daily lives. Furthermore, in providing pupils with knowledge about democracy, schools play an essential role as a meeting point for children and young people from diverse cultures with diverging cognitive abilities and different supporting environments. Schools mirror diversity in society, but all children have 'school' as a common denominator where they meet each other and learn about each other's backgrounds and histories. Thus, teachers have an important role both in implementing democratic values and in handling critical situations in school and class.

#### **2.3** *The Crucial Role of Teachers in Promoting Democratic Values*

Several research studies underline the importance of teachers for cultivating a trusting learning community and for developing actively engaged pupils (Cornelius-White, 2007; Nordenbo et al., 2008; Moos et al., 2004). Ravndal (2019), a terrorism researcher at the Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo, highlights three factors which are supposed to prevent extremism and radicalization among pupils (Ravndal, cited in Skjong, 2019). These are: first, teaching pupils to recognize extremist ideas and ideology and informing them about all kinds of fanaticism, conspiracy theories, authoritarian practices and antidemocratic attitudes; second, fostering pupils' critical thinking with regard to the internet and the use of social media, including 'fake news'; and third, teaching young people about democratic thinking and living. Ravndal underlines the importance of giving pupils a basic understanding of what democracy implies, not only in theory but also in practice. An essential prerequisite for this to succeed is that teachers must have been trained and must have gained knowledge about these issues (Ravndal, cited in Skjong, 2019).

According to Børhaug (2004), democracy is broadly about the individuals' empowerment when they meet with other people, community structures, and other cultures; this empowerment is grounded in a democratic society which brings in freedom and equality as a reference point. When teachers listen to pupils' opinions and encourage them to participate in discussions or in school elections, this activity in turn builds a bridge between the individual's activity in the classroom and in society (Westrheim & Hagatun, 2015). Røthing argues that the classroom should be an arena in which controversies are welcome to be discussed and in which teachers should be encouraged to uncover issues and to raise questions (Røthing, cited in Skjong, 2019). Nevertheless, Røthing distinguishes between relational and categorical approaches and advocates a relational approach. This is because a categorical approach might unintentionally escalate extremist attitudes. Pupils who are singled out and rebuked based on categorical rules such as, for instance, 'we have no tolerance for racist slogans in the classroom' may quickly feel rejected and misunderstood. Such an experience can reinforce a feeling of being an outsider and strengthen a marginalized development.

A relational approach, by contrast, focuses on relationships within the class and promotes an environment in which pupils can dare to contribute controversial statements without being excluded from the class. Taking an extremist position involves emotions and faith in oneself or a like-minded group (Hogg, 2014). The role of the teacher is demanding. On the one hand, teachers are expected to challenge racism and extremist thinking, and on the other hand, they are being asked to take care of the individual as well as the whole group of pupils in the classroom (Røthing, cited in Skjong, 2019).

A relational approach could focus on building good relationships with and between all pupils in the classroom and nurturing an inclusive class environment where everyone feels appreciated. Research findings show that the atmosphere in school classes depends to a large degree on the teachers' behaviours in their interaction with pupils. Yet teachers themselves seem scarcely conscious of the strength and influence their actions have. Most teachers are prone to underestimating their importance in this matter (Jackson et al., 1993; Jacobsen et al., 2003). However, some teachers also feel uncertain about how to handle difficult situations and choose to ignore them and rush to other content because a given situation feels too controversial and sensitive (Aasebø, 2017). Well-prepared teachers can give pupils opportunities for acting and participating in decisions with their own opinions. They can also listen to and influence attitudes, and they can highlight utterances and discuss consequences of opinions that are not at all compatible with a democratic way of thinking. Nevertheless, for the classroom to become an arena where controversial topics can be discussed, the classroom atmosphere and the relationships between pupils and teachers are of great importance (Deimel et al., 2019). Thus, working on providing knowledge about democracy and guidance for dealing with critical incidents in school and instruction are essential topics for both in-service and pre-service teachers.

A programme called *Democratic Mobilization* (DEMO) at the University of Agder (UiA) in Grimstad/Kristiansand was established at the Department of Education in 2015. This programme aims to mobilize, corroborate, and strengthen the emphasis on democracy as an essential issue within pedagogy and teacher education. The UiA cooperates with the surrounding municipalities in southern Norway as part of the university's vision for the 'co-creation of tomorrow's knowledge', within which 'democracy and active citizenship' is one of six interdisciplinary priority areas. The UiA also has a close relationship with the ARKIVET (Archive) Peace and Human Rights Centre in Kristiansand. This chapter will present how ARKIVET and the UiA work hand in hand in the national initiative *Democratic Preparedness against Racism and Anti-Semitism* (*Demokratisk beredskap mot rasisme og antisemittisme,* or DEMBRA; see Norwegian Centre for Holocaust and Minority Studies, 2020a). DEMBRA is a programme that works on the prevention of racism, group-based hostility, and antidemocratic attitudes, and it supports schools and teacher education all over Norway.

The DEMBRA initiative is twofold and focuses on both schools and teacher education. Both the project DEMBRA for Schools and DEMBRA for Teacher Education can be characterized as having a proactive approach when it comes to preventing the development of radicalization and extremist thinking.

#### **3 The DEMBRA Initiative**

The early beginnings of DEMBRA date back to March 2010. The Norwegian public broadcaster Norsk Rikskringkasting (NRK) published a story covering anti-Semitism towards Jewish pupils in Norwegian schools (NRK, 2010, 12:30– 20:15). In the wake of the debate that followed, the Norwegian government put together a working group to come up with ideas on how to handle anti-Semitism and racism in schools. The group was also asked to try to explain why such prejudice existed amongst pupils. The report, entitled *It May Happen Again,* was handed over to and subsequently published by the Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research (Eidsvåg et al., 2011) in January 2011 and contained thirty-nine suggestions for strengthening knowledge, working skills, and awareness on this topic through courses and programmes. Several of these suggestions emphasize working with the school as a whole rather than class by class. For example, instead of dealing with racism as a problem concerning one class or a few pupils, schools should pursue a whole-school approach to encourage inclusion and fight exclusion. DEMBRA was implemented as a direct response to these suggestions.

Just six months after the report was handed to the Ministry of Education and Research, racist terror struck the whole nation as eight people were killed by a car bomb in Oslo, followed by the attack on the Norwegian Labour Party's youth camp on the island of Utøya, where sixty-nine people died in a massacre. These significant incidents shed a worldwide light on the prevalence of radicalism and terror in Norway and were an eye-opener for Norwegian society (Kristiansen, 2015; Lenz & Nustad, 2015). It was baffling how such atrocities could happen in such a small and peaceful country of about five million people that is economically well situated with an average high level of education and with a functioning system of law and justice. As a result, DEMBRA could not be implemented fast enough as the debate that followed (and that still continues) showed how deeply rooted both anti-Semitism and racism seem to be in some areas and segments of Norwegian society.

As a consequence, in 2012, the Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research asked for initiatives that could serve to fulfil some of the thirty-nine suggestions. DEMBRA got funding as a national initiative for this work. The Norwegian Centre for Holocaust and Minority Studies (The Holocaust Centre) and the European Wergeland Centre (EWC) started up DEMBRA in 2013, primarily for schools in the Oslo region. The Holocaust Centre is also where project management and vital administrative functions are based. Since then, DEMBRA has advanced and been established through several national peace and human rights centres in Norway: the Falstad Centre (central), the Nansen Centre for Peace and Dialogue (inland), the Rafto Foundation (west), the Narvik Centre for Peace (north), and ARKIVET Peace and Human Rights Centre (south). DEMBRA also serves as a model project for other Nordic countries, particularly Sweden and Denmark.

In late 2013, the first five schools completed a DEMBRA initiative in Oslo. Simultaneously, the Norwegian government set up a task force to provide new insights for the school system. The official Norwegian Report (NOU:8), the *Ludvigsen Report* (Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research, 2015), was handed to the authorities in 2015. The report advised a revision of the whole scale of learning practices within the school system. The report suggested a more holistic view of the school system and a curricular change, dedicating more time to lifelong learning and in-depth learning. This conjunction of events created momentum for DEMBRA and led to extended funding for the project. Since 2019, DEMBRA has been funded from the national budget, and each coordinating centre receives a part of this funding proportionate to the size of the initiative and to how many schools the centre serves. Evaluation reports indicates that the DEMBRA efforts are worth the time and finances invested (Lenz & Kjeøy, 2015; Lenz et al., 2017).

The ARKIVET Peace and Human Rights Centre is the DEMBRA provider for the southern part of Norway as it is located in Kristiansand, the biggest city in the region. ARKIVET started its work in 2001 in the buildings of the old state archive. As this building served as the headquarters of the German Gestapo (secret state police) from January 1942 until May 1945, educational work on the promotion of peace and the protection of human rights has been the backbone of ARKIVET since its very beginning. ARKIVET became a regional coordinator of DEMBRA in 2018 and is a natural partner for schools in the region.

Both in-service and pre-service teachers need support in disseminating knowledge and dealing with extremism situations. In the next two sections, we present the implementation and research work of DEMBRA for Schools and DEMBRA for Teacher Education in the region of southern Norway.

#### **3.1** *DEMBRA for Schools*

DEMBRA as a programme for schools is a nationwide initiative and has been promoted in Norwegian secondary schools since 2013 (Lenz & Nustad, 2015). In southern Norway, ARKIVET is the partner for the schools in the region. This section presents the ideas behind DEMBRA for Schools, the characteristics of the local intervention programme, and some research findings connected to the implementation.

#### 3.1.1 The Implementation of DEMBRA for Schools

ARKIVET provides schools with personal DEMBRA guides who map a school's prerequisites for participation and suggest measures and initiatives in school to focus on democracy and citizenship. Cooperation with the teaching staff and consideration of the experiences and desires of the teachers are essential when it comes to setting up practical measures. It is therefore important to provide the necessary time needed for the DEMBRA guide to explain thoroughly that DEMBRA is about critical reflection and changing viewpoints rather than giving schools top-down input on trends or best-practice recipes to achieve critical thinking. It is a fundamental prerequisite that DEMBRA must be accepted by the staff. Acceptance is achieved by asking the participants in both formal and informal ways, for instance in a democratic vote about participating in the study. This is intended to strengthen the participants' ownership and to make the initiative less top-down. So even if the principal and other leaders are eager to conduct a DEMBRA initiative, it will not be implemented unless the staff have agreed to it.

Nevertheless, to ensure quality and progression, the suggested timeline and development is defined by five basic principles and ten steps to be completed within a DEMBRA year. In sum, they cover and explain the ideas behind DEM-BRA and set up boundaries for what DEMBRA stands for.

The five DEMBRA principles are: (1) participation and inclusion; (2) knowledge and critical thinking; (3) diversity competence; (4) ownership and embeddedness; and (5) entirety. Behind each principle, there is a variety of ways to explain how and why this principle is essential and why it is necessary to fulfil the implementation of DEMBRA. Because all these explanations are intertwined, it is evident for the DEMBRA teachers that there is no single correct answer on how to prevent xenophobia and bigotry but rather an array of possible methods and outcomes. DEMBRA does not prescribe specific theories and methods. On the contrary, the project allows a school's staff to determine the best way for working on their specific area within the scope and the methodology of the five DEMBRA principles.

The DEMBRA website provides a checklist of ten steps to be completed during the DEMBRA year (Table 8.1, see also Norwegian Centre for Holocaust and Minority Studies, 2020b). The steps do not need to be followed slavishly, but they do show the desired change, the progress, as well as the outcomes of the efforts that both the school and the DEMBRA guide put into the initiative.

#### 3.1.2 Research on DEMBRA for Schools in Southern Norway

Since ARKIVET started DEMBRA for Schools in southern Norway, the first two schools in the region have completed their year of tutoring. The effects of the schools' work are being investigated both quantitatively and qualitatively. Here, we report the first qualitative findings on the development of the programme at the first two schools in southern Norway, which we will call School A and School B.

According to the ten steps of implementation (Table 8.1), DEMBRA should start with a mapping of experiences, attitudes, and behaviours among pupils


table 8.1 10 process steps in the DEMBRA for schools programme

Source: Adapted from: 'DEMBRA–Implementation', by Norwegian Centre for Holocaust and Minority Studies (2020b)

and teachers alike. The end point of the year of tutoring, which also marks the start of a new approach towards otherness, bigotry, etc., requires finalizing a plan going forward based on the experiences and competencies that the school has gained during that year. The findings referred to reflect on the development of School A and School B.

Approximately 40% of School A's pupils came from minorities. Since 2002, since before the DEMBRA initiative, the school had already worked very hard to create a sense of 'we and us'. The school was well known in the region and had also won awards for the 'we and us' work. School A did not use the DEMBRA mapping survey because the staff were concerned that some of the questions might generate negative attitudes towards ethnic and national minorities and that, despite the tool's good intention, the survey might trigger use of words such as 'Poles', 'Somalians', 'gay', 'Muslim', 'Norwegians', and 'women' in a negative way. As School A had worked so hard over such a long period of time on creating a common identity instead of segregating certain groups, it provided a convincing reason for not using the DEMBRA mapping survey. Nevertheless, the school had to provide another kind of mapping exercise as a starting point for the DEMBRA work. Therefore, the school's DEMBRA group together with its DEMBRA guide decided to conduct qualitative discussions on what the school needed most to strengthen and further its already established work.

Based on the findings, the whole staff was provided with two day-long workshops on specific themes, namely 'in- and out-groups' and 'dialogue'. The first workshop provided the philosophy, theories, and effective educational practices for understanding and combating the emergence of in- and out-groups, micro-aggression, etc. The second workshop provided the same for creating safe environments for discussion and disagreements in the classroom, including the importance of trying to understand one's interlocutor, regardless of whether the person is a pupil or a teacher. As a result of the intervention, the teachers decided to dedicate more of their work on strengthening communication within the classroom rather than the whole school. So far, they had worked more on communication at school level, but now they saw the need for inserting measures in the microcosm of the classroom.

Unlike School A, School B did complete the mapping survey and benefited from this exercise when deciding the scope of intervention. While the survey is mostly designed for teachers and pupils in grades 8, 9, and 10, School B also distributed surveys to grades 1 to 7. The DEMBRA guide helped to identify what stood out from these surveys based on the responses. School B identified as its starting point for the DEMBRA initiative the use of specific abusive words and particular places in the schoolyard which were conflict areas where insecurity thrived. Based on this information, School B's competence workshop was designed to promote the understanding and interpretation of the language of the pupils and to include exercises on taking other people's perspectives. Through role play and by creating awareness of different the connotations and meanings that words may hold in different contexts or for different audiences, the DEMBRA group decided to work on 'unity' as the school's primary objective. The intervention resulted in a workshop about democracy and all the arrays of what democracy is and can be for 8th and 9th graders.

Results from interviews with the principal after the conclusion of the programme indicate that the programme output had far better effects on pupils in the upper year groups (grades 8–10) than in the lower year groups (grades 1–7). This coincides with experiences from the focused work on critical thinking*.*  Critical thinking as a concept is much easier to implement for teachers and easier to grasp for pupils the older the pupils are. Feedback given by the school to the DEMBRA guide also suggests that there is still improvement to be made on empowering teachers and staff to provide conceptual DEMBRA teaching when this is not conducted by the DEMBRA group or a designated guide. Such feedback helps build a better programme for schools that will participate in years to come.

#### 3.1.3 Discussion: DEMBRA for Schools at ARKIVET

DEMBRA programmes have been conducted in the Oslo area for up to seven years in total. Thus, evaluation reports with findings concerning the learning potential for a DEMBRA school are now available (Lenz & Kjeøy, 2015; Lenz et al., 2017). In the south of Norway, however, DEMBRA is still in its infancy, and there are few research findings to date. Nevertheless, more and more data is becoming available from investigating the 10-steps process (Table 8.1); this data provides valuable insights into how schools in the region can improve their work related to democracy and radicalism and offers some knowledge about which priorities teachers set and how they develop measures for improving their schools. In this way, other schools and the project overall can profit from the experiences that DEMBRA schools have had. The main objective of DEMBRA is not primarily to provide data but rather to provide local opportunities and tailored tools for schools to conduct targeted work on certain challenges and specific goals.

The examples provided above show how schools can choose very different approaches to the DEMBRA work within the same framework and based on the same principles. School A and School B ended up with very clear goals for improvement in the years to come, but yet they handled the programme very differently. DEMBRA does not simply finish at the end of the year. Through its guidance and competence raising activities, DEMBRA promotes ongoing critical thinking and self-reflection with the aim of creating better knowledge and therefore sustainable environments for democratic citizenship.

#### **3.2** *DEMBRA for Teacher Education*

From a long-term perspective, it is crucial to guarantee a focus on democratic values not only for pupils in schools but also for students during their teacher education; thus, pre-service teachers are future ambassadors for preventing extremism and radicalism in schools. This section presents the ideas behind DEMBRA for Teacher Education and exemplifies some teaching methods and report results from a local case study in southern Norway conducted by the UiA.

#### 3.2.1 The Implementation of DEMBRA for Teacher Education

The importance of education and the role of the teacher have been highlighted among researchers in the field of terrorism and extremism (Ghosh et al., 2017; Gereluk, 2012). The influence of teachers is essential as a multiplicator of democratic values far beyond the school's boundaries. Therefore, it is crucial to equip pre-service teachers with the knowledge and skills to cope with the challenging situations that might occur in the classroom (Ravndal, cited in Skjong, 2019). This is what DEMBRA for Teacher Education is about.

DEMBRA for Teacher Education is based on the same ideas as DEMBRA for Schools, but the aims of the two programmes differ. The aims of DEMBRA for Teacher Education are to contribute to teaching strategies and materials for pre-service teachers. To this end, a digital database (see Norwegian Centre for Holocaust and Minority Studies, 2020c) was established which contains materials from which teacher trainers can draw inspiration when they create their lessons and seminars related to democracy, citizenship, racism, and anti-Semitism for pre-service teachers. The digital database of resources is a continuous work in progress and is based on teaching materials collected from teacher educators in various institutions.

The digital database consists of teaching units through which the different teacher educators in the programme present different ways of teaching DEMBRA-related topics. In southern Norway, teacher educators at the UiA contributed materials regarding the multicultural classroom, democracy, critical thinking dialogue, racism, ethics, and trust to the database (Endresen et al., 2020). The teaching units were evaluated by the students, sometimes improved, and subsequently documented and registered. Finally, all teaching materials from each teacher educator were submitted in detail to the project management group at the Norwegian Centre for Holocaust and Minority Studies in Oslo. The content in the digital database consists of informative texts, didactical programmes, teaching units, and various types of exercises. All materials are free and available to all teacher educators and pre-service teachers (Norwegian Centre for Holocaust and Minority Studies, 2020c).

The teacher training institutions participating in the project must adhere to the DEMBRA values, but they can also add their own local nuance to the submitted teaching materials. The UiA, for instance, seeks to promote pre-service teachers' capacity for building an inclusive and supportive classroom environment in order to prevent marginalization and discrimination among pupils, and to focus on and develop pre-service teachers' critical thinking abilities. Furthermore, teacher education aims to stimulate the pre-service teachers' sensitivity and vigilance towards attitudes and ideologies which strip away an individual's humanity by pigeonholing, infringing human rights, promoting black-and-white thinking, and disregarding in various ways the individual's uniqueness. This requires not only fostering an awareness of these challenges but also nurturing pre-service teacher students' self-confidence and fostering sufficient resilience in future teachers to enable them to discuss controversial issues in the classroom instead of avoiding difficult and challenging situations.

The next section presents a closer look at the materials that were developed and implemented by the UiA. The materials were evaluated by the students and subsequently sent to the project management group at the Norwegian Centre for Holocaust and Minority Studies for further processing and preparation for inclusion in the resource database.

3.2.2 Developing DEMBRA Materials for Use in Teacher Education In this section, we present a case study of how an educator in a teacher training programme conducted a teaching unit. The teaching unit consisted of twelve hours of instruction in the autumn of 2018. There were about twenty teacher students in the group. The teaching unit was divided into three sections and was carried out using a mixture of various methodological approaches.

In accordance with research findings that underline the teacher's role and the classroom atmosphere (Hattie, 2008), the starting point for Section 1 was to articulate and draw lines between the fields of values, ethics, and identity. This is supported by the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, who claims that there is an essential link between identity and a kind of orientation. He writes: 'To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary' (Taylor, 1989, p. 28). The quotation highlights that values, morals, and ethics are dimensions that are, in fact, deeply involved in a person's self-understanding.

The content of Section 1 involved a mixture of information presented by the educators, various examples from the internet and YouTube, and practical exercises in which the teacher students participated. The meaning aspect is


table 8.2 Topics of the DEMBRA sessions for pre-service teachers at the UiA

Source: Adapted from 'DEMBRA–Implementation', by Norwegian Centre for Holocaust and Minority Studies (2020c)

strengthened by thinking about teaching from a narrative perspective (Taylor, 1989, p. 47). The pre-service teachers had the opportunity to grasp their lives as a narrative. By looking back in time on their own personal experiences, they reflected on fundamental values and thought about what sort of values and ethics would become important in their prospective work as a teacher (Haraldstad & Kristiansen, 2019). The here-and-now situation invited a dialogue about attitudes and ideas from the past and about what could be important to develop further, or to change and rethink. Engaging the teacher students in these different exercises meant that more implicit attitudes and ideas were brought forward. In general, the narrative approach permits a dialogue in the classroom where stories are put on the table and discussed (Rendtorff & Hermansen, 2002). The sharing of good and bad memories and of stories from their own lives often led to discussions about which values—if possible—they could agree upon as fundamental values for a teacher to practice, which values should be discarded or rejected, and which values might lead to a deterioration in classroom atmosphere. The different values were further discussed in light of the Norwegian ethical code for teachers (Bjerkestrand et al., 2012).

Section 2 was about racism, anti-Semitism, creating stereotypes, and blackand-white thinking. The teacher students were encouraged to share stories in small groups about their experiences of racism, both their own stories or stories they had been told or had read about. One goal for this teaching sequence was to give the students an understanding of how it might feel to be a victim of racism and more knowledge about the different sorts of mechanisms involved in racism. Another goal was to give a historical introduction to the concepts within the field of science, culture, and ideology in a Norwegian and European context, illuminating the ideas that led to the ultimate and horrifying scenarios during the Second World War. Finally, today's 'everyday racism', which is hard to define and which is expressed more indirectly and is somehow invisible at different levels of the society (Bangstad & Døving, 2015), was put on the agenda. Through sharing experiences, watching authentic scenes on the internet, and participating in various exercises, the students were encouraged to challenge their own attitudes and ideas and to explain them clearly. In this way, fundamental attributions and tacit values were revealed.

Section 3 was titled 'trust and dialogue'. Trust and trusting relationships seem to be a very basic prerequisite for the functioning of a democratic society at a political level ('general trust') as well as for life in communities and interhuman relationships, including the classroom community (Kristiansen, 2005). However, trust is a difficult concept to define. At the individual level, it has to do with a feeling of safety based on the expectation that 'the other person does not have an intention to harm me' (Baier, 1991, p. 4). If trust is indeed fundamental for a well-functioning democratic society, it important to teach future teachers how trust can be nurtured and how to create a trusting atmosphere in the classroom. A trusting atmosphere will influence students' willingness to take part in discussions and to share ideas and thoughts. Moreover, getting to know a person and learning to trust him or her could contribute to reducing both prejudice and preconceived negative images of people or groups of people to which a particular individual is assumed to belong. A further factor that could prevent extremism is an increased awareness of ideas that contribute to pigeonholing people and of ideas that nourish further polarization between 'them and us'. Trust and dialogue are related terms. Both refer to some relational qualities and basic ethical standards. To take part in a conversation would imply a willingness to listen and to adjust to what the other has to say. Fostering dialogue and trusting relationships amongst pupils may well serve to counteract lines of extremist development.

#### 3.2.3 Discussion: DEMBRA for Teacher Education at the UiA

At the end of each section, teacher students gave a written evaluation based on the work of Brookfield (2014), who has worked specifically with the concept of critical thinking and on principles of making education relevant for future work. Altogether thirty evaluation forms were collected. The findings show that 90% considered the topic of the unit as very important. About 75% of the students reported to have been the most engaged when they were involved in solving different tasks, participated in exercises, or took an active part in the dialogue. In response to the question if anything surprised them, 50% of the students agreed. Some were surprised by their own attitudes as they were revealed in some of the exercises. Others were astonished by their fellow students' views. The general impression was that the students found the teaching sessions to be relevant and essential in light of their prospective professional life. Some of the students also wanted to go deeper into the material and write their mandatory essays about some of these topics.

The findings showed that the sharing of stories and experiences in addition to participating in solving the different tasks contributed to creating a positive atmosphere among the students. The student group was composed of participants from different religious and cultural backgrounds. The students rated the unit as relevant, and we therefore think that the training will be of importance in their future work. In particular, we feel that it is important that the students themselves had the experience of a supportive classroom atmosphere and know how it feels to take part and be listened to. In their evaluation, the students also expressed their appreciation of themselves being active in the training by participating in the different activities. However, the students also stated that the sessions could have challenged them more regarding their personal attitudes. They also would have liked to have been given some tools and to have seen a stronger emphasis on best practices and potential pitfalls in designing a supportive and inclusive classrooms atmosphere. Moreover, questions on democracy and citizenship education were not explicitly put on the agenda in this unit. Nevertheless, there is hope that the experience of taking part in the discussions in the classroom community might stimulate higher levels of self-confidence in the students for their future work as teachers.

#### **4 Summary and Overall Discussion**

Although international surveys report a positive status of democracy in Norway, it is still important to be concerned about democracy. Democracy cannot be taken for granted; it has to be nurtured and taken care of. That is why prevention programmes like DEMBRA for Schools and DEMBRA for Teacher Education are so important.

But prevention programmes have to consider many issues. Democracy as a term is quite vague, and Biesta (2006) even claims that *'*democracy has so many meanings that it has ceased to have any meaning at all' (Biesta, 2006, p. 122). The understanding of democracy in school curricula frequently changes according to trends and policies (Briseid, 2012), and in Norway, we recognize that different aspects of democratic values are emphasized through the different curricula reforms (Briseid, 2012; Børhaug, 2004). Thus, working on the topic of democracy, we have to keep the fundamental issue in mind, i.e. that the word democracy implies a different understanding in different contexts and that this understanding differs from individual to individual and across time. This implies another issue. The findings of ICCS 2016 might show a good match between the ICCS questionnaire and the current curriculum in Norway, but it is not certain that the curriculum considers relevant and actual aspects of democracy sufficiently if the curriculum does not remain up to date. Thus, it is important not to adhere to old conceptions but instead continually to rethink democracy in the curriculum, to develop interventions, and to calibrate research instruments according to societal trends because new forms of communication and new types of movement will challenge the democratic values again and again in the future.

How prominent democracy should be as a topic in school curricula is discussed in many countries, and there are also differences in how different countries weight democratic values in school. In Norway, there is a particular emphasis on underlining the importance of equipping pupils with the relevant skills to be able to reason and analyse in order to be able to interpret information and to give reasons for their opinions (Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training, 2017). Different cognitive skills are essential for participating in a democracy, for analysing and recognizing extremist ideas and ideology, and for critical thinking. Teachers are the social actors who implement school curricula, and schools are a mirror of the society in which pupils with all kinds of opinions, attitudes, and values meet. With that, it is obvious that schools and teacher education are natural places for implementing prevention programmes. In this chapter, we have presented two Norwegian approaches whose aim it is to build the capability of in-service (DEMBRA for Schools) and pre-service teachers (DEMBRA for Teacher Education) to work on democratic issues in the classroom.

DEMBRA is targeted at in-service and pre-service teachers to ensure a sustainable democracy in the future. The findings from research conducted alongside the implementation of the DEMBRA programmes show that the DEMBRA for Schools and DEMBRA for Teacher Education projects enhance their participants' focus on the topics of democracy, racism, and anti-Semitism. The work in the two sample schools School A and School B showed that DEMBRA supported the schools in establishing and conducting concrete measures. Findings also indicated that older pupils responded better to the programme than younger pupils. This means there is a need to think about concepts for younger pupils as well.

To ensure a high level of acceptance and motivation, DEMBRA for Schools aims to anchor the programme with the teachers from the very beginning of the initiative. At the same time, it is a challenge to get a school's holistic attention and compliance to work on democracy. In everyday life, principals struggle with implementing various guidelines and recommendations distributed topdown from the government, and teachers are not always very keen on starting yet another draining and time-consuming project if it is not entirely necessary. Furthermore, there are many competing programmes, both commercial and public, trying to get a foothold in schools. It is now essential to continue with the DEMBRA work in schools and to ensure that the focus on democracy is not at risk of drowning among other innovations and programmes that might enter schools.

Following research that shows that the role of teachers is much more important than teachers are aware of (Jackson et al., 1993; Jacobsen et al., 2003), it becomes crucial to put this theme on the agenda for teacher education as well. DEMBRA for Teacher Education can play an essential role by preparing prospective teachers to help prevent children from developing extremist ideologies. Attitudes will involve an awareness both of critical thinking as well as of emotional aspects. DEMBRA for Teacher Education provided pre-service teachers with knowledge and skills on how to deal with difficult situations relating to democracy, racism, and anti-Semitism in the context of a regular teacher education course. The students perceived the instruction as very important and greatly relevant for their own lives as teachers. About half of the students were surprised after having taken a closer look at their own attitudes and the values of their peer students. Most of them had not previously reflected upon these topics to a great extent. According to Schön (1984), this surprising and confusing experience represents a potential for learning. Surprises can play a constructive role in this sense. The students' lack of skills in reflecting upon this topic corroborates the importance of implementing DEMBRA into teacher education.

At this time, the curriculum and instruction around democracy and citizenship are being reformed and re-implemented in Norway. In so doing, experiences and knowledge gained from intervention programmes like DEMBRA provide essential contributions and support for the emerging ideas on creating good arenas for sustainable learning on democratic issues in schools.

#### **References**


Kunnskapsdepartementet. https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/kd/ vedlegg/grunnskole/eidsvagutvalget/eidsvag\_rapport\_det\_kan\_skje\_igjen.pdf


### **A Public Health Approach to Inclusive Schools** *Reconnecting Young People and Preventing Violent Extremism*

*Dan Laitsch and Douglas S. McCall*

#### **Abstract**

This chapter uses a public health approach to look at what we know about violence and violent extremism in the context of kindergarten-to-12th-grade school systems where schools are already trying to intervene and build resilience. The chapter presents issues to consider as we more intentionally try to leverage such programmes to address violent extremism. Efforts at preventing violent extremism (PVE) can be viewed on a continuum of opportunities for creating a safe and positive society in which all members find value, place, and belonging. Within an education context, PVE programmes help to identify and address risk factors for radicalization, strengthen protective factors, and build resilience. Because of the individualized nature of violent extremism, many PVE initiatives focus on individuals at risk; however, we consider the extent to which a comprehensive approach to social inclusion might minimize risk factors, strengthen protective factors, and build resilience across groups, thus reducing the need for law enforcement to intervene. We see schools as a place for social connection which links and broadly interrupts the path to violent extremism. We identify challenges that schools face in becoming centres of resilience and identify next steps for addressing these challenges.

#### **Keywords**

school health – social connection – violence prevention – democratic schooling

#### **1 Introduction**

Violent extremism has become a core concern in the early twenty-first century, with more than 62,000 incidents of terrorism occurring between 2011 and 2015 (Borum & Neer, 2017). As a result, national governments have worked individually and collectively to try and address violent extremism; however, the scope of the problem stretching across substantially different contexts has brought with it a number of challenges to the design of policies and the implementation and evaluation of interventions. Our intent in this paper is twofold: first, to examine the issue broadly within the context of primary and secondary schools; and second, to offer a series of research-based recommendations for educators and education policymakers by applying a public health and inclusive approach to the issue. Because the context of violent extremism and educational systems differs substantially from country to country, our work will focus on broader principles for consideration rather than offering specific programme proposals.

#### **2 Public Health Approach**

A public health approach to violence prevention is not new. Indeed, some of the foundational work in the early part of this century regarding international efforts for preventing violence took a public health approach to the issue (Dahlberg & Krug, 2002). A public health approach generally requires six steps: (1) surveillance (definition and monitoring); (2) identification of risk factors; (3) identification of protective factors; (4) seeking and developing interventions (mitigating risk and strengthening protective factors in building resilience); (5) evaluating interventions; and (6) scaling up (Satcher & Higginbotham, 2008).

In 2002, the World Health Organization contextualized violence as a public health issue (Dahlberg & Krug, 2002) and followed that initial report with related reports looking at development agencies (World Health Organization [WHO], 2008); violence prevention (WHO, 2010); and status (Butchart & Mikton, 2014; Mikton et al., 2016). In 2018, the American Public Health Association (APHA) declared violence a public health concern. This work looks at issues of violence generally, however, and not at violent extremism or terrorism specifically. Indeed, the WHO categorization of violent extremism falls under the broader term of collective violence.

Parallel with and similar to developments in the public health sector, the crime prevention and education sectors have developed school-based and school-linked models focusing on preventing crime and violence and promoting social inclusion (Juvonen et al., 2019; European Agency for Special Needs and Inclusive Education, 2018). The research on inclusive schooling is extensive, and models describing multicomponent approaches have been published by United Nations (UN) agencies for years These include a manual for child friendly schools (United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF], 2007) and a handbook on school-based violence prevention (WHO, 2019). This 'inclusive schools' approach has been recommended by high-level authorities (UNICEF, 2017; Global Counter Terrorism Forum, 2017) as the framework for preventing violent extremism, student alienation, and isolation.

#### **3 Surveillance/Overview of the Literature**

The first step in a public health approach to the prevention of violent extremism is to define the problem (part of the surveillance of the issue within a public health framework). As Ghosh et al. (2017) point out, a major challenge within the PVE literature is the lack of a common definition of terms (including terms such as terrorism, violent extremism, collective violence, ideologically motivated violence) and approaches (countering violent extremism versus preventing violent extremism). Part of the problem is that the use of these terms is politically laden—that is, when violence takes on political or ideological purposes, it becomes an exercise of power. In such cases, the powerful are left to define who the terrorists and extremists are and, unsurprisingly, that tends to be those seeking changes in power relations, both within and among countries (Borum & Neer, 2017; Ucko, 2018). Further challenges arise in determining what constitutes extremism and to what extent efforts to address extremism might conflict with the principles of free thought and speech. For these reasons, the UN, in seeking to address terrorism and violent extremism, left the definition of the terms to its individual member states (United Nations General Assembly, 2006). There is additional ambiguity in how terms interact and overlap, with some researchers using the terms 'violent extremism' and 'terrorism' synonymously.

The process of becoming a violent extremist or terrorist is also difficult to map, and it is therefore difficult to design interventions to prevent or counter it. The literature identifies multiple types of violent extremists or terrorists, ranging from lone offenders to loosely organized networks and highly organized groups. Further, the path towards personal engagement in extremist activity is diverse, with individual motivation to engage in violent extremism developing slowly over time and along variable pathways (Borum & Neer, 2017). In fact, some identified risk factors are so general as to be meaningless at best and harmful to prevention efforts at worst (Wynia et al., 2017).

While most articles acknowledge these problems, they also note that there are commonalities across the definitions. Terrorism is generally conceptualized through a description of the violent action, the actors (individuals and groups acting outside the scope of a nation or its military), the targets (advocating public violence against civilians), and the actors' motivations (advancing a particular political goal or seeking to create fear in populations). In the Canadian context, the government defines these terms as follows (Canada Centre for Community Engagement Prevention of Violence, 2018):


In the United States, the APHA uses the term 'ideologically motivated violence'. For the purposes of this article, we are analysing the scholarship across these terms together but will discuss the collected research in terms of violent extremism. Despite the definitional difficulties, violence has been identified as a public health problem at national (American Public Health Association [APHA], 2018) and global levels (Dahlberg & Krug, 2002), with more than 62,000 incidents of violent extremism occurring between 2011 and 2015 (Borum & Neer, 2017).

#### **4 Risk Factors**

When looking at preventing violent extremism, there are two primary umbrellaterms: countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE). CVE was initially advanced by the Obama administration in the United States, although many of the prevention perspectives were present in earlier efforts in Europe. CVE focuses on the idea that governments and communities can take proactive steps to counter the recruitment and radicalization of followers by extremist organizations, ideas further incorporated in the UN's *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism* (United Nations General Assembly, 2015). Both terms demonstrated a shift away from a more security-oriented approach to counterterrorism towards a focus on addressing the structural causes of violent extremism: lack of socioeconomic opportunities; marginalization and discrimination; poor government; violations of human rights and the rule of law; prolonged and unresolved conflicts; and radicalization in prisons (United Nations General Assembly, 2015). It is this broader approach to prevention that provides an opportunity for education policymakers to think about ways to contribute to the reduction of violence and extremism.

When looking at risk factors, the research literature talks about push and pull entry into extremist ideology and groups (Ghosh et al., 2017). Push factors are largely social conditions that create a vulnerability to extremist ideas and recruitment. Pull factors refer to intentional efforts to bring vulnerable individuals into extremist groups. This chapter focuses more on involving schools in addressing the push factors as a protective strategy rather than promoting involving schools directly in thwarting recruitment efforts. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) points out that 'the role of education is, therefore, not to intercept violent extremists or identify individuals who may potentially become violent extremists, but to create the conditions that build the defences, within learners, against violent extremism and strengthen their commitment to non-violence and peace' (2017, p. 22).

#### **4.1** *Individual Indicators Identified in the Literature*

Identifying the risk factors for violent extremism is a complex undertaking. The path to violent extremism (radicalization) is generally thought to progress along five lines (Borum & Neer, 2017): (1) life experiences (such as discrimination or alienation); (2) activating/triggering situations (more recent events driving an extreme response in an individual); (3) predisposing vulnerabilities and propensities (psychological issues, such as the need for belonging); (4) social and group dynamics (engagement with a radical group); and (5) ideology or narrative (adoption of an extremist group's ideas, beliefs, and values). Within these lines, a variety of individual and communal indicators associated with extremism have been identified in the literature (see Table 9.1). The risk factors include: lack of social control (lack of stable employment); social learning (radical peers); a history of psychological and mental health issues; experience of violence and abuse; a criminal record; isolation and separation from the mainstream identity; and experience of individual discrimination.

These risk factors are not unique to violent extremism and have, in fact, been associated with a number of violence-related social problems, including gang membership (Eisenman & Flavahan, 2017), criminal involvement (Clemmow et al., 2020), school dropout (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], 2016), and violent behaviour (Clemmow et al., 2020). This broad overlap of risk factors associated with a diversity of negative longer-term indicators suggests that a broad-based approach to intervention could address multiple potential negative outcomes.

#### **4.2** *Communal Indicators Identified in the Literature*

Individual risk factors are only one part of the story when looking at violence and violent extremism. Breakdowns of the community can also contribute to


table 9.1 Risk factors and protective factors for violent extremism

increased risk. Experiencing economic discrimination (UNESCO, 2016), community stigma and isolation (UNESCO, 2016, 2017), and separation from experiences of the common good (Kurlychek et al., 2012) can also lead to involvement in extremism and violence. Again, these indicators are not unique to the type of violent extremism identified here and have been more broadly associated with criminal and gang activity.

#### **5 Protective Factors**

Just as there are life experiences that can increase one's risk for violent extremism, there are also experiences that can build resilience, i.e. the capacity to resist engaging in such negative behaviours (see Table 9.1). Without wishing to oversimplify, many of the protective factors are essentially the opposite of the risk factors. Rather than social isolation, there is a social connection; instead of separation from the common good, there is trust in public institutions; and rather than a lack of social control, there is power-sharing and self-governance.

#### **5.1** *Social Connection*

Social connection refers to the idea that individuals feel a connection to the people in their communities, resulting in a reduced impetus to harm that community. While isolation and alienation are associated with extremist involvement, strong social connections with public institutions and communities can serve as important protective factors (Policy Research, Justice Canada, Canadian Heritage, 2001).

When individuals embrace a common purpose and hold common values within their communities (feeling membership of an ethnic, cultural, religious, or other type of community), the impetus for harming that community is reduced (Ellis & Abdi, 2017). Similarly, embracing common purposes and values across separately identifiable communities (separate communities united by common values and goals, such as diversity, liberty, democracy) can also build resilience to violence and violent engagement (Ellis & Abdi, 2017).

While social connection is important, it rests within the broader public values of that community. As identified under the heading of risk factors, if the values of the community are extreme, then a sense of social connection to those views obviously connects the individual to extremism. Some research has shown that a strong social connection can result in the dehumanization of people outside of the social grouping (Waytz & Epley, 2012), potentially increasing the risk of extremism. In short, social connection depends strongly on the 'what' that individuals are connected with.

#### **5.2** *Social Linkage*

A key aspect in ensuring a positive social connection is the extent to which that connection is part of a linkage between the community and broader public values and institutions. Building trust in public institutions, involvement in activities to advance community goals, sharing power, and strengthening community self-governance, decision making, and outcomes can help build resilience to violent extremism (Ellis & Abdi, 2017).

Resorting to violence and extremism may be an indicator that non-violent behaviours are not seen as viable paths for realizing desired personal and social outcomes. A sense of social connection and a belief in common values across diverse communities suggests that desired outcomes can be achieved within non-violent and socially acceptable norms.

As with the risk factors, these protective factors are also associated with building resilience to other negative outcomes, again including violence, crime, and gang activity (Mendelson et al., 2018; Kia-Keating et al., 2011). Further, these factors are related to positive social outcomes such as political participation (Briggs, 2010), school completion, post-secondary involvement, and lifetime earnings (David-Ferdon et al., 2016). Finally, schools are an important place for building these social connections and for community linkages (Blank et al., 2003; Johnson, 2009).

#### **6 Intervening**

Schools act as a cultural focal point for the community (Blank et al., 2003). As centres of cultural transference, schools serve as a uniting force within the community; they can help minimize individual and communal risk factors, strengthen protective factors, and build resilience in students, families, and the broader community.

#### **6.1** *Schools as Centres for Social Connection and Linkage*

A social connection is created when individuals in schools and communities embrace common values and purposes within a broader cultural framework, resulting in an educated citizenry able to participate fully in the economy. These connections are realized through linkages between individuals and the broader society and positively influence a number of health and mortality outcomes (Holt-Lunstad, et al., 2017; Pate et al., 2016; Patton et al., 2017). Schools that are envisioned as a public good and a source of cultural transference empower students and their families with a sense of control over their intellectual, cultural, and economic future.

As public enterprises, schools in many countries are guided by locally elected school boards. By involving the community in selecting the stewards for the local schools, the community is empowered in guiding the development of its children towards a common set of values, and this personal investment in the broader society can serve as a protective factor guiding participants to live within the norms of the community (Land, 2002).

Within schools, parent groups further help to give voice to the community and to empower its members to experience some sense of involvement and control over their child's education. Envisioned this way, public schools are widely accessible in most countries and provide a ubiquitous intervention point for building social connection and community empowerment (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2017).

#### **6.2** *Educational Programmes and Pedagogy*

The view of schools as centres for the community and as focal points for addressing society's problems is neither new nor unique (Blank et al., 2003). Activists see schools as a place for teaching future generations about issues they see as important and as a result, there are a large number of programmes and structures proposed for schools and their communities. By arguing for changes in the curriculum and in schools through teacher preparation and professional development, extracurricular activities, and school-wide reform, activists

can seek to realize social change within the broader curriculum (see Figure 9.1) that might increase social inclusion, reduce bullying, build intercultural understanding, and promote a host of other potential outcomes (Juvonen et al., 2019). While this very crowded curriculum can become a barrier to groups seeking to introduce new programmes (such as antiterrorism education), it also provides a broad base of programmes already designed to address many of the risk and protective factors identified in the literature. To strengthen PVE interventions and intervention points, target schools and districts should be surveyed to determine the presence of existing programs already focused on the target risk and protective factors (see Table 9.2).


table 9.2 Selected educational programmes addressing similar PVE risk and protective factors

In Canada, for example, all jurisdictions have a core curriculum on health and personal and social development that is delivered in a variety of ways. Several Canadian provinces have recently jointly moved towards a competency-based, cross-curricular framework that includes many aspects related to social inclusion and global competencies (Council of Ministers of Education, 2020). Canadian jurisdictions were able to incorporate with relative ease the curriculum adjustments, instructional programmes, and teacher training on extremism that have already been developed and implemented in other countries.

All Canadian jurisdictions also already use multicomponent approaches to health and welfare that have broad support in research and experience (McCall & Laitsch, 2017). These include inclusive and child-friendly schools, safe schools, healthy schools, and community schools. Other multi-intervention programmes in use include social and emotional learning, positive behaviour support, and gang prevention. Consequently, a hybrid multicomponent approach for preventing violent extremism and promoting social inclusion was easily understood and embraced by Canadian educators (see Table 9.3). A recent research review undertaken for the Department of Education in the United Kingdom has already recommended a similar multicomponent approach there (Sheikh et al., 2010).

Activists interested in advancing their programmes are used to thinking of schools as knowledge centres—centres of learning that are designed to transmit knowledge about an issue to students. While teaching students specific knowledge or skills may contribute to resilience in students at risk of violent extremism (Ghosh et al., 2017; Sheikh et al., 2010), building trust in institutions, communities, and peers can also be accomplished by considering the way we teach (pedagogies) and the customs and rules (culture) of the institution. In particular, by using pedagogies and cultural practices that support students' intrinsic motivation to engage with their school, we can strengthen their resilience for facing challenging situations. In other words, while we might *teach* students what democracy is through the curriculum, we can help them *experience* democracy by using democratic practices within the classroom, school, and community (see Figure 9.2).

Classroom management is a core part of teaching, and the establishment of classroom rules and norms sends a powerful message to students the values of their society and culture. Classroom rules that are *imposed* by the teacher or principal send a clear message to student that obedience to authority is paramount. On the other hand, classroom rules and norms that are *discussed, negotiated, and democratically determined* send a message that rules are determined collectively. Students then become active participants in making the


Table 9.3 Violent extremism risk factors and protective factors and the example educational programmes that address them

system work rather than being oppressed and powerless participants in an externally determined system.

Democratic classroom pedagogies focus on relationship building and trust by creating communities of learning. Students build connections with each other and with the institution, including its practices and procedures. When rules and norms are broken, the use of positive discipline (Luiselli et al., 2005) and restorative justice programmes (Finley, 2011) can strengthen students' connection with their peers and their community and empower them to participate in the resolution process rather than being alienated, isolated, or pushed away from community through punishments like suspension, removal from class, or after-school detention. These types of programmes are in many ways about teaching the skills and behaviours, and thereby giving students actual experience of, democracy and justice.

Bringing the community into the school can also have substantial benefits by building social connections and linkages, including reductions in dropout and risky behaviour (Heers et al., 2016). The concept of community schools sees schools as centres of cooperation with other public health and social service institutions. It involves parents in school governance and activities and offers extracurricular activities to students and the broader community (Heers et al., 2016).

#### **7 Programme Design, Development, and Implementation**

Designing school-based programmes to address the risk of terrorism and violent extremism will be challenging. The lack of a common definition for terrorism and violent extremism makes it difficult both to design and test specific programmes. The lack of a specific typology and pathway for terrorism and violent extremism also makes it challenging to adopt a particular programmatic approach for intervention due to the complexity and uncertainty regarding the specific indicators or behaviours that can be targeted for disruption (Horgan et al., 2018). Finally, a significant risk factor for violent extremism is alienation from public institutions (e.g. government). A core part of any intervention must include an intentional effort to build trust between the community and public institutions. An authoritarian approach to prevention based on discipline and reporting risks alienating the very community it needs to engage (Kundnani, 2009; Wynia et al., 2017).

Understanding the diversity of risk factors that are correlated with violence and violent extremism can help us in examining approaches that can mitigate the risks and help build resilience (see Table 9.4). In thinking about interventions in this manner, however, there are three important caveats to keep in mind. First, the path to violent extremism is non-linear and generally the culmination of multiple push and pull risk factors; second, the research is not conclusive on many risk factors with different studies at times offering conflicting outcomes (Clemmow et al., 2020); and third, we need to ensure that we are not creating a deficit model of symptoms to be addressed but instead focus on creating a healthy culture and community.

#### **7.1** *Contextual Challenges: Authentic Change*

Public schools occupy a special place in communities and are highly visible institutions. While schools may not necessary be seen by the public as an arm of the government, as publicly funded and governed entities, they play a key role in strengthening social linkage through building trust in other public institutions, establishing common goals and purposes, and power-sharing. However, in realizing the power of schools to build social linkages between communities and the broader public, a number of technical and authentic challenges arise.

#### **7.2** *Technical Challenges*

One of the biggest challenges in strengthening the role of schools in promoting social linkage is the deficit model approach to change as represented by many intervention programmes. As highlighted earlier, schools are seen as important intervention points in addressing social problems. Schools have been asked to 'fix' many of society's problems—including obesity, media literacy, gender equity, and racism—even while they are being labelled the protectors of privilege and the status quo because their structures reinforce capitalist and neoliberal values that protect those in power through a hidden curriculum (Portelli & Konecny, 2013). Adding another problem, namely violent extremism, to the

#### Table 9.4 List of overlapping risk factors and protective factors for violence in schools and for violent extremism


238 Laitsch and McCall

list—particularly when it may be seen as protecting those in power at the expense of the local community—is unlikely to result in significant uptake by educators, even if it is mandated by the state.

Instead of conceptualizing PVE work as another specific problem for the community or for schools to address, we propose focusing on the broader role of schools in building a resilient culture in which violent extremism is not a viable alternative. This can be done through the consideration of whole school or whole child approaches to change that emphasize and support healthy children, cultures, and communities. Broad interventions supporting democratic schooling, citizenship education, personal health, and other programmes focused on personal wellness (see Table 9.3) can help minimize the push factors that drive children to violence.

There are several well-established school-based or school-linked multicomponent approaches that can provide policy or programme frameworks that 'offer a home' for methods for preventing student alienation, isolation, potential violent extremism and that promote social inclusion. These include approaches such as child friendly and inclusive schools, safe and caring schools, healthy schools, community schools, intercultural education, disaster risk reduction, and peace education, among others.

There are also several well-established multi-intervention programmes (MIP) that can be adapted to include greater attention to student alienation and isolation. These include anti-bullying programmes, positive behaviour supports (PBS), dropout prevention, gang prevention, mental health programmes, resistance training in substance abuse prevention, school climate improvement programmes, and others.

These multifaceted approaches and programmes represent an existing infrastructure and capacity to build on while addressing violent extremism. They should be continued, but we are not simply recommending a 'rising tide lifts all boats' approach. The existing approaches, programmes, and single interventions need to be modified to include isolated and alienated students who may *not* be acting out in school and thereby calling attention to themselves. This is the 'child-seeking approach', which is one of the tenets of the child friendly schools model.

At the same time, we cannot allow ourselves to bias our actions with a Westernized view of introvert and extrovert behaviour. Introspection is not always isolating. Alienation, or at least seeking to be independent from the views of our parents and from the traditional norms in our communities, is usually a healthy part of becoming an adult. At the same time, schools are the first social institution that young people encounter as they begin to recognize and understand their own family and cultural backgrounds and that of the others around them. The formation of their identity at this stage of life is critical. If they perceive that there is no place for them, or if the groups or individuals with whom they have formed relationships are somehow stigmatized or disadvantaged, then essential bonding or attachments can be stalled or disrupted.

Rather than a narrow interpretation of schools as centres of academic instruction oriented towards economic prosperity in a competitive market place, schools should be reconceptualized as centres of the community, models of democracy, and a force for advancing the health and wellness of community members. By building strong links to the health of the community, the drivers for extremism can be interrupted.

Finally, the narrative of schools as places of violence and failure—particularly in already vulnerable and isolated communities—needs to be interrupted. Think tanks and advocacy groups engaged in broad-based efforts to privatize education, particularly in North America, have attempted to create a sense of crisis in public education and, more broadly, government in general, portraying public institutions as a failing system in order to drive parents to the private sector (Berliner & Biddle, 1995; Thunert, 2003; Anderson & Donchik, 2016; Sturges, 2015; Verger et al., 2016). By creating dissatisfaction and distrust in public institutions, these think tanks are in actual fact interrupting the social linking forces that serve as protective mechanisms against violence and violent extremism.

Schools, particularly those in vulnerable and marginalized communities, need to be seen as safe places that can be entrusted with looking after the best interests of their students and the communities in which they reside. Building trust in social institutions is consistently identified as an important part of PVE and needs to be a core component of any effort to address violent extremism in schools.

#### **7.3** *Authentic Challenges*

An additional challenge faced in PVE within the school context is identifying the appropriate intervention point. Violence and violent extremism are often conceptualized as an individual act or an isolated problem; however, they are embedded in the broader societal context. This creates a tension between the problem (individual action) and the context (societally based) and suggests that efforts to address violence in one area may be undercut by the context of the other area. A focus on interrupting the push factors influencing an individual student can themselves be interrupted by pull factors originating from the community. Similarly, a focus on strengthening the community without also supporting the individual in many respects represents the current approach that schools take to social change, whereby they rely on individuals to take responsibility for their own learning.

The programmatic nature of interventions can also create a challenge to implementation as funding and support are provided on a limited basis rather than as core funding (Moffett et al., 2016). The fragmented nature of a programmatic approach can also create challenges (WHO, 2008). Coordination across community organizations and multiple programmes can be difficult unless it is an intentionally designed component of the intervention. Finally, national education strategies to support the completion of education (all the way through secondary school), housing strategies, and poverty reduction strategies are lacking in many countries (Butchart & Mikton, 2014; Mikton et al., 2016; WHO, 2008).

#### **8 Next Steps and Conclusion**

Research looking at the efficacy of isolated, individual programmes for addressing violent extremism has found few, if any, effective programmes (Pistone et al., 2019). For the reasons referenced throughout this paper, it seems unlikely that any single programme will result in widespread implementation or change in practice. Instead, advocates need to create comprehensive approaches that encompass the multiple existing programmes already aimed at reducing violence and other antisocial behaviours as well as other policies, services, practices, and changes in schools that strengthen protective factors.

Such a comprehensive approach should conceptualize schools as public institutions for strengthening social linkage and building individual and community trust, for establishing goals and purposes to advance the common good across the community, and for supporting involvement in collective democratic actions, power-sharing, and community empowerment. Importantly, this means countering the political narrative of public schools as being violent, unsafe, and ineffective. Further, it means embracing schools as centres of citizenship and community (Ghosh et al., 2017), rather than providers of individual economic productivity and workforce preparation. Finally, as centres of democratic engagement and empowerment, schools must be empowered to represent the diversity of the community and resist the villainization of competing political views.

Within these broad principles, schools should maintain a specific focus on academic achievement and school connectedness as well as on establishing positive adult relationships, supporting a community of prosocial non-violent peers, and advancing economic opportunity for students and the community (Stewart & Sun, 2004). Schools should be seen as tools for addressing short- and long-term risk factors for violence and violent extremism, including poverty, student mobility and transience, positive adult and peer relationships, mental health, and social development. Viewed this way, we can create a culture of inclusion, health, and safety that maximizes the protective factors of education as an institution rather than seeing schools as places where violent and dangerous individuals can be identified and removed.

#### **References**


## **Education for Democratic Citizenship through Values** *and* **Knowledge Education (V***a***KE) in Communities with Cultural Diversity**

*Fostering Migrants' Competences for Integration in Austria*

*Sieglinde Weyringer, Jean-Luc Patry, Natascha Diekmann and Lydia Linortner*

#### **Abstract**

The didactical tool Values *and* Knowledge Education (V*a*KE) combines values education in the tradition of Kohlberg with knowledge acquisition through inquiry-based learning on a constructivist basis. The claim is that this method can provide integration competencies and hence contribute to fostering dispositions for courageous non-violent engagement. The prototypical V*a*KE steps need to be adapted to specific audiences and conditions. Two studies are presented in which V*a*KE was tested with Muslim immigrants: the first one with a small group of unaccompanied male minors, the second with ninety-five female refugees. In both studies, the participants declared to be highly satisfied with the experience. In the first study, the workshop had to be extended from the planned three half-days to four sessions at the participants' request, and the participants acquired many competences, culminating in their decision to implement a democratic structure. In the second study, after two half-days of workshop sessions, the participants were asked to take behaviour resolutions and to act accordingly between the second and the third half-days, which most of them achieved successfully. Results show that V*a*KE had positive effects. It is possible to conclude that V*a*KE is a promising intervention for promoting successful integration and for preventing terrorist orientations in those who have participated.

#### **Keywords**

values education – authentic learning – constructivism (learning) – multicultural education – democratic values

This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-SA 4.0 License.

<sup>©</sup> Sieglinde Weyringer, Jean-Luc Patry, Natascha Diekmann and Lydia Linortner,

<sup>2022 |</sup> doi:10.1163/9789004525658\_011

#### **1 Introduction**

'Everyone must be prevented from climbing the staircase [of terrorism]' say Ghosh et al. (2016, p. 123); this is a challenging imperative not only in the context of religious extremism, but also for societal and political processes in general. The steps of this staircase proceed from fundamentalism to extremism, radicalism, and terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005). However, in daily life it is nearly impossible even for individuals—let alone for a group or a community—to be aware of whether and when they have started climbing this staircase, and which step has already been reached. Movement towards the staircase will have begun in the mind, and at first only as a vague idea, long before it becomes visible. The susceptibility for wanting to climb the staircase is driven not just by specific personal conditions like poverty, little access to resources, or experiences of injustice, but may also be linked to group properties like nationality, religion, or ideas on societal constitution. Push and pull factors (Ghosh et al., 2016) influence this process; however, the individual person remains the responsible actor, and everyone may be tempted. The whole process can be imagined as a path with many branches. At each fork in the path, actors decide on which path they wish to follow. A 'good' decision means to avoid ending up on the staircase of terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005); for this to happen, the acting person needs to possess certain competences, which may be different at different branch points. Educational interventions aiming to prevent young people from stepping onto the staircase and designed to foster courageous non-violent engagement should focus on such competencies.

In this chapter, we claim that the didactical approach *Values* and *Knowledge Education* (V*a*KE) can be used to establish and strengthen such competences. After discussing our theory about what it means to be a migrant, we present the V*a*KE method and our experiences of using it in two sets of integration training, one with female asylum seekers and one with unaccompanied young refugees. We show that the V*a*KE intervention can indeed contribute to averting the risk of radicalization.

#### **2 Emigration, Migration, and Integration**

Educational interventions will only be successful if the characteristics of the target audience and the educational goals are considered in their design. In this particular study, we work with migrants, specifically refugees from Islamic countries. The question then becomes what the educational goals are in these particular conditions.

We acknowledge that the dominant group plays an important role in the process of integration and that it has a specific responsibility in this regard (Berry & Sam, 2013, p. 153; Grigoryev et al., 2019, p. 2). In the present chapter, however, we will look at integration only from the point of view of the members of the non-dominant cultural groups, i.e. migrants.

#### **2.1** *What It Means to Be a Migrant*

Our characteristics of migrants will not refer to legal definitions or to the categorizations and policies as defined by the host society. Our considerations are linked to migration theory (e.g. FitzGerald, 2014), research on drivers of migration (e.g. Castelli, 2018), health-related issues like risk and protective factors for migrants' well-being (e.g. Prilleltensky, 2008), the mental health needs of migrants (e.g. Rousseau & Frounfelker, 2019), and the research by Hertz (e.g. 1981, 1985, 1988). Based on these and other studies which we cannot discuss here, we want to draw a picture of what it means to be a migrant in the everyday life in the host country. Migrants and tourists share the basic characteristic that both are perceived as foreigners by the inhabitants of a host country; however, the detailed perceptions are different. Tourists can ignore the hosts' attitudes because they stay a limited time and then return to their home country; migrants have to develop viable coping strategies because they stay for an unlimited period of time and seek to start a new life in the host country. The practice of hospitality, defined as the provision of support and help, is the prior value perceived by both groups of foreigners, but in a different manner.

The challenges that migrants are faced with when arriving in the host country depend first of all on the circumstances and motives for leaving their home country. Whether due to belligerent conflicts, economic problems, or ecological crises, the core motive for leaving the home country forever is distress and the hope to improve or to re-establish a good quality of life.

Upon arrival in the host country, following an initial feeling of relief, the feeling of being a stranger will surround all activities like a dense fog. Newly arrived persons experience unfamiliarity with situations that are well-known to the members of the dominant group; they quickly recognize that the coping strategies which they had established in their home country are no longer applicable. Feelings of *being excluded* and *not belonging* will grow, followed by the threat of a diminishing quality of life because of reduced access to goods and benefits in the host country. Individuals might face the host community as a closed and homogeneous but entirely unknown entity. The main barrier for the new arrivals is their lack of language competence. Further, nonverbal and paraverbal communication patterns for daily routines, habits, behaviours, and communication customs (e.g. how to greet), are unknown both in terms of giving and receiving messages. Specific terms and connotations are interpreted differently. Preferred attitudes in the host community, like political and religious concerns (e.g. regarding the concept of democracy) are unknown or unfamiliar and therefore difficult to understand because previous experiences of those attitudes in the home country may be missing or different (e.g. the police may have been experienced as oppressor in the home country but may have a completely different role in the host country). Berry (1997) speaks here of acculturation—i.e. cultural change resulting from the encounter of two (or more) groups with different cultural backgrounds—and the ensuing acculturative stress, which differs highly between people, ranging from changes that are easy to accomplish up to psychopathologic problems.

These problems are exacerbated by the fact that the migrants' main social relationships are now far away and difficult, if not impossible, to maintain (Albrow, quoted in Hill, 2019, p. 29), while there are no or only limited social networks outside of the migrants' own community in the host country. Furthermore, previous education and one's place in the economic world, although often devalued by the receiving society, play an important role for pre-acculturation (Berry, 1997, p. 22).

All these aspects jeopardize individuals' established self-concepts, challenge their personal cultural (including religious) identities (Liebkind et al., 2016), and inhibit coping and active problem solving. Evidence for this can be found, for instance, in interviews with refugees (e.g. Margaroni & Magos, 2018). The described negative feelings are enhanced by the observation that supposedly mandatory rules do not seem to apply to members of the host society; for instance, although bigamy is forbidden by law in the host country, some men are married but nevertheless have a lover. A consequence of such discrepancies could be disappointment with and rejection of the normative constitution of the host community.

Value priorities and hierarchies form core pillars for the establishment of personality and identity. The migrants' personalities and identities, developed through the shared cultural traditions, norms, and rites of their home country, are strongly challenged by the host society. As newcomers, migrants depend on others not only with respect to appropriate (viable) behaviours, but also with regard to understanding the rules to apply and the laws to comply with and what types of sanctions non-compliance will carry. Such dependence is comparable to the level of heteronomous morality in the sense of Piaget (1932) attributed to children aged between five and nine years. In order to strengthen the established identity, an equilibrium within the structure of the personal self is required. To cope with this, individuals may enter the staircase of terrorism. On the other hand, education that promotes an adaptive interpretation, a change, and/or acceptance of other value priorities and hierarchies is assumed to be a strategy for avoiding this undesirable path.

#### **2.2** *Integration*

What are the competences and values aimed at? This depends on the concept one has of how immigrants can live in the host society. Instead of 'assuming that there is an inevitable process of cultural and psychological homogenization', our view is to accept 'that diversity is a fact of contemporary life' (Berry & Sam, 2013, p. 151). The general idea is that each group should be entitled to practice its own culture in their *intragroup* interactions, while interactions *between* the groups should follow the principles of the dominant culture, with the latter understanding and acknowledging the needs and principles of the members of the non-dominant group and tolerating such behaviour as much as possible. One must mention here that tolerance is an expression of a power relationship because only the powerful person or group can be tolerant. Powerless people or groups such as members of the non-dominant culture do not have the freedom to tolerate—or not to tolerate—the behaviours or culture of members of the powerful groups.

We propose a normative framework of three levels which express our ideal, with the first one having priority over the second one and the second one over the third:


occur, the possibility of civil disobedience is explicitly acknowledged: If a law does not comply with human rights, it is deemed acceptable that the person affected should break it but while obeying the specific conditions of non-violence, appropriateness, transparency, and acceptance of legal sanctions if these are not excessive. Democratic attempts to change the law should, of course, also be considered, but the power of the nondominant group in this regard is limited (Banks, 2017).

3. *The principle of different spheres*: As Berry (1997, p. 12) says, 'there can … be variation according to one's location: in more private spheres or domains (such as the home, the extended family, the ethnic community), more cultural maintenance may be sought than in more public spheres (such as the workplace or in politics)'. This permits integration without surrendering the original culture. Such an approach requires that the respective people recognize when a sphere is 'private' with 'cultural maintenance' (in Berry's terminology), and when it is 'public'. Individuals must master the respective culture-specific practices, i.e. they 'must possess sufficient knowledge and awareness of the norms and values of a foreign culture' (Molinsky, 2010, p. 724). Furthermore, individuals must be able to switch from one cultural practice to another when moving from one sphere to another without feeling threatened in their identity and authenticity (Molinsky, 2007, 2010). In the public sphere, each participant is expected to have an understanding of the other participants' culture-specific perspective and the possible limits of adaptation to the principles of the other culture. Since the different spheres can also be interpreted as *situations* (as Molinsky does), one can finally refer to the theory of situation specificity (Patry, 2019).

These are normative demands which require the individuals involved to decide and justify their decisions and to act accordingly. According to these principles, any cultural practice in agreement with points 1 and 2 is acceptable in the private sphere. The critical situations occur in the public sphere when the cultural requirements of the two cultures clash. Human dignity and the law need to be observed in this sphere as well, and by all partners. Compliance with the dignity principle in particular manifests itself in the way in which individuals interact with each other: encounters must be governed by mutual esteem and respect (Tausch & Tausch, 1998). This holds also for small gestures, including routine decisions within daily life. An example of such a decision would be whether to shake hands when greeting each other; in order to act respectfully, knowledge about the respective other culture is necessary. In addition, external influences can also impact these decisions, as illustrated by the 2020 coronavirus crisis which significantly altered established greeting practices.

The application of these principles may require balancing the pros and cons; for instance, judging whether an action is exaggerated with respect to some principles is a judgement call that requires weighing up the circumstances. Therefore, balanced decision-making skills also need to be fostered. In any case, the weighing of pros and cons and responsibility for the ultimate decision rests with individuals, who are also responsible for their actions. In interpersonal situations, particularly in the public sphere, problems may arise whose solution is not evident from the principles of the priority of human dignity and the priority of law. In such cases, an appropriate problem-solving strategy must be used. Two approaches can be mentioned here, namely negotiating values based on justification (moral judgement; see Kohlberg, 1984) and the Gordon communication model (the 'no-lose' method, see Adams, 2017).

As the principles of primacy of Human Rights, of the primacy of law, and of the different spheres are normative, they do not imply that people actually follow the respective rules to the letter; instead, these demands describe a target situation, and education is designed to facilitate the application of and compliance with these rules. We assume that complying with them will obstruct individuals' progress towards the staircase of terrorism mentioned at the beginning of this chapter because compliance will promote mutual understanding. For individuals to follow these principles from values to action, the following steps are required: (a) individuals must identify the values system which underpins their action decisions; (b) they must acquire the competencies required to execute the decisions; and (c) they must execute the decided actions in concrete situations. The Values *and* Knowledge Education (V*a*KE) intervention programme is designed to address these issues.

#### **2.3** *Competences for Integration*

Education and training address dispositions, i.e. tendencies to behave in a certain way. This is particularly difficult if situation specificity is the goal (Patry, 2019), as is necessary for integration in the different spheres. One of the most important dispositions refers to competences, i.e. what a person is *able* to do. This does not mean that the person actually performs the competence all the time, but rather that the competence can be activated when necessary (Mischel & Shoda, 1995); and this, in turn, permits situation-specific behaviour. Hence, as a first strategy, we will explore the concepts of competence that are important for migrants.

The key competences for lifelong learning as defined by the European Union provide a good framework. They are based on the combination of knowledge, skills, and attitudes. They are developed through formal, non-formal, and informal learning and in different environments (European Commission, 2018, p. 5). Their application includes responsibility and autonomy as criteria for quality assurance (European Commission, 2018, p. 18). The development of competences is not limited to the period of formal education that occurs for children and adolescents mostly between the ages of six and eighteen years. Rather, the concept encompasses the entire lifetime of a person, as manifested in the terms 'lifelong education' and 'lifelong learning'.

A further approach borrows from concepts of empowerment and resilience. Both address individuals as well as groups and organizations. *Empowerment approaches* differentiate between value orientation and theory, which includes processes and outcomes (Zimmerman, 2000). This concept is characterized by several features that are in contrast with traditional approaches. To begin with, it goes 'beyond ameliorating the negative aspects of a situation by searching for those that are positive' (Zimmerman, 2000, p. 44). Additionally, it focuses on enhancing wellness instead of fixing problems; on identifying strengths instead of risk factors; on searching for environmental influences instead of blaming victims; on coping with stress; on adapting to change and influencing communities; and on redefining professionals' roles as collaborators and facilitators rather than as experts and counsellors (Zimmerman, 2000, p. 44). Related competences at individual levels are decision-making skills and working with others. The outcomes are a sense of control, critical awareness, and participatory behaviours (Zimmerman, 2000, p. 47). Lord and Hutchison introduce five elements to describe the personal empowerment process in more detail: experiences of powerlessness, gaining awareness, learning new roles, initiating participation, and contributing. Training programmes following this process result in increased levels of personal control, self-efficacy, and the attribution of personal success to the interdependence of the self and the community (Lord & Hutchison, 1993, p. 18).

*Resilience* is defined as 'anticipation-, resistance-, and absorption-related actions … prior to the occurrence of an adverse event, whereas response, adaption, and recovery occur afterwards' (Carlson et al., 2012, p. 17). The theoretical and practical relevance of resilience for social work and development is increasing (van Breda, 2018). Measures for supporting and accompanying migrants in their efforts towards integration can be classified as social work.

In agreement with Berry's concept of integration (2005, 2008), Dai and Chen (2020) formulate six assumptions regarding cultural integration competence which we have adapted to our specific conditions as follows:


Based on their assumptions, Dai and Chen formulate a model of dimensions and components of cultural integration competence; we have added some issues to fit our specific conditions (Table 10.1; our addenda are shown in italics).

Our adaptations to the model are as follows.

*Tolerance for ambiguity* (1.1): This is a specific issue within open-mindedness. Individuals must be able to accept that for any given circumstance there may


Table 10.1 Dimensions and components of cultural integration competence

a Items in italics represent the components that we added to the model. Source: Based on Dai and Chen (2020)

be different outcomes or interpretations, particularly with respect to values; in particular, they must accept that other people may have a different culture this is a means (among others) for preventing individuals from engaging in the staircase of terrorism.

*Language competence* (2.5): A primary condition for intercultural exchange is a language that is mutually understood. Members of the host society can reasonably expect that migrants should learn their language for use in the public sphere, even if they continue to speak their own language in their private spheres.

*Moral competence* (2.6): 'Moral ability is a regulating factor that influences the development of intercultural competence, and the bigger the cultural gap, the more important the moral ability is in intercultural interaction' (Dai & Chen, 2020, p. 20). From the prescriptive standpoint that we take in this chapter, there are principles such as human rights that must be accepted under any circumstances. Beyond such values, the concept of moral competence refers to the justification of values (moral judgement; see Kohlberg, 1984) and the appropriate patterns of argumentation for or against specific value decisions (stages of moral judgement, see Kohlberg, 1984). Moral competence also permits the balancing of cases of conflicting values.

*Situation-specific behaviour* (3.5): People must be able to adapt their behaviours as a function of their environment (Molinsky, 2010; this is a prerequisite for satisfying Berry's (1997) principle of different spheres). A pertinent theory is available (Patry, 2019), but it has not yet been applied to this specific topic.

*Empowerment* (4.5) and *resilience* (4.6) were discussed above. They are a synthesis of the previous components and dimensions.

Principles, topics, and contents related to citizenship and democracy have to be analysed in terms of whether and how they contribute to a corresponding development. Competence is seen here as the potential for the autonomous, responsible, and flexible application of knowledge using skills and attitudes on a practicable level of ability. Ability is a precondition for doing something. Attitude is a mental concept for the assessment of a situation based on developed concepts of self and identity, personal priorities, and a hierarchy of ethical values.

The term 'competences for integration' refers to the competences required to find a balance between the cultural disposition of the home and host societies, and, more specifically, the competences required to decide whilst moving in the public sphere which aspects to take from the host society and which aspects to reject, and what *reasons* underlie the decision.

Focusing on the needs of migrants at the start of their integration process, several competences can be highlighted as being supportive of these needs: orientation competences, and the competences to speak and communicate, to involve and act, to cope, to learn, to adapt and change, to assess, and to empower oneself. The most important competence is internal integration, i.e. the ability to reconcile the three personal dimensions of integration (the cognitive, the affective/emotional, and the physical dimension), which do not proceed simultaneously and congruently, and to bring about a conclusion to the process of moving from emigration to immigration, i.e. to precipitate the moment of 'arriving'.

#### **3 Using Values** *and* **Knowledge Education (V***a***KE) to Increase Integration Competence**

We assume that V*a*KE is a method which has the potential to foster the people's integration competence according to the normative framework set out previously. In this section, we will present the main issues of V*a*KE without, however, claiming to provide a full and exhaustive description. We will present two studies using V*a*KE with migrants that show that the intervention can address at least some of the issues of integration competence.

#### **3.1** *Values and Knowledge Education (V***a***KE)*

The teaching-learning method Values *and* Knowledge Education (V*a*KE; Weyringer et al., 2022b) is a constructivist approach that combines values education and knowledge acquisition, whereby knowledge and values are related to each other. The process starts with the discussion of a moral dilemma in the tradition of Blatt and Kohlberg (1975). However, in contrast to this tradition, the dilemma is conceived in such a way that it requires some factual knowledge or triggers questions to gain such factual knowledge. In this way, the dilemma promotes enquiry-based learning, whereby students look for answers to their questions. They can then continue their dilemma discussions on a higher level. A short description of this method is available in a YouTube video produced by Cohenian et al. (2017), while a more detailed description can be found in Christodoulou and Georgiadou (2020).

V*a*KE was developed at the beginning of the twenty-first century and has been studied in different contexts since then. The main results can be summarized as follows: Participants acquire at least as much (and often much more) knowledge as students from control groups with traditional teaching; they develop their moral judgement competence as defined by Kohlberg (1984); they are highly motivated; and their discussions often lead to actions in agreement with the decisions taken.

The prototypical V*a*KE procedure is a sequence of eleven steps. Some variations have also been formulated, including V*a*KE-*dis* (V*a*KE-*differentiated,*  *individualized, and specified*), which includes specific reflection steps (Weyringer, 2008). The two research studies discussed in this chapter used V*a*KE*-dis.*

#### **3.2** *Using V***a***KE with Migrants*

We have used V*a*KE in two research studies with migrants: one with unaccompanied male minors (Patry et al., 2016) and one with female Muslim refugees (Weyringer et al., 2018). In both studies, the standard V*a*KE-*dis* process had to be adapted to comply with the needs of the participants. In particular, participants had to get accustomed to the open teaching principles with which they had not previously been not familiar.

The first study (Study 1) was completed with ten males unaccompanied adolescents between sixteen and seventeen years of age hailing from Muslim countries who had come to Austria in 2015 with little to medium knowledge of the German language (Patry et al., 2016). The integration competence addressed here was understanding and supporting democratic principles, including adhering to democratic values and knowing about and getting a positive attitude towards democracy.

All participants came from countries with authoritarian regimes and no democratic tradition; we hypothesized that despite this lack of experience, the participants could acquire democratic competence through V*a*KE, i.e. not through instruction but through co-construction with the combination of values and knowledge education, and that they would tend towards a democratic form of government.

The dilemma story described a science fiction situation: 100 people are sent to a fictive planet, Wahinu, to start a new life. All of them are different; they are unfamiliar with the environmental conditions; there are no rules and laws, which leads to chaos. The people want to establish a system of government. Two options are given. Either one person (the 'king') sets the rules and laws and decides what is right and wrong on everyone else's behalf; or everyone does this together based on joint decisions. Which option should the people choose, and why?

The V*a*KE process was scheduled for three half-days, running from 10.30 a.m. to 1 p.m.; in agreement with the principles of V*a*KE, the process was conceived flexibly so that the workshop leader could adapt to the specific needs that arose in the course of the workshop. In particular, at the participants' request, an additional half-day was added. The eventual process can be summarized as follows:

– On the first half-day, following mutual introductions, the dilemma story was read and participants were shown the pictures. The facilitators ensured that the participants understood the story and asked how the participants had experienced the process so far (reflection phase 1). Following initial individual decisions regarding the preferred type of government, the participants engaged in a first dilemma discussion. Then they were asked to find arguments in support of the position they had *not* defended (change of perspective).


The process was guided in small steps and constantly adapted in light of specific experiences. Many different learning materials were used, such as pictures, specific forms of social interaction (including a repetition of the statements by other people in German and their translations into English and the respective mother language), visualization of achievements in posters, etc.

The aim of the study was to gather as much information as possible about (1) the practicability of V*a*KE under the given circumstances and (2) about the impact on the participants. Since V*a*KE was conceived flexibly, it was not possible to anticipate assessment instruments; instead, participating observation was practiced based on predefined observation goals, and the outputs produced during the process were collected. The observation goals were whether the respective steps of the process could be implemented properly and whether they achieved their aims. In general, the observations showed that indeed the implementation was successful and that the intervention aims were achieved. Below, a selection of these results is presented.

In the reflection phases, the participants stated that they experienced the workshop as very interesting; in reflection phase 3, they said that knowledge acquisition had been difficult but manageable. All adolescents participated actively in all steps and dared to express their own opinions. The use of posters and flip charts in different steps was conducive for information exchange and concentration. Compared to the first day, there was a substantial improvement in the discussion with respect to (i) the quality of the arguments (justifications); (ii) oral fluency; (iii) the reaction to expressed opinions; (iv) self-confidence in expressing one's opinion; and (v) the quality of oral expression. It was striking how participants tried to justify their arguments. Their respective social position in the group played no role. The newly acquired knowledge about discussion and argumentation was immediately implemented, as was the researched information about democracy. There were some problems with language, but the participants improved during the process.

In the end, all participants opted for a democratic government on the planet of Wahinu with a cabinet of two or three persons to be renewed every five months, with divided power and mutual control. They spontaneously decided to hold an election among themselves complete with a presentation of election manifestos, ballot papers, and a ballot box, and two participants were elected into the Wahinu cabinet. This means that the participants deliberately chose to turn their decision into action.

The second study (Study 2) involved female Muslim refugees (Weyringer et al., 2018) and was initiated and supported by the Austrian Integration Fonds (Österreichischer Integrationsfonds). A total of ninety-five women from seven different Muslim countries of origin participated in eleven workshops in groups of between four and sixteen participants. Each of the workshops lasted three half-days, with the third session taking place about two weeks after the second. Most workshops were conducted in Arabic, and some in Dari/Farsi. Each workshop was led by a female leader with the help of an interpreter.

The procedure was based on the V*a*KE-*dis* programme but contained additional elements to comply with the needs of the participants. The key elements of the workshops are given in Table 10.2. The concrete implementation of the elements differed from group to group since the workshop leaders took up propositions of the participants or decided on their own what fitted the group best. A more detailed account of the procedure can be found in Weyringer et al. (2018) and Patry et al. (2019).

A lot of time had to be invested in interactions in order to build trust and define individuals' positions by discussing what it means to be a woman in the home and host countries, what the participants' needs are, and the future perspective.

On the second day, it was possible to commence the dilemma discussion based on an example scenario as follows (different dilemmas were used in different workshops):

Mrs Sanar has the opportunity to get a job. She is very interested in taking it. Her future boss says that she has to give up her headscarf (*hijab*) to get the job.


Table 10.2 Key elements of V*a*KE-dis workshops in Study 2

a AT = Austria

b HC = home country

Source: From Patry et al. (2019, p. 197, adapted with permission)

The participants did not expect the non-directive nature of the V*a*KE approach, and the steps had to be explained. A central issue on the second day was that the women had to formulate the behaviour goals (resolutions) which they wanted to achieve during the following two weeks, and they were instructed in how to complete a notebook charting their achievements on a daily basis. In some of the courses, participants were sent text messages to remind them to take notes in their notebooks; in others this was not possible.

The experiences of implementing the resolutions were discussed on the third day, then the V*a*KE process was continued until a final common synthesis was achieved. The format was decided by the women (e.g. role plays). Finally, the women discussed their futures with respect to integration and completed an evaluation questionnaire.

The following assessment tools were used:


Since the processes in the different workshops differed considerably while still being in agreement with the principles of V*a*KE, the assessments of individual and group tasks (c and d) differed considerably. Analyses were quantitative (a: frequencies and means; b: types of behaviours, judgements) and qualitative (b: content; c, d); the assessments e to h were used as background to understand the meaning of the material. In the next section, only selected and prototypical results will be presented.

#### **4 Selected Results**

The integration framework presented above is too complex to be tested within two simple studies. Given the heterogeneity of the workshops, it is impossible to give a representative summary of the results in the context of this chapter. In particular, due to the shortness of the two studies, we cannot make firm statements regarding the sustainability of the observed outcomes. However, we can offer some indications about the (presumed) impact of V*a*KE with respect to integration competence.

In Study 1, the participants were even more motivated than expected, as was demonstrated by the fact that they requested an extension of the programme. They developed their value concepts and their justification around democratic decision structures and learned corresponding discussion and argumentation rules. They were able to coordinate their interaction (integration competence 3.2, see Table 10.1) and negotiate meaning (integration competence 3.3), developed a common ground (integration competence 4.1), and improved mutual understanding (integration competence 4.2; this was particularly visible in the election held at the end of the procedure that occurred with the full agreement even of those who were not elected). They also supported situation specificity (integration competence 3.5) as they assumed that the inhabitants elected to the cabinet would govern for five months and then step back to the role of a regular member of the society.

In Study 2 (Weyringer et al., 2018, 2022a) after some initial scepticism, the women were very interested. Following some hesitation, they engaged keenly in the discussion, and their evaluations showed that they were highly motivated and would recommend the workshops to other women. The reports by the workshop leaders confirmed this outcome.

Because of language problems, only a few language-based instruments could be used for assessment. In particular, the evaluation questionnaire and the behaviour diaries were collected from all participants, and in some of the phases and workshops (see Table 10.2), the groups wrote some posters. We can offer some anecdotal results with respect to the issues discussed above; further results can be found in Weyringer et al. (2018, 2022a) and in Patry et al. (2019).

The women could clearly distinguish between the culture in their home countries and in the host country. This is visible both in the posters (e.g. about positive and negative aspects of the two cultures—see Figure 10.1—and a typical woman in the two cultures, see Figure 10.2) and in their pictures (Figure 10.3). They perceived positive and negative issues in both countries, and they did not perceive their home country as homogeneous; instead, they could clearly differentiate between profession, housewife, and party (see left-hand side of Figure 10.3). Obviously, the participants were able to differentiate the cultural spheres as defined by Berry (1997), but they also distinguished further between different situations within each of the spheres (integration competence 3.5., see Table 10.1). One can also interpret these posters and pictures as an expression of an acquired understanding of the host country (integration competence 4.2) and a multicultural perspective (integration competence 2.4); the women did not seem to have problems with ambiguity (integration competence 1.1), and the positive and negative aspects identified in Figure 10.1 indicate that they had a critical cultural awareness (integration competence 2.2).


Figure 10.1 Sample poster: positive and negative aspects of the home and host country. (Poster translated from German by the authors)


Figure 10.2 Sample poster: being a woman in the home country and in the host country. (Poster translated from German by the authors)

Figure 10.3 Drawings from two participants about women in their home country and in Austria. Left-hand picture = home country; teacher, housewife, having a party. Right-hand picture = Austria (from Patry et al., 2019, p. 199, reprinted with permission)

Regarding behavioural resolutions, according to their diaries, 60 of the 92 women formulated concrete behavioural goals. The main reason for not making a resolution was language problems. Among those who made resolutions, most aimed at improving their German language competence (60%). Further aims mentioned repeatedly were social contacts and social integration (10%) and acquiring a profession or a job (7%). Most of the resolutions mentioned only once were specific to the person's situation, such as finding a new apartment, improving their time management, or improving their education skills. This indicates clearly that the participants aimed to integrate themselves into their host country, a goal for which language competence is a primary condition (integration competence 2.5, see Table 10.1).

In the final evaluation, the women were asked, among other things, what they had learned and what they wanted to implement. The results are given in Table 10.3. Only 78 women answered the first question, and 50 answered the second question. Failure to respond was mainly due to language problems. One can see that the women learned many competences linked with integration competence. As V*a*KE does not aim at specific categories per se but devolves responsibility for determining the content of learning to the programme participants, the heterogeneity of the learned competences mentioned in Table 10.3 is not surprising.

About half of the women mentioned that they gained knowledge about issues related to human rights. Many of the other competences learned correspond to the components addressed in Table 10.1, including behavioural abilities like problem solving. The goals to be implemented, although answered by fewer women, emphasize integration-related activities, followed by learning German (the host country language) being the most prominent goal, as well as behavioural goals like problem solving and researching information.


Table 10.3 Answers provided by participants in Study 2 in response to the statement categories: 'This is what I have learned' and 'This is what I want to implement'

a These were open-ended questions and respondents were allowed to provide multiple answers.

b *n* = 78.

c *n* = 50.

Source: Weyringer et al. (2018, table 4, p. 18), translated with permission

#### **5 Conclusions**

The results of Study 1 as reported above can be attributed to the V*a*KE programme: The election procedure, for instance, was spontaneously initiated be the participants and would not have occurred without the V*a*KE course. In Study 2, however, the selected results cannot necessarily be attributed to the V*a*KE programme as the results were gathered during different phases of the workshops and there was no control group. The behaviour results, on the other hand, are clearly linked to the workshops. Similarly, it is clear that the behavioural resolutions were triggered by the workshops; it might be possible that the behavioural resolutions as such can be attributed to V*a*KE, but the choice of topics may have had other motivations.

The questionnaire in Study 2 was answered at the end of the workshops, and the results (Table 10.3) can be related at least to some degree to V*a*KE. Again, since there was no control group, there may also have been other reasons that we cannot capture here. In any case, these results clearly indicate that the participating women are motivated to integrate. The other results indicate that they are indeed able to distinguish the different spheres, as is required for our concept of integration.

Moral competence (integration competence 2.6 in Table 10.1) could not be assessed because of time constraints. However, it has been shown repeatedly that dilemma discussions such as used in the V*a*KE programmes foster moral competence (Schläfli et al., 1985; Lind, 2016); and Weinberger (2016) also shows this for V*a*KE in particular. We can assume, hence, that moral competence has indeed been fostered in the two studies.

In both studies, participants acquired knowledge about the host culture. While the participants in Study 2—female refugees—are not a group at particular risk of entering the staircase of terrorism as discussed in the first section, we can assume that they do exert an influence within their cultural communities that may be leveraged to hinder other people in engaging in the staircase. On the other hand, the male adolescents in Study 1 can clearly be considered as being at risk of this unfavourable personal development. While there is no certitude that using V*a*KE can prevent them from doing so, the fact that the V*a*KE programme was embraced by these young men with much interest and that it was implemented without excessive difficulty gives reason for the optimistic assessment that V*a*KE can be successfully implemented and that the programme can have a positive influence in preventing individuals from ascending the staircase of terrorism. The results of Study 1 would further seem to support this assumption. We hope that it will be possible to use the V*a*KE programme for further intervention, both for the benefit of the participants and to gain more experience and evidence with this method.

#### **Acknowledgements**

The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support given by the Österreichischer Integrationsfonds. The support for the production of Study 2 as referenced in this chapter does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Österreichischer Integrationsfonds cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

#### **References**


### **Learning Civic Attitudes through Intergenerational Cooperation with ICT Tools**

*Promising Practices from Local Communities*

*Joanna Leek and Marcin Rojek*

#### **Abstract**

The idea of this paper comes from community-based projects under the Erasmus+ programme which brought together immigrant young people and unrelated older adults for ICT courses. In this chapter, we first describe ways in which educational activities using information and communication technologies (ICT) in out-of-school local communities can promote civic attitudes, prevent radicalization and extremism, and have the potential to help assimilate immigrants into the local environment. Second, we present how ICT-based learning influences a common understanding, communication, a willingness to help each other, and the sharing of mutual concerns and passions. We claim that ICT within intergenerational learning can be perceived as a sociocultural construct and that it can facilitate mutual interactions and promote the building of subjectivity, self-determination, and an awareness of social and cultural potential. Activities that support ICT within intergenerational relations can provide opportunities for preventing destructive behaviours, accepting the binding patterns of civic activities, and developing lasting and far-reaching learning experiences. ICTbased intergenerational learning further helps participants build their status as citizens based on trust and cooperation.

#### **Keywords**

citizenship education – sociocultural learning – school and out-of-school activities in Europe – immigrants – ICT

#### **1 Introduction**

Immigration is the 'new normal' for many children and young around the world, and it is impossible for these children and young people to foresee all of the problems that may result from immigration. Being an immigrant is generally perceived as stressful. Taken out of their familiar environment of family, friends, and neighbours, and taken away from their predictable, everyday routines, young people experience doubts and feelings of helplessness, loneliness, and alienation. Immigration forces them to change their behaviours and ways of thinking in order to deal with their new living conditions, which, in turn, requires them to *learn*. However, this learning does not only take place in schools (which they are used to) but is closely intertwined with their everyday experiences in their new country. This results in behaviour and thought structures being developed in new social and cultural contexts. Therefore, both formal and non-formal education is required to support immigrant young people.

Schools and local communities are the settings in which many of the acculturative struggles of immigrant young people unfold, and these settings have traditionally served as the vehicles for the acclimatization of immigrants in Europe. Thus, local community and school activities that focus on developing civic values have the potential to help assimilate immigrants into the local environment. They can provide the opportunity to prevent destructive behaviours and intervene directly in the primary environment which shapes the immigrants' experience, providing lasting and far-reaching learning experiences. Isolation and frustration lead to different emotional disturbances and to behaviours that contradict generally accepted norms.

Two European projects that support citizenship education are relevant for this chapter: project EUCiTec, which was run in several schools in Poland, Cyprus, and the United Kingdom; and the ICT Guides project implemented in local communities in Gothenburg (Sweden), Madrid (Spain), Sheffield (United Kingdom), and Berlin (Germany).The results of these projects show that local communities can provide an avenue for engaging school students in activities that promote civic values by using information and communication technologies (ICT).

In this chapter, we will present how educational activities using ICT undertaken by local communities outside of the school context can promote attitudes that support learning with others, mutual understanding, and education for citizens. We claim that research on cultural issues in globalization and radicalization within social relations are crucial to understanding and explaining 'learning'. The advancing technological revolution, especially in the area of sociocultural communication, has produced new perspectives on public involvement and citizenship. In this sense, new learning communities and practices have appeared that can be perceived as a new way of participating in culture, classically understood as a

[…] patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour, acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action. (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 181)

In this new way, a new type of social and cultural interaction is created by ICT in the online environment. Learning with ICT tools promotes the building of subjectivity; self-determination; awareness of internal, social and cultural potential; and enables knowledge-sharing and the participation of various entities in their sociopolitical reality as it is broadly understood. For its participants, ICT-based learning makes it more likely that they will accept the binding patterns of civic activity in their society and that they will abide by the general rules for social behaviour. ICT-based learning further helps participants build their status as citizens and their sociocultural relationships based on trust and cooperation.

#### **2 Learning Civic Attitudes to Live Together in Society: The Sociocultural Perspective**

Society and culture shape the mind, they provide people with tools thanks to which they function efficiently in the world, but also create a concept of self and possibilities. Learning always are embedded in a cultural environment which constitutes its important context. It refers to formal learning but mostly to informal learning.

As Livingstone (1999, p. 51) points out, informal learning can be defined as 'any activity involving the pursuit of understanding, knowledge or skill which occurs outside the curricula of educational institutions, or the courses or workshops offered by educational or social agencies'. This kind of learning may not have specific learning objectives. Informal learning may occur at the initiative of the individual, but also happens as a by-product of organized activities, which may or may not have learning objectives. On the other hand, in formal learning, information is exchanged between teachers and learners. Informal learning takes place spontaneously in the course of various sociocultural activities, with knowledge being constructed through the human relationships embedded in the culture. In some cultures, the importance of learning in childhood and adolescence is emphasized as necessary for successful entry into adulthood and a satisfying life, while in other cultures, learning is considered important throughout life. Lifelong learning is characterized by the fact that it can happen anywhere, not just in schools, universities, or other educational institutions. If it occurs in public and cultural spaces, it happens more by choice than by coercion. Lifelong learning often takes place when permits, qualifications, and assessments are not needed.

The direct sources of modern thinking about learning can be found in the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, the field of psychology was seeing intensive development while fast-growing industry and new industrial theologies required educational solutions that could prepare young people and adults quickly for the new challenges arising on the job market (Lengrand, 1975). The search for new methods of learning included not only psychology, but also sociology, cultural studies, management, and anthropology.

At various times, different theories of learning in society and culture have been developed by Jean Piaget, Jerome Bruner, Benjamin Bloom, David Ausubel, and Howard Gardner. These theories are still important today for planning actual educational processes and inspiring further research. In relation to immigrant youths, they are linked with a phenomenon of early school leaving that has a social and cultural complexion. Early school leaving is a multi-faceted problem caused by a cumulative process of school or training disengagement. It starts at different levels educational path and has got individual, usually personal reasons. Young people leaving education and training prematurely usually are coming from socially disadvantaged backgrounds, from vulnerable groups, this includes young people with special needs, or with migration background. The risk of early school leaving is closely linked to the lower socioeconomic status of migrants, language barriers and their limited access to sufficient learning support. That is why migrants need to be offered educational opportunities which support prevention and intervention when school or training disengagement occurs. (Lubeck & Garrett, 1990, pp. 325– 340; Finn, 1989, pp. 135–142; Fagan & Pabon, 1990, pp. 306–354; Traag & van der Velden, 2011, pp. 56–62).

Constructivism, especially social constructivism, can be regarded as the genesis of these theories. Its founder, Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934), assumed that learning is a thought process taking place in relation with culture. Social relations, cultural norms, and values have a strong impact on learning and even intensify the process (Vygotsky, 1978, 1986). According to Vygotsky, the most important element in children's learning is the development of their learning skills, that is, the tools enabling the full use of their potential. A child's ability to think clearly and creatively, to plan, to implement plans, and to communicate are much more important than the factual knowledge itself. Just as technical tools extend our physical abilities, 'tools of the mind' expand our mental abilities, allowing us to solve problems and find solutions in the real world. This means that to be able to function successfully, children should learn to use their minds. They will then become responsible for their own learning, learning consciously and becoming sensitive to the social and cultural context in which they grow up or to new contexts. It also means that the society and culture in which the children grow up does, to some extent, determine their future learning and path through life.

This strong connection between learning and culture was also emphasized by Jerome Bruner. In his opinion, learning takes place in interactions with culture, which affect better understanding of cultural processes and their course (Bruner, 1963, 1973). Children's active participation in social and cultural practices is the main condition for discovery learning as a technique of enquiry-based learning and is considered to be a constructivist approach to education. The more a child treats learning as discovering (as opposed to simply memorizing), the more it will develop a tendency towards autonomous learning in the future.

Both Vygotsky and Bruner are representatives of the sociocultural approach to learning. According to these two psychologists, learning is not memorizing but critical reflection on one's own social position, interactions, and place in culture. Understood in this way, learning leads to social and cultural integration as well as active and creative participation in social and cultural practices.

A detailed exemplification of the sociocultural approach to learning is the concept of cosmopolitan learning developed by Rizvi (Rizvi, 2009, 2014; Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). It resonates strongly with immigrants and is worth recalling, especially regarding reasons for early school leaving. Referring to the sociocultural determinants of learning, Rizvi postulates that learning should draw on experiences formed at the intersection of ethnic and social origins and the interpersonal interactions taking place at the global level today. The result of such learning is a 'morally coherent fashion' (Rizvi, 2009, p. 258). In his opinion, 'if learning about global connectivity is to become cosmopolitan, then it must have the potential to help students come to terms with their situation in the world—the situation of their knowledge and cultural practices, as well as their positionality in relation to the social networks, political institutions and social relations that are no longer confined to particular communities and nations, but potentially connect up with the rest of the world' (p. 264). According to Rizvi, the movements driven by globalization on the one hand and by immigration on the other are not complete opposites but have many similarities, which can be explained as follows. With migration, the movement of people is often permanent. Migrants leave one place in search of another and are often forced to assimilate into their new cultural milieu. With globalization, many people are constantly on the move while others are joining communities—now typical of many parts of the globe—that have already become linguistically and culturally heterogeneous. Such a dynamic cultural context has given rise to so-called third cultures in which stories of movement are best told under the auspices of hybridity and cultural melange rather than cultural adaptation. Hybridization differs from the earlier modernist requirement of assimilation because its cultural politics do not have a cultural 'centre of gravity' (Rizvi, 2014, p. 115).

Rizvi underscores the importance of recognizing that the globalization of the political, economic, and cultural arenas has a strong impact on how immigrants relate to the world on a daily basis. As a consequence, new rules for responding to the exertion of influence within political, economic, and cultural dimensions have arisen. Therefore, learning needs to become more cosmopolitan to enable immigrants to enter new modes of thinking. Learning can foster personality traits such as criticality, critical and independent thinking, and creativity. Immigrant learners are permanently confronted by the social and cultural conditions of their new places of residence. Moreover, a deeper approach to learning can enable the development of a personal understanding that can encourage the development of qualities in their ways of thinking. With regard to the theoretical framework outlined above, the general conclusions for preventing immigrants from leaving school before completing their education can be summarized as follows:


which they live as well as by agents of socialization. Therefore, the connections between learners and their culture are important. Culture offers people specific development opportunities (aside from other opportunities) that are available to communities participating in different cultures and in other interpersonal relations. Framing this assumption around the issue of reasons for immigrants' early school-leaving and how to prevent it suggests the hypothesis that if education was not perceived as a positive value in the society or culture in which immigrants grew up, they will continue to perceive it negatively. Attitudes to education can, however, be changed through learning in a new society and culture consisting of relatively stable and inherited traditions, norms, patterns of behaviour, and material possessions.


#### **3 ICT as a Sociocultural Construct**

The role of ICT in education is becoming increasingly important and well recognized, which is evidenced by multiple research projects and scientific studies. Online worlds have quickly gained in popularity with children and young people, have become part of popular culture, and can be considered a sociocultural construct. Online platforms allow people to communicate and provide them with information and resources. However, apart from functioning as a communications channel, they are a social space in which people meet and form communities (e.g. chat, ICQ, Skype, WhatsApp, Viber, LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter messenger, MOOC, Cloud, LMS, webinars, Educasting podcasting, forums, virtual classrooms*,* online games, etc.). The development of ICT and virtual, online spaces has significantly transformed the ways in which we use and interact with cultural works. Technical capabilities enabling the fast transfer of data and the idea of free access to information and sociocultural resources has made the internet a place of social relationships and cultural participation. Moreover, according to outstanding internet expert Marc Prensky (2001, pp. 3–6), participation in virtual worlds proportionately increases the learning skills of the younger generations. It stimulates innovation, creativity, and originality. Long-term use of online social spaces has social, cultural, and educational value. ICT and virtual spaces democratize access to knowledge, social relationships, and cultural values. Online worlds are a place in which young immigrants who have found themselves in a new, different culture, can come together and in which they spend time frequently. They are forced to unlearn and learn all over again, and this can be a particularly unpleasant feeling. In a foreign country, they are in some sense regressing in their personal development back to childhood and to a child's mental state and have to learn the simplest things all over again. If they can, many migrants avoid this unpleasant confrontation with their new reality, seeking asylum in cyberspace. There, everyone is knowledgeable and can learn and teach others, and everyone potentially has full access to modern open knowledge resources. This openness changes many of the traditional patterns of social and cultural relationships in which the hierarchical, conventionalized social contacts associated with assigned social roles and specific places in the social and cultural structure cease to count. Online, knowledge is not usually transmitted only one way but is negotiated and constituted socially. There is a certain interchangeability between the student and teacher roles in which young people learn to act responsibly, which is characteristic of teachers—and teachers can look at the world from the student's perspective. ICT tools are conducive to the development of creativity and creative inventiveness, which are qualities required today for the independent shaping of one's life, self-fulfilment, and learning. Modern times require people who perceive new challenges as a chance for success, who can accept and introduce changes, and who are capable of original ideas and bold projects. These kinds of people are important to help prevent immigrants from leaving school too soon. This is because with the use of ICT tools, immigrants can establish contacts and even long-lasting relationships with members of other groups in their host country and participate in its society and culture while also maintaining part of their own cultural identity. ICT tools allow them to build social relationships and function better as individuals or groups in their new sociocultural environment. ICT tools also allow them to learn the language and build cultural competences in their new country. Integration—with the exception of certain knowledge, skills, and competences—is primarily the quest to become a part of society.

#### **4 An Example of ICT-Based Citizenship Education: The** *Inspiring European Citizenship through Educational Technology* **Project**

The modern world is confronted with a huge number of threats with potentially catastrophic consequences on a continental scale. None of the threats is a new phenomenon, but their accumulation and scale of intensity in recent years have increased mainly due to globalization and technological development. There are many reasons for this and they form a complex set of issues and problems that the search for solutions is extremely difficult. However one tendency is expressive: formal and informal education has been recognized as an effective and feasible tool for counteracting terrorism and protecting against it. Preparing society to properly behave and respond to terrorist threats has become a priority of education in many European countries and USA.

Preventing radicalization should be at the centre of educational activities both in and out of the school environment for two reasons: first, because radicalization is a destructive process, and second, because it takes various forms and is sometimes confused with other unfavourable processes.

Therefore, education has a special role to play in development of citizenship. Moreover, research results on the challenges of societies in the twenty-first century shows that the health and stability of European democracies does not depend on good governance of the state as much as on development of the values of their citizens (Sas et al., 2020; Schuurman & Taylor, 2018; Youngman, 2018; European Commission, 1998;). In the opinion of Sas et al. (2020, p. 1),

Research has shown that radicalized individuals are not uneducated, but have often completed secondary or tertiary education. Additionally, it became clear that some extremist groups consider the school environment as an attractive recruitment place. These findings led to a new approach where the education sector is considered as a prominent partner in preventing and combating the radicalization of young individuals.

In the context of citizenship education, the need for a sense of responsibility, solidarity, and tolerance towards the common good of humanity as a whole is emphasized. Citizenship in this sense is a competence that should be developed in schools and beyond: in families, peer groups, and in the neighbourhood.

Citizenship, according to Antal (2008), has functioned as a tool of legitimization and as a way of excluding and discriminating against different groups such as ethnic, religious, and cultural minorities. For Enslin (2000), citizenship confers membership, identity, values, and rights of participation. Concepts of the education of citizens have been defined in different ways, but as Hoskins (2006) or Nelson and Kerr (2006) emphasize, despite the differences in approaches to citizenship concepts, the core definition of citizenship includes participation in civil community life and engagement in issues of concern to citizens.

In the context of education for citizens, the term 'active digital citizenship' is used. To Hoskins (2006), active citizens participate in community life and values, political life, and civil society, and the term 'active engagement' in the context of citizenship encompasses a range of actions such as voting, protesting, and participating in the everyday life of the community. Recently, digital citizenship has become the focus of research. Studies on this topic emphasize the need for education in responsible citizenship (Berson & Berson, 2004). The multidimensional concept of digital citizenship assumes technical skills, local and global awareness, networking agency, internet political activism, and critical perspective (Choi, 2016). Another important aspect of digital citizenship is working with others, which is directly associated with a person's proficiency with ICT tools (Aesaert et al., 2015; Livingstone & Helsper, 2009).

For several years now, the European Commission has run different initiatives to promote youth actions in support of social cohesion and the promotion of equality and mutual understanding. Prevention of the radicalization of young people is also now of growing concern in Europe and beyond in both formal and informal transnational projects. One example of European transnational cooperation that takes a holistic approach to the promotion of social cohesion through citizenship education is the three-year (2017–2020) *Inspiring European Citizenship through Educational Technology* (EUCiTec) project, developed by higher education institutions (HEI s) and schools from Poland, Cyprus, and the United Kingdom (project number 2017-1-UK01-KA201-036710). The project uses the idea of virtual reality and online tools supporting civic education in schools. For Dioniso (2013), virtual realities, also called virtual worlds, are 'computer-generated simulations of three-dimensional objects or environments with seemingly real, direct, or physical user interaction' (p. 38). The distinctive features of virtual realities are imagination, immersion, and interaction (Burdea & Coiffet, 2003): users can explore structures that only exist online to practice or experience certain tasks and activities.

According to the definition by Sherman and Craig (2003), virtual realities are a medium composed of interactive computer simulations. Students using such media are users, or participants, that simulate actions to gain a feeling of being mentally immersed in the simulation or virtual world. The idea and the benefits of virtual realities have been recognized by the military, architects, and doctors, among others. With the EUCiTec project, they are now also being explored as part of citizenship education in schools. The project's main objective was the development of an imaginative digital learning tool kit for primary and secondary school teachers and teacher educators at HEI s in England, Cyprus, and Poland to support them in assessing their current abilities to use ICT (virtual worlds) to teach citizenship. A virtual world is an interactive program that enables and enhances the engagement of young people in the collaborative exploration of identity, culture, religion, and social and ethical values in ways that promote citizenship values and skills. The basic assumption of the EUCiTec project is that through the use of virtual interactive spaces, teachers, teacher educators, and young people can identify shared, underlying moral, ethical, cultural, and religious social perspectives and values that support their civic education in the school environment. The application can be used by teachers in their curricular activities and includes workshop ideas for students of different age groups, a tool kit, and guidance materials developed within this project. It can support teachers in their use of virtual and online spaces during curricular and extracurricular activities. The virtual world program covers different topics within the area of citizenship education, such as human rights, intercultural communication, and individual and community responsibilities, and has been designed in line with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's guidelines for global citizenship education in the twenty-first century (2004). All of the materials were free to use after logging in and easy to adapt to students' needs.

Project implementation and effects were evaluated using a quantitative approach (Clarke et al., 2013). The aim was to estimate to what extent educational practices and innovative digital resources developed in the project allow young people to explore, develop, and practice citizenship in a safe environment representing real-world contexts that deal with issues of direct relevance to them, their lives, and their growth as citizens in a pluralistic democracy. Our study has a diagnostic nature focused on the description of the values and features of dependent and independent variables, and the results obtained are the basis for formulating judgments about the presence or absence of relationships between variables. The main findings indicate that virtual environment of citizenship learning meets the needs of youth to use online tools in curricular activities in school environment. These learning opportunities with ICT tools have become a compelling activity for youth, particular those with language difficulties (i.e. with specific language impairment or language difficulties that relate to immigrants' backgrounds). Such programs prove previous findings on youth in digital environment, that they are 'Digital Natives' (Prensky, 2001), 'the Net Generation' (Tapscott, 2008), and 'Millennials' (Howe et al., 2009) and want to use virtual learning opportunities in school education, more often than it is present in curricular activities.

**5 The** *ICT Guides* **Project: An Example of Intergenerational Learning Using ICT to Reduce Early School Leaving and Develop Responsible Citizenship**

Another project conducted in Europe that supports sociocultural learning using digital technologies is the ICT Guides project (see Leek & Rojek, 2019, 2020, for a previous publication of this section, including more detailed findings from the ICT Guides project). Compared to the EUCiTec project, the ICT Guides project supports civic education in out-of-school environments using the concept of intergenerational learning with digital tools, such as tablets and mobile phones. The idea of running the project in Gothenburg (Sweden), Madrid (Spain), Sheffield (United Kingdom), and Berlin (Germany) was influenced by the high percentage of young people, especially immigrant young people, at risk of early school leaving (ESL) in these cities. In addition, these cities also feature a high percentage of older immigrants who are perceived as being at risk of social exclusion because of their age. The main aim of the project was to help young immigrants to acclimatize to their new homes and to develop their sense of citizenship by helping them run a series of ICT courses for older people on how to use their mobile devices. Accompanying the courses was a research study on the challenges in supporting young immigrants through intergenerational learning in order to increase their success at school.

The ICT Guides project was conducted in 2017 and 2018 as a set of ten ICT courses bringing together immigrant young people and native adults in the four participating cities. It sought to answer the following question: how can ICT tools and intergenerational learning facilitate a mutual understanding between newly arrived immigrant young people and older, native adults so that they can live together in one society? To answer this question, a mixed research approach was adopted, with qualitative and quantitative research being conducted simultaneously. In our understanding, the social world is not empirically measurable and society is not simply the sum of its individuals. Therefore, intergenerational learning can be understood and explained as a phenomenon embedded in culture, which is the exonormative matrix of the behaviour of individuals and groups. Based on this assumption, the main concept of the ICT Guides project was to use our understanding of intergenerational learning in relation to culture and to encourage immigrant young people to develop and conduct digital courses for unrelated older adults. The research concept included baseline (before the courses started) and endline (after courses finished) qualitative questionnaires. In choosing this approach with two questionnaires we applied a process perspective (expectations towards the course and experiences after the course) to study in-depth intergenerational learning efforts that immigrant young people and unrelated older adults employ when participating in an online course.

The project showed that ICT tools are very useful and indeed necessary during the first few months of school education in a new country or in a new social environment when young people are facing new challenges. They allow immigrant pupils to keep in touch with their families and friends and to adjust to their new realities. During the courses, the use of ICT tools in intergenerational classes reduced social and personal barriers between young people and older people and facilitated their learning about each other. It turned out that most immigrant students are fluent in the use of ICT technologies and tools such as smartphones, tablets, laptops. This proficiency is their strength, and it can be leveraged by teachers in schools and in informal education (e.g. street working). On the other hand, there is a low level of technological maturity among the young immigrants; in other words, while ICT tools do play a very important role in their lives, young people tend to use them more for fun and entertainment rather than for learning. For example, before the courses started, most students watched YouTube for entertainment, but the adult participants made them aware that YouTube can be used for learning as well. They pointed out that most universities have YouTube channels with videos of at least some of their lectures. In this way, ICT tools enable access to almost unlimited sources of knowledge and communication. In addition, ICT tools help people to overcome language barriers in intergenerational relationships. The young people explained that their main reason for participating in the ICT Guides courses was to improve their language competence.

One of the aims of the study was to determine, via baseline questionnaires given out prior to the start of the courses, what the young people wanted to learn from their adult counterparts and to compare these expectations to what they had actually learned by the time the course ended. The young people's expectations of intergenerational learning were to do with language and the kinds of knowledge that would be useful to their day-to-day lives in their new country. After the final meeting, the pupils were asked about their perceived benefits of the course; in their responses, they emphasized the benefits of language learning and the practical information they had obtained. The pupils also appreciated getting to know the older people and finding out more about the life of the older generation, which they had not expected before the course began.

Several dominant findings arise from our study. In our initial interactions and conversations, both the immigrant young people and the local adults were aware of the significance of ICT tools. During the actual courses, the tools used 284 Leek and Rojek

gave both groups the opportunity to get to know each other better despite language difficulties. In particular, online translator apps or programs were excellent at facilitating communication. The young immigrants offered the following feedback: 'The iPad was important when I met the elderly people. We had something to concentrate on'; 'I could help the older people with their apps and we talked about the iPad'; 'The iPad worked as a way of us talking to each other'; and 'we had something to talk about, we had plenty conversations' (Leek & Rojek, 2019, p. 99; 2020, pp. 143–147). Language and communication skills were a recurrent topic among the young immigrants, while the older participants on the courses offered feedback such as: 'We know that without this iPad, it would not be possible to start a conversation' (Leek & Rojek, 2019, p. 99).

Our study also showed that an inability to speak the dominant language fluently, unfamiliarity with cultural codes, and uncertainty about how to deal with different social groups can sometimes be challenging for young immigrants. In the opinion of the course participants, the internet greatly supported first contacts and knowledge exchange in intergenerational learning and helped the two groups to get to know each other. Other helpful ICT elements included pictures, maps, and music from online sources. These items can sometimes replace language and thus facilitate learning. In this way, ICT tools reduce intergenerational distance and help to overcome the polarization between younger and older citizens. Depending on the needs of the participants and the tools available, ICT tools were used spontaneously in participants' intergenerational collaboration. Both age groups were interested in using ICT tools together because they both knew that the ability to use these tools is one of the key skills of our contemporary times and that the significance of ICT tools will only increase in the future.

However, ICT played a different role for both cohorts individually. The young cohort primarily used ICT to achieve specific goals and for entertainment purposes. For the older participants, ICT tools not only facilitated learning but were also in themselves an object of learning. In other words, the older cohort learned with the help of ICT while learning about it. Paradoxically, this difference fostered the potential for intergenerational learning as it intrigued people and made them interested in others. Additionally, it turns out that while the young people were proficient at using ICT, they were not usually prepared to function independently and effectively in our information and knowledge society in real life. This is evidenced by the fact that they primarily used ICT for entertainment and pleasure and to alleviate boredom. So, despite their proficiency with ICT, the young people exhibited low technological maturity, whereby technological maturity can be defined as readiness for the independent, effective, innovative, and responsible use of ICT. Technological maturity includes the readiness to formulate expectations for technology in terms of current and future needs (Till, 2016). Technological maturity determines the satisfactory and constructive functioning of individuals in an information society, while a lack of competence puts individuals at risk of social exclusion. ICT competences are important for accessing education and labour markets and are considered among the most important human competences of the twenty-first century, a so-called key competence.

As a result of the young people's low level of technological maturity, the use of ICT plays an important role in their lives but nonetheless consumes time that should be dedicated to learning. Courses based on intergenerational learning with ICT support the development of key contemporary competences and soft skills, especially communication and language skills. According to both the young and adult participants of a survey we conducted as part of the project, improvement of their communication and language skills mainly resulted from their collaborative use of ICT tools. Both the young people and the adults told us that the courses definitely had an impact on their mutual understanding and gave them the opportunity to introduce themselves, learn about each other, and share their knowledge and skills.

It can therefore be seen that in order for immigrant pupils and students to increase their acquisition of key European citizenship competences as defined by European Commission (2013, 2019), initiatives can be designed using intergenerational collaboration with the use of ICT tools. However, ICT tools only make educational sense when collaborative purposes are their main function. Otherwise, ICT tools themselves become a goal and effect of learning without having any impact on the immigrant pupils' educational lives. ICT tools cannot replace face-to-face interaction, but they can effectively contribute to a better understanding and harmonious coexistence between young immigrants and older local people living together in big cities.

#### **6 Conclusions**

The two projects for developing citizenship skills examined here—EUCiTec and ICT Guides—situate learning about citizenship within communities of practice in which young people develop an understanding of citizenship through sociocultural and personal interactions but also learn more complex civic behaviour through their interactions with other ICT users. We follow here the interpretation of communities of practice based on Wegner (1998), which claims that these are groups of people that share mutual concerns or a passion for something they do, and that they learn how to do it better through regular interaction. Practices in our understanding include working with their peers in school (EUCiTec project) and with older people (ICT Guides) and are a way of personal meaning-making, all in the context of sociocultural learning. The EUCiTec and ICT Guides projects show that although ICT can support citizenship education, it still requires the internal motivation of the students or users, their need to participate, the desire for a sense of belonging to society and culture, as well as good attitudes, such as a readiness to take action. In a borderless European Union, which in the traditional sense is a place of protection for refugees and in a non-traditional sense is where ICT does not have any 'borders' for its users, both curricular and extracurricular activities using online spaces are a source of information, knowledge, and the foundation of civic attitudes. Community activities then provide the opportunity for learners to practice their citizenship skills in real life.

The EUCiTec and ICT Guides projects provide young people with opportunities for constructing their own attitudes to citizenship and sharing in the practicing of it. Banks (2008) posits that citizens can cultivate multiple and overlapping identities based on national, ethnic, racial, religious, class, gender, and cultural attachments. Our research shows that the use of ICT in out-of-school environments creates promising perspectives for the emotional dimension of civic attitudes like personal responsibility or self-efficacy in undertaking actions, and that it supports intercultural and intergenerational learning. Another distinctive feature of ICT within citizenship education in out-of-school activities is the bottom-up involvement of young people (coming from and led by students) in community-based actions. Involvement is directed by the sense of purpose; in the case of immigrant young people, this purpose was the need to help older adults with using digital devices in order to promote their inclusion in the digital society (i.e. the elderly participants may then be able to book doctor's appointments online or check local bus departures online). A sense of purpose comes from believing that one's actions will be helpful for others; this, in turn, might contribute to preventing violent extremism, as Borum (2014) claims. In contrast, citizenship education in schools is more knowledge focused, supports civic actions, equips learners with an understanding of the social world, offers a source of information about others (i.e. the internet), and develops learners' readiness to participate in society; it is, however, like other school activities, more curriculum focused. In this way, students learn how to process social information and discuss injustices in the world, which, as Borum (2014) describes, supports the prevention of violent behaviours.

The advancing technological revolution, especially in the area of sociocultural communication that is exemplified by developments in ICT, has forced new perspectives on public involvement and citizenship. Subsequently, new learning communities and practices have appeared that can be perceived as new ways of participating in society and culture and with which new types of social and cultural interaction are created in virtual and online spaces. Moreover, dynamically developing information and communication technologies are an attractive and effective form of informal learning because key ICT features, such as interactivity, limitlessness, and accessibility, attract great attention from people of all ages, educational backgrounds, and nationalities, becoming a keystone of contemporary non-formal education.

Learning through the use of ICT promotes the building of subjectivity, self-determination, and awareness of internal social and cultural potential and enables knowledge-sharing and the participation of various entities in our sociopolitical reality. It makes it thus much more likely that people of all legal statuses, from established nationals to new and old immigrants, will follow the patterns of civic behaviour that are binding in society, that they will accept the general rules of that society, and that they will therefore build their status as citizens in their community on foundations of trust and civic cooperation.

#### **Acknowledgements**

This scientific work has been funded with the support of the European Commission, No. 2017-1-UK01-KA201-036710, Inspiring European Citizenship through Educational Technology, ICT Guides No. 2015-1-SE01-KA201-012232, and the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education, agreement no. 3590/ ERASMUS+/2016/2.

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### **Social Diversity, Migration, and Social Innovation** *Insights from Germany*

#### *Ewa Bacia*

#### **Abstract**

This chapter presents study results analysing the inclusive activities carried out by grassroots initiatives in Germany for migrants and refugees. The chapter discusses if grassroots initiatives might be effective at preventing radicalization and extremism. The context of analysis is a debate regarding social inclusion and the postmigrant society. Case studies portray a change in the vision of society. Hierarchical social systems in which incomers needed to adjust to existing conditions are increasingly being replaced by open horizontal structures. Their common denominator is accepting social diversity, horizontal communication, and mutual exchange.

#### **Keywords**

social diversity – inclusion – postmigrant society – social innovation – Germany – grassroots movements

#### **1 Introduction**

It is estimated that in 2015, net migration was positive in Germany, amounting to around 1.1 million people (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016a). Determining exact numbers is impossible as the scale and type of migration to the Federal Republic of Germany has reached an unprecedented level. Asylum applications are filed mainly by refugees from Syria, Albania, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The majority of asylum applicants are young people under the age of forty. Children and young people under the age of fifteen are the largest group. Two out of three incomers are male (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge [BAMF], 2015). A majority of the incomers do not speak German and do not have the competence required to integrate socially or vocationally into their new conditions and circumstances. The existing situation not only presents a huge challenge to German state institutions and existing social structures, but it also requires a shift in the perspective towards migration policy and presents new challenges to civic society. Moreover, it forces reflection on a new vision of civic society.

In Germany, as in other European countries, animated debates have been taking place regarding the issue of refugees and their prospects of successful integration. As the debates were especially intensive in 2015 and 2016, this chapter focuses on examples from that time.

Some German citizens adamantly reject Chancellor Angela Merkel's policy of taking in refugees, seeing it as a real danger for their own safety and well-being. Strong anti-immigrant and nationalist leanings are observed in the social environment of the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident (Pegida) movement, whose aim it is to combat the Islamization of Germany. In this environment, Muslims are often perceived as potential radicals or even terrorists, and their culture and religion are considered incompatible with German traditions.

At this point, one should raise questions about the meaning and definition of German culture, tradition, society, and integration. Many answers are presented in the media and politics and in social debates. This chapter focuses on civic grassroots movements which advocate a new approach to migration, social diversity, and social integration. The educational meaning of initiatives to prevent radicalization and extremism is discussed at the end of the chapter.

The migration phenomenon in Germany is not new; what *is* new is the scale and the pace of the influx of incomers. While the theme of refugees is a worldwide political issue, Germany is the country that accepts the highest number of refugees in Europe. Here, migrant policy has been a key issue influencing the country's functioning for some time. For years, migrants have been cocreating German society. In 2018, 20.8 million people from migrant families were living in Germany, making up twenty-five per cent of the country's population (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016b). The number of people with migrant origins increased by half a million in one year. One in three German children is raised in a family where at least one parent comes from a different country. In cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants, the ratio of these families amounts to forty-six per cent. Migration experiences and social mobility are nothing special in Germany—on the contrary, they are a normal state of being.

This chapter analyses the inclusion activities undertaken by members of civic society in Germany for migrants and refugees. The context for analysis is a debate linking social inclusion and postmigrant society (Foroutan, 2015). The chapter offers examples of actions that take the form of social innovation. These examples highlight a change in the German vision of society in the direction of a postmigrant society. Structures of a more open nature, whose common denominator is an acknowledgement of the social diversity of citizens, are being formed at a grassroots level. This process is supported by the development of horizontal communication and by enhancing social interactions. At the same time, we observe a decline of the hierarchical social systems in which incomers needed to adjust to existing conditions (Foroutan, 2015).

The emergence of open social structures stands in contrast with the presence of anti-immigrant, nationalist movements, such as the Pegida association. These movements are developing in a parallel manner, inspired by highly different systems of values. It would be difficult to expect members of the Pegida association to acknowledge that social diversity is a positive social factor and to support the formation and enhancement of structures based on diversity. However, the social actions that support and develop open structures in Germany are strong and visible enough to merit an in-depth analysis, which will be the focus of this work.

#### **2 Integration in a Postmigrant Society**

For years, the concept of integration has been a key word in the German migration debate in its political, vocational, and social dimensions. Debates regarding the integration of refugees who may hail from cultures that are very different to the German one have been taking place both in politics and society. While many politicians call for more extensive integration actions, others claim that integration is impossible because of the various cultural differences and differing levels of education.

Integration can be defined in two different ways. First, the concept describes the opportunities for participation in the main areas of social life, including employment, training, and the educational system. Second, integration might be defined more broadly as social cohesion with all the political and economic interrelationships of the social system, including its power and dependency relationships (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, n.d.). We can find both meanings of the concept in the German political and social debates.

In the summer of 2016, the German Parliament passed the Integration Act (*Integrationsgesetz)*. This provides refugees with quicker access to language and integration courses and facilitates their entry into the labour market. Hence, politics defines integration in the context of education and work, both of which are intended to enable migrants to become part of German society.

German social scientists who explore issues of integration and migration criticize such a limited approach to the topic of integration. Professor Naika Foroutan of the Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research has labelled the Integration Act 'lex refugee'—that is, a law regulating actions towards refugees, which is not equivalent to an integration act as such. Moreover, she alleges that the legislator unduly (i.e. irrelevantly to the contemporary situation) limits integration to migrants' problems (Wissenschaft im Dialog, 2016b). This conceptualization was shaped in Germany in the 1970s, when there was a very strong distinction between incomers ('foreign ones') and the host society, whereby the host society was stable and perceived its task largely in terms of integrating migrants in terms of teaching and adjusting them to live in the existing conditions in the host country. In this view, migrants are considered a foreign element which should be shaped and changed in order to fit in with the majority. Integration is then a coordinated process designed to facilitate the achievement of this outcome efficiently. Based on such a definition, we focus on the individual traits of migrants which prove their level of maladjustment with the dominant society. If integration is unsuccessful, the reasons for the lack of success are sought in migrants' individual and cultural profiles.

Naika Foroutan points out a mistake in this mode of thinking. She argues that the current German society is a postmigrant one. The 'post' prefix does not indicate the end of migration but refers instead to processes of social change taking place as a result of intensified levels of migration. According to Foroutan (2015), postmigrant societies are societies where:


One in three German citizens has migrant origins. Although migrants' identity has been partly shaped in a different culture, many migrants possess German citizenship and feel German. In 2012, three journalists proposed labelling this group 'the new Germans' instead of 'migrants' (Bota et al., 2012).

At the beginning of 2015, the first Congress of New German Organizations (*Bundeskongress Neuer Deutscher Organisationen*) took place in Berlin. Its participants formulated the message that the new Germans and people of colour have to be more present (Neue Deutsche Organisationen, 2015). People originating from immigrant families do become politicians, journalists, and doctors; however, their participation in these vocational groups is less common than that of people originating from families with no migrant past.

Eradicating this underrepresentation requires extending the concept of integration so that reasons for the existing state of affairs are attributed not only to the skills or characteristics of people with a migrant past but also to social structures. In postmigrant times, the whole society changes, requiring the elites to open up to new social groups that sometimes represent different cultures and values. In this way, cultural systems are subject to slow change.

According to the new social model, integration is not only an instrument for differentiation and exclusion, as a part of which the incomers—the 'others' are contrasted with the German majority. In the new approach to society, integration means that sharing in the social goods has been secured for all people who live in a given society, irrespective of their social or ethnic background (Georgi, 2015, p. 10). Therefore, integration is based on participation; equal access to the labour market, education, and healthcare system; and legal and social protection. Its success depends on both parties' openness to change because integration is a dynamic process concerning every individual who lives in a society that hosts migrants. Accepting such a viewpoint opens up the possibility of shaping a social reality which ensures benefits for all parties involved (Wissenschaft im Dialog, 2016a).

#### **3 From Integration through Social Diversity to Inclusion**

When migration and mobility are treated as a normal state of affairs (Bade & Oltmer, 2004), migration policy becomes a social policy that is important for the whole of society. The postmigrant society is at least as diverse as the migrant one, which should be analysed along numerous dimensions such as: the reasons for migration; migrants' legal status, religious affiliation, age, education and vocational qualifications; or relationships with their country of origin. Ethnic characteristics are only one element of the heterogeneity within migrant groups, in the same way that ethno-cultural identity is merely one aspect of the 'multidimensional diversity' of Germany as the host society (Vertovec, 2007). In a diverse society, attempts to organize reality along the lines of the distinction between ethnic majority and migrants become pointless. In the face of the enhanced phenomenon of transnational biographies, common mobility, or the recent refugee wave, an understanding of integration that is restricted to thinking in national terms becomes irrelevant to reality (Riegel, 2009).

In 2004, the German Board for Migration proposed a definition of integration which was later adopted by the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration:

Integration is a measurable participation of people with and without migration experiences in the main domains of social life, such as preschool education, school and vocational education, access to the labour market, to legal assistance and social security, as well as participation in the political life. (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration, 2010, p. 13)

In line with this definition, it is difficult to deal with integration in all domains. Integration actions carried out by a given institution or organization are usually focused on integration in one or two domains of social life, or they focus on the recipients' particular characteristics, such as vocational competences, age, or sexual orientation.

This is where the concept of integration meets the concept of social diversity*.* The concept of diversity refers to various overlapping levels of belonging to diverse groups in terms of characteristics such as gender, ethnic and religious affiliation, citizenship, sexual orientation, physical and mental health, social background, and age. Pluralistic identities and belonging to numerous coexisting groups are a natural phenomenon from the perspective of diversity. The very concept of diversity has positive connotations; it is imbued with respect for the pluralism of models and life situations that treats diversity as a resource for society (Georgi, 2015, p. 11).

The term diversity combines integration as previously defined with the concept of inclusion, which—similarly to the concept of integration—initially possessed a very narrow meaning. Following the adoption of the United Nations' *Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities* (2006), debates on inclusion have taken place mostly with reference to people with disabilities. However, inclusion is, as a matter of fact, each individuals' human right; hence, it is not limited to the issue of disability. Conceptualized more broadly, inclusion means eradicating barriers and forms of excluding people who find themselves in different starting positions depending on individual differences that result from social diversity. An individual's social starting position may, for example, depend on their socioeconomic status, ethnic background, or sexual orientation (Georgi, 2015, p. 12).

The aim of inclusion is to form social structures and to bring about a legal state in which the discrimination between starting points is eliminated and participation is enabled. The concept of inclusion also entails acceptance and acknowledgement of, and appreciation for, social diversity. The starting point and driving force for inclusive actions are individuals' needs and their participation in various spheres of societal life. Hence, the central point is not connected with the people and groups who are to be integrated with the majority, but rather with structural and institutional changes in important domains of social life. In order to enable participation and self-determination on the individual's part, these structures need to be opened up and become sensitive to diversity (Merx, 2013). Inclusion requires the state to be active and to adjust its structures and legal system so that each and every individual gains the chance to participate. Inclusive policy means shaping activities aimed at carrying out the ban on discrimination included in the first chapter of the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*) of the Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. the German constitution, where Article 3 announces that no person shall be disadvantaged or favoured because of their gender, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or their religious beliefs or political opinions.

When interpreted through the lens of social diversity, integration has a lot to do with inclusion policy, which is increasingly a central point in the debate on issues of migrant movements in Germany. As a result of acknowledging the value of social diversity, the implementation of integration actions leads to inclusion policy, which is underpinned by a certain vision of society. According to this vision, the multitude of life models and combinations of the characteristics of individual members of society are a resource which can be leveraged. In order to make this possible, society needs to develop its structures and open them up to individuals and groups.

#### **4 Social Innovation as a Grassroots Response to the Refugee Issue**

Since 2015, the issue of refugees in Germany has been labelled as a crisis by many commentators. It is unclear what is at the core of this crisis; whether the crisis is the number of people seeking support in Germany, the overburdening of public institutions, or the efforts required to address the challenges with which public institutions are presented. Accepting and socially integrating such numerous groups of refugees and migrants requires a mobilization of forces. Restricting these actions to the domain of standard public tasks does not suffice. The scale and sociocultural scope of this phenomenon require new ideas and unconventional solutions—that is, innovation both in the technical and social spheres (if this distinction still makes any sense). Each technical innovation needs to be embedded in social practice and thus to acquire a social dimension (Kretschmer, 2015). This is particularly visible with regard to the refugee issue, where the differences between groups who enter into relationships are not only concerned with cultural and social issues but also with technical competences. Social innovation for refugees is an example of a broad approach to social integration and innovation.

Social innovation is a … configuration of social practices in certain fields of action …, initiated by a certain group of social actors …, deliberately reconceptualized … [and] carried out in order to solve problems and satisfy needs better … than it would be possible based on the existing practices. … Innovation is not limited to the medium of technological artefacts—it is carried out on the level of social practices. (Howaldt & Schwarz, 2010, p. 54)

Social researchers who analyse social innovation in various countries and regions of the world have formulated the hypothesis that alongside the transition from the industrial society to the knowledge and service society, a change takes place in the innovation system paradigm (Howaldt & Schwarz, 2010, p. 8), as a result of which the relationship between technological and social innovation changes significantly.

The significance of institutional and social networks is increasing in the new paradigm. Linear solutions are being replaced with interactive models. The representatives and social actors of interwoven institutions continuously interact and develop, test and diffuse new modes of acting. Another distinctive feature of the new paradigm is the increasing role of individuals. Formerly, science was the driving force for innovation: political programmes of social development were constructed based on scientific diagnoses and recommendations. Nowadays, a new model is beginning to emerge in which society is becoming the focal point of innovation.

In the European Union, social innovation is treated as a mode of empowering people and driving change.

Social innovations are innovations that are social in both their ends and their means. … [These are] new ideas (products, services and models) that simultaneously meet social needs (more effectively than alternatives) and create new social relationships or collaborations. They are innovations that are not only good for society but also enhance society's capacity to act. (European Commission, 2011, p. 9)

In Germany, actions designed to achieve the social integration of refugees are taken by numerous diverse institutions and organizations. The state strives to construct the so-called *Willkommenskultur*, that is, to create conditions—a culture—in which all incomers will feel welcome in Germany. The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees supports projects that offer refugees help with adjusting to their new conditions. Federal offices encourage social work for refugees and offer free training and courses for volunteers as a part of integration actions. Both Germans and migrants who came to the country earlier may engage in volunteering activities (BAMF, 2014). Church organizations such as the German Protestant Churches' *Diakonie* actively provide help (Hettenhausen et al., 2017). Many initiatives originate in German schools and other academic institutions. State institutions collaborate with major nongovernmental organizations, including foundations with significant financial capabilities and political influence, such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Robert Bosch Foundation, or the Bertelsmann Foundation.

However, the analyses which will follow focus on initiatives inspired by individuals or small groups of people who notice the need to introduce certain changes to existing structures. Five exemplary initiatives are described. They differ in their origins, subject areas, target groups, and the methods employed, scope, organization and funding. The shared themes in these initiatives are: including the social needs connected with the influx of refugees to Germany; introducing social innovation in a grassroots manner; and the underpinning vision of society.

#### **4.1** *Where Does Social Innovation Directed at Refugees Originate?*

Some of the social programmes originate from the initiative of individuals who notice the problem of refugee integration in Germany and wonder how they might help. The initiators of new solutions, such as Malte Bedürftig (Case Study 3) or Thomas Batsching (Case Study 5), frequently come up with innovative ideas rooted in their own competences, experiences, and contacts that can be utilized to help. Malte Bedürftig and Thomas Batsching are professionals with many years of professional experience and with extensive contacts. By making use of their contacts and their own competences, they developed initiatives connecting people in need of help with individuals who may offer professional help.

In Case Study 2, the prime originators of the new programme were students—that is, people motivated by a willingness to help, yet without any work experience. The starting capital which the students had at their disposal was only their willingness to help, their inventiveness, and their organizational skills. The students proved to be effective and convincing in their actions; as

#### **Summer academy for young people**

The Leuphana University of Lüneburg, in collaboration with the Vodafone Foundation, carries out three-week summer camps during which young people receive an all-day educational and coaching programme connected with both vocational preparation and sports activities; in addition, they prepare and stage a musical. The work is organized like a project. It is aimed at combining theory with practice and at developing competences as a result of taking actions supported by professional teachers and trainers.

The camps have been organized for the past ten years; a total of 1,800 young people have participated so far. The original concept of the programme was targeted at young people facing various problems with completing their school education. 'We have a colourful mixture of young people: both very shy and withdrawn as well as ones with aggressive inclinations', explains Maren Voßhage-Zehnder, the programme coordinator. 'Children from difficult families, children with learning problems and [those] motivated to learn, children who, for various reasons, found themselves in a dead-end street and, as a result of that, need robust support and coaching' (Kretschmer, 2016c).

In 2015, young refugees joined this group. Along with young people from German schools, they underwent a three-week educational and coaching programme as well as an intensive German language course. 'Refugee children are mostly very ambitious and incredibly eager for knowledge', the coordinator adds (Kretschmer, 2016c). The projects are carried out in international groups, and the collaboration between German young people and refugees is very close.

```
Source: Based on Kretschmer (2016c) and Leuphana Universität 
Lüneburg (2016)
```
a result, their actions were formalized and the university became involved in organizing the programme.

The activity of educational institutions is frequently the result of social innovation directed at refugees. This is the case in the following examples, where possibilities for action were created at a university (Case Study 1) and in a school (Case Study 4). In the case of programmes organized by public institutions, it is important for the institutional framework to serve as a support rather than a limitation and to leave opportunities for individuals and groups to develop innovative ideas.

#### **tun.starthilfe für flüchtlinge**

'tun.starthilfe für flüchtlinge' is the name of a students' initiative which gave rise to an association that organizes numerous activities for refugees. Members of the initiative hold the view that refugees' rights to take part in social life can be realized only when actions at the political level are accompanied by actions from within civic society. The initiative involves activities such as organizing German language courses in refugee camps, carrying out educational workshops for various target groups (e.g. refugees, pupils, and students), supporting the development of the competences of volunteers who are willing to help refugees, running information and social campaigns aimed at combating stereotypes, increasing the awareness and transcultural acceptance of refugees in German society, and holding workshops on art, crafts, music, and acrobatics in collaboration with refugees. The highlight of the programme is the summer festival organized and held by the local community and refugees in collaboration with non-governmental organizations, student groups, and employees of the Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt. Since the academic year 2013/2014, students of this university have had the opportunity to receive credits for participation in the programme as a part of the EduCulture module, which includes a series of lectures, an internship, and an accompanying seminar.

Source: Based on tun.starthilfe (2016)

#### **4.2** *What Are the Domains in Which Innovation Is Implemented?*

Social innovation directed at refugees appears in all domains in which demand for new solutions exists. Incomers from other countries and cultures initially need comprehensive support: from formal and administrative issues (Case Study 4), through learning the language (Case Study 1, 2, and 4), to vocational integration (Case Study 5). While refugees need help with determining who they may turn to for support and for what matters (Case Study 3), in order to achieve full social integration, it is also necessary for refugees to participate in social life in all its various dimensions. Hence, initiatives appear in which concerts, exhibitions, or other cultural and sporting events are organized in collaboration with refugees. These events have an open nature and integrate people (also newcomers) in the local community (Case Study 1 and 4).

#### **4.3** *Whom Do the Actions Target?*

An important distinctive aspect of the case studies presented in this article is the fact that they are not targeted solely at refugees. The programme targeted TABLE 12.3 Case Study 3

#### **GoVolunteer online platform**

The GoVolunteer online platform was founded by Malte Bedürftig, a McKinsey consultant who had wanted to help refugees for a long time, and who had been asking his friends and family if they would also be willing to help. When he found that many were willing to help, Malte Bedürftig created an online platform for coordinating the actions of numerous volunteers. In November 2015, he founded the GoVolunteer public benefit organization in collaboration with Henryk Seeger, another entrepreneur who had been socially active for years. The platform connects volunteers with helping organizations. Social organizations use the website to seek potential volunteers in the local environment. These potential volunteers may later gain access to the actions coordinated by these organizations with just one click. 'We want to offer easy access to information for anyone who wants to help. At the same time, we reduce the coordination effort for the organizers, who, as a result, may focus on their main task: helping refugees', the initiative's founder explains (Kretschmer, 2016a).

Two months after the platform's launch, there were a hundred initiatives for volunteers to join. The originators have been developing the platform and plan to reach hundreds of organizations and thousands of volunteers in all regions of Germany as well as other German-speaking countries. Malte Bedürftig wanted GoVolunteer to become a central platform for communication in the domain of helping refugees not only in Germany but also in Austria, and Switzerland. 'Our software allows fitting the actions perfectly to the organization's needs. The platform is founded on the crowdfunding formula. Introducing solutions arising from the community into the structure and development of the initiative is intended to ensure its longevity. The aim is to "make helping a community experience"', the founder explains. 'Not only for a few months, but for years!' (Kretschmer, 2016a).

Source: Based on Kretschmer (2016a)

at young people who are experiencing various school problems that has been carried out for a decade (Case Study 1) is of particular interest in this respect. The reasons for failure at school might be highly diverse, ranging from family problems through health problems to psychosocial maladjustment. Migrant origin and traumatic experiences connected with a refugee past might be factors that undermine educational success. As the number of people with such deficiencies is growing in German society, the summer academy for young people with problems has been extended to include refugee children. However, they are not the only recipients of the benefits of the camp, and educational benefits are also derived by children from German families.

As a result of the robust refugee influx into Germany, German society is changing. Members of German society who have been living in the country for a long time also need support in adjusting to the changes. For this reason, many actions within the innovations discussed here are targeted at German citizens, including students (Case Study 2), pupils (Case Study 1 and 4), volunteers (Case Study 2 and 3), job counsellors (Case Study 5), or non-governmental organizations that intend to learn about the most efficient modes of providing support in the new social situation (Case Study 3). Local communities are the recipients of many programmes as they are being targeted by information and social campaigns that present the importance of the question and issues connected with it (Case Study 2 and 4).

TABLE 12.4 Case Study 4

#### **Service learning at the Albrecht-Thaer School in Hamburg**

Pupils at this Hamburg school acquire knowledge about refugees' circumstances in Germany and in their particular district during their lessons (learning) and at the same time they become involved in teams that act on the needs of refugees in their area (service).

Ikra and Shirin wanted to provide support for refugees who struggle with the language barrier. They understand the problem as they originate from families with Turkish and Arabic roots. Their mother tongue was useful in their initial contacts with refugees, which were facilitated by collaborating with non-governmental organizations that had long been active in the domain of helping migrants. Initially, the girls did minor translations and supported the refugees in running administrative errands. Then, through one of the organizations, they got to meet two refugee families. They helped these families to learn German and assisted their children with doing homework for six months. 'We will probably continue to do so even when the school obligation is no longer in place. This help is not an obligation to us—to us, the issue is very close', one of the pupils explains (Netzwerk Lernen durch Engagement, 2016).

Another group of pupils takes interest in refugees' housing conditions. Young activists visited refugee centres and took part in debates with the mayor and in workshops organized by the local organization. They held a fundraiser in order to finance further equipment for the refugee centres and are now planning to organize a tournament and summer concert in collaboration with refugees.

Source: Based on Netzwerk Lernen durch Engagement (2016)

#### **4.4** *How Are the Actions Carried Out?*

The actions are carried out through various methods and with the use of various tools. While some of them take more traditional educational forms, such as courses or training (Case Study 2), active working methods such as workshops and coaching are frequently used (Case Study 1 and 5). Many of the initiatives are based on modern technological solutions. For instance, specially designed online platforms (Case Study 3 and 5) are used to establish contacts and provide counselling.

Various social actors are involved in these actions, namely public institutions, non-governmental organizations, educational institutions, businesses, and many individuals, including individuals with migrant origins. In some cases, the initiatives are predesigned by bigger organizations (Case Study 1 and 4), but each time the actions bring about visible results due to the collaboration between numerous representatives of civic society, both individuals and small groups of people. The emergence of a new issue that is salient for civic society initiates the development of new networks of contacts and enhances existing ones. The new networks develop at the grassroots level, which is a chance for the society to transform in a more participative direction.

Based on the refugees' position and role in these activities, three types of initiatives can be distinguished, namely: activities *carried out for* refugees (e.g. language courses, collecting clothing, job counselling); activities prepared for and carried out *in collaboration* with refugees (cultural and sporting events); and *information and social campaigns* presenting possible actions in conditions that are new to the whole of society to a broad group of recipients.

#### **4.5** *Where Does the Money Come From?*

Involving numerous environments and undertaking actions in the system of links between individuals, groups, institutions, and organizations creates various opportunities for funding these social initiatives. Some of them are funded by large foundations (Case Study 1); some are based on crowdfunding, which is an innovative mode of obtaining financial resources through the use of social networking websites (Case Study 3). Some funds may be acquired through fundraisers and through holding cultural and social events. While these events are already a part of actions for and with refugees, the sale of items may generate money for further actions (Case Study 4).

Many of the initiatives initially rely on volunteer work (Case Study 2, 3, and 5). However, as their actions extend, initiatives often manage to secure sponsorship. Companies support social initiatives directed at refugees through their corporate social responsibility mechanisms (Case Study 5).

#### TABLE 12.5 Case Study 5

#### **HR integrate**

Through its website, HR Integrate enables refugees who seek employment in Germany to contact professional job counsellors. As a result, refugees can easily receive individual support for entering the German labour market. Contact is established online; however, further collaboration includes face-to-face meetings and lasts until an individual successfully integrates into a workplace.

The initiator of this programme was Thomas Batsching, a job counsellor from Munich. Like many others, he wanted to help in the summer of 2015 when the wave of people coming to Germany was increasing. He arrived at the conclusion that he would accomplish the most through making use of his competences, contacts, and thirty-five years of experience of job counselling. 'The idea is that a professional counsellor takes a refugee by the hand and guides the individual as a mentor into the German labour market' (Kretschmer, 2016b).

Help involves creating a qualifications profile, identifying potential employers, writing application letters, preparing for job interviews, and providing support at the initial stages of employment. An individual may participate in the project for three or even up to five years, even though it is organized in a manner that aims to provide extensive help over a short period of time. In order to make this possible, Thomas Batsching collaborates with numerous vocational and aid organizations. The aim is to establish a national network in order to provide help for refugees in the sites where they stay.

The programme has some sponsors. Some small companies have decided to implement the idea of corporate social responsibility by allowing their employees to spend two hours per week providing counselling help for refugees.

Source: Based on Kretschmer (2016b)

#### **5 The Role of Grassroots Initiatives in Preventing Extremism and Radicalization**

The mechanisms described above relating to German grassroot social initiatives provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that German society is transforming into a postmigrant society. The ratio of families with migrant origins and the robust influx of refugees further enhance social diversity, which had already been high regardless of this phenomenon. This diversity is not restricted to ethnic characteristics or religious affiliation. When diversity, enhanced by mobility and migration, becomes an everyday social reality and a normal state of matters, social structures undergo a modification which is followed by a rapid reaction on the part of civic society.

Individuals, small groups, and non-governmental organizations initiate programmes directed not only at refugees, but also at the remainder of society, which, as a result of accepting refugees, is evolving into a postmigrant society. A postmigrant society is a dynamically changing society in which new communication structures, relationships, and opportunities for life development emerge.

The new conditions present people with a social challenge and promote the emergence of social innovation. The social innovation presented in this chapter reveals the broad and inclusive manner in which social integration can be grasped in a postmigrant society. Communicating the new participative vision of society and social integration might have an educational impact and support the prevention of extremism and radicalization. Rethinking society in a participative manner might oppose some mechanisms leading to extremism and radicalization. Citizenship education aiming at fostering the new way of living society can be effective in the prevention of extremism and radicalization.

All people have a deep and profound psychological need for meaning and identity, a need for belonging (Borum, 2014, p. 292). If these needs are not fulfilled and individuals feel rejected or excluded, they are more likely to become radical (Williams, 2002). Participation of newcomers alongside native citizens in grassroots initiatives as described in this chapter may give the participants the feeling of belonging and identity.

People who feel marginalized from mainstream society can be easier influenced by extremist ideologies (Bhui et al., 2012). In a postmigrant society, all people, regardless of their origins, are welcome to engage in society and receive opportunities for doing so. This reduces the risk of radicalization.

Underlying systemic inequalities may lead an individual to radicalized or violent responses in order to attain the basic securities they need (Ghosh et al., 2016, p. 9). Postmigrant societies need more participation in order to abolish systematic inequalities and more citizenship education, which empower people and make them understand the meaning of participation in the postmigrant society. Participation is possible in all societal domains: the labour market, education and healthcare systems, legal and social protection. The grassroots initiatives described in this chapter offer some examples of participation designed to combat inequalities. This kind of participation has an educational aspect as it promotes values of citizenship and diversity. Creating new opportunities for participation should be accompanied by an appropriate citizenship education. Participation itself is the way of doing change, but it is the citizenship education which might make the change lasting and profound. The combination of participation and citizenship education is to be seen as an effective mean to prevent extremism and radicalization in the long term.

#### **Acknowledgement**

This chapter is a revised version of Bacia, E. (2019). Social diversity, migration and social innovation: A new vision of society constructed by grassroots movements in Germany. In E. Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, H. J. Abs, & P. Müller (Eds.), *Thematic papers based on the conference "Migration, social transformation, and education for democratic citizenship" (2nd InZentIM conference & 6th EARLI-SIG 13 conference)*, University of Duisburg-Essen, August 27–29, 2018 (pp. 25–41). DuEPublico. https://doi.org/10.17185/duepublico/47634

#### **References**


Bota, A., Pham, K., & Topçu, Ö. (2012). *Wir Neuen Deutschen* [*Us new Germans*]. Rowohlt.


## **Preventing Prejudices through Social Skills Training and Intergroup Contact between Refugee and Native Children**

*Jan S. Pfetsch, Anja Schultze-Krumbholz and Laura M. Neumann*

#### **Abstract**

The increasing cultural and ethnic diversity in Europe can enrich its societies with intercultural friendships and exchange. The positive integration of individuals who have experienced forced migration depends on a successful process of psychosocial adjustment and the intercultural openness of the society of destination. Childhood is a particularly crucial stage in the development of ethnic prejudices, and measures for preventing prejudices and fostering tolerance should therefore start at this early age. Based on an exemplary intervention study, this chapter shows how intergroup contact combined with social competence training can reduce prejudices and increase tolerance both, for majority and minority groups.

#### **Keywords**

intergroup contact – prejudice – tolerance – inclusive education – intervention study

#### **1 Background**

Societal events and changes can trigger prejudice and prejudice-related hate and attacks. For example, the migration movement into Europe in 2015, when refugees from war regions in the Middle East migrated to Europe in large numbers, posed a challenge for many countries: integrating the newly arrived into society and increasing society's tolerance towards them. Since childhood is a crucial stage for the development of ethnic prejudices (Raabe & Beelmann, 2011), it seems reasonable to implement interventions for this age group to foster tolerance and integration and reduce prejudices and discrimination. Schools can be especially challenged by the need to organize school places for children and adolescents with refugee experiences because of the disparities

© Jan S. Pfetsch, Anja Schultze-Krumbholz and Laura M. Neumann, 2022 doi:10.1163/9789004525658\_014

This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-SA 4.0 License.

between international school systems, the generally low levels of migrants' competence in the language of their country of destination, and high numbers of arriving refugees caused by natural disasters, humanitarian crises, or (civil) wars in certain nations or regions. On the other hand, educational institutions have specialized staff for teaching and education, the normative mission to support the civic development of their students, and organizational structures to enable joint learning and intergroup contact between native and refugee children. This chapter will show how structured intergroup contact can be established through social skills training and cooperative learning and that these interactions can influence prejudices and tolerance in native and refugee children alike and how this can be a promising approach for preventing radicalization and extremism.

#### **2 Prejudices and Tolerance**

Our current understanding of prejudice is based on Gordon Allport's definition of prejudice as 'an antipathy based on a faulty and inflexible generalization' (1954, p. 9). This antipathy may be felt, thought, or expressed, thus reaching from an emotional and cognitive to a behavioural dimension. These three dimensions of prejudice can be found in the conceptualization of prejudice as a display of negative attitudes through the dislike of a person (emotional), the attribution of negative characteristics to this person (cognitive), or negative behaviour towards this person (behavioural) based on the generalization of attributions regarding the out-group of which the person is assumed to be a member (Dovidio et al., 2010; Raabe & Beelmann, 2011). Attitudes are 'favourable or unfavourable evaluations or appraisals' (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188) of behaviour, objects, or people. Prejudice towards individuals is based on group-assigned characteristics and does not take into account individual differences within the out-group (Raabe & Beelmann, 2011).

This three-dimensional conceptualization of prejudice provides a good starting point for intervention and prevention approaches because it allows for a description of complex situations, although the phenomenon cannot be uniformly described because not all components occur simultaneously. Someone with negative assumptions about an out-group does not necessarily have to behave in a discriminatory way. Nonetheless, the three dimensions are helpful for analytical purposes and for an understanding of how the dimensions of prejudice influence each other (Klein, 2014). The cognitive dimension is sometimes also equated to stereotypes, i.e. the typical picture that people associate with a specific social group (Lippmann, 1922; cited in Dovidio et al., 2010). The psychological, and especially the cognitive, function of stereotypes is to reduce or simplify complex social environments. However, this leads to the perception of a group as a whole (i.e. an overgeneralization; Allport, 1954), with each member believed to be sharing the same attributes instead of allowing for the fact that group members may have unique characteristics. These processes may take place automatically, involuntarily, and unintentionally. However, they are dependent on a number of circumstances and can therefore be modified, although a much larger cognitive effort is necessary for an individualized as compared to a categorical perception (Degner et al., 2009). Moreover, people emotionally resist new knowledge that might disprove their prejudices (Fishbein, 2002, p. 3).

To a large extent, prejudices are based on emotions (affective dimension). They can be related to sympathy or antipathy, which can be expressed in intense forms such as anger, rage or hatred, and which can influence the need for social closeness versus social distance towards members of another group (Beelmann et al., 2010). It can be assumed that the affective and cognitive processes underlying prejudices are interrelated. In the context of prejudice, emotions primarily refer to fear or to a perceived threat to the in-group's very existence, its political or economic power, or its physical or material well-being. Fear can also be elicited by a perceived threat to the in-group's values and traditions. Additionally, fear may be more personal, such as people being afraid of being embarrassed, ridiculed, or rejected by members of the out-group. Finally, stereotypes themselves lead to expectations of negative, conflictual, or unpleasant interactions (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). However, changing such emotions seems feasible: using approaches like reappraisal, misattribution, or desensitization to the emotions caused by intergroup relations may reduce the effect of negative emotions on, for example, judgement and behaviour (Smith & Mackie, 2005).

The behavioural dimension of prejudice is often believed to refer to behavioural intentions rather than specific behaviour (e.g. Fishbein, 2002). Attitudes can be a driver for behavioural intentions (i.e. discriminatory intentions) which, in turn, are related to actual discriminatory behaviour. However, factors like (subjective) norms and perceived behavioural control also influence behavioural intentions and behaviour (Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). In adults, discriminatory behaviour may range from derogatory comments behind someone's back to genocide, while children often show discriminatory behaviour by socially excluding out-group peers, being rude to them, calling them names, or picking a fight with them (Fishbein, 2002; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002).

Prejudices in their different dimensions have detrimental outcomes for the development of children and adolescents. For example, school-wide perceptions of peer prejudice within the respective school were associated with lower academic achievement, while individual perceptions of peer prejudice were linked to lower levels of school attachment (Benner et al., 2015). Being aware of the negative expectations regarding one's group can lead students to underperform even though they initially started out equal in terms of parental income, education, and quality of school. Thus, a factor unrelated to intelligence or skills influences the academic achievement of students of colour (Aronson, 2004). Moreover, prejudices expressed as behaviours (i.e. discrimination) are related to subjective health (Kolarcik et al., 2015) as well as to aggressive behaviour and violence (Bayram Özdemir et al., 2018; Kuhn, 2004). Even more importantly, from a societal point of view, prejudice reduces contact (Binder et al., 2009) and may thus have negative effects on feelings of belonging and connectedness. However, a feeling of attachment to society protects against radicalization and extremism (Lösel et al., 2018). Adolescents who are rejected or excluded may find a sense of meaning and belonging in radical or extremist groups (Borum, 2014).

In contrast to ethnic prejudices, tolerance refers to the belief that e.g. immigrants and non-immigrants should be treated equally. This belief is based on an understanding of equalitarian principles and political convictions (van Zalk & Kerr, 2014). However, tolerance is not the exact opposite of prejudice and may even co-occur with prejudices within individuals; that is, individuals might have prejudices towards members of an out-group while at the same time believing that everyone should be treated equally. Tolerance can be increased through intergroup contact (e.g. in the form of friendships) which in turn decreases prejudices (van Zalk & Kerr, 2014). The results of this longitudinal study showed that prejudices and tolerance were only moderately negatively related and did thus not form opposite ends of one dimension. According to Forst (2000; see also Köhler, 2016) there are four levels of tolerance. The first three levels—permission, coexistence, respect—all refer to some kind of permission and all of them accept but do not endorse the differences. Only at the highest level—appreciation—do the groups not only view each other as equal but also appreciate each other's views, while still believing their own views to be superior. So even at its appreciative highest level, tolerance still carries some kind of rejection, according to this approach.

There is significant variation between adolescents regarding levels of prejudice and tolerance. Regarding the development from childhood to adolescence, Raabe and Beelmann (2011) examined 113 studies from around the world and found that prejudices increased between early and middle childhood and then decreased between middle and late childhood as well as within late childhood. They did not find changes in adolescence and concluded that changes are limited to childhood. Moreover, they found age-specific changes; for example, explicit prejudices decreased between middle and late childhood, but implicit prejudices did not. Also, prejudices against national out-groups did not change during this age, while they decreased for minorities within a country. Given these results, the authors concluded that the time between middle and late childhood could be a sensitive phase for reducing prejudices (Raabe & Beelmann, 2011). Argued from a social-cognitive perspective, the in-group preference and positive identification with a high-status group is crucial for the development of prejudices at this age, and higher levels of cognitive flexibility, hypothetical thinking, and openness for other people's perspectives during early adolescence enable more social tolerance. In addition to cognitive development, social identity and societal context can influence the stability of prejudices from childhood to adolescence; thus, the ethnic identity of participants can also influence the development of prejudices (Teichman & Bar-Tal, 2008). Contrary to Raabe and Beelmann (2011), van Zalk and Kerr (2014) found changes in adolescence; prejudices decreased from early to late adolescence while tolerance increased. However, only about a quarter of the individual differences in changes could be attributed to simultaneous changes in prejudice and tolerance. Further, tolerance increased to a much smaller extent than prejudice decreased. The authors explain the general developmental trends of these attitudes with social norms and value systems which adolescents increasingly acquired and integrated as well as with cognitive maturation processes which allowed adolescents to align abstract principles of equality with real-life situations. Norms of tolerance need to be modelled by significant others (e.g. parents, peers) as well as relevant institutions (e.g. school).

#### **3 Prevention of Prejudice**

To reduce prejudice and to enhance respect for ethnic differences in childhood, several empirical studies have been conducted, and three reviews have systematized the empirical evidence of the preventive interventions explored in the studies (Aboud et al., 2012; Beelmann & Heinemann, 2014; Ülger et al., 2018). These reviews divide prejudice prevention programmes based on programme content (e.g. knowledge-based interventions, intergroup contact, social-cognitive skills, or individual competence training). Other distinctions concern the intervention strategy (e.g. perceptual-cognitive strategies, individual strategies, interpersonal strategies, or a combination of these) or the exposure to information to change group attitudes (e.g. intergroup contact, media exposure to another ethnic group, exposure to multicultural or antibias instruction).

In a systematic review of 32 studies for children up to eight years with 62 effect sizes on attitudes and 59 effect sizes on peer relations, Aboud et al. (2012) found interventions concerning attitudes to be more effective than those concerning peer relations, and media-based or multicultural/antibias interventions to be more effective than contact interventions. Interestingly, promoting intergroup attitudes was more positive for ethnic majority children than for ethnic minority children. The authors explained this through the assumption that prejudice and exclusion are more prevalent and serious in majority ethnicities (Aboud et al., 2012).

Based on a meta-analysis of 81 research reports with 268 effect sizes for children and adolescents from three to eighteen years, Beelmann and Heinemann (2014) concluded that the inclusion of programme components like structured direct intergroup contacts and training in perspective taking, and the programme parameters 'active trainer' (be it a researcher, teacher, or trained student) and 'implementation within the curriculum' are related to higher effect sizes. In general, multimodal programmes showed higher and more generalized effects on prejudice and other intergroup attitudes (tolerance, social distance, knowledge) than programmes with only one content aspect, and the cognitive and behavioural aspects of intergroup attitudes were more strongly influenced than the emotional aspects (Beelmann & Heinemann, 2014).

Integrating 50 anti-bias interventions in schools with over 7,000 school-age students, Ülger et al. (2018) found that interventions were effective for both primary school students and middle and high school students (but slightly more effective for older students), and that interventions led by researchers or research assistants were more effective than interventions led by teachers (in contrast to Beelmann & Heinemann, 2014). While the intervention effect was significant for majority group members, interventions showed no significant effect for minority group members (although only seven studies contributed effect sizes for this group). Additionally, intergroup contact interventions and multifaceted interventions (combined intervention strategies) were highly effective in younger children and less effective in older children and adolescents (Ülger et al., 2018).

In sum, although these meta-analyses show some variation in the results for programme components and intervention strategies, it seems that prevention programmes to change cognitive, affective, and behavioural prejudices are generally effective, also work for younger children (although higher effect sizes can be found in adolescents), and mainly reduce prejudices in majority groups and to a lesser extent in minority groups. Intergroup contact and multimodal/ multifaceted programmes seem to provide promising intervention contents.

#### **4 Intergroup Contact**

The origin of the contact hypothesis is dated to Gordon Allport (1954), who stated that intergroup contact reduces prejudices and who proposed four optimal conditions of contact: equal status of involved groups, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and support by institutional authorities. Indeed, meta-analytic evidence suggests that these optimal contact conditions facilitate a decrease in prejudice but that even if the conditions are not met, a smaller reduction of prejudices occurs (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). The reduction of prejudices through greater contact is remarkably robust across age groups, gender, and nations. The effect can be seen quite universally and works for majority groups and to a lesser extent also for minority groups (Pettigrew et al., 2011). Not only direct contact with an ethnic minority (meeting face-toface with out-group members) but also extended contact (knowing an in-group member who has an out-group friend) and imagined contact (simply imagining contact with out-group members) can improve intergroup attitudes (Hewstone & Swart, 2011). In relation to refugees, positive intergroup contact of adults with asylum seekers leads to more positive attitudes towards asylum seekers in general (Kotzur et al., 2019). Further, in five- to eleven-year-old children, extended intergroup contact also improved attitudes toward refugees (Cameron et al., 2006). Thus, intergroup contact can be a powerful tool for reducing prejudice and for fostering tolerance for both majority and minority status groups (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005), especially when combined with training in social competencies and intergroup knowledge (Beelmann & Heinemann, 2014).

#### **5 The Need for Intervention in Schools**

Early adolescence is an important phase for the formation of friendships, which have numerous strong effects on development, especially regarding normative and differential aspects (Hartup, 1996). School is a primary meeting place for different social groups, and school attendance is compulsory in Germany and many countries. As we have already shown, intergroup contact and friendships are significant for reducing prejudices and increasing tolerance. To accommodate newly arrived refugee children and adolescents, many German schools established new types of classes (so-called 'welcome classes') in the past decade. The rationale behind this was a focus on language development and acquisition. However, these classes had a separating effect, keeping these children and adolescents socially out of regular classes and away from the opportunities of intergroup contact for both majority and minority students. Since German young people are among the most intolerant young people in Europe (Beelmann et al., 2009), there is a pressing need for the social integration of refugee children in schools and society.

#### **6 Research Question and Hypotheses**

Building on previous research, we examined whether a universal prevention programme would help native and refugee children to reduce prejudice and increase tolerance on both sides. Based on empirical results regarding the relevance of childhood as a crucial stage for the development of ethnic prejudices (Raabe & Beelmann, 2011), the effectiveness of intergroup contact (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005) and combined interventions of intergroup contact and training in social competencies and intergroup knowledge (Beelmann & Heinemann, 2014; Ülger et al., 2018), and results showing that intergroup contact effectively reduces prejudices among majority and minority groups even in younger children (Ülger et al., 2018), we formulated two hypotheses:


#### **7 Intervention Study**

#### **7.1** *Design of the Intervention*

A universal prevention programme for the reduction of prejudices between native and refugee children was developed for 5th graders (children around 10 or 11 years), which lasted for eight weeks and a total of 18.5 hours. The programme was implemented from May to July 2017 and was accompanied by data collections (see below). The programme consisted of several units (see Table 13.1) that were implemented by at least two trained educators per group (school social workers, similar to education welfare officers). In a first, cognitively oriented unit, the themes were causes of flight and self-reflection on


table 13.1 Overview of the intervention programme

societal views of refugees. In order to reflect personal experiences and in order to relate the information to their own living situations, only native children learned facts about refugees and their living situations. In a second step, social competence training with seven units was conducted and implemented in small groups of native and refugee children. Examples of behaviourally oriented contents included cooperative games, exercises about person perception or emotion awareness, role plays about tolerance, group work on friendship, and social responsibility, and a problem-solving schema which was taught through role plays about conflict resolution. In the last unit, the mixed small groups were sent on a field trip in the neighbourhood during which they had to complete challenges to achieve a positive ending of the programme.

#### **7.2** *Methods*

**Sample:** For the current study, 5th graders from four classes of a primary school in a large German city participated in a universal prevention programme. There were *Ntotal* = 57 students in total (*nnative* = 42 native students and *nrefugee* = 15 refugee students), who were between 10 and 13 years old, with a mean age of *M* = 11.2 (*SD* = 0.73) years; 60% of students were female, 40% male. 27 children (47%) took part in the experimental group, of which 19 were native (33%) and 8 were refugee children (14%). The control group consisted of 30 children (53%), of which 23 were native (40%) and 7 were refugee children (12%).

**Group conditions:** The prevention programme was implemented under different conditions; participants were assigned to intergroup contact (yes/no) and social skills training (yes/no), which was partially combined with a unit of knowledge training about the causes of flight and self-reflection on societal views of refugees. Because the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954) stresses the importance of a structured situation and common goals in the intergroup contact, intergroup contact was only implemented together with the social skills training, thereby fulfilling the optimal conditions for intergroup contact according to Allport (1954): equal status of all participants (native and refugee students); common goals (in exercises, cooperative games, role plays, field trip); intergroup cooperation (mixed small groups of native and refugee students); and support by authorities (teachers, educators). The programme conditions could not be randomly assigned but instead included the participants in groups depending on their membership of a school class and social experiences (native students versus students with refugee experiences). Thus, five groups of participants were distinguished as follows:


– Control group 3 (CG3): *n* = 12 native students—participants received no intervention (neither knowledge training, social skills training, nor intergroup contact).

**Measures:** Participants filled in questionnaires before the eight-week intervention (T1), immediately after the intervention (T2), and two months later (T3). The constructs included cognitive, affective, and behavioural levels of ethnic prejudices as well as interpersonal tolerance. All constructs were measured using established valid instruments.

*Cognitive prejudices* were measured with a scale from Feddes et al. (2009) on a 4-point Likert scale (*none* [1], *some* [2], *a lot* [3], *all* [4]). The four items (friendly, polite, clever, kind) with the common item stem 'how many German [refugee] children are …?' were answered once for the in-group and once for the out-group (German versus refugee children). Based on the responses, bias values were calculated (subtracting the values concerning the out-group from the values concerning the in-group) and averaged, resulting in one mean score with the range of −3 = out-group preference, 0 = no preference, +3 = in-group preference, *MT1* = 0.60, *SDT1* = 0.65, Cronbach's α = .79/.74/.74 (for T1/T2/T3, respectively).

*Affective prejudices* were measured with a sympathy rating and a street exercise. For the sympathy rating (two additional items on the cognitive prejudices scale), participants answered the question 'how much do you like German [refugee] children?' on a 4-point Likert scale (*not at all* [1], *rather not* [2], *rather yes* [3], *a lot* [4]). The resulting bias score had a mean of *MT1* = 1.19, *SDT1* = 1.10. In the street exercise (Griffith & Nesdale, 2006), participants were shown a street with nine houses. They were asked to imagine that they lived in the middle house and that a German and a refugee family would move to the street. Then they were asked to mark the houses into which house the German and the refugee family should move. Based on the responses—the distance of the in-group versus out-group family's house to the respondent's own house—a bias value was calculated (distance in-group minus distance out-group, *MT1* = 0.76, *SDT1* = 1.33). Because the sympathy rating and street exercise were substantially correlated (*rs* = .58/.54/.65 for T1/T2/T3, respectively), we combined both measures to form a composite score for affective prejudices.

*Behavioural prejudices* were measured by the intended behaviour measure (Cameron et al., 2006). For hypothetical situations, participants indicated on a 5-point Likert scale (*not at all* [1], *very much* [5]) their behavioural intentions for five behaviours ('how much would you … like to play with/…like/…like to take for dinner at home/…like to have at home over night/…like to share a secret with?') regarding a German and a refugee child. Again, a bias score was calculated (in-group minus out-group) and items were averaged (*MT1* = 0.93, *SDT1* = 1.03, Cronbach's α = .86/.90/.93 for T1/T2/T3, respectively).

*Interpersonal tolerance* was measured with a scale by Beelmann et al. (2006), which included 17 items on a 5-point Likert scale (*does not apply* [1], *applies completely* [5]), with a mean score of *MT1* = 3.88, *SDT1* = 0.60, and a Cronbach's α = .82/.82/.81 (for T1/T2/T3, respectively). An example item that covered social tolerance is 'everybody should behave like the others do' (reverse coded), and an item concerning the acceptance of social difference reads: 'everybody can be as they want to be'.

Additionally, after the intervention (T2), we asked the experimental groups about their perception of the programme (enjoyment, feeling of well-being, contact experience). 76% of responses concerning the perception of the programme were positive (*much* or *very much* on a 5-point Likert scale from *not at all* [1] to *very much* [5]), and enjoyment of the programme was even more pronounced in children with refugee experiences (*MEG2* = 4.25, *SDEG2* = 0.71) compared to native children (*MEG1* = 3.84, *SDEG1* = 1.26).

**Analyses:** Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) tested the effects of the factors group (experimental versus control conditions) and time (before the intervention (T1); after the intervention (T2); and two months later (T3)). The important test statistics were the interaction effects of time by group to analyse the intervention effect on prejudices and tolerance (H1) with follow-up tests to differentiate between experimental conditions (H2).

#### **8 Results**

#### **8.1** *Descriptive Analyses*

To provide an overview of the dependent variables of cognitive prejudice, affective prejudice, behavioural prejudice, and interpersonal tolerance, Table 13.2 displays the means and standard deviations for the complete sample at the three measurement points.

The means and standard deviations for the dependent variables in each experimental group at the three measurement points can be found in Table 13.3.

#### **8.2** *Testing the Hypotheses*

The first hypothesis assumed that intergroup contact would reduce prejudices and increase interpersonal tolerance in both native and refugee children. Indeed, the repeated measures ANOVA for cognitive prejudices differentiating groups with intergroup contact (EG1 and EG2) and without intergroup contact


table 13.2 Overview of prejudices and tolerance over time

Items: Number of items per scale. Range: Variation of possible values. Time: Measurement points, whereby T1 = before intervention, T2 = after intervention, T3 = 8-week follow-up. *N:* Number of students. *M:* Mean. *SD:* Standard deviation.

(CG1, 2 and 3) showed a significant main effect of time (*F*(1.52, 83.31) = 10.80, *p*  < .001, ηp² = .164) and a significant interaction effect of time and group (*F*(1.52, 83.31) = 9.57, *p* = .001, ηp² = .148). The results for affective prejudices also showed a significant main effect of time (*F*(1.76, 97.03) = 8.62, *p* = .001, ηp² = .136) and a significant interaction effect of time and group (*F* (1.76, 97.03) = 5.63, *p* = .007, ηp² = .093). In contrast, for behavioural prejudices, a significant main effect of time could be found (*F*(1.22, 67.09) = 3.30, *p* = .005, ηp² = .262) but not a significant interaction effect of time and group (*F*(1.22, 67.09) = 2.79, *p* = .092, ηp² = .048). For interpersonal tolerance, a significant main effect of time (*F*(1.43, 77.01) = 24.67, *p* < .001, ηp² = .314) and a significant interaction effect of time and group was confirmed (*F*(1.43, 77.01) = 8.56, *p* = .002, ηp² = .137). For all significant interaction effects, the groups with intergroup contact (EG1 and EG2) showed more favourable outcomes than the groups without intergroup contact (CG1, 2 and 3), i.e. groups with intergroup contact showed lower levels of prejudices and higher levels of tolerance after the programme (see Table 13.3).

The second hypothesis assumed that a combination of intergroup contact, social competence, and knowledge training would show the most favourable outcomes (reduced prejudices, increased interpersonal tolerance). This assumption was analysed through planned contrasts between experimental


table 13.3 Development of prejudices and tolerance in experimental conditions

T1: Before intervention; T2: After intervention; T3: 8-week follow-up. *M:* Mean. *SD:* Standard deviation.

groups with combined social competence training and intergroup contact versus groups with no combination (for native students: EG1 versus CG1, for students with refugee experience: EG2 versus CG2). As displayed in Figures 13.1 and 13.2, the combination of intergroup contact and social competence training resulted in lower cognitive prejudices directly after the programme (for native children and children with refugee experience) and eight weeks after the programme (for children with refugee experience), lower affective prejudices directly after the programme (for native children and children with refugee experience) and eight weeks after the programme (for children with refugee experience), and lower behavioural prejudices directly after and eight weeks after the programme (for children with refugee experience only). Additionally, interpersonal tolerance was higher directly after the programme (for native children and children with refugee experience) and eight weeks after the programme (for children with refugee experience). In sum, the combination of intergroup contact and social competence training resulted in lower prejudices and higher interpersonal tolerance compared to the control groups without the combination of intergroup contact and social skills training. However, the effects were more stable for the children with refugee experience.

#### **9 Discussion**

The current study shows how intergroup contact between native and refugee children can be designed and that the structured situation of the social

Figure 13.1 Development of prejudices in experimental conditions. T1 = before intervention; T2 = after intervention; T3 = 8-week follow-up

Figure 13.2 Development of interpersonal tolerance in experimental conditions. T1 = before intervention; T2 = after intervention; T3 = 8-week follow-up

skills training was effective in the context of school classes. While the empirical results showed that cognitive and affective prejudices were significantly reduced, this was not the case for behavioural prejudices. Additionally, it was possible to foster interpersonal tolerance. Native children in EG1 reported fewer cognitive and affective prejudices (but not behavioural intentions) and more interpersonal tolerance compared to the no-intervention control group (CG1) directly after the programme (T2). However, this effect had diminished eight weeks later (T3). For refugee children in EG2, cognitive and affective prejudices decreased significantly (T3). Further, these participants reported significantly higher interpersonal tolerance after the intergroup contact (T2) and two months later (T3). Additionally, intergroup contact combined with social competence training led to more favourable outcomes (fewer prejudices, more tolerance) compared to social skills training alone or no intervention. This result adds to the growing evidence that fostering social competences and intergroup knowledge is especially helpful for supporting the positive effect of intergroup contact (Beelmann & Heidemann, 2014).

Importantly, the positive intervention effect could be observed among both native children and refugee children. The effect sizes for the reduction of prejudices were comparable and slightly higher than in reviews for native children (small to medium effect sizes, Beelmann & Heinemann, 2014; Ülger et al., 2018). However, we found surprisingly strong effects for refugee children (in contrast, however, see Ülger et al., 2018). This result is especially encouraging as positive attitudes towards peers in the country of destination might help refugee children to seek and build more intercultural contacts and friendships. Having at least some good friends is a strong resilience factor for a child's healthy psychosocial development and a possible source of social support in challenging situations that might arise as refugees adapt to their new life circumstances. This might help to establish connectedness and belonging and thus prevent susceptibility to radical or extreme movements or groups. By further fostering values of citizenship and diversity and by acknowledging and valuing differences, the presented intervention is also in line with recommendations on how education and interventions in educational contexts can help build resilience against radicalization and extremism (Ghosh et al., 2017).

Limitations of the current study concern the use of self-reports for measuring prejudices and tolerance. As these constructs are normative and participants might want to express socially accepted attitudes, self-serving biases in the responses cannot be ruled out. Further, the groups could not be randomly assigned to the experimental condition because of organizational constraints in schools, and the sample size was limited, especially for children with refugee experience. The main reason for this is that the recruitment of schools and classes for study participation was complicated, and it took nearly a year to find a school that was open to this research question and to then establish a trusting relationship with the headteacher and school educators in order to conduct the study. Conducting research on topics with high political and societal relevance can be challenging and rewarding at the same time.

#### **10 Implications**

Implications of the current study include a call for prevention efforts that address both native and refugee children. Instead of separating refugee children in language courses over a long period of time, increasing the frequency of situations with direct contact to native children seems recommendable. The example of the intervention described here shows how positive opportunities for intergroup contact can be established. The combination of social skills and knowledge training and intergroup contact seems especially promising for the prevention of negative attitudes and behaviours in children as the combination of intergroup contact and social skills training was more effective than social skills training alone (see Beelmann & Heinemann, 2014). Structured opportunities for interethnic contact seem to be a powerful tool in culturally diverse schools.

The prevention of prejudices could be integrated into the school curriculum; positive intergroup contact combined with social-emotional learning could be particularly helpful in this regard. Some schools are challenged by negative intergroup attitudes and intolerance among their students. Rather than exerting moral pressure, providing learning opportunities for children and adolescents to extend their world views and to get in contact with persons with different social and cultural experiences might be the answer. Western democratic multicultural societies should try to strengthen the moral, social, and emotional development of their future citizens, and the reduction of prejudices is one important step on this journey.

#### **References**


C. McKown (Eds.), *Handbook of race, racism, and the developing child* (pp. 452–482). Wiley & Sons. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118269930.ch18


### **Migration and Citizenship Education**

*Addressing Challenges of Extremism and Radicalization in South Africa*

*Saloshna Vandeyar*

#### **Abstract**

This chapter makes a case for a *pedagogy of compassion* as a soft power to address the challenges of extremism and radicalization and to promote education for cosmopolitan citizenship in South Africa. A case study explores how a teacher negotiates the contours of migration and social transformation in order to foster critical, resilient, and cosmopolitan citizenship education. Data capture involved semi-structured interviews, observations, and field notes. Findings reveal that a pedagogy of compassion as a soft power underpinned by human rights could be highly effective in responding to an educational space created by global migration and in addressing challenges of extremism and radicalization in South Africa. The implementation of a pedagogy of compassion by a teacher who is a transformative intellectual can assist students in channelling their anxieties away from oppositional behaviour towards creative endeavours and in circumventing the possibility of acts of terrorism.

#### **Keywords**

contested spaces – democratic citizenship – extremism – hope – pedagogy of compassion – polarized thinking – radicalization

#### **1 Introduction**

South Africa has a history of violent extremism stemming from domestic grievances that remain prevalent. Although South Africa has not experienced a terrorist attack over the past decade, the country is not immune to the global challenges posed by violent extremism. Transnational extremist groups are expanding their networks across the globe, including in South Africa. South Africa has been linked to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and, more recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, with an estimated six hundred to one thousand South Africans having joined this group (Cachalia & Schoeman, 2017). South Africa has also encountered local extremist threats such as the 2008 xenophobic attacks on Black immigrants or the most recent attack of August 2019, and the thwarted plot by the far-right group the African National Congress (ANC) at the ANC's 53rd National Conference in Manguang (a township in the province of Free State in South Africa) in 2012.

These international and local extremism threats raise questions regarding extremism in South Africa and the education sector's response to these threats. While threats posed by domestic groups such as the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and People against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) have diminished, there are increasing concerns relating to international extremist groups. South Africa's contact with international extremist organizations takes the form of individuals who are associated with these extremist groups and who use South Africa to hide out, plan operations, and source funding. What threat does extremism pose to South Africa and how should teachers respond to this challenge?

The xenophobic attacks of 2008 and subsequent smaller sporadic attacks on immigrant hawkers, the most recent of which took place in August 2019 (Evans & Wiener, 2019), signal a form of extremism in the South African context. If this form of extremism is left unbridled, it could lead to some individuals progressing on a path towards terrorism. How can teachers counter this form of extremism?

The inception of democracy in South Africa witnessed a change in the hues and contours that once defined the South African education landscape. This change was embedded in the South African Schools Act of 1996, which aimed to transform the education system to become 'a key allocator of life chances as an important vehicle for achieving equity in the distribution of opportunity and achievement among South African citizens'. Prior to 1994, an ideology of apartheid had regulated the South African education system. In an attempt to dismantle this system, a barrage of educational reform efforts driven by legislative polices that promoted democracy and human rights for all citizens was introduced in South African schools.

Contested spaces between Black and White South African students were a defining feature of the early years of democracy. It is worthy to note here that the terms Black, White, Indian and Coloured derive from the apartheid racial classifications of the different peoples of South Africa. The use of these terms, although problematic, has continued through the post-apartheid era in South Africa. In this chapter, these terms are used grudgingly for clarification of the context.

However, over the past two decades, the mass entry of Black immigrant students into the South African schooling system has added another layer of complexity to the already existing contested spaces in shared places. Referencing the apartheid era solidarity of all non-Whites as black, 'Black immigrant students' refers to non-White immigrants who come from African countries, descendants of any of the peoples of Africa, and to Indian immigrants who hail from India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

Given the changing historical, political, social, and educational context of South Africa, this chapter asks how teachers can and should address the challenges of extremism and radicalization in South African schools.

The chapter begins by briefly sketching the background context. Next, a review of the literature on extremism, radicalization, citizenship education and global migration will be presented. The review will be followed by a brief outline of the theoretical framework. The chapter concludes by critically connecting the findings of this study with the literature review and the theoretical framework in order to unpack how an exemplary teacher might negotiate the contours of migration and social transformation and might address the challenges of extremism and radicalization in order to promote cosmopolitan citizenship education.

#### **2 Exploring the Terrain**

#### **2.1** *Extremism and Radicalization*

An exploration of the literature reveals that the act of terrorism progresses along a continuum of fundamentalism, extremism, radicalization, and terrorism (Stephens et al., 2019; Ghosh et al., 2016; Borum 2014). This paper seeks to explore how a teacher might address the challenges of extremism and radicalization in South Africa. An understanding of what is extremism and how it differs from radicalization is thus necessary. Extremism as defined by Desmond Tutu is 'when you do not allow for a different point of view; when you hold your own views as being quite exclusive; when you don't allow for the possibility of difference' (quoted in Davies, 2009, p. 4). When extreme positions are justified on moral grounds, the stage is set for radicalism.

Radicalization represents non-conformist thinking capable of imagining alternatives to the existing status quo and a firm commitment to bring about the desired social and political change through whatever means possible. It is both a mental and an emotional process that can prepare and motivate an individual to pursue violent behaviour (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2011). This process of change in an individual's psycho-cognitive construction of new identities is ignited by radicalization which, in turn, effects changes in behaviour. If kept unchecked or not curbed in time, radicalization will lead to terrorist acts. What role can education play in addressing extremism and radicalization?

The predominant response from governments around the world to the challenge of terrorism is the use of what Ghosh et al. (2016) refer to as hard power. The literature reveals that governments' approaches to terrorism are largely reactive in nature. Governments call for military action and surveillance measures. In contrast, terrorists' narratives use soft power that appeals to the psychological, emotional, and intellectual aspects of individuals (Ghosh et al., 2016). Ghosh et al. make a case for countering terrorists' soft power with the use of a soft power of a different kind, namely education. They propose that terrorism policies should incorporate education as a preventative measure and should be used a valuable tool to countering extremism. In a bid to counter terrorism, governments should adopt a proactive approach and implement preventative strategies to enable and empower students to become active, critical, democratic, and resilient citizens imbued with a sense of common humanity and compassion. Education should thus be at the heart of anti-radicalization plans (Gagne, 2015). Students need to see the relevance of what they learn and need to be able to develop a critical understanding of the world. This would pre-empt some of the triggers that push and/or pull students onto the dangerous path towards radicalization and, ultimately, terrorism.

Ghosh et al. (2016) argue that teachers must have the appropriate tools to recognize, understand, and address the psycho-social factors that may lead their students towards any stage on the continuum towards terrorism. Teachers must be able to recognize the push and pull factors towards radicalization to ensure a safe learning environment for all students.

#### **2.2** *Citizenship Education and Global Migration*

Globalization and migration present new and encompassing challenges to imagination and representation as well as challenging the creation of images, which is so essential to both individual and collective world-making (Petersen & Schramm, 2017). Since the mid-1990s, global migration has promoted unprecedented levels of international demographic mobility (Castles, 2017). Migration patterns have also become more complex. This phenomenon can be partly attributed to a renewed emphasis on social cohesion and the integration of minorities into Western countries. Such unprecedented movement necessitates the reconceptualization of citizenship education.

A review of the large body of literature on citizenship education reveals two schools of thought, namely cosmopolitan citizenship education and multicultural citizenship education (Parker, 2017). Some researchers advocate a move away from the current fledgling positive approach to migration towards one that can be recalibrated as cosmopolitan (Bashir, 2017; Starkey, 2017). Bashir proposes a notion of 'regional citizenship with a cosmopolitan outlook' (Bashir, 2017, p. 24). He argues that such a notion of citizenship would create more inclusive educational spaces which will afford a diverse body of students opportunities for developing a sense of belonging to their multilayered communities within and outside of the nation (Bashir, 2017, p. 25). Starkey (2017) suggests that we need to nurture a form of citizenship that develops a sense of belonging to humanity without encroaching on students' sense of belonging to their local and national communities. From a cosmopolitan perspective, local, national, regional, and global identities are seen as complementary. One of the key objectives of citizenship education is to value diversity in all its forms religious, cultural and political—which cosmopolitan citizenship purports to do. Parker (2017) claims that cosmopolitan citizenship education is a better option than multicultural citizenship education because it is more universal and inclusive in nature. He argues that the curriculum should shift from focusing on ways in which hegemonic knowledge is valued to re-valuing powerful knowledge systems. Thus, Parker (2017) contends that human rights constitute powerful knowledge and would be the most effective concept for responding to an educational space created by global migration.

Global citizenship education also harbours the potential for addressing moral conscience. In this regard, Dill (2013) identifies two primary and competing moral features in global citizenship education. First, a global consciousness, which provides students with a global orientation, including empathy, cultural sensitivity, and humanist values; a vision of oneself as part of a global community, and a moral conscience to act for the good of the world. And second, global competencies, which provide students with the necessary skills for competing in a global knowledge society. Dill claims that many countries opt for the former rather than the latter. However, he highlights the fact that the notion of global citizenship has been couched in Western canons of knowledge and suggests that it may perhaps be time to consider alternative knowledge systems to address migration and citizenship education.

#### **3 Theoretical Moorings: A Pedagogy of Compassion**

The concept of a pedagogy of compassion was first published in Vandeyar and Swart (2019). It builds on the work of Freire (1998) and Jansen (2009) and proposes the following tenets:

#### **3.1** *Dismantling Polarized Thinking and Questioning One's Ingrained Belief System*

Educational settings are almost genetically stereotyped (Keet et al., 2009, p. 110). The lingering legacies of apartheid have ensured that educational spaces in South Africa are still stereotyped according to racial or genetic compositions. For this reason, Jansen (2009, p. 153) calls for the disruption of knowledge so that all South Africans can confront each other with their respective memories of trauma, tragedies, and triumph in the classroom. According to Jansen (2009), polite silences and hidden resentments should be exposed, indirect knowledge should be made explicit, and its potential and real harm should be openly discussed. Dialogue between opposing parties should be encouraged because conflict not only promotes engagement but also harbours the inherent potential to dismantle polarized thinking. Vandeyar and Swart (2019) expand on this tenet by arguing that it should go beyond simply unsettling or dismantling polarized thinking towards questioning one's ingrained belief system.

#### **3.2** *Changing Mindsets: Compassionately Engaging with Diversity in Educational Spaces*

Jansen claims that pedagogic dissonance happens when one's stereotypes are shattered. This does not happen overnight. 'One incident of pedagogic dissonance does not, of course, lead to personal change, but it can begin to erode sure knowledge' (Jansen, 2009, p. 154). Linked to the notion of pedagogic dissonance as argued by Jansen is the work by Zembylas (2010, 2017), who emphasizes the proactive and transformative potential of discomfort. Zembylas (2010, p. 703) argues that teachers experience immense discomfort when having to confront diversity and multiculturalism. Drawing on Foucault (1994) who introduced the concept of an ethic of discomfort and the work done by himself and Boler (Boler & Zembylas, 2003; Boler, 2013), he claims that

an ethic of discomfort, therefore, invites teachers and students to critique their deeply held assumptions about themselves and others by positioning themselves as witnesses (as opposed to spectators) to social injustices and structurally limiting practices such that they see and act as ambiguous rather than dualistic subjects (e.g. 'us' and 'them'). (Zembylas, 2010, p. 707)

Freire (1992, p. 95) maintains that teachers should have a critical democratic outlook on the prescribed teaching content and should never allow themselves to succumb to the naive temptation of looking on content as something magical. If teachers treat content as neutral, thereby ignoring what Jansen calls pedagogic dissonance, then the content has power of its own accord and the teacher can only 'deposit' it in students, which means that the content loses its power to effect the desired change. All of the above play out in educational spaces which, according to Postma (2016, p. 5),

are political spaces of a particular kind. They are spaces of reflection, of relative safety and reduced risks; courage is not assumed, but fostered; opportunities are provided to experiment with new beginnings and imaginations, and to develop judgement; forgiveness could be cultivated and hope fostered.

Fusing a set of different horizons or views, namely those of pedagogic dissonance (Jansen, 2009); ethic of discomfort (Foucault, 1994; Boler & Zembylas, 2003); critical democratic outlook and 'knowledge of living experience' (Freire, 1992, p. 57); and educational spaces (Postma, 2016), Vandeyar and Swart (2019) propose a proactive commitment to engage compassionately with diversity in educational spaces. Educational spaces have to be opened up to the multitude of student voices. Compassionately responding to student voices entails not only warmth and care, but also a feeling of deep sympathy and sorrow for another individual who may be stricken by misfortune, accompanied by a strong desire to alleviate the suffering.

#### **3.3** *Instilling Hope and Sustainable Peace*

'A postconflict pedagogy is founded on hope', wrote Jansen (2009, p. 154). Freire (1992, p. 77) claims that there is no change without a dream, and that there is no dream without hope. The hope that Jansen and Freire refer to is achievable in practice. It is insufficient to simply pronounce hope; hope should be acted upon. There is no room for utopia in postconflict pedagogy. In a postconflict society, the former oppressor and the oppressed do not get caught up in a blaming game. Jansen refers to postconflict pedagogy as follows: 'This kind of critical pedagogy recognizes the power and the pain at play in school and society and their effects on young people, and then asks "how things could be better"' (Jansen, 2009, p. 154). Similarly, Freire argues that as an individual and as a class, the oppressor can neither liberate nor be liberated. This is why, through self-liberation and through the required just struggle, the oppressed—as individuals and as a class—liberate the oppressor through the simple act of forbidding them to keep oppressing. 'The liberation of individuals acquires profound meaning only when the transformation of society is achieved' (Freire, 1992, p. 85). Vandeyar and Swart (2019) argue that such transformation not only instils hope but also holds the promise of sustainable peace.

#### **4 Research Strategy**

Meta-theoretically, I was drawn to the tenets that govern social constructivism for my worldview. The methodological paradigm employed the lens of phenomenology, which describes the development of a phenomenon in relation to how an individual experiences it (Hammersley, 2012). The research design was a qualitative case study (Silverman, 2006) and a narrative inquiry. The concept for the case study was defined by teachers who were negotiating the contours of migration and social transformation in order to promote democratic citizenship. The research sample of the broader study consisted of fifteen teachers and was varied in terms of ethnicity, gender, and years in the teaching profession. Snowball sampling (Baltar & Brunet, 2012; Rubin & Babbie, 1993) was utilized to recruit participants in five schools in the Gauteng province. Principals were requested to identify teachers who were fostering change in their schools. This chapter reports on the data capture of one of these teachers.

Data capture comprised a mix of semi-structured interviews, observations, and field notes. Semi-structured interviews were designed to determine the teacher's perspectives about the way in which the process of desegregation was unfolding in her classroom and yielded a set of criteria used in observations. These interviews coincided with the three-week period of classroom observations. Follow-up interviews were conducted for clarification and elaboration of certain issues that arose in the first interview and in classroom observations. The physical environment of the classroom, which included observations of artefacts such as paintings, decor, photographs, portraits, and school magazines, also received attention. Observation was the main data gathering technique used in this study. Observed lessons were videotaped, and interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.

Data was analyzed utilizing qualitative content analysis (Schreier, 2014; Stan, 2010). Codes were generated from the data and continuously modified by the researcher's treatment of the data in order 'to accommodate new data and new insights about the data' (Sandelowski, 2000, p. 338; Mayring, 2000). This was a reflexive and an interactive process that yielded extensive codes and themes. Multiple readings of the data were conducted, organizing codes and themes into higher levels of categories within and across the interviews, observations, and other sources of data (Merriam, 1998).

To ensure research rigour, the following quality criteria were considered: transferability, credibility, dependability, confirmability, and authenticity. Transferability refers to the scope and the restrictions to which findings of this research can be applied. Credibility of the research findings included the purposeful sampling of the research participant, the sampling of the research site, and the application of appropriate data-gathering strategies (Butler-Kisber, 2010). Dependability was achieved through a process known as auditing. The audit trail procedure can also be valuable when verifying confirmability (Seale, 2002). The authenticity of this study rests in the 'faithful reconstruction of the participant's multiple perceptions' (McMillan & Schumacher, 2001, p. 415). Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee at the university. The ethics application went through a rigorous blind peer review process (Lindsay, 2010). Pseudonyms were given to the research site and to participants to ensure anonymity and confidentiality.

#### **5 Findings: Vignette**

The data reported here is part of a broader data set that was reported in a paper that was published in the *Journal for Research in Childhood Education*. Permission has been granted to use this part of the data.

Priya was an Indian English-speaking female in her late thirties and held a Bachelor in Education degree. This was her seventeenth year in the teaching profession. She had taught for eight years at a former Indian school. This was her ninth year at Broadacres Primary School, a former 'White' school. The repeal of the Group Areas Act in 1991 and the desegregation of schools in 1995 prompted a strong influx of Black South African students into Broadacres Primary School since the inception of democracy, as well as Black immigrant students over the past decade. The catchment area of the school thus comprised a diverse community. White students came from the suburb of Broadacres. The majority of Black (indigenous and immigrant) students commuted to the school from the surrounding Black townships and informal settlements.

Priya taught English and Life Orientation to children aged between 12 and 13 years. Her classes comprised forty students per class and were both genderand race-sensitive. Students were seated in groups of five across gender and race. On average, students in her classes comprised a mix of approximately ten White students, four Indian students, and one Coloured student; the rest were African and some Black immigrant students hailing from the South African Development Community region, India, Pakistan, or Sri Lanka.

Priya proactively set out to attend to first and second order changes in terms of diversity by applying what I call the metaphors of mirrors and windows. The metaphor of the mirror is about validating the identity of every student in the class. All students should see themselves reflected in the classroom. In this way, their identity is affirmed. The metaphor of the window relates to the fact that even if a particular cultural group is not represented in the classroom, teachers still need to 'open the window' to allow their students to 'look outside' to learn about other cultures.

Priya attempted to create an educational space that would give all students a sense of belonging and a feeling of being at home. Projects and posters that reflected the diverse backgrounds and cultures of all students adorned the classroom walls. The physical appearance, classroom climate, and atmosphere were conducive to teaching a class of diverse students.

During a life orientation lesson about valued citizenship, Priya was confronted with an incident of racial stereotyping. Some students expressed strong opinions about Black immigrants in South Africa. The climate was ripe for this discussion as the stalls and small shops of some Black immigrant hawkers in the township had been burnt and looted over the previous weekend. Some South African students expressed strong nationalist sentiments:


Priya allowed for a multitude of her students' voices to be heard. Then she said: 'To have a different viewpoint or opinion is not wrong. Let us discuss this and come to some understanding of whether what you are saying is the only truth'.

Robust discussion and debate ensued in the class. Priya set about challenging each of the students' viewpoints, allowing for the multitude of voices to contribute to the discussion. She effectively illustrated that there should be no 'our', 'them', 'they', and 'us'. The 'other' is as much a global citizen of the world as he or she is any one of us.

She also tried to impress upon her students that we are not born into an identity, but that identity is fluid and context-based. She asked some Black immigrant students to identify in terms of their cultural backgrounds. Responses elicited were: Rwandan; Congolese South African; Indian-South African; African; South African-Nigerian. She then used these responses to validate her argument. She also outlined the value and benefits of having Black immigrants in South Africa. By the end of the lesson, a few students expressed some misgivings and others were still a bit dubious. This was understandable as it could not be expected that the ways of thinking of all students would have changed after only one lesson. However, Priya certainly planted the seed of doubt and created the opportunity for students to question their beliefs. Priya possessed an admirable professional trait of presenting her students with many truths so as to challenge them to exercise critical and reflective thinking. She consolidated the lesson by reinforcing what they had learnt with the following task:

The President of South Africa announced today that all Black immigrants who came to South Africa since the advent of democracy will be deported to their countries of origin.

Write a letter to the president in which you respond to this announcement. Justify your standpoint.

The due date for this task was a week later, which gave students time for introspection and self-reflection.

#### **6 Discussion**

In an attempt to negotiate the contours of migration and citizenship education, and in order to address challenges of extremism and radicalization in South African schools, Priya provided an admirable educational response. The beginnings of the three specific vulnerabilities observed among violent extremists as identified by Borum (2011) seemed to be emerging in her classroom. Students in her class clearly demonstrated a need for personal meaning and identity and a need for a sense of belonging. Indigenous students articulated a perceived sense of injustice while immigrant students experienced a sense of humiliation.

In attempting to diffuse any potential tension that might have arisen, Priya chose a teaching philosophy and a strategy that was inclusive and closely aligned with the tenets espoused in a pedagogy of compassion. She did not impose her views on students but opened up the educational space to a multitude of student voices. She allowed polite silences and hidden resentments to be exposed in her classroom, and she encouraged dialogue. In so doing, she not only promoted engagement between opposing parties but attempted to disrupt received knowledge and dismantle polarized thinking (Jansen, 2009). Opportunities were created for students to begin to question and critique their ingrained beliefs about themselves and others (Vandeyar & Swart, 2019) so that 'they could see and act as ambiguous rather than dualistic subjects, for example, "us" and "them"' (Zembylas, 2010, p. 707). Learning was not only about the content but also about the relationship that Priya forged between herself, the student(s), and the learning experience. She was open to the idea that she might not have all the answers all of the time, as was evident from her comment: 'To have a different viewpoint or opinion is not wrong'. Sanzerbacher (1991) interprets Freire's view on knowledge construction to mean that all knowledge is mediated and that no one has the truth. It was apparent that there was co-creation of knowledge, which shifted the power dynamics in this classroom. Students were empowered to take responsibility for their own learning by applying critical and reflexive thinking.

Educational spaces are political and contested spaces of a particular kind. It was clear that students in Priya's class were echoing and reflecting the image of the social mirror of South African society. What they had heard from their families and their respective communities seemed to be imbibed as 'the truth' and to run as deep as knowledge in the blood (Jansen, 2009). This mindset created a psychological climate that harboured the potential for vulnerabilities and propensities to reveal and shape behaviours in ways that could increase a student's likelihood of involvement in violent extremism (Borum, 2014, p. 286). Borum argues that 'motivational, attributional style, volitional and attitudinal propensities can affect the likelihood of a person's involvement with violent extremism' (Borum, 2014, p. 294). If left unchecked, this could lead to acts of terrorism. In her attempt to change the mindset of students and to shatter their stereotypical views, Priya refused to treat the content as neutral. Instead, she tried to use the power of the content to effect the desired change (Freire, 1992). She created opportunities for pedagogic dissonance and exposed her students to an ethic of discomfort (Boler & Zembylas, 2003). Priya seemed to live by the axiom that 'one incident of pedagogic dissonance can begin to erode sure knowledge' (Jansen 2009, p. 154). Her own values, beliefs, and worldview surfaced during the discussion while she facilitated students in examining their own beliefs (Ghosh et al., 2016). She attempted to inculcate critical and reflexive thinking skills in her students, created opportunities for them to engage compassionately with diversity in educational spaces, and effectively illustrated that difference is a primary and a rich resource that resides at the heart of human experience (Figueroa, 2000).

Priya's teaching methods sought to challenge beliefs before they became radicalized. She co-created spaces of critical hope. Students were challenged to experiment with new beginnings and imaginations and to develop judgement (Postma, 2016). By focusing on positive aspects and nurturing critical and reflexive thinking skills, forgiveness could be cultivated and hope instilled with the goal of creating sustainable peace. It would seem that Priya's approach was aligned with cosmopolitan citizenship education because it was underpinned by human rights and was more universal and inclusive in nature. Her approach also seemed to address a global consciousness in which students were provided with a global orientation, including empathy, cultural sensitivity, and humanist values—a vision of oneself as part of a global community, and a moral conscience to act for the good of the world (Dill, 2013).

#### **7 Conclusion**

A robust and critical re-examination of the role of education in negotiating the contours of migration and citizenship education to address challenges of extremism and radicalization is required in South Africa. Ghosh et al. (2016, p. 14) claim that 'the right kind of educational measures will have to run their course to make a difference'. I argue that effective citizenship education in schools as a means of addressing both unity and diversity and extremism and radicalization could be achieved through the implementation of a pedagogy of compassion. Pedagogy of compassion as a soft power is underpinned by human rights and constitutes, as Parker (2017) contends, the powerful knowledge that would be most effective in responding to an educational space created by global migration. Pedagogy of compassion as implemented by a teacher who is a transformative intellectual (Freire, 1992) brings with it the potential for dismantling polarized thinking; for shattering polite silences of post-apartheid South African society; and for fostering cosmopolitan citizenship education (Bashir, 2017; Starkey, 2017). Such transformative education can assist 'students to channel their anxieties away from oppositional behaviour toward creative endeavours' (Ghosh et al., 2016, p. 13) and would be most effective in addressing challenges of extremism and radicalization in South Africa.

The challenge, then, is to take minds and hearts formed over the long millennia of living in local troops and equip them with ideas and institutions that will allow us to live together as the global tribe we have become. (Appiah, 2015, p. 8)

#### **References**

Appiah, K. A. (2015). *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a world of strang*ers. Penguin.


### **Index**

acculturation 2, 4, 12, 48, 107–110, 113–115, 120, 249 anti-Semitism 10, 131, 132, 134, 201, 206, 207, 213, 215, 216, 219 argumentation and reasoning 142 authentic learning 246 citizenship democratic 1–4, 7, 10, 201, 202, 212, 246, 338 digital 280 failed 6, 7, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24–26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36 participatory 6, 17, 19, 20, 24–28, 36 recognized 6, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24 transformative 6, 17, 19–23, 32 typology 6, 19–22 civic attitudes 11, 271, 273, 286 community-based projects 271, 286 constructivism (learning) 246, 274, 337 contested spaces 332, 342 culture cultural groups 106, 107, 248 majority 106–110 minority 107 democracy democratic citizenship 1–4, 7, 10, 201, 202, 212, 246, 338 democratic schooling 238 democratic values 6, 10, 11, 80, 97, 137, 139, 201, 203, 204, 213, 218, 257 disaffected young people 45–47, 51, 55–57, 61 discrimination 8, 18, 20, 29, 34, 82, 83, 87–89, 98, 106, 107, 110–120, 137, 140, 155, 158–163, 210, 214, 227–229, 234, 250, 279, 297, 310, 313

diversity

cultural 10, 120, 246 ethnic 310 linguistic 107 social 12, 291–293, 295–297, 305

education citizenship ix, x, 1, 2, 4–9, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 30, 32, 36, 79, 90, 100, 129, 130, 134,

135, 138, 139, 142, 143, 145, 196, 203, 217, 232, 234, 238, 272, 279–281, 286, 306, 307, 331, 333–335, 341, 343 civic and citizenship 6–8, 17, 19, 22, 24, 32, 36, 130, 132, 134–136, 145, 280–282 for cosmopolitan citizenship 12, 331, 333–335, 343 inclusive 6, 8, 203, 205, 214, 217, 224, 225, 232–234, 238, 310, 334, 335, 341, 343 multicultural ix, x, 7, 32, 36, 213, 254, 262, 334, 335 policy 181, 182, 184, 188, 196, 225, 227 social studies 32, 36 values 11, 246, 256, 257, 278 equity 17, 236, 332 ethnicity 87, 111, 159, 161, 164, 338 extremism jihadism 1, 7, 43, 44, 46–49, 51, 53, 55–57, 62–64, 66, 68, 70 non-violent 50, 51, 97 right-wing 9, 98, 120, 129–133, 137, 139–142, 145 violent 3, 10, 11, 81, 88, 99, 114, 130, 141, 163, 224–230, 233–240, 286, 331, 341, 342

fundamentalist religious attitudes 84–86

globalization 17, 22, 64, 157, 167, 197, 272, 275–277, 279, 334 grassroots movements 12, 291, 292, 299, 304–306

hate speech 132, 133

hope 31, 57, 60, 248, 337, 343 host society 9, 69, 110, 112, 154, 155, 156, 158, 163–165, 168, 170, 171, 248–250, 255, 294, 295

identity 3, 8–10, 17, 19, 20, 26, 28, 30, 49, 50, 53, 56, 60–63, 67, 69, 80, 82, 83, 86, 89, 90, 97, 98, 100, 106, 108–110, 112–120, 129, 130, 135, 142, 143, 161, 162, 185, 186, 194–196, 211, 214, 228, 239, 249, 251, 254, 255, 278, 279, 281, 286, 294–296, 306, 314, 333, 335, 339, 341

	- learning 11, 271, 282–286
	- relations 271, 283

migration


#### Index 349

school health 233, 238 school and out-of-school activities 271, 272, 282, 286 social relationships 8, 79, 86–92, 94, 96, 99, 168 self-esteem 8, 9, 53, 83, 87, 106, 108, 110–120, 137, 162 social categorization 154–156, 158, 159, 161–164, 167, 169, 170 connection 11, 32, 224, 229–231, 234, 235 inclusion 154, 158, 170, 224, 225, 232, 233, 238, 291, 292 innovation 12, 291, 292, 297–301, 306 transformation 1, 291, 333, 338 sociocultural learning 11, 271, 275, 277, 282, 285, 286 stereotypes 54, 110, 111, 120, 155, 159–164, 170, 215, 216, 301, 311, 312, 335, 336

teacher education 184, 201, 202, 206, 208, 213, 214, 217–219

terrorism 3, 9, 18, 48, 56, 62, 69, 80, 81, 85, 86, 99, 129–131, 133, 139, 141, 145, 181–184, 188, 194, 196, 202, 204, 213, 224–227, 232, 235, 246, 247, 249, 252, 255, 266, 279, 292, 331–334, 342

